Vegan Butter Can Be Called “Butter”—But Not “Hormone Free” or “Revolutionizing Dairy with Plants”

From Miyoko’s Kitchen v. Ross, decided Aug. 21 by Judge Richard Seeborg (N.D. Cal.), but just recently posted on Westlaw:

Miyoko’s produces and sells a variety of plant-based, vegan products which are designed to resemble dairy products in appearance and taste. The company markets its foods using names that reference the products’ more common dairy analogues, such as a “vegan butter” and “vegan cheese.” These dairy references are always preceded by conspicuous terms such as “vegan” or “plant-based.” …

California law directs the Department to review food labelling for compliance with federal law. See Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 32912.5 (specifically directing as much “in connection with advertising and retail sales of milk, … dairy products, cheese, and products resembling milk products”). As pertains here, federal law forbids a retailer from selling “misbranded” food items (that is, items with “labelling [that] is false or misleading”), food items “offered for sale under the name of another food,” and food items that, though “purport[ing] to be or … represented as a food for which a definition and standard of identity” exists, do not “conform to such definition and standard ….” 21 U.S.C. § 343. For nearly a century, the standard of identity for butter has required a product “made exclusively from milk or cream, or both … and containing not less than 80 per centum by weight of milk fat.” 21 U.S.C. § 321a.

On December 9, 2019, Miyoko’s received written notice from the Department’s Milk and Dairy Foods Safety Branch indicating the label for its “Cultured Vegan Plant Butter” failed to comply with this regulatory framework. Noting that “the product is not butter” and may not imply it is “a dairy food without [traditional dairy] characteristics,” the Letter instructed Miyoko’s to remove five terms from the product’s label: “butter,” “lactose free,” “hormone free,” “cruelty free,” and “revolutionizing dairy with plants.” The Letter also objected to the display of the animal sanctuary imagery and the phrase “100% dairy and cruelty free” on Miyoko’s website, stating “[d]airy images or associating the product with [agricultural] activity cannot be used on the advertising of products which resemble milk products.” …

The court held that Miyoko’s use of “butter” (prefixed with “vegan” or “plant-based”), “lactose free,” and “cruelty free” were likely truthful and nonmisleading and therefore likely protected by the First Amendment. (The question had to do with likelihood, because the court was deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction; the court’s analysis, though, seemed pretty confident on these points.)

But the court held that “hormone free” is literally false:

The parties do not seriously disagree about the truthfulness of Miyoko’s “hormone free” claim: because plants contain naturally-occurring hormones, and because Miyoko’s vegan butter is made of plants, it necessarily contains hormones as well….

Miyoko’s struggles to escape this result by reference to its prototypical consumer, who allegedly “understands that the phrase … in context with other phrases [on the label] … mean[s] that the company’s vegan butter does not contain the artificial hormones that are sometimes added to animal-based dairy products.” While there is something to be said for the connection a brand forges with its customers, this reasoning takes that concept a step too far.

[The Court’s First Amendment caselaw] insists, at the threshold, that commercial speech be true, and provides no exception for falsities made true by the target consumer’s supposed contextual awareness. Indeed, as the State persuasively points out, no court has ever repudiated a regulator’s authority to demand that products claiming to lack hormones actually lack hormones. Against this backdrop, Miyoko’s insistence that it would be “illogical for any consumer to believe” that a product labelled “hormone free” does not contain hormones falls decidedly flat…. Because its plant-based butter is not “hormone free,” there is no merit to Miyoko’s request for license to label it with that term.

And the court held likewise as to “revolutionizing dairy with plants”

[T]o “revolutionize” an industry requires “chang[ing] it fundamentally or completely” [citing a dictionary]. “Revolutionizing dairy” thus denotes direct interaction with animal-based milk products in a way that leaves them “fundamentally” different than they were before. Put simply, this is not at the core of what Miyoko’s—a maker of dairy replacements—does or seeks to do. Just like the statement that a vegan clothier’s motorcycle jackets “revolutionize leather with cotton,” or that a maker of non-alcoholic beverages “revolutionizes whiskey with seltzer,” this claim of Miyoko’s is plainly misleading. The State should not be enjoined from responding to its presence in the marketplace with appropriate regulatory action.

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Vegan Butter Can Be Called “Butter”—But Not “Hormone Free” or “Revolutionizing Dairy with Plants”

From Miyoko’s Kitchen v. Ross, decided Aug. 21 by Judge Richard Seeborg (N.D. Cal.), but just recently posted on Westlaw:

Miyoko’s produces and sells a variety of plant-based, vegan products which are designed to resemble dairy products in appearance and taste. The company markets its foods using names that reference the products’ more common dairy analogues, such as a “vegan butter” and “vegan cheese.” These dairy references are always preceded by conspicuous terms such as “vegan” or “plant-based.” …

California law directs the Department to review food labelling for compliance with federal law. See Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 32912.5 (specifically directing as much “in connection with advertising and retail sales of milk, … dairy products, cheese, and products resembling milk products”). As pertains here, federal law forbids a retailer from selling “misbranded” food items (that is, items with “labelling [that] is false or misleading”), food items “offered for sale under the name of another food,” and food items that, though “purport[ing] to be or … represented as a food for which a definition and standard of identity” exists, do not “conform to such definition and standard ….” 21 U.S.C. § 343. For nearly a century, the standard of identity for butter has required a product “made exclusively from milk or cream, or both … and containing not less than 80 per centum by weight of milk fat.” 21 U.S.C. § 321a.

On December 9, 2019, Miyoko’s received written notice from the Department’s Milk and Dairy Foods Safety Branch indicating the label for its “Cultured Vegan Plant Butter” failed to comply with this regulatory framework. Noting that “the product is not butter” and may not imply it is “a dairy food without [traditional dairy] characteristics,” the Letter instructed Miyoko’s to remove five terms from the product’s label: “butter,” “lactose free,” “hormone free,” “cruelty free,” and “revolutionizing dairy with plants.” The Letter also objected to the display of the animal sanctuary imagery and the phrase “100% dairy and cruelty free” on Miyoko’s website, stating “[d]airy images or associating the product with [agricultural] activity cannot be used on the advertising of products which resemble milk products.” …

The court held that Miyoko’s use of “butter” (prefixed with “vegan” or “plant-based”), “lactose free,” and “cruelty free” were likely truthful and nonmisleading and therefore likely protected by the First Amendment. (The question had to do with likelihood, because the court was deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction; the court’s analysis, though, seemed pretty confident on these points.)

