Brickbat: I Fart in Your General Direction

badsmell_1161x653

Police in Vienna, Austria, fined a man €500 (about $564) for releasing “a massive intestinal wind in the immediate vicinity of the officers.” Police say the man “had already behaved in a provocative and uncooperative manner” when they approached him as he sat on a park bench and tried to talk to him.

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Brickbat: I Fart in Your General Direction

badsmell_1161x653

Police in Vienna, Austria, fined a man €500 (about $564) for releasing “a massive intestinal wind in the immediate vicinity of the officers.” Police say the man “had already behaved in a provocative and uncooperative manner” when they approached him as he sat on a park bench and tried to talk to him.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/3fPwLLJ
via IFTTT

Half A Million Users Uninstall French Contact Tracing App As It Fails To Engage Users

Half A Million Users Uninstall French Contact Tracing App As It Fails To Engage Users

Tyler Durden

Wed, 06/24/2020 – 04:15

New York City, Norway and Germany have each struggled to get their contact-tracing programs off the ground. In NYC, an army of 3,000 contact tracers has struggled to glean information from a reluctant patient population. In Norway, objections from a data privacy watchdog compounded with low usage levels led the project to be mostly abandoned.

In the US and Europe, contact-tracing apps have been controversial as many have alleged these government-sponsored tracking apps infringe on people’s rights by collecting location data, while doing little to uncover early infections, since infections involving random passing encounters with asymptomatic patients are relatively rare.

Now, French public health officials are running into a similar problem as the much-heralded new phone app for tracking coronavirus cases has only alerted 14 people that they were at risk of infection since its launch three weeks ago, according to France’s digital affairs minister, while almost half a million users have chosen to uninstall the app.

Here’s how it works: The StopCovid app keeps track of users who have been in close proximity of one another over a two-week period. If any become infected, they inform the platform, which alerts the others.

French officials defended the app as a vital tool for slowing the spread of COVID-19, although critics expressed data privacy concerns.

Since its launch, 68 people informed the platform they had been infected and only 14 users were alerted that they were now at risk.

Still, government ministers defended the app, saying its lack of usefulness is due to the fact that the outbreak in France had mostly died down. Already, 460,000 users have uninstalled the app, leaving only 1.5 million users across the whole country, which has a population of roughly 67 million.

The government will pay roughly $91,000 to $136,000 a month for app-related expenses like hosting and development work, though these costs could rise with another spike.

Britain abandoned its own contact tracing app plan a few months ago when major flaws emerged in testing, prompting a public outcry.

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/2YZ8w6W Tyler Durden

Indiana Supreme Court Creates a Clear Split on Compelled Decryption and the Fifth Amendment

The Indiana Supreme Court has handed down a decision in a compelled decryption case, Seo v. State, that creates a clear split in the lower courts on how the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to compelled unlocking of a phone.  The split means that there’s a chance the U.S. Supreme Court might review the decision, and they’re likely to take a case on this issue soon even if they don’t take this particular one.

This post summarizes the legal issue, explains the new decision, and then considers the chances the U.S. Supreme Court might agree to take the case if the losing party seeks further review.  (It’s a long post, but I promise a fascinating federal courts problem at the end. No, really!)

I. Two Approaches to the Law of Compelled Unlocking

Imagine investigators have a search warrant to search a locked electronic device like a cell phone. They can’t unlock it, however, because they don’t know the password.  The government obtains an order directing a person known to use the phone to enter in the password (without disclosing the password to the government) and hand over the unlocked device.  But the recipient person refuses to comply,  asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

How should a court rule?

Under the relevant Supreme Court precedents, courts have to consider two questions.  First, what is the testimonial aspect of the compelled act?  In other words, what does the order try to compel the person to implicitly speak?  And second, does the government already know that implied speech, or is it using the compelled act to learn it?

If the government already knows the implicit speech, the Fifth Amendment is no barrier under what is called the “foregone conclusion” doctrine.  If the government is trying to compel the act to learn the implicit speech, however, the privilege applies and blocks the order.

Courts have struggled to answer how these principles apply to a compelled order to enter in a password to unlock a phone or other electronic device.  Two basic views have emerged.

The first view is that the only implicit testimony is “I know the password.” If you are ordered to enter in a password, and you enter in the password that unlocks the phone, the only implied statement you have made is that you knew the password and therefore could enter it.  Under this view, the government can compel an act of entering in the password, defeating the Fifth Amendment objection, when the government already knows that the person knows the password.

