The Dangerous Paradise of 1980 Miami

book1

Dave Barry has described Miami as a tropical paradise full of people from many different lands, cultures, backgrounds, and walks of life, all of whom want to kill each other. The city’s proximity to the piratical Caribbean, which has always been happy to help Americans evade their country’s prohibitions, has inspired breathtakingly flamboyant displays of open criminality since the beginning of recorded Miami history.

Sometimes this is merely amusing, as when Calvin Coolidge’s entourage pulled into Key West in 1928 on the first leg of a state visit to Cuba and discovered that, even with the president of the United States and his vast law-enforcement traveling party in town, nobody made even a pretense of observing Prohibition. The one-night stopover turned into a drunken bacchanal, with reporters dizzily toppling off gangplanks into the ocean the next day as they tried to board Coolidge’s Havana-bound flotilla.

Other times it has been deadly. On the day after Christmas in 1969, a pair of Cuban-exile cocaine trafficking groups, occupying five cars, raced through Miami’s crowded downtown streets for half an hour, engaged in a running gun battle that left two men badly injured and one dead. The low body count was surprising, especially given that several participants were CIA-trained veterans of the Bay of Pigs. But what is truly astonishing is that the bang-bang was so ordinary that it didn’t rate even the merest mention in The Miami Herald.

Why should it? Miami was full of untethered rage and a plenitude of weapons. The foes of Fidel Castro carried out at least 30 bombings in 1975. Miami Herald crime writer Edna Buchanan once opened her trunk to load some groceries only to find that her husband (also a Herald reporter) had stashed a load of machine guns there to smuggle to his pals in Havana.

The Year of Dangerous Days: Riots, Refugees, and Cocaine in Miami 1980 is a crisp and fascinating account of arguably the worst single year for a city that’s had a lot of bad ones. If it has a flaw, it’s that the author, the journalist and novelist Nicholas Griffin, seems to think Miami was normal before it was flooded with cocaine cowboys from Colombia and refugees from Cuba. From the real-estate scammers and bootleggers of the 1920s to the transplanted New York mobsters of the ’40s and ’50s to the anti-Castro bombers of the ’60s and ’70s, Miami has been perpetually at war with itself.

And then the city was blindsided by an unprecedented tidal wave of refugees from Cuba and a mind-bogglingly violent cohort of cocaine traffickers from Colombia.

The events were not connected, even tangentially. They didn’t even really take place simultaneously. The narcotraffickers began arriving in the mid-1970s, as dance clubs and cocaine underwent a mutually reinforcing surge in popularity. They announced themselves in spectacular fashion in summer 1979. Three men walked into a liquor store in what was then South Florida’s biggest shopping mall and machine-gunned two people, then kept spraying bullets around the parking lot as they fled. The two corpses were so shot up that the medical examiner couldn’t count all the bullet holes, though Griffin—a connoisseur of Miami madness—notes that one of the men, despite being blown to bits, “managed to keep his bottle of Chivas intact.”

Left behind was a van with reinforced steel plates, gun ports, black one-way glass, and a hefty supply of bulletproof vests and automatic weapons inside. Buchanan called it a “war wagon.” (Full disclosure: She’s a friend of mine. I worked at the Herald in 1979, the year before the events of Griffin’s book, and returned in 1992 for 27 more years. A lot of the characters in The Year of Dangerous Days are my friends or acquaintances, and a few—mostly editors—are sworn enemies.)

By 1980, the cocaine cowboys had turned Miami into an endless-loop replay of Gunfight at the O.K. Corral. They were audacious, murdering victims everywhere from freeways to airport luggage carousels. Once, a couple checking into a motel near the airport complained their room had a peculiar odor; management promptly dispatched a maid to remove a body from under the bed. They were prolific, racking up as many as four corpses in four hours in separate killings. They came close to recycling their victims: One man was shot five times in the head as he pushed his wife’s wheelchair—she was still recovering from 30 bullet wounds in an earlier attack.

So many coke-laden airplanes filled Miami’s airspace after dark that two collided in midair, scattering half a dozen bodies around the beach. Police started finding dead drug mules, putrefying in cheap hotel rooms after bags of cocaine burst open in their intestines. (The cops always knew the cause of death instantly, thanks to the laxatives and enemas at the side of the bed.) Some 60 percent of the city’s first-degree murder cases were settled on lesser charges because Miami’s courts were so wildly overcrowded.

The crime would have overwhelmed even a competent police department. But in Miami, the homicide squad was continuously short-staffed because its members kept getting indicted. (An FBI investigation of the homicide cops had so much electronic surveillance running that it took 22 stenographers working full-time just to keep up with the tapes.) The source of the corruption, of course, was the narcotraffickers the cops were supposed to be investigating.

The traffickers had an awesome stash of cash with which to hand out bribes. When federal agents arrested South Florida’s top Colombian money launderer, it took a day and a half to total just the $40 million he had stacked on the floors of his safe houses. And as the government began freezing bank accounts, the Federal Reserve had to fly an emergency load of funds to Miami to prevent a run on the bank.

Against this backdrop, the Mariel refugees started flooding in. “Flooding” is an overworked word in describing immigration, but it applies here: About 125,000 Cubans—roughly equal to a third of the city’s population—came to Miami in just six weeks.

The Mariel boatlift represented the detonation of a fuse inadvertently lit in 1978. Seeking foreign exchange to fund his fraying revolution, Castro for the first time had allowed Cuban exiles in Miami to visit friends and family who had stayed behind. In a single year, the visitors pumped $100 million into Cuba, filling it with TVs and tape recorders, medicine and mascara. It was graphic evidence that Castro’s description of a hardscrabble exile life in Miami was a lie. Castro, worried by the discontent he had unleashed, shut the visits down. But the discontent remained.

On April 1, 1980, an unemployed bus driver and a few of his friends rammed his vehicle through the gate at the Peruvian embassy in Havana. The ambassador, to Castro’s surprise, declared them asylum seekers and wouldn’t give them back. Castrologists to this day debate whether what followed was pure pique or a canny plan; either way, the dictator pulled Cuban guards off the premises. By Sunday, some 10,000 would-be refugees had crowded inside, far more than the Peruvians could feed; the crowd began strangling and eating neighborhood cats. Having either proved his point or committed a humiliating error, Castro blocked the embassy door again.