But the court held that “hormone free” is literally false:

The parties do not seriously disagree about the truthfulness of Miyoko’s “hormone free” claim: because plants contain naturally-occurring hormones, and because Miyoko’s vegan butter is made of plants, it necessarily contains hormones as well….

Miyoko’s struggles to escape this result by reference to its prototypical consumer, who allegedly “understands that the phrase … in context with other phrases [on the label] … mean[s] that the company’s vegan butter does not contain the artificial hormones that are sometimes added to animal-based dairy products.” While there is something to be said for the connection a brand forges with its customers, this reasoning takes that concept a step too far.

[The Court’s First Amendment caselaw] insists, at the threshold, that commercial speech be true, and provides no exception for falsities made true by the target consumer’s supposed contextual awareness. Indeed, as the State persuasively points out, no court has ever repudiated a regulator’s authority to demand that products claiming to lack hormones actually lack hormones. Against this backdrop, Miyoko’s insistence that it would be “illogical for any consumer to believe” that a product labelled “hormone free” does not contain hormones falls decidedly flat…. Because its plant-based butter is not “hormone free,” there is no merit to Miyoko’s request for license to label it with that term.

And the court held likewise as to “revolutionizing dairy with plants”

[T]o “revolutionize” an industry requires “chang[ing] it fundamentally or completely” [citing a dictionary]. “Revolutionizing dairy” thus denotes direct interaction with animal-based milk products in a way that leaves them “fundamentally” different than they were before. Put simply, this is not at the core of what Miyoko’s—a maker of dairy replacements—does or seeks to do. Just like the statement that a vegan clothier’s motorcycle jackets “revolutionize leather with cotton,” or that a maker of non-alcoholic beverages “revolutionizes whiskey with seltzer,” this claim of Miyoko’s is plainly misleading. The State should not be enjoined from responding to its presence in the marketplace with appropriate regulatory action.

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Europe Considers Orwellian Proposal To Protect Its Dairy Industry From Vegan Competitors

oatmilk

As early as this week, the European Union (E.U.) could deal a nonsensical and significant blow to makers of plant-based dairy substitutes such as almond milk and soy-based yogurt. And though several U.S. states have taken some steps to protect animal-based dairy interests, some of the E.U.’s more obnoxious efforts make those wrongheaded efforts in U.S. states look reasonable by comparison.

In 2017, a European court banned makers of plant-based milks from labeling their milk as “milk.” Since then, as The Conversation explained in an excellent piece this week, the E.U. has moved to place further restrictions on plant-based dairy substitutes.

Opponents of the current E.U. proposal, Amendment 171, have dubbed it the “Dairy Ban.” The law would prohibit plant-based milk producers from using words or images on their food labels that may also be used to describe or refer to animal-based dairy products.

Worse still, the rules could expand beyond simply censoring words and pictures on food packaging. It could even prohibit the use of some common food packaging itself.

“They would also be unable to use packaging designs that call to mind dairy products, such as yoghurt [containers] or milk cartons,” The Conversation explains. “Even simply showing climate impact by comparing the carbon footprint of their products with dairy equivalents could become illegal.

Some of the potential consequences of the proposed E.U. ban, critics contend, could be downright Orwellian.

Amendment 171 has spurred headlines such as “Dairy Lobby Wants to Stop Vegan Brands From Using Images of Their Own Products.” Oatly, the Sweden-based oat milk maker that’s helping lead the charge against Amendment 171, notes the law would prohibit it and other plant-based food companies from using the phrase “does not contain milk” to describe “products that don’t um…contain milk.”

That would be exactly as preposterous as it sounds.

Why are E.U. lawmakers leading the charge against the powerful animal-based dairy industry’s upstart plant-based competitors? Simple. Lawmakers are doing so at the behest of those same powerful animal-based dairy interests.

The dairy lobby (both in the U.S. and E.U.) claims the honest and accurate labeling, imagery, and packaging used by most plant-based competitors misleads consumers. It does not.

“No reasonable consumer would confuse soymilk or almond milk with cow’s milk,” an advocate for plant-based foods told me in a 2017 column I wrote on wrongheaded efforts to protect the U.S. dairy industry from plant-based competitors. “In fact, demand for plant-based milks is on the rise precisely because consumers are seeking out dairy-free options.”

While plant-based meat and dairy substitutes are indeed a small-but-growing segment of the global food market, that growth has been slowed by the lawmakers who have pushed burdensome rules.

Here in the U.S., lawmakers in several states have mimicked some of the worst inclinations of lawmakers in Brussels. In 2018, Missouri became “the first state to take steps to prevent misrepresentation of products as meat that are not derived from livestock or poultry,” banning vegan and vegetarian imitators from using the term “meat” to refer to their products. Since then, the National Conference of State Legislatures reports at least 10 U.S. states have adopted similar laws.

Plant-based food makers have sued to overturn some of these laws, including Missouri’s. And these lawsuits often reveal the inanity of the laws they’re challenging. For example, as I explained in a column last year, a federal judge in California—a state that has targeted vegan dairy companies—ruled that the “maker of a vegan butter, may use the word ‘butter’ to describe its, well, vegan butter.”

In the United States, at least, these various state laws barring plant-based food makers from honestly describing the products they sell violate their First Amendment rights. And they violate the First Amendment rights of consumers to see, read, and be informed by those honest descriptions.

As I urged in a 2012 column, food companies should be free to use “any and all statements that aren’t demonstrably false” on their product labels. Plant-based food companies are no exception.

While the rights of food companies and consumers may differ to some extent in the E.U., the same general principles apply equally there and in the U.S.: consumers are served best when the law allows companies to tell the truth about their food products. That’s why the growing European crackdown on plant-based foods, which violates that principle, is so harmful and should be reversed.

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Europe Considers Orwellian Proposal To Protect Its Dairy Industry From Vegan Competitors

oatmilk

As early as this week, the European Union (E.U.) could deal a nonsensical and significant blow to makers of plant-based dairy substitutes such as almond milk and soy-based yogurt. And though several U.S. states have taken some steps to protect animal-based dairy interests, some of the E.U.’s more obnoxious efforts make those wrongheaded efforts in U.S. states look reasonable by comparison.

In 2017, a European court banned makers of plant-based milks from labeling their milk as “milk.” Since then, as The Conversation explained in an excellent piece this week, the E.U. has moved to place further restrictions on plant-based dairy substitutes.

Opponents of the current E.U. proposal, Amendment 171, have dubbed it the “Dairy Ban.” The law would prohibit plant-based milk producers from using words or images on their food labels that may also be used to describe or refer to animal-based dairy products.