I have argued for this first view in a 2019 article, Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. This view has been adopted by a few courts, most importantly the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Jones (2019).

The second view is that unlocking the phone implies more testimony than just “I know the password.”  Unlocking the phone is a gateway to a treasure of potential evidence.  The ability to unlock the phone implies control of the phone, and control of the phone implies control of its contents.  Under this view, the government needs more evidence to compel an act of entering in the password than merely that the person knows the password. Exactly what else the government needs to know can vary, but it might include what incriminating contents are on the phone or what the person knows about those incriminating contents.

This second view has been argued for by scholarship including Laurent Sacharoff’s article responding to me, What Am I Really Saying When I Open My Smartphone? A Response to Orin S. Kerr.  This view also has been adopted by a few courts, although the most important decision, the 11th Circuit’s 2011 ruling in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, is notably unclear about its precise reasoning.

Despite all the lower court uncertainty on how the law applies to this important fact pattern, the missing link has been a clear split among courts recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court’s Rule 10.  Rule 10 is the rule on considerations about what cases to take.  Under that rule, the Supreme Court reviewing cert petitions mostly looks for splits within the set of federal circuit courts and state supreme courts.  We haven’t yet had a clear split for Rule 10 purposes, however, because the 11th Circuit’s ruling was too murky.

That is, until today.  As of this morning, we have our split thanks to the Supreme Court of Indiana’s ruling in Seo v. State.

II.  The Facts and New Ruling in Seo v. State

Katelin Seo was arrested for harassing and stalking a man we know only as “D.S.” Searching Seo upon her arrest revealed her locked iPhone 7 Plus.  The government obtained a search warrant to search the phone and a second warrant ordering Seo to unlock the phone to help the government execute the first warrant.  Seo asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege.

The Indiana Supreme Court sustained the assertion of privilege.  In its view, the government could not force Seo to unlock her phone.

The court adopted the second view described above.  According to the court, being forced to unlock a phone reveals a breadth of factual information beyond that a person knows the password:

[T]he act of production doctrine links the physical act to the documents ultimately produced. See Laurent Sacharoff, What Am I Really Saying When I Open My Smartphone? A Response to Orin S. Kerr, 97 Tex. L. Rev. Online 63, 68 (2019). And the foregone conclusion exception relies on this link by asking whether the government can show it already knows the documents exist, are in the suspect’s possession, and are authentic. Id. True, the documents’ contents are not protected by the Fifth Amendment because the government did not compel their creation. See Doe I, 465 U.S. at 611–12; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409–10. But the specific documents “ultimately produced” implicitly communicate factual assertions solely through their production. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36 & n.19, 45.

When extending these observations to the act of producing an unlocked smartphone, we draw two analogies. First, entering the password to unlock the device is analogous to the physical act of handing over documents. Sacharoff, supra, at 68. And second, the files on the smartphone are analogous to the documents ultimately produced. Id.

Thus, a suspect surrendering an unlocked smartphone implicitly communicates, at a minimum, three things: (1) the suspect knows the password; (2) the files on the device exist; and (3) the suspect possessed those files. And, unless the State can show it already knows this information, the communicative aspects of the production fall within the Fifth Amendment’s protection. Otherwise, the suspect’s compelled act will communicate to the State information it did not previously know— precisely what the privilege against self-incrimination is designed to prevent. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973).

This leads us to the following inquiry: has the State shown that (1) Seo knows the password for her iPhone; (2) the files on the device exist; and (3) she possessed those files?

The state failed to meet that burden.  True, the government had a search warrant based on probable cause to search the phone. That satisfied the Fourth Amendment.  But the court suggests that the wish to search the phone also makes it problematic from a Fifth Amendment perspective.  The government was using the search warrant to “scour the device” for evidence, and that evidence was incriminating.

Thus, the Fifth Amendment blocked the compelled unlocking:

Even if we assume the State has shown that Seo knows the password to her smartphone, the State has failed to demonstrate that any particular files on the device exist or that she possessed those files. Detective Inglis simply confirmed that he would be fishing for “incriminating evidence” from the device. He believed Seo—to carry out the alleged crimes—was using an application or internet program to disguise her phone number.