President Jimmy Carter, who had been championing human rights around the world, suddenly had second thoughts about accepting the fruits of his humanitarian labors. Maybe Costa Rica could take some of them? But Miami Mayor Maurice Ferre, hoping to calm crowds of angry demonstrators who wanted their families freed to come to the United States, told reporters there was no need to stall. “Miami’s absorbed 600,000 Cubans,” he said. “They’re a net benefit to our community. Cubans haven’t taken from the coffers but rendered taxes to us.”

Eventually, Castro simply ignored Carter. He declared that the exiles could come pick up their families in Cuba—in a little fishing village called Mariel, about 40 minutes from Havana—and ferry them back to Miami in boats. And not just the 10,000 huddled inside the Peruvian embassy. Anybody. The first flotilla of eight boats made the round trip in a single day, returning with family members the crews had been trying to extract for 20 years.

The race was on. News helicopters showed a hellish traffic jam along the single-lane 160-mile highway that was Miami’s only link to Key West. From there, rippling lines of boats stretched out the 120 miles to Mariel: fishing skiffs, cabin cruisers, anything that would float. The process was by no means as efficient or easygoing as that first day had promised. The refugees, soon known as Marielitos, left with nothing but the clothes on their backs. Government-assembled mobs usually beat them on their way to the water. Storms battered the boats waiting to be loaded with refugees, crashing them into rocks, walls, and other boats. The harbor filled with sewage and gasoline, through which some crewmen had to swim, collecting donations for the ransoms some officials demanded.

In the single most ghastly story in a book that’s full of them, Griffin describes the fate of a 36-foot cruiser named the Olo Yumi, which departed Mariel overloaded with more than 50 refugees at the order of the Cuban military. Running into rough weather, it capsized, spilling passengers—less than half of them in life jackets—in all directions.

Among them was a 14-year-old girl named Ibis Guerrero, who over the next few minutes watched as her father, mother, and sisters slipped beneath the roiling waves. “She had gone from the youngest in an exiled family of six to an orphan in under an hour,” writes Griffin. And still the dying continued. Another mother handed Ibis her 4-year-old son, then vanished. The next morning in Key West, the girl watched stoically as workers at a funeral home pulled five caskets out of a stack of 10 so she could say goodbye to her family.

On May 10, another disaster befell the Marielitos: the New York Times headline “Retarded People and Criminals Are Included in Cuban Exodus.” The story itself, describing how Cuban officials had forced two boats to accept passengers from mental wards and prison cells, was accurate and nuanced, describing how little it took to be labeled criminal or crazy in Castro’s totalitarian state and what a tiny percentage of the boatlift the two vessels represented. But the headline was repeated—and exaggerated—endlessly. The Times itself editorialized that Castro “mocks the generosity of the United States by dumping criminals, even leprosy patients, into the boats” and demanded tighter enforcement of American immigration laws. Castro joined in from the other direction, calling the Marielitos gusanos (worms) and escoria (scum).

Griffin resists the most lurid smears, but he casually accepts the contention that the boatlift brought 5,000 criminals to the United States. Perhaps—but in Cuba you could get a rap sheet for slaughtering a cow without permission, refusing to join the Communist Party, being jobless, being gay, or playing Beatles records. And some of the so-called criminals were fakers: Signing a carta de escoria (literally a “scum letter”) confessing to a criminal record or sexual deviance was one of the quickest ways to the head of the boatlift line.

The U.S. government identified about 1,650 people who came ashore during the boatlift with a record that would be considered seriously criminal in the U.S., and it promptly jailed them all. Though many reporters over the years have used the staggering increases in Dade County crime in 1980 (robbery up 124 percent, assault up 109 percent) as evidence that Marielitos ran amok, those numbers were hugely inflated by three days of rioting in the city’s black neighborhoods. It’s true that Dade set a record for homicides in 1980, but it did the same thing in 1979, before the refugees arrived. The principal culprits in both years were the cocaine cowboys.

That rioting, the third of Griffin’s narratives, is both as old as America and as fresh as this morning’s newspaper. By 1980, black people were no longer under a curfew that forced them off Miami Beach by sundown. But most were cooped up in three almost-contiguous neighborhoods—Liberty City, Overtown, and the Black Grove—clustered along Interstate 95, all ruined by the highway’s construction in the early 1960s.

Those areas, collectively known to cops as the Central District, had 23 percent of the county’s robberies and 40 percent of its stabbings—and the police only made things worse. Commanders put their most brutal blockheads in the black districts and then further concentrated them on the midnight shift. The black communities were where “they sent the screwups that the brass didn’t want to have to see in the daytime,” said Buchanan, who as a crime reporter knew as much about the cops as anyone, including their own commanders. The fallout included one (white) cop who shot a (black) guy in the head for peeing against a wall.

The Central District was a powder keg in search of a spark, and that spark was Arthur McDuffie, a black 33-year-old ex-Marine who sold insurance for a living. He could also be something of a scofflaw, and that side of him was on display in the wee hours of December 17, 1979. His motorcycle speed hit 80 mph. He popped a wheelie and extended an upraised middle finger to a cop. As he zig-zagged across the north side of Miami, at least 15 officers took pursuit.

At 1:59 a.m., McDuffie apparently decided enough was enough and stopped at a street corner. At 2:03, an ambulance arrived. What happened in the intervening four minutes would be hotly disputed, but whatever it was, McDuffie’s health took an abrupt and inauspicious decline. He required 11 pints in blood transfusions. His sister said his head looked like a basketball: His brain was so swollen that doctors could do nothing but watch him die.

Some of the cops claimed that McDuffie attacked them. If so, scofflaw seems far too inadequate a term to characterize him. He was one scrawny 147-pound guy against 15 cops, none of them exactly gentlemen. Michael Watts, one of the officers who would be arrested for McDuffie’s death, had already been in trouble for fracturing the skull of a black motorist who ran a red light and then dragging another black driver out of her car by her feet, bouncing her head along the pavement.