Worse still, the rules could expand beyond simply censoring words and pictures on food packaging. It could even prohibit the use of some common food packaging itself.

“They would also be unable to use packaging designs that call to mind dairy products, such as yoghurt [containers] or milk cartons,” The Conversation explains. “Even simply showing climate impact by comparing the carbon footprint of their products with dairy equivalents could become illegal.

Some of the potential consequences of the proposed E.U. ban, critics contend, could be downright Orwellian.

Amendment 171 has spurred headlines such as “Dairy Lobby Wants to Stop Vegan Brands From Using Images of Their Own Products.” Oatly, the Sweden-based oat milk maker that’s helping lead the charge against Amendment 171, notes the law would prohibit it and other plant-based food companies from using the phrase “does not contain milk” to describe “products that don’t um…contain milk.”

That would be exactly as preposterous as it sounds.

Why are E.U. lawmakers leading the charge against the powerful animal-based dairy industry’s upstart plant-based competitors? Simple. Lawmakers are doing so at the behest of those same powerful animal-based dairy interests.

The dairy lobby (both in the U.S. and E.U.) claims the honest and accurate labeling, imagery, and packaging used by most plant-based competitors misleads consumers. It does not.

“No reasonable consumer would confuse soymilk or almond milk with cow’s milk,” an advocate for plant-based foods told me in a 2017 column I wrote on wrongheaded efforts to protect the U.S. dairy industry from plant-based competitors. “In fact, demand for plant-based milks is on the rise precisely because consumers are seeking out dairy-free options.”

While plant-based meat and dairy substitutes are indeed a small-but-growing segment of the global food market, that growth has been slowed by the lawmakers who have pushed burdensome rules.

Here in the U.S., lawmakers in several states have mimicked some of the worst inclinations of lawmakers in Brussels. In 2018, Missouri became “the first state to take steps to prevent misrepresentation of products as meat that are not derived from livestock or poultry,” banning vegan and vegetarian imitators from using the term “meat” to refer to their products. Since then, the National Conference of State Legislatures reports at least 10 U.S. states have adopted similar laws.

Plant-based food makers have sued to overturn some of these laws, including Missouri’s. And these lawsuits often reveal the inanity of the laws they’re challenging. For example, as I explained in a column last year, a federal judge in California—a state that has targeted vegan dairy companies—ruled that the “maker of a vegan butter, may use the word ‘butter’ to describe its, well, vegan butter.”

In the United States, at least, these various state laws barring plant-based food makers from honestly describing the products they sell violate their First Amendment rights. And they violate the First Amendment rights of consumers to see, read, and be informed by those honest descriptions.

As I urged in a 2012 column, food companies should be free to use “any and all statements that aren’t demonstrably false” on their product labels. Plant-based food companies are no exception.

While the rights of food companies and consumers may differ to some extent in the E.U., the same general principles apply equally there and in the U.S.: consumers are served best when the law allows companies to tell the truth about their food products. That’s why the growing European crackdown on plant-based foods, which violates that principle, is so harmful and should be reversed.

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The Senate’s Problem Isn’t the Filibuster, It’s a Lack of Open Debate

schumer

While Democrats have not yet abolished the filibuster, they have rejected Republican demands that they commit to maintaining the Senate’s current rules over the next two years. Some Democrats are even threatening to blow up those rules if Republicans try to filibuster President Joe Biden’s agenda. However, doing so will make the Senate even more dysfunctional than it is now.

Ending the filibuster will make it harder for senators to adjudicate their constituents’ concerns, to negotiate with one another as equals, and to compromise. The Senate is one of only two places in the federal government where elected officials can gather to reconcile their disagreements and make collective decisions. And the Senate’s rules are vital to making that debate process work.

The Senate’s rules are designed to facilitate lawmaking by pushing senators to agree with one another. They do so by making the legislative process more predictable and reliable than it would be otherwise. That makes it possible for senators to form expectations about what will happen in the future and, by extension, make it easier to compromise in the present. And it gives senators leverage in negotiations. Those rules also lead to stable policy by reconciling losers in a debate to its outcome. For example, Sen. Richard Russell (D–Ga.) led the filibuster against the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After he failed to stop the bill, Russell accepted the outcome as legitimate and urged his fellow southern senators to do so as well.

Breaking those rules to abolish the filibuster would make it harder, not easier, for the Senate to function.

Unlike in the House of Representatives, where a simple majority can vote to end debate at any point, the Senate’s rules require a three-fifths majority to end debate over senators’ objections. The rules require an even larger two-thirds majority to end debate when the underlying legislation is a proposal to change the Senate rules. It thus takes more votes to end a filibuster (typically 60 senators) than it does to pass a bill (typically 51 senators).

In the past, senators rightly understood that their ability to filibuster was not absolute; it merely gave individual senators leverage to force their colleagues, the House, or the administration to negotiate with them in a debate. That is why legislation approved by the Senate almost always included minority-favored provisions in addition to those supported by the majority. In that way, the filibuster facilitated negotiation and compromise.

That changed as the gap between Democrats and Republicans widened in the late 20th century. Once a source of leverage that specific senators could use in negotiations, the filibuster morphed into a veto that Senate minorities could use to block legislation favored by the majority. Even the prospect of a filibuster is a powerful force—in recent years, gun-related legislation has stalled in the Senate, not because a committed minority is filibustering it but because senators on both sides are threatening to filibuster it.

Yet despite how it may operate, the filibuster is not really a veto. It does not level the playing field between the majority and minority sides in debates. It merely grants a senator, or senators, the opportunity to speak on the Senate floor for as long as possible. Using the filibuster to obstruct the majority regularly requires minority-party senators to be willing to expend considerable effort to succeed. And the filibuster cannot cause gridlock in a debate of reasonable length because no two sides in any debate are evenly matched in terms of their members’ effort. One group of senators must always prevail after a debate. Gridlock only occurs when senators do not debate.

The filibuster operates like a veto today because Senate majorities are unwilling to use the rules to pass legislation. Senators may temporarily delay particular aspects of that agenda by speaking on the floor. But they cannot prevent the Senate from voting in perpetuity, because filibustering imposes physical and opportunity costs and because of the procedural limitations contained in the Senate’s existing rules and practices.

For example, Rule XIX limits how many times a senator may speak on the floor in a debate and it stipulates that when a senator is no longer able to talk, he or she has no choice but to yield the floor. At that point, the Senate votes on the underlying question unless another senator seeks recognition and then speaks for as long as he or she desires and is able. While the length of the Senate’s business delay is proportional to the number of senators who participate in a filibuster, there is no point at which business gets delayed indefinitely, since individual senators can speak for only a finite period. When no senator seeks recognition in a debate, the Senate must vote.

The Senate will rarely need to go to such lengths to overcome filibusters because simply debating a bill before trying to pass it creates buy-in among senators and builds bipartisan support for it. Legislation on issues like COVID-19 relief, criminal justice reform, privacy, and trade can pass on large bipartisan votes if leaders let the process play out instead of trying to control it. A freewheeling debate in which all senators can participate makes it easier for cross-partisan coalitions to emerge. And it also helps constituents assign responsibility for policy outcomes and hold their elected officials accountable in the next election.

Abolishing the filibuster will therefore not make it easier for senators to negotiate and compromise. Instead, it will give majorities an incentive to craft major bills behind closed doors and pass them through the chamber as quickly as possible by limiting senators’ ability to participate in the legislative process. The result will be to make the Senate even more dysfunctional than it is now.

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The Senate’s Problem Isn’t the Filibuster, It’s a Lack of Open Debate

schumer

While Democrats have not yet abolished the filibuster, they have rejected Republican demands that they commit to maintaining the Senate’s current rules over the next two years. Some Democrats are even threatening to blow up those rules if Republicans try to filibuster President Joe Biden’s agenda. However, doing so will make the Senate even more dysfunctional than it is now.

Ending the filibuster will make it harder for senators to adjudicate their constituents’ concerns, to negotiate with one another as equals, and to compromise. The Senate is one of only two places in the federal government where elected officials can gather to reconcile their disagreements and make collective decisions. And the Senate’s rules are vital to making that debate process work.

The Senate’s rules are designed to facilitate lawmaking by pushing senators to agree with one another. They do so by making the legislative process more predictable and reliable than it would be otherwise. That makes it possible for senators to form expectations about what will happen in the future and, by extension, make it easier to compromise in the present. And it gives senators leverage in negotiations. Those rules also lead to stable policy by reconciling losers in a debate to its outcome. For example, Sen. Richard Russell (D–Ga.) led the filibuster against the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After he failed to stop the bill, Russell accepted the outcome as legitimate and urged his fellow southern senators to do so as well.

Breaking those rules to abolish the filibuster would make it harder, not easier, for the Senate to function.

Unlike in the House of Representatives, where a simple majority can vote to end debate at any point, the Senate’s rules require a three-fifths majority to end debate over senators’ objections. The rules require an even larger two-thirds majority to end debate when the underlying legislation is a proposal to change the Senate rules. It thus takes more votes to end a filibuster (typically 60 senators) than it does to pass a bill (typically 51 senators).

In the past, senators rightly understood that their ability to filibuster was not absolute; it merely gave individual senators leverage to force their colleagues, the House, or the administration to negotiate with them in a debate. That is why legislation approved by the Senate almost always included minority-favored provisions in addition to those supported by the majority. In that way, the filibuster facilitated negotiation and compromise.

That changed as the gap between Democrats and Republicans widened in the late 20th century. Once a source of leverage that specific senators could use in negotiations, the filibuster morphed into a veto that Senate minorities could use to block legislation favored by the majority. Even the prospect of a filibuster is a powerful force—in recent years, gun-related legislation has stalled in the Senate, not because a committed minority is filibustering it but because senators on both sides are threatening to filibuster it.

Yet despite how it may operate, the filibuster is not really a veto. It does not level the playing field between the majority and minority sides in debates. It merely grants a senator, or senators, the opportunity to speak on the Senate floor for as long as possible. Using the filibuster to obstruct the majority regularly requires minority-party senators to be willing to expend considerable effort to succeed. And the filibuster cannot cause gridlock in a debate of reasonable length because no two sides in any debate are evenly matched in terms of their members’ effort. One group of senators must always prevail after a debate. Gridlock only occurs when senators do not debate.

The filibuster operates like a veto today because Senate majorities are unwilling to use the rules to pass legislation. Senators may temporarily delay particular aspects of that agenda by speaking on the floor. But they cannot prevent the Senate from voting in perpetuity, because filibustering imposes physical and opportunity costs and because of the procedural limitations contained in the Senate’s existing rules and practices.

For example, Rule XIX limits how many times a senator may speak on the floor in a debate and it stipulates that when a senator is no longer able to talk, he or she has no choice but to yield the floor. At that point, the Senate votes on the underlying question unless another senator seeks recognition and then speaks for as long as he or she desires and is able. While the length of the Senate’s business delay is proportional to the number of senators who participate in a filibuster, there is no point at which business gets delayed indefinitely, since individual senators can speak for only a finite period. When no senator seeks recognition in a debate, the Senate must vote.

The Senate will rarely need to go to such lengths to overcome filibusters because simply debating a bill before trying to pass it creates buy-in among senators and builds bipartisan support for it. Legislation on issues like COVID-19 relief, criminal justice reform, privacy, and trade can pass on large bipartisan votes if leaders let the process play out instead of trying to control it. A freewheeling debate in which all senators can participate makes it easier for cross-partisan coalitions to emerge. And it also helps constituents assign responsibility for policy outcomes and hold their elected officials accountable in the next election.

Abolishing the filibuster will therefore not make it easier for senators to negotiate and compromise. Instead, it will give majorities an incentive to craft major bills behind closed doors and pass them through the chamber as quickly as possible by limiting senators’ ability to participate in the legislative process. The result will be to make the Senate even more dysfunctional than it is now.

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The Sordid History of the Fairness Doctrine

radio_right

After Twitter permanently suspended Donald Trump’s account, conservative interest in mandating online platform neutrality spiked. Meanwhile, progressives alarmed by the Capitol riot called for reviving the Fairness Doctrine to combat the misinformation circulating about the election. The national mood has never been more favorable for some kind of government regulation of the internet.

The Fairness Doctrine hasn’t been active policy at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) since the 1980s, so public knowledge of the doctrine is hazy at best. But the more you learn about the actual history of the Fairness Doctrine and its antecedents, the clearer it becomes that applying similar regulations to the internet would be a mistake.

When many people hear the phrase “Fairness Doctrine,” they picture a time at some indeterminate point in the past when broadcast media were reasonable and balanced. Back then, they imagine, radio and television station owners couldn’t air only their own opinions and spread unchecked misinformation; they had to let the other side on any given hot-button issue have a say, allowing the “good guys” to act as a check on the “bad guys” and their lies.