Three cops eventually took immunity to testify against five others on charges ranging from second-degree murder to fabricating evidence. They weren’t necessarily the best spokesmen for the prosecution—one, nicknamed Mad Dog for his disciplinary record, admitted to advising another cop where to hit the unconscious McDuffie with a flashlight to break his legs—and a change-of-venue jury in Tampa, after deliberating for 90 minutes, acquitted everybody of everything.

Within minutes, raging Miami crowds were shooting and burning and beating anything that moved. Two young white men who happened to be driving through Liberty City when the news was announced were dragged from their car, shot, pounded with cement blocks, and then repeatedly run over. (Incredibly, one of them survived.)

“Two, three, five, 12 at a time,” Griffin writes, describing the arrivals at Miami’s major trauma hospital. “Housewives blinded by rocks through car windscreens, a cameraman knocked unconscious  by a baseball bat to the back of the head; reporters beaten to the ground.” On the first day, all eight dead were white; on the second day, all eight were black. After three days, the rioting ended—no thanks to the cops, who didn’t dare venture into the Central District. There were 18 fatalities and around $100 million in damage, all of it in the black part of town.

Are there lessons from Miami’s year of dangerous days? A few. The drug war leads to sickening violence and garish corruption, but it does little or nothing to actually stop drugs. (When the U.S. government finally got the cocaine cowboys under control, it almost immediately went to war—this time, literally—against Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega over cocaine.) Cuba was, and is, an awful place. Most of the sound and fury over immigration is counterproductive. And when cops behave like an occupying army, pretty soon the place starts looking like Berlin in 1945. Watch the news tonight to see how well we learned that one.

The Year of Dangerous Days: Riots, Refugees, and Cocaine in Miami 1980, by Nicholas Griffin, Simon & Schuster, 319 pages, $26.99

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The Dangerous Paradise of 1980 Miami

book1

Dave Barry has described Miami as a tropical paradise full of people from many different lands, cultures, backgrounds, and walks of life, all of whom want to kill each other. The city’s proximity to the piratical Caribbean, which has always been happy to help Americans evade their country’s prohibitions, has inspired breathtakingly flamboyant displays of open criminality since the beginning of recorded Miami history.

Sometimes this is merely amusing, as when Calvin Coolidge’s entourage pulled into Key West in 1928 on the first leg of a state visit to Cuba and discovered that, even with the president of the United States and his vast law-enforcement traveling party in town, nobody made even a pretense of observing Prohibition. The one-night stopover turned into a drunken bacchanal, with reporters dizzily toppling off gangplanks into the ocean the next day as they tried to board Coolidge’s Havana-bound flotilla.

Other times it has been deadly. On the day after Christmas in 1969, a pair of Cuban-exile cocaine trafficking groups, occupying five cars, raced through Miami’s crowded downtown streets for half an hour, engaged in a running gun battle that left two men badly injured and one dead. The low body count was surprising, especially given that several participants were CIA-trained veterans of the Bay of Pigs. But what is truly astonishing is that the bang-bang was so ordinary that it didn’t rate even the merest mention in The Miami Herald.

Why should it? Miami was full of untethered rage and a plenitude of weapons. The foes of Fidel Castro carried out at least 30 bombings in 1975. Miami Herald crime writer Edna Buchanan once opened her trunk to load some groceries only to find that her husband (also a Herald reporter) had stashed a load of machine guns there to smuggle to his pals in Havana.

The Year of Dangerous Days: Riots, Refugees, and Cocaine in Miami 1980 is a crisp and fascinating account of arguably the worst single year for a city that’s had a lot of bad ones. If it has a flaw, it’s that the author, the journalist and novelist Nicholas Griffin, seems to think Miami was normal before it was flooded with cocaine cowboys from Colombia and refugees from Cuba. From the real-estate scammers and bootleggers of the 1920s to the transplanted New York mobsters of the ’40s and ’50s to the anti-Castro bombers of the ’60s and ’70s, Miami has been perpetually at war with itself.

And then the city was blindsided by an unprecedented tidal wave of refugees from Cuba and a mind-bogglingly violent cohort of cocaine traffickers from Colombia.

The events were not connected, even tangentially. They didn’t even really take place simultaneously. The narcotraffickers began arriving in the mid-1970s, as dance clubs and cocaine underwent a mutually reinforcing surge in popularity. They announced themselves in spectacular fashion in summer 1979. Three men walked into a liquor store in what was then South Florida’s biggest shopping mall and machine-gunned two people, then kept spraying bullets around the parking lot as they fled. The two corpses were so shot up that the medical examiner couldn’t count all the bullet holes, though Griffin—a connoisseur of Miami madness—notes that one of the men, despite being blown to bits, “managed to keep his bottle of Chivas intact.”

Left behind was a van with reinforced steel plates, gun ports, black one-way glass, and a hefty supply of bulletproof vests and automatic weapons inside. Buchanan called it a “war wagon.” (Full disclosure: She’s a friend of mine. I worked at the Herald in 1979, the year before the events of Griffin’s book, and returned in 1992 for 27 more years. A lot of the characters in The Year of Dangerous Days are my friends or acquaintances, and a few—mostly editors—are sworn enemies.)

By 1980, the cocaine cowboys had turned Miami into an endless-loop replay of Gunfight at the O.K. Corral. They were audacious, murdering victims everywhere from freeways to airport luggage carousels. Once, a couple checking into a motel near the airport complained their room had a peculiar odor; management promptly dispatched a maid to remove a body from under the bed. They were prolific, racking up as many as four corpses in four hours in separate killings. They came close to recycling their victims: One man was shot five times in the head as he pushed his wife’s wheelchair—she was still recovering from 30 bullet wounds in an earlier attack.

So many coke-laden airplanes filled Miami’s airspace after dark that two collided in midair, scattering half a dozen bodies around the beach. Police started finding dead drug mules, putrefying in cheap hotel rooms after bags of cocaine burst open in their intestines. (The cops always knew the cause of death instantly, thanks to the laxatives and enemas at the side of the bed.) Some 60 percent of the city’s first-degree murder cases were settled on lesser charges because Miami’s courts were so wildly overcrowded.

The crime would have overwhelmed even a competent police department. But in Miami, the homicide squad was continuously short-staffed because its members kept getting indicted. (An FBI investigation of the homicide cops had so much electronic surveillance running that it took 22 stenographers working full-time just to keep up with the tapes.) The source of the corruption, of course, was the narcotraffickers the cops were supposed to be investigating.