That narrative is almost entirely a myth. Despite its evocative name, the Fairness Doctrine was primarily a tool wielded by established political interests to suppress unwelcome speech.

The true story of the Fairness Doctrine begins long before the first major implementation of the doctrine in 1963, back before the rule was enacted in 1949, back all the way to the Radio Act of 1927. That law created the FCC’s precursor, the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), and gave it the power to license and limit radio stations. Among other things, the law required licensees to promote “the public interest, convenience, and necessity” and not simply to serve their own interests.

Does that sound vague to you? It certainly did to station owners in the 1920s and ’30s. Whose convenience are we talking about? What content is necessary and what is not? Is there even such a thing as a singular public interest? The inherent ambiguity also meant incredible opportunities for graft and political privilege. In practice, the more political connections and capital you possessed, the more “public interest” your license application had. The commission maintained a revolving door with the major radio networks, and the networks quickly consolidated what had been a relatively diverse and independent radio landscape.

Non-WASPs and political radicals in particular faced an uphill battle when applying for station licenses. In 1928, for example, the FRC attempted to reassign the license for the leftist Queens station WEVD, named after the socialist leader Eugene Victor Debs. It took a major public pressure campaign to convince the agency that the station showed “due regard for the opinions of others,” which was necessary given that they were “the mouthpiece of a substantial political or religious minority” and thus not naturally deserving of a broadcast voice. Of course, non-socialist stations never had to show a similar “due regard”; it was taken for granted that they represented the public interest.

Similarly, in 1933 the FRC decided that two stations in Chicago—WIBO and WPCC, which served a predominantly immigrant audience—should lose their licenses to a new station, WJKS, because the latter’s programming was better “designed to meet the needs of the foreign population.” By what standard? Well, WJKS promised to air programming that “stress[ed] loyalty to the community and the Nation” and taught “American ideals and responsibilities.” The FRC had decided that the public interest was synonymous with ethno-nationalist self-interest, the 1930s regulatory version of an “English only” sign.

Federal regulation ensured that radio broadcasting in the 1930s became less diverse, less weird, less independent, more corporate, more anodyne, and more centralized. Even actress and comedian Mae West was barred from the airwaves for 13 years after she dared to utter this shocking obscenity in a 1937 radio sketch: “Come on home with me, honey. I’ll let you play in my wood pile.” Thank goodness the government was there to protect the public interest against mild innuendo!

The commission’s crackdown did not go unchallenged. Take “Fightin’ Bob” Shuler, a muckraking fundamentalist pastor from Los Angeles who used his platform to expose local politicians and businessmen for their involvement in one of the largest financial frauds to that point in U.S. history, the Julian Petroleum scandal. His enemies retaliated by asking the FRC not to renew his license, and the commission proceeded to revoke his right to broadcast. Shuler sued, claiming a violation of his free speech rights.

The case, Trinity Methodist Church South v. Federal Radio Commission (1932), made its way to a federal circuit court, which denied Shuler’s claim and, more importantly, upheld the FRC’s power to license or deny stations on the basis of the content of their speech. All subsequent jurisprudence on broadcast speech regulation hinged on this and a handful of other cases from the time.

There’s a vital contrast between what was happening with First Amendment claims in broadcasting versus developments in print media. Just a year prior to Shuler’s case, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled in Near v. Minnesota (1931) that prior restraint on newspapers by state governments was censorship. As a result, two radically different media regimes emerged: Print speech got ever firmer and clearer protections, while radio speech received distinctly second-class status. The FCC could freely grant or pull licenses based on whether it believed a station’s speech fit within “the public interest,” which in turn meant whatever a small group of industry lobbyists, political flunkies, and communications lawyers managed to form a consensus about.

How did the government get away with denying broadcasters full free speech rights? When challenged in cases like Trinity, they appealed to something called the “scarcity rationale.” Since the electromagnetic spectrum is physically finite, they argued, the First Amendment shouldn’t apply to radio. The government needed to choose winners and losers, because someone had to decide who got a license and who did not.

This was always a convenient legal fiction, if for no other reason than because the FCC has never hit the technical limit on the number of possible broadcast stations, either then or now. To the extent that there was scarcity on the airwaves, it was artificially imposed by the FCC itself. By limiting the number of stations, the agency protected powerful media companies from competition, as when it delayed regulatory approval for FM radio because of lobbying by businesses heavily invested in AM broadcasting. Nevertheless, the courts bought the scarcity rationale excuse until the 1990s.

Thus, a readily corruptible government agency with a sweeping but ambiguous mandate had authority over the airwaves. Politicians quickly discerned an opportunity to manipulate the regulators for political advantage. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, for example, had little tolerance for those who questioned the New Deal. Some of his most vociferous opponents were conservative newspaper owners, who were increasingly critical after Roosevelt’s Supreme Court–packing scheme in 1937. Now, Roosevelt couldn’t go after them directly, thanks to that pesky First Amendment, but many of these newspapermen had begun to buy radio stations, and in that arena FDR could target them for special regulatory attention.

As one former commissioner put it, Roosevelt “put the blow torch” on his FCC chairman, Larry Fly, to use various regulations to shut down the president’s enemies. Among other measures, Fly proposed a cross-media ownership ban; it ultimately failed but it still tied up newspaper acquisition of FM licenses for several years. (President Richard Nixon’s FCC would ultimately enact a cross-media ownership ban in an attempt to intimidate the owner of The Washington Post into easing up on the paper’s Watergate reporting.)

Fly’s most lasting legacy was the Mayflower Doctrine, a direct precursor of the Fairness Doctrine. In the 1941 Mayflower decision, the FCC ruled that a station that had “editorialized” by criticizing FDR would lose its license to a disgruntled former employee. “A truly free radio,” Fly wrote, “cannot be used to advocate the causes of the licensee. It cannot be used to the support of principles he happens to regard most favorably. In brief, the broadcaster cannot be an advocate.” Well, then. 

The radio industry pushed back, and in 1949 the FCC backed away from the ban on editorializing. But it kept a crucial component, which was that licensees operated “under an obligation to insure that opposing points of view will also be presented.” This 1949 statement was the basis of the Fairness Doctrine. But the Fairness Doctrine remained notional from 1949 to 1963, with relatively little attempt to exercise the vast powers the FCC had claimed for itself—certainly nothing as extensive as its efforts during the 1930s. Yet something big was changing in the broadcasting industry, something with enormous consequences for regulatory policy.

After World War II, the major networks, which had controlled 95 percent of all radio stations in America in 1945, shifted their attention and capital investment to television. By 1952, fewer than half of radio stations were network affiliates, a ratio that continued to fall through the rest of the decade. Most new radio licenses during this period were going to small-timers—say, a local car dealer who wanted a station to advertise his business. Finances were tight for these independent stations, so the owners were open to selling timeslots to groups the networks wouldn’t have given the time of day to. 

That included a new generation of right-wing broadcasters, who (mostly unfairly) attacked liberals and Democrats as unpatriotic Communist sympathizers. After President John F. Kennedy’s election in 1960, he became a particular target of these broadcasters, who went after everything from his mishandling of the Bay of Pigs invasion to his proposed Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

This Radio Right emerged rapidly. The biggest of them, a fundamentalist minister from New Jersey named Carl McIntire, could be heard on just two radio stations in 1956; by 1963, he was on more than 460 outlets. His estimated weekly audience was 20 million people—about as many as Rush Limbaugh reached 40 years later.

JFK, who had narrowly won in 1960, wanted these irritants quashed. His brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, concocted a detailed plan for doing so with the help of Walter and Victor Reuther, executives with the United Automobile Workers. Their plan, later nicknamed the “Reuther Memorandum,” had many moving parts, but the two most significant involved the Internal Revenue Service and the Federal Communications Commission. The tax agency, though a program called the “Ideological Organizations Project,” would target right-wing broadcasters for audits in order to dry up the flow of small-dollar listener donations they used to buy airtime. Meanwhile, the FCC would use the Fairness Doctrine to pressure stations not to sell airtime to the offending broadcasters.

In 1963, JFK told his newly appointed FCC chief, Bill Henry, “It is important that stations be kept fair.” Henry listened. One of his first official acts as chairman was to issue a clarification of the Fairness Doctrine that promised a new push for enforcement. The statement singled out only examples of conservative speech that needed balancing by liberal voices, and not vice versa.

Enforcement hinged on members of the public filing Fairness Doctrine complaints with the commission. At license renewal time, the FCC would consider the quantity and quality of Fairness Doctrine complaints. Losing a license—which was rare in this period—was the death penalty for a radio station. But even if a station didn’t lose its license, it would have to bear the expense of hiring legal counsel to fight the complaints and extra staff to prove compliance.

Henry’s most useful tool in enhancing the Fairness Doctrine was a complementary rule known as the Cullman Doctrine, which stipulated that response time claimed under the Fairness Doctrine should be provided for free if the respondents said they couldn’t afford to pay. (Unsurprisingly, nobody ever said they could pay.) This made direct criticism of public figures and administration policies an expensive proposition for the station owners, who responded by ditching conservative broadcasters known for making attacks.

Here is one example of how the Kennedy administration weaponized the Fairness Doctrine. In 1963, JFK negotiated the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union. He planned to make it the centerpiece of his re-election bid. The Radio Right attacked it ceaselessly during the summer of ’63. This mattered, because Kennedy needed two-thirds of the Senate for treaty ratification.

So the White House secretly organized a front organization—the Citizens Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban—to threaten stations that aired conservative criticisms of the treaty with Fairness Doctrine complaints unless they were given free response time. The plan was a success, hundreds of hours of free pro-treaty airtime was secured, and the treaty passed by a comfortable margin.

Kennedy was killed shortly thereafter, but the Democratic National Committee picked up the Fairness Doctrine baton. It secretly organized a pressure campaign—complete with its own front organization—to extract free airtime for Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 presidential campaign. Thousands of hours of free airtime were secured, but as the party’s operatives reported after the election, even “more important than the free radio time…was the effectiveness of this operation in inhibiting the political activity of these Right Wing broadcasts.” Stations dropped conservative programming en masse.

When the U.S. Supreme Court validated the Fairness Doctrine in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (1969), it did so unaware that the Democratic National Committee had secretly sponsored the original complainant, feeding him opposition research and even paying for his health insurance. By this time, President Nixon was wielding the Fairness Doctrine against the left.

Conservative radio didn’t make a comeback until relatively laissez-faire commissioners appointed by President Jimmy Carter (the true Great Deregulator) stopped rigorously enforcing the Fairness Doctrine. Ronald Reagan’s FCC ended the rule in 1987, and Reagan vetoed a bi-partisan bill to reinstate it.

We are fortunate that Congress and the courts decided in the 1990s to regulate the internet under a print regulatory regime rather than a broadcast regime. As a result, the internet was “born free,” to borrow a phrase from Adam Thierer. For example, when Congress codified Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, it extended to the internet a set of legal precedents that had protected bookstores from publisher liability.

And thank goodness they did! Imagine how disastrous a Fairness Doctrine for the internet would be, if outlets and platforms had an affirmative obligation to ensure that either articles published or user posts permitted were carefully balanced according to some ambiguous public interest standard. Think of the mischief that, say, President Donald Trump could have done under a Fairness Doctrine-style regime. The Trump reelection campaign—or some ostensibly independent PAC—could have forced outlets to run a response to any criticism of the administration.

The Fairness Doctrine as originally conceived would not pass legal muster for cable broadcasting or the internet. But there have been proposals for Fairness Doctrine–style regulations that would make an end-run around First Amendment protections by targeting Section 230’s liability waiver. For instance, in 2019 Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) introduced a bill that would have given the Federal Trade Commission the power to certify that social media platforms are politically neutral with their content moderation policies; decertification would have exposed companies to significant legal liability. Hawley’s legislation was laughed off at the time, but just last October several Senate Republicans, including Lindsey Graham, introduced a bill that would make platforms liable for their moderation of political speech.

These approaches might not pass First Amendment muster. But even if they ultimately failed in court, that would still mean years of messy legal challenges with significant chilling effects on online speech and innovation. 

Despite its name, the Fairness Doctrine was deeply unfair. It made broadcasting less diverse, more beholden to powerful corporate interests, and more susceptible to political abuse. And it was a key weapon in one of the most successful censorship campaigns in American history. It would be a mistake of historic proportions to mimic it while writing regulations for the internet.

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The Sordid History of the Fairness Doctrine

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After Twitter permanently suspended Donald Trump’s account, conservative interest in mandating online platform neutrality spiked. Meanwhile, progressives alarmed by the Capitol riot called for reviving the Fairness Doctrine to combat the misinformation circulating about the election. The national mood has never been more favorable for some kind of government regulation of the internet.