The traffickers had an awesome stash of cash with which to hand out bribes. When federal agents arrested South Florida’s top Colombian money launderer, it took a day and a half to total just the $40 million he had stacked on the floors of his safe houses. And as the government began freezing bank accounts, the Federal Reserve had to fly an emergency load of funds to Miami to prevent a run on the bank.

Against this backdrop, the Mariel refugees started flooding in. “Flooding” is an overworked word in describing immigration, but it applies here: About 125,000 Cubans—roughly equal to a third of the city’s population—came to Miami in just six weeks.

The Mariel boatlift represented the detonation of a fuse inadvertently lit in 1978. Seeking foreign exchange to fund his fraying revolution, Castro for the first time had allowed Cuban exiles in Miami to visit friends and family who had stayed behind. In a single year, the visitors pumped $100 million into Cuba, filling it with TVs and tape recorders, medicine and mascara. It was graphic evidence that Castro’s description of a hardscrabble exile life in Miami was a lie. Castro, worried by the discontent he had unleashed, shut the visits down. But the discontent remained.

On April 1, 1980, an unemployed bus driver and a few of his friends rammed his vehicle through the gate at the Peruvian embassy in Havana. The ambassador, to Castro’s surprise, declared them asylum seekers and wouldn’t give them back. Castrologists to this day debate whether what followed was pure pique or a canny plan; either way, the dictator pulled Cuban guards off the premises. By Sunday, some 10,000 would-be refugees had crowded inside, far more than the Peruvians could feed; the crowd began strangling and eating neighborhood cats. Having either proved his point or committed a humiliating error, Castro blocked the embassy door again.

President Jimmy Carter, who had been championing human rights around the world, suddenly had second thoughts about accepting the fruits of his humanitarian labors. Maybe Costa Rica could take some of them? But Miami Mayor Maurice Ferre, hoping to calm crowds of angry demonstrators who wanted their families freed to come to the United States, told reporters there was no need to stall. “Miami’s absorbed 600,000 Cubans,” he said. “They’re a net benefit to our community. Cubans haven’t taken from the coffers but rendered taxes to us.”

Eventually, Castro simply ignored Carter. He declared that the exiles could come pick up their families in Cuba—in a little fishing village called Mariel, about 40 minutes from Havana—and ferry them back to Miami in boats. And not just the 10,000 huddled inside the Peruvian embassy. Anybody. The first flotilla of eight boats made the round trip in a single day, returning with family members the crews had been trying to extract for 20 years.

The race was on. News helicopters showed a hellish traffic jam along the single-lane 160-mile highway that was Miami’s only link to Key West. From there, rippling lines of boats stretched out the 120 miles to Mariel: fishing skiffs, cabin cruisers, anything that would float. The process was by no means as efficient or easygoing as that first day had promised. The refugees, soon known as Marielitos, left with nothing but the clothes on their backs. Government-assembled mobs usually beat them on their way to the water. Storms battered the boats waiting to be loaded with refugees, crashing them into rocks, walls, and other boats. The harbor filled with sewage and gasoline, through which some crewmen had to swim, collecting donations for the ransoms some officials demanded.

In the single most ghastly story in a book that’s full of them, Griffin describes the fate of a 36-foot cruiser named the Olo Yumi, which departed Mariel overloaded with more than 50 refugees at the order of the Cuban military. Running into rough weather, it capsized, spilling passengers—less than half of them in life jackets—in all directions.

Among them was a 14-year-old girl named Ibis Guerrero, who over the next few minutes watched as her father, mother, and sisters slipped beneath the roiling waves. “She had gone from the youngest in an exiled family of six to an orphan in under an hour,” writes Griffin. And still the dying continued. Another mother handed Ibis her 4-year-old son, then vanished. The next morning in Key West, the girl watched stoically as workers at a funeral home pulled five caskets out of a stack of 10 so she could say goodbye to her family.

On May 10, another disaster befell the Marielitos: the New York Times headline “Retarded People and Criminals Are Included in Cuban Exodus.” The story itself, describing how Cuban officials had forced two boats to accept passengers from mental wards and prison cells, was accurate and nuanced, describing how little it took to be labeled criminal or crazy in Castro’s totalitarian state and what a tiny percentage of the boatlift the two vessels represented. But the headline was repeated—and exaggerated—endlessly. The Times itself editorialized that Castro “mocks the generosity of the United States by dumping criminals, even leprosy patients, into the boats” and demanded tighter enforcement of American immigration laws. Castro joined in from the other direction, calling the Marielitos gusanos (worms) and escoria (scum).

Griffin resists the most lurid smears, but he casually accepts the contention that the boatlift brought 5,000 criminals to the United States. Perhaps—but in Cuba you could get a rap sheet for slaughtering a cow without permission, refusing to join the Communist Party, being jobless, being gay, or playing Beatles records. And some of the so-called criminals were fakers: Signing a carta de escoria (literally a “scum letter”) confessing to a criminal record or sexual deviance was one of the quickest ways to the head of the boatlift line.

The U.S. government identified about 1,650 people who came ashore during the boatlift with a record that would be considered seriously criminal in the U.S., and it promptly jailed them all. Though many reporters over the years have used the staggering increases in Dade County crime in 1980 (robbery up 124 percent, assault up 109 percent) as evidence that Marielitos ran amok, those numbers were hugely inflated by three days of rioting in the city’s black neighborhoods. It’s true that Dade set a record for homicides in 1980, but it did the same thing in 1979, before the refugees arrived. The principal culprits in both years were the cocaine cowboys.

That rioting, the third of Griffin’s narratives, is both as old as America and as fresh as this morning’s newspaper. By 1980, black people were no longer under a curfew that forced them off Miami Beach by sundown. But most were cooped up in three almost-contiguous neighborhoods—Liberty City, Overtown, and the Black Grove—clustered along Interstate 95, all ruined by the highway’s construction in the early 1960s.

Those areas, collectively known to cops as the Central District, had 23 percent of the county’s robberies and 40 percent of its stabbings—and the police only made things worse. Commanders put their most brutal blockheads in the black districts and then further concentrated them on the midnight shift. The black communities were where “they sent the screwups that the brass didn’t want to have to see in the daytime,” said Buchanan, who as a crime reporter knew as much about the cops as anyone, including their own commanders. The fallout included one (white) cop who shot a (black) guy in the head for peeing against a wall.