The Fairness Doctrine hasn’t been active policy at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) since the 1980s, so public knowledge of the doctrine is hazy at best. But the more you learn about the actual history of the Fairness Doctrine and its antecedents, the clearer it becomes that applying similar regulations to the internet would be a mistake.

When many people hear the phrase “Fairness Doctrine,” they picture a time at some indeterminate point in the past when broadcast media were reasonable and balanced. Back then, they imagine, radio and television station owners couldn’t air only their own opinions and spread unchecked misinformation; they had to let the other side on any given hot-button issue have a say, allowing the “good guys” to act as a check on the “bad guys” and their lies.

That narrative is almost entirely a myth. Despite its evocative name, the Fairness Doctrine was primarily a tool wielded by established political interests to suppress unwelcome speech.

The true story of the Fairness Doctrine begins long before the first major implementation of the doctrine in 1963, back before the rule was enacted in 1949, back all the way to the Radio Act of 1927. That law created the FCC’s precursor, the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), and gave it the power to license and limit radio stations. Among other things, the law required licensees to promote “the public interest, convenience, and necessity” and not simply to serve their own interests.

Does that sound vague to you? It certainly did to station owners in the 1920s and ’30s. Whose convenience are we talking about? What content is necessary and what is not? Is there even such a thing as a singular public interest? The inherent ambiguity also meant incredible opportunities for graft and political privilege. In practice, the more political connections and capital you possessed, the more “public interest” your license application had. The commission maintained a revolving door with the major radio networks, and the networks quickly consolidated what had been a relatively diverse and independent radio landscape.

Non-WASPs and political radicals in particular faced an uphill battle when applying for station licenses. In 1928, for example, the FRC attempted to reassign the license for the leftist Queens station WEVD, named after the socialist leader Eugene Victor Debs. It took a major public pressure campaign to convince the agency that the station showed “due regard for the opinions of others,” which was necessary given that they were “the mouthpiece of a substantial political or religious minority” and thus not naturally deserving of a broadcast voice. Of course, non-socialist stations never had to show a similar “due regard”; it was taken for granted that they represented the public interest.

Similarly, in 1933 the FRC decided that two stations in Chicago—WIBO and WPCC, which served a predominantly immigrant audience—should lose their licenses to a new station, WJKS, because the latter’s programming was better “designed to meet the needs of the foreign population.” By what standard? Well, WJKS promised to air programming that “stress[ed] loyalty to the community and the Nation” and taught “American ideals and responsibilities.” The FRC had decided that the public interest was synonymous with ethno-nationalist self-interest, the 1930s regulatory version of an “English only” sign.

Federal regulation ensured that radio broadcasting in the 1930s became less diverse, less weird, less independent, more corporate, more anodyne, and more centralized. Even actress and comedian Mae West was barred from the airwaves for 13 years after she dared to utter this shocking obscenity in a 1937 radio sketch: “Come on home with me, honey. I’ll let you play in my wood pile.” Thank goodness the government was there to protect the public interest against mild innuendo!

The commission’s crackdown did not go unchallenged. Take “Fightin’ Bob” Shuler, a muckraking fundamentalist pastor from Los Angeles who used his platform to expose local politicians and businessmen for their involvement in one of the largest financial frauds to that point in U.S. history, the Julian Petroleum scandal. His enemies retaliated by asking the FRC not to renew his license, and the commission proceeded to revoke his right to broadcast. Shuler sued, claiming a violation of his free speech rights.

The case, Trinity Methodist Church South v. Federal Radio Commission (1932), made its way to a federal circuit court, which denied Shuler’s claim and, more importantly, upheld the FRC’s power to license or deny stations on the basis of the content of their speech. All subsequent jurisprudence on broadcast speech regulation hinged on this and a handful of other cases from the time.

There’s a vital contrast between what was happening with First Amendment claims in broadcasting versus developments in print media. Just a year prior to Shuler’s case, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled in Near v. Minnesota (1931) that prior restraint on newspapers by state governments was censorship. As a result, two radically different media regimes emerged: Print speech got ever firmer and clearer protections, while radio speech received distinctly second-class status. The FCC could freely grant or pull licenses based on whether it believed a station’s speech fit within “the public interest,” which in turn meant whatever a small group of industry lobbyists, political flunkies, and communications lawyers managed to form a consensus about.

How did the government get away with denying broadcasters full free speech rights? When challenged in cases like Trinity, they appealed to something called the “scarcity rationale.” Since the electromagnetic spectrum is physically finite, they argued, the First Amendment shouldn’t apply to radio. The government needed to choose winners and losers, because someone had to decide who got a license and who did not.

This was always a convenient legal fiction, if for no other reason than because the FCC has never hit the technical limit on the number of possible broadcast stations, either then or now. To the extent that there was scarcity on the airwaves, it was artificially imposed by the FCC itself. By limiting the number of stations, the agency protected powerful media companies from competition, as when it delayed regulatory approval for FM radio because of lobbying by businesses heavily invested in AM broadcasting. Nevertheless, the courts bought the scarcity rationale excuse until the 1990s.

Thus, a readily corruptible government agency with a sweeping but ambiguous mandate had authority over the airwaves. Politicians quickly discerned an opportunity to manipulate the regulators for political advantage. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, for example, had little tolerance for those who questioned the New Deal. Some of his most vociferous opponents were conservative newspaper owners, who were increasingly critical after Roosevelt’s Supreme Court–packing scheme in 1937. Now, Roosevelt couldn’t go after them directly, thanks to that pesky First Amendment, but many of these newspapermen had begun to buy radio stations, and in that arena FDR could target them for special regulatory attention.

As one former commissioner put it, Roosevelt “put the blow torch” on his FCC chairman, Larry Fly, to use various regulations to shut down the president’s enemies. Among other measures, Fly proposed a cross-media ownership ban; it ultimately failed but it still tied up newspaper acquisition of FM licenses for several years. (President Richard Nixon’s FCC would ultimately enact a cross-media ownership ban in an attempt to intimidate the owner of The Washington Post into easing up on the paper’s Watergate reporting.)

Fly’s most lasting legacy was the Mayflower Doctrine, a direct precursor of the Fairness Doctrine. In the 1941 Mayflower decision, the FCC ruled that a station that had “editorialized” by criticizing FDR would lose its license to a disgruntled former employee. “A truly free radio,” Fly wrote, “cannot be used to advocate the causes of the licensee. It cannot be used to the support of principles he happens to regard most favorably. In brief, the broadcaster cannot be an advocate.” Well, then. 