The Central District was a powder keg in search of a spark, and that spark was Arthur McDuffie, a black 33-year-old ex-Marine who sold insurance for a living. He could also be something of a scofflaw, and that side of him was on display in the wee hours of December 17, 1979. His motorcycle speed hit 80 mph. He popped a wheelie and extended an upraised middle finger to a cop. As he zig-zagged across the north side of Miami, at least 15 officers took pursuit.

At 1:59 a.m., McDuffie apparently decided enough was enough and stopped at a street corner. At 2:03, an ambulance arrived. What happened in the intervening four minutes would be hotly disputed, but whatever it was, McDuffie’s health took an abrupt and inauspicious decline. He required 11 pints in blood transfusions. His sister said his head looked like a basketball: His brain was so swollen that doctors could do nothing but watch him die.

Some of the cops claimed that McDuffie attacked them. If so, scofflaw seems far too inadequate a term to characterize him. He was one scrawny 147-pound guy against 15 cops, none of them exactly gentlemen. Michael Watts, one of the officers who would be arrested for McDuffie’s death, had already been in trouble for fracturing the skull of a black motorist who ran a red light and then dragging another black driver out of her car by her feet, bouncing her head along the pavement.

Three cops eventually took immunity to testify against five others on charges ranging from second-degree murder to fabricating evidence. They weren’t necessarily the best spokesmen for the prosecution—one, nicknamed Mad Dog for his disciplinary record, admitted to advising another cop where to hit the unconscious McDuffie with a flashlight to break his legs—and a change-of-venue jury in Tampa, after deliberating for 90 minutes, acquitted everybody of everything.

Within minutes, raging Miami crowds were shooting and burning and beating anything that moved. Two young white men who happened to be driving through Liberty City when the news was announced were dragged from their car, shot, pounded with cement blocks, and then repeatedly run over. (Incredibly, one of them survived.)

“Two, three, five, 12 at a time,” Griffin writes, describing the arrivals at Miami’s major trauma hospital. “Housewives blinded by rocks through car windscreens, a cameraman knocked unconscious  by a baseball bat to the back of the head; reporters beaten to the ground.” On the first day, all eight dead were white; on the second day, all eight were black. After three days, the rioting ended—no thanks to the cops, who didn’t dare venture into the Central District. There were 18 fatalities and around $100 million in damage, all of it in the black part of town.

Are there lessons from Miami’s year of dangerous days? A few. The drug war leads to sickening violence and garish corruption, but it does little or nothing to actually stop drugs. (When the U.S. government finally got the cocaine cowboys under control, it almost immediately went to war—this time, literally—against Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega over cocaine.) Cuba was, and is, an awful place. Most of the sound and fury over immigration is counterproductive. And when cops behave like an occupying army, pretty soon the place starts looking like Berlin in 1945. Watch the news tonight to see how well we learned that one.

The Year of Dangerous Days: Riots, Refugees, and Cocaine in Miami 1980, by Nicholas Griffin, Simon & Schuster, 319 pages, $26.99

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Boris Johnson Is Doling Out £10,000 Fines for Starting Snowball Fights During COVID-19

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“We live in a land of liberty,” said Boris Johnson, the prime minister of the United Kingdom, at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. “It’s one of the great features of our lives that we don’t tend to impose those sorts of restrictions on people in this country, but I have to tell you we will rule nothing out.”

He definitely didn’t rule anything out.

The country has now instituted one of the most rigorous lockdowns in the world. Under Johnson’s guidance, those in England are forbidden from leaving their homes unless they have a “reasonable excuse,” which includes shopping for food, going to a medical appointment, attending religious services, and exercising no more than once a day.

That may not sound like a far cry from some of the stay-at-home orders in the United States, namely the one California Gov. Gavin Newsom recently lifted. But Johnson’s government ups the ante beyond even Newsom’s, in that the former is not afraid to take harsh punitive measures against those who step out of line. West Yorkshire Police recently issued £10,000 fines—the equivalent of about 13,700 U.S. dollars—to two men, aged 20 and 23, in Leeds, England.

Their crime: organizing a snowball fight.

“It was a very welcome relief…a welcome laugh that people needed,” said one of the men, who, along with his friend, used social media to advertise the gathering. “I know many students who are extremely depressed, and stressed with online exams and have had little support. Mental health is equally as important as physical health…so many young people and students really have nothing to keep them going at this point.”

Household mingling is strictly prohibited in England—indoors or outdoors. Single adults who live alone and single parents with children under 18, however, may form “support bubbles,” which must only consist of one other household. Fines of £800 apply for anyone who attends a gathering of more than 15 people, and organizers face that ruinous £10,000 fee.

The draconian approach is not the exception, but the rule. Earlier this month, two women in Derbyshire were “surrounded” by police after they drove five miles to go on a remote walk together. The catch: They were each carrying hot drinks, so the cops classified it as a picnic and increased the punishment. Driving for exercise is “not in the spirit” of the current era, said the police.

The women each faced £200 fines, which were later dropped after a backlash. Whether or not the two men in Leeds will be so lucky remains to be seen.

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Boris Johnson Is Doling Out £10,000 Fines for Starting Snowball Fights During COVID-19

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“We live in a land of liberty,” said Boris Johnson, the prime minister of the United Kingdom, at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. “It’s one of the great features of our lives that we don’t tend to impose those sorts of restrictions on people in this country, but I have to tell you we will rule nothing out.”

He definitely didn’t rule anything out.

The country has now instituted one of the most rigorous lockdowns in the world. Under Johnson’s guidance, those in England are forbidden from leaving their homes unless they have a “reasonable excuse,” which includes shopping for food, going to a medical appointment, attending religious services, and exercising no more than once a day.

That may not sound like a far cry from some of the stay-at-home orders in the United States, namely the one California Gov. Gavin Newsom recently lifted. But Johnson’s government ups the ante beyond even Newsom’s, in that the former is not afraid to take harsh punitive measures against those who step out of line. West Yorkshire Police recently issued £10,000 fines—the equivalent of about 13,700 U.S. dollars—to two men, aged 20 and 23, in Leeds, England.

Their crime: organizing a snowball fight.

“It was a very welcome relief…a welcome laugh that people needed,” said one of the men, who, along with his friend, used social media to advertise the gathering. “I know many students who are extremely depressed, and stressed with online exams and have had little support. Mental health is equally as important as physical health…so many young people and students really have nothing to keep them going at this point.”

Household mingling is strictly prohibited in England—indoors or outdoors. Single adults who live alone and single parents with children under 18, however, may form “support bubbles,” which must only consist of one other household. Fines of £800 apply for anyone who attends a gathering of more than 15 people, and organizers face that ruinous £10,000 fee.

The draconian approach is not the exception, but the rule. Earlier this month, two women in Derbyshire were “surrounded” by police after they drove five miles to go on a remote walk together. The catch: They were each carrying hot drinks, so the cops classified it as a picnic and increased the punishment. Driving for exercise is “not in the spirit” of the current era, said the police.

The women each faced £200 fines, which were later dropped after a backlash. Whether or not the two men in Leeds will be so lucky remains to be seen.

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Corey DeAngelis: Why 2021 Is a Turning Point for School Choice

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Nearly a year into ubiquitous school closings as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic—and even with a vaccine being rolled out—it’s far from clear when most students will be going back to full-time, in-person classes.

How are the shutdowns affecting K-12 education and changing the way we think about public schools? Corey De Angelis, the Reason Foundation’s director of school choice, tells Nick Gillespie that a historically large number of parents are leaving traditional residential-assignment schools and looking to take their education dollars with them. As student failure rates climb and dissatisfaction with distance learning increases, says DeAngelis, there’s also mounting frustration with teachers unions for their continued opposition to reopening despite mounting evidence that schools are not a significant source of infection.

Over a dozen state legislatures are considering laws that would massively expand publicly funded school choice and De Angelis says that the pandemic ultimately may accomplish what decades of white papers have failed to deliver: a switch to a system in which parents rather than bureaucrats decide where their kids go to school.

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Corey DeAngelis: Why 2021 Is a Turning Point for School Choice

8102588_thumbnail

Nearly a year into ubiquitous school closings as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic—and even with a vaccine being rolled out—it’s far from clear when most students will be going back to full-time, in-person classes.

How are the shutdowns affecting K-12 education and changing the way we think about public schools? Corey De Angelis, the Reason Foundation’s director of school choice, tells Nick Gillespie that a historically large number of parents are leaving traditional residential-assignment schools and looking to take their education dollars with them. As student failure rates climb and dissatisfaction with distance learning increases, says DeAngelis, there’s also mounting frustration with teachers unions for their continued opposition to reopening despite mounting evidence that schools are not a significant source of infection.

Over a dozen state legislatures are considering laws that would massively expand publicly funded school choice and De Angelis says that the pandemic ultimately may accomplish what decades of white papers have failed to deliver: a switch to a system in which parents rather than bureaucrats decide where their kids go to school.

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Don’t Freak Out About GameStop

sipaphotoseleven392510

The price of GameStop’s stock has been sent soaring by rocket emojis in the Reddit forum r/wallstreetbets. The rally has captured the attention of the world, including regulators and the White House. At the market’s close on January 28, GameStop shares were worth about $198, up about 400 percent from a week ago, but down from their meteoric height of over $400. Everyone from Bernie Sanders to Jon Stewart is saying that this is evidence that Wall Street is broken or rigged. What’s really going on?

Stocks go up and down all the time. Why is the GameStop rally different?

A lot of Wall Street hedge fund money was tied up in betting that GameStop, which has suffered as consumers increasingly make purchases online, would continue to decline. 

There are a number of ways to bet against a company’s success, but a popular strategy is to “short sell.” The mechanics of a short sale are a bit complicated: A trader doesn’t actually own the stock, but “borrows” it for a specified amount of time and then sells it when either the agreed-upon price is reached or the time period expires. But this is risky. A short sale executed without a hedge could expose a trader to unlimited losses.  

The underlying risk in short sales is what retail investors turned into an opportunity. Unlike traditional stock rallies, GameStop’s rise (and the rise of other stocks caught up in the moment, like AMC) grew from the actions of individual retail investors who have recently gained greater market access through the availability of low-cost trading apps. 

Because retail traders are not a monolith, it’s often difficult to discern their exact motivation. Some hypothesize that GameStop’s rise began by identifying an undervalued stock. Others hypothesize that retail traders were exercising their muscle, seeing how much they could move the market. And others, in what is becoming the dominant narrative, hypothesize that traders identified GameStop specifically to target Wall Street’s short positions. 

Regardless of the motivation, by executing trades in GameStop, these retail investors created what is known as a “short squeeze,” where the fast-rising price of the stock caused the holders of short positions to buy the stock in order to limit their losses––pushing the stock price even higher, creating a type of feedback loop. This left a number of hedge funds high and dry, possibly causing billions in losses

Because a lot of the trading was in options, there was also a “gamma squeeze,” which created another feedback loop. Market makers who sell call options (bets that the stock price will rise) often buy some underlying stock to hedge their exposure, pushing the price up even further.

As more investors jumped on the bandwagon, whether retail or institutional, the price continued to soar to new heights. GameStop’s price has stabilized some on Thursday after online trading platforms limited investors’ abilities to open new trading positions. 

So what’s the problem?

There may be no problem at all. Markets and bubbles go together. The Dutch tulip craze of the 1600s is just one example of the time-honored tradition of bubbles. 

Retail traders riding the rally would tend to agree that there’s no problem. For Main Street, this is a success story, albeit one that may have a sad ending for those taking losses when the stock price inevitably descends. It illustrates the power of retail investors and sends a shot across the bow of Wall Street, who often calls them “dumb money.” 

Wall Street, on the other hand, is shaken. Short selling is a textbook trading strategy. Indeed, despite those who argue it is morally unacceptable to bet against a company’s success, short selling generally improves market efficiency by helping to guide price discovery and capital allocation. Although it’s not unusual for short sellers to lose big, few would have predicted a short squeeze coming from retail traders. 