The radio industry pushed back, and in 1949 the FCC backed away from the ban on editorializing. But it kept a crucial component, which was that licensees operated “under an obligation to insure that opposing points of view will also be presented.” This 1949 statement was the basis of the Fairness Doctrine. But the Fairness Doctrine remained notional from 1949 to 1963, with relatively little attempt to exercise the vast powers the FCC had claimed for itself—certainly nothing as extensive as its efforts during the 1930s. Yet something big was changing in the broadcasting industry, something with enormous consequences for regulatory policy.

After World War II, the major networks, which had controlled 95 percent of all radio stations in America in 1945, shifted their attention and capital investment to television. By 1952, fewer than half of radio stations were network affiliates, a ratio that continued to fall through the rest of the decade. Most new radio licenses during this period were going to small-timers—say, a local car dealer who wanted a station to advertise his business. Finances were tight for these independent stations, so the owners were open to selling timeslots to groups the networks wouldn’t have given the time of day to. 

That included a new generation of right-wing broadcasters, who (mostly unfairly) attacked liberals and Democrats as unpatriotic Communist sympathizers. After President John F. Kennedy’s election in 1960, he became a particular target of these broadcasters, who went after everything from his mishandling of the Bay of Pigs invasion to his proposed Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

This Radio Right emerged rapidly. The biggest of them, a fundamentalist minister from New Jersey named Carl McIntire, could be heard on just two radio stations in 1956; by 1963, he was on more than 460 outlets. His estimated weekly audience was 20 million people—about as many as Rush Limbaugh reached 40 years later.

JFK, who had narrowly won in 1960, wanted these irritants quashed. His brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, concocted a detailed plan for doing so with the help of Walter and Victor Reuther, executives with the United Automobile Workers. Their plan, later nicknamed the “Reuther Memorandum,” had many moving parts, but the two most significant involved the Internal Revenue Service and the Federal Communications Commission. The tax agency, though a program called the “Ideological Organizations Project,” would target right-wing broadcasters for audits in order to dry up the flow of small-dollar listener donations they used to buy airtime. Meanwhile, the FCC would use the Fairness Doctrine to pressure stations not to sell airtime to the offending broadcasters.

In 1963, JFK told his newly appointed FCC chief, Bill Henry, “It is important that stations be kept fair.” Henry listened. One of his first official acts as chairman was to issue a clarification of the Fairness Doctrine that promised a new push for enforcement. The statement singled out only examples of conservative speech that needed balancing by liberal voices, and not vice versa.

Enforcement hinged on members of the public filing Fairness Doctrine complaints with the commission. At license renewal time, the FCC would consider the quantity and quality of Fairness Doctrine complaints. Losing a license—which was rare in this period—was the death penalty for a radio station. But even if a station didn’t lose its license, it would have to bear the expense of hiring legal counsel to fight the complaints and extra staff to prove compliance.

Henry’s most useful tool in enhancing the Fairness Doctrine was a complementary rule known as the Cullman Doctrine, which stipulated that response time claimed under the Fairness Doctrine should be provided for free if the respondents said they couldn’t afford to pay. (Unsurprisingly, nobody ever said they could pay.) This made direct criticism of public figures and administration policies an expensive proposition for the station owners, who responded by ditching conservative broadcasters known for making attacks.

Here is one example of how the Kennedy administration weaponized the Fairness Doctrine. In 1963, JFK negotiated the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union. He planned to make it the centerpiece of his re-election bid. The Radio Right attacked it ceaselessly during the summer of ’63. This mattered, because Kennedy needed two-thirds of the Senate for treaty ratification.

So the White House secretly organized a front organization—the Citizens Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban—to threaten stations that aired conservative criticisms of the treaty with Fairness Doctrine complaints unless they were given free response time. The plan was a success, hundreds of hours of free pro-treaty airtime was secured, and the treaty passed by a comfortable margin.

Kennedy was killed shortly thereafter, but the Democratic National Committee picked up the Fairness Doctrine baton. It secretly organized a pressure campaign—complete with its own front organization—to extract free airtime for Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 presidential campaign. Thousands of hours of free airtime were secured, but as the party’s operatives reported after the election, even “more important than the free radio time…was the effectiveness of this operation in inhibiting the political activity of these Right Wing broadcasts.” Stations dropped conservative programming en masse.

When the U.S. Supreme Court validated the Fairness Doctrine in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (1969), it did so unaware that the Democratic National Committee had secretly sponsored the original complainant, feeding him opposition research and even paying for his health insurance. By this time, President Nixon was wielding the Fairness Doctrine against the left.

Conservative radio didn’t make a comeback until relatively laissez-faire commissioners appointed by President Jimmy Carter (the true Great Deregulator) stopped rigorously enforcing the Fairness Doctrine. Ronald Reagan’s FCC ended the rule in 1987, and Reagan vetoed a bi-partisan bill to reinstate it.

We are fortunate that Congress and the courts decided in the 1990s to regulate the internet under a print regulatory regime rather than a broadcast regime. As a result, the internet was “born free,” to borrow a phrase from Adam Thierer. For example, when Congress codified Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, it extended to the internet a set of legal precedents that had protected bookstores from publisher liability.

And thank goodness they did! Imagine how disastrous a Fairness Doctrine for the internet would be, if outlets and platforms had an affirmative obligation to ensure that either articles published or user posts permitted were carefully balanced according to some ambiguous public interest standard. Think of the mischief that, say, President Donald Trump could have done under a Fairness Doctrine-style regime. The Trump reelection campaign—or some ostensibly independent PAC—could have forced outlets to run a response to any criticism of the administration.

The Fairness Doctrine as originally conceived would not pass legal muster for cable broadcasting or the internet. But there have been proposals for Fairness Doctrine–style regulations that would make an end-run around First Amendment protections by targeting Section 230’s liability waiver. For instance, in 2019 Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) introduced a bill that would have given the Federal Trade Commission the power to certify that social media platforms are politically neutral with their content moderation policies; decertification would have exposed companies to significant legal liability. Hawley’s legislation was laughed off at the time, but just last October several Senate Republicans, including Lindsey Graham, introduced a bill that would make platforms liable for their moderation of political speech.

These approaches might not pass First Amendment muster. But even if they ultimately failed in court, that would still mean years of messy legal challenges with significant chilling effects on online speech and innovation. 

Despite its name, the Fairness Doctrine was deeply unfair. It made broadcasting less diverse, more beholden to powerful corporate interests, and more susceptible to political abuse. And it was a key weapon in one of the most successful censorship campaigns in American history. It would be a mistake of historic proportions to mimic it while writing regulations for the internet.

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