Given the attention GameStop trading has received, regulators undoubtedly will try to ascertain whether there are any legal problems. The most common question is whether the retail traders manipulated the market. They seem to have acted with some degree of concert to change the stock’s price. But that’s not the definition of illegal market manipulation. In fact, most of us hope others will follow suit when we buy a stock, pushing the price higher. There are even legitimate investment strategies aimed at helping to push the stock in your favor. 

For there to be illegal market manipulation, there generally needs to be some sort of fraud or deception. But here, little suggests that investors were being misled. The online forum was refreshingly (if vulgarly) transparent. Making a market manipulation case here may prove to be challenging.

Does this prove markets are broken?

There’s no shortage of criticism about the current situation. While Wall Street searches for solutions to protect its own bets from what it views as the unpredictable “retail horde,” retail traders decry online trading platforms’ decisions to halt trading as being in cahoots with the hedge funds. But it’s not a stretch to see GameStop as part of the normal functioning of markets. The brokerages’ decisions to limit trading reportedly stemmed requirements imposed by parts of the market infrastructure, which left brokerages scrambling to find the capital to keep trading open. When viewed through the lens of the extensive regulation of brokerages’ financial operations, a trading halt is not a surprising outcome.

The fact that GameStop is now trading far above fair estimates of the company’s value is not an incontrovertible sign that the market is broken. Stock prices move in and out of alignment all the time. It’s likely that GameStop is due for a correction, but some stocks (like Tesla) have remained overvalued, according to conventional metrics, for extended periods. 

With the huge trading volume and increase in value, it’s easy to forget that GameStop remains a very small part of the market as a whole. GameStop’s trading is an extreme example, but standing alone––or even with the few other stocks that have been driven up during this time––it is not enough to show that the theories underlying market operation have failed.

Do we need new regulations?

A viral story like this may catch attention, but newsworthy headlines themselves do not justify new regulations. Easy access to the markets for retail investors is a good thing. It allows those traditionally left out, like the young or those with modest savings, to find opportunities to grow their wealth. While the GameStop trading is not what anyone would suggest as a prudent path to building long-term wealth, the expanded market access opportunities that helped fuel this rally are exactly those that we should be excited to support for retail investors.

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Don’t Freak Out About GameStop

sipaphotoseleven392510

The price of GameStop’s stock has been sent soaring by rocket emojis in the Reddit forum r/wallstreetbets. The rally has captured the attention of the world, including regulators and the White House. At the market’s close on January 28, GameStop shares were worth about $198, up about 400 percent from a week ago, but down from their meteoric height of over $400. Everyone from Bernie Sanders to Jon Stewart is saying that this is evidence that Wall Street is broken or rigged. What’s really going on?

Stocks go up and down all the time. Why is the GameStop rally different?

A lot of Wall Street hedge fund money was tied up in betting that GameStop, which has suffered as consumers increasingly make purchases online, would continue to decline. 

There are a number of ways to bet against a company’s success, but a popular strategy is to “short sell.” The mechanics of a short sale are a bit complicated: A trader doesn’t actually own the stock, but “borrows” it for a specified amount of time and then sells it when either the agreed-upon price is reached or the time period expires. But this is risky. A short sale executed without a hedge could expose a trader to unlimited losses.  

The underlying risk in short sales is what retail investors turned into an opportunity. Unlike traditional stock rallies, GameStop’s rise (and the rise of other stocks caught up in the moment, like AMC) grew from the actions of individual retail investors who have recently gained greater market access through the availability of low-cost trading apps. 

Because retail traders are not a monolith, it’s often difficult to discern their exact motivation. Some hypothesize that GameStop’s rise began by identifying an undervalued stock. Others hypothesize that retail traders were exercising their muscle, seeing how much they could move the market. And others, in what is becoming the dominant narrative, hypothesize that traders identified GameStop specifically to target Wall Street’s short positions. 

Regardless of the motivation, by executing trades in GameStop, these retail investors created what is known as a “short squeeze,” where the fast-rising price of the stock caused the holders of short positions to buy the stock in order to limit their losses––pushing the stock price even higher, creating a type of feedback loop. This left a number of hedge funds high and dry, possibly causing billions in losses

Because a lot of the trading was in options, there was also a “gamma squeeze,” which created another feedback loop. Market makers who sell call options (bets that the stock price will rise) often buy some underlying stock to hedge their exposure, pushing the price up even further.

As more investors jumped on the bandwagon, whether retail or institutional, the price continued to soar to new heights. GameStop’s price has stabilized some on Thursday after online trading platforms limited investors’ abilities to open new trading positions. 

So what’s the problem?

There may be no problem at all. Markets and bubbles go together. The Dutch tulip craze of the 1600s is just one example of the time-honored tradition of bubbles. 

Retail traders riding the rally would tend to agree that there’s no problem. For Main Street, this is a success story, albeit one that may have a sad ending for those taking losses when the stock price inevitably descends. It illustrates the power of retail investors and sends a shot across the bow of Wall Street, who often calls them “dumb money.” 

Wall Street, on the other hand, is shaken. Short selling is a textbook trading strategy. Indeed, despite those who argue it is morally unacceptable to bet against a company’s success, short selling generally improves market efficiency by helping to guide price discovery and capital allocation. Although it’s not unusual for short sellers to lose big, few would have predicted a short squeeze coming from retail traders. 

Given the attention GameStop trading has received, regulators undoubtedly will try to ascertain whether there are any legal problems. The most common question is whether the retail traders manipulated the market. They seem to have acted with some degree of concert to change the stock’s price. But that’s not the definition of illegal market manipulation. In fact, most of us hope others will follow suit when we buy a stock, pushing the price higher. There are even legitimate investment strategies aimed at helping to push the stock in your favor. 

For there to be illegal market manipulation, there generally needs to be some sort of fraud or deception. But here, little suggests that investors were being misled. The online forum was refreshingly (if vulgarly) transparent. Making a market manipulation case here may prove to be challenging.

Does this prove markets are broken?

There’s no shortage of criticism about the current situation. While Wall Street searches for solutions to protect its own bets from what it views as the unpredictable “retail horde,” retail traders decry online trading platforms’ decisions to halt trading as being in cahoots with the hedge funds. But it’s not a stretch to see GameStop as part of the normal functioning of markets. The brokerages’ decisions to limit trading reportedly stemmed requirements imposed by parts of the market infrastructure, which left brokerages scrambling to find the capital to keep trading open. When viewed through the lens of the extensive regulation of brokerages’ financial operations, a trading halt is not a surprising outcome.

The fact that GameStop is now trading far above fair estimates of the company’s value is not an incontrovertible sign that the market is broken. Stock prices move in and out of alignment all the time. It’s likely that GameStop is due for a correction, but some stocks (like Tesla) have remained overvalued, according to conventional metrics, for extended periods. 

With the huge trading volume and increase in value, it’s easy to forget that GameStop remains a very small part of the market as a whole. GameStop’s trading is an extreme example, but standing alone––or even with the few other stocks that have been driven up during this time––it is not enough to show that the theories underlying market operation have failed.

Do we need new regulations?

A viral story like this may catch attention, but newsworthy headlines themselves do not justify new regulations. Easy access to the markets for retail investors is a good thing. It allows those traditionally left out, like the young or those with modest savings, to find opportunities to grow their wealth. While the GameStop trading is not what anyone would suggest as a prudent path to building long-term wealth, the expanded market access opportunities that helped fuel this rally are exactly those that we should be excited to support for retail investors.

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Justice Department Rescinds Trump-Era Memo Ordering Prosecutors To Seek Harshest Sentences

justice department

The Justice Department has rolled back a Trump-era memo that directed federal prosecutors to seek the harshest charges and sentences available to them.

In a memorandum released today, reported by HuffPost, acting Attorney General Monty Wilkinson rescinded a 2017 memo that ordered federal prosecutors to seek the toughest charges and maximum possible sentences on the books.

“The goal of this interim step is to ensure that decisions about charging, plea agreements, and advocacy at sentencing are based on the merits of each case and reflect an individualized assessment of relevant facts while longer-term policy is formulated,” Wilkinson wrote in the memo.

In 2013, former Attorney General Eric Holder ordered federal prosecutors to avoid charging certain low-level offenders with drug charges that triggered long mandatory sentences. The directive was an attempt to mitigate some of the notoriously harsh drug sentences that the federal guidelines and sentencing laws created.

In 2017, however, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions, a staunch defender of mandatory minimum sentences, rescinded Holder’s memo, giving prosecutors the green light once again to hammer drug offenders. Prosecutors who wished to depart from this guidance were required to get a supervisor’s approval.

“We are returning to the enforcement of the laws as passed by Congress, plain and simple,” Sessions said in a speech at the time. “If you are a drug trafficker, we will not look the other way, we will not be willfully blind to your misconduct.”

Sessions blamed Holder’s 2013 “smart on crime” initiative for a national rise in crime in 2015 and 2016. This claim was absurd on its face; Holder’s memo may have led to shorter sentences for only around 500 federal drug offenders each year.

“The Acting Attorney General’s interim guidance replaces a directive that made it more difficult for prosecutors to exercise their traditional discretion and to pursue justice on a case-by-case basis,” a Justice Department spokesperson said in a statement to Reason. “The interim guidance returns to the well-established approach of emphasizing that prosecutorial decisions should be made after a careful consideration of the particular facts and circumstances of individual criminal cases.”

The Biden administration has already started rolling back other Trump-era criminal justice policies. Earlier this week, President Joe Biden signed an executive order directing the Justice Department not to renew any contracts with private prisons. 

Other Trump-era Justice Department policies could also be on the chopping block. For example, Sessions also rolled back Obama-era Justice Department guidance on civil asset forfeiture that restricted when federal authorities could “adopt” local cases. Such adoptions are one of the primary ways state and local police get around stricter state laws on civil asset forfeiture, which allows police to seize property suspected of being connected to criminal activity even when the owner is not charged with a crime.

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Justice Department Rescinds Trump-Era Memo Ordering Prosecutors To Seek Harshest Sentences

justice department

The Justice Department has rolled back a Trump-era memo that directed federal prosecutors to seek the harshest charges and sentences available to them.

In a memorandum released today, reported by HuffPost, acting Attorney General Monty Wilkinson rescinded a 2017 memo that ordered federal prosecutors to seek the toughest charges and maximum possible sentences on the books.

“The goal of this interim step is to ensure that decisions about charging, plea agreements, and advocacy at sentencing are based on the merits of each case and reflect an individualized assessment of relevant facts while longer-term policy is formulated,” Wilkinson wrote in the memo.

In 2013, former Attorney General Eric Holder ordered federal prosecutors to avoid charging certain low-level offenders with drug charges that triggered long mandatory sentences. The directive was an attempt to mitigate some of the notoriously harsh drug sentences that the federal guidelines and sentencing laws created.

In 2017, however, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions, a staunch defender of mandatory minimum sentences, rescinded Holder’s memo, giving prosecutors the green light once again to hammer drug offenders. Prosecutors who wished to depart from this guidance were required to get a supervisor’s approval.

“We are returning to the enforcement of the laws as passed by Congress, plain and simple,” Sessions said in a speech at the time. “If you are a drug trafficker, we will not look the other way, we will not be willfully blind to your misconduct.”

Sessions blamed Holder’s 2013 “smart on crime” initiative for a national rise in crime in 2015 and 2016. This claim was absurd on its face; Holder’s memo may have led to shorter sentences for only around 500 federal drug offenders each year.

“The Acting Attorney General’s interim guidance replaces a directive that made it more difficult for prosecutors to exercise their traditional discretion and to pursue justice on a case-by-case basis,” a Justice Department spokesperson said in a statement to Reason. “The interim guidance returns to the well-established approach of emphasizing that prosecutorial decisions should be made after a careful consideration of the particular facts and circumstances of individual criminal cases.”

The Biden administration has already started rolling back other Trump-era criminal justice policies. Earlier this week, President Joe Biden signed an executive order directing the Justice Department not to renew any contracts with private prisons. 

Other Trump-era Justice Department policies could also be on the chopping block. For example, Sessions also rolled back Obama-era Justice Department guidance on civil asset forfeiture that restricted when federal authorities could “adopt” local cases. Such adoptions are one of the primary ways state and local police get around stricter state laws on civil asset forfeiture, which allows police to seize property suspected of being connected to criminal activity even when the owner is not charged with a crime.

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