Yet, the detective’s own testimony confirms that he didn’t know which applications or files he was searching for:

“There are numerous, and there’s probably some that I’m not even aware of, numerous entities out there like Google Voice and Pinger and Text Now and Text Me, and I don’t know, I don’t have an all-encompassing list of them, however if I had the phone I could see which ones she had accessed through Google.”

In sum, law enforcement sought to compel Seo to unlock her iPhone so that it could then scour the device for incriminating information. And Seo’s act of producing her unlocked smartphone would provide the State with information that it does not already know. But, as we’ve explained above, the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against compulsory self-incrimination prohibits such a result. Indeed, to hold otherwise would sound “the death knell for a constitutional protection against compelled self-incrimination in the digital age.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 117 N.E.3d 702, 724 (Mass. 2019) (Lenk, J., concurring); see also Davis, 220 A.3d at 549 (“[T]o apply the foregone conclusion rationale in these circumstances would allow the exception to swallow the constitutional privilege.”).

The court next offered three reasons why “extending” the foregone conclusion doctrine to smartphones was “concerning.”  First, phones store a tremendous amount of information:

Recall that, in Hubbell, the Government had not shown that it had any prior knowledge of either the existence or location of 13,120 pages of documents. 530 U.S. at 45. Though not an insignificant amount of information, it pales in comparison to what can be stored on today’s smartphones. Indeed, the cheapest model of last year’s top-selling smartphone, with a capacity of 64 gigabytes of data, can hold over 4,000,000 pages of documents—more than 300 times the number of pages produced in Hubbell. 5 It is no exaggeration to describe a smartphone’s passcode as “the proverbial ‘key to a man’s kingdom.'” United States v. Djibo, 151 F. Supp. 3d 297, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).

Second, allowing the government to compel unlocking the phone would raise additional complicated questions once the search was underway that were avoided by not allowing the search at all:

For example, if officers searching a suspect’s smartphone encounter an application or website protected by another password, will they need a separate motion to compel the suspect to unlock that application or website? And would the foregone conclusion exception apply to that act of production as well? Suppose law enforcement opens an application or website and the password populates automatically. Can officers legally access that information? Or what if a suspect has a cloud-storage service—like iCloud or Dropbox—installed on the device, which could contain hundreds of thousands of files. Can law enforcement look at those documents, even though this windfall would be equivalent to identifying the location of a locked storage facility that officers did not already know existed? Such complexity is neither necessary nor surprising: the foregone conclusion exception is, in this context, a low-tech peg in a cutting-edge hole.

Third, it was unwise to take a broad view of the foregone conclusion doctrine in light of its uncertain basis,  its uncertain future at the U.S. Supreme Court, and the effect of technological change:

Not only was the exception crafted for a vastly different context, but extending it further would mean expanding a decades-old and narrowly defined legal exception to dynamically developing technology that was in its infancy just a decade ago. And it would also result in narrowing a constitutional right.

Two Justices dissented, mostly (but not entirely) on mootness grounds.  Here’s the potential problem.  Seo had refused to unlock the phone, had been held in contempt, appealed, and then, while the case was on appeal, reached a deal with the government and pled guilty to the crime.  Wait, the dissenters argued, isn’t the case now moot?  Seo was held in civil contempt, but there is no longer a case left on which the civil contempt can relate.  The court shouldn’t reach the constitutional question.  (I’ll say more on this below.)

One of the two dissents, by Justice Massa, did express a view on the underlying Fifth Amendment question:

[T]his Fifth Amendment question is the closest of close calls. Courts around the country split, falling into two camps. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 767 (2019); Laurent Sacharoff, What Am I Really Saying When I Open My Smartphone? A Response to Orin S. Kerr, 97 Tex. L. Rev. Online 63 (2019). Reasonable minds can disagree; indeed, many have. Our Court’s decision on the merits today is thus not unreasonable, though I would come out the other way for the reasons further explained by Professor Kerr.

 

III.  Will the U.S. Supreme Court Take the Case?

So the battle is joined.  If the state seeks further review, will the U.S. Supreme Court take the case?

On one hand, we now have a clear split.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the Indiana Supreme Court clearly and completely disagree on how the law applies.  Even putting aside the 11th Circuit’s opinion, given its murkiness, we now have a very stark split. The courts disagree in a way that will be outcome determinative in many cases.

Further, this is a very important question in modern criminal investigations.  Indeed, 22 states recently joined an amicus brief asking the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene and settle this area.  It seems very likely that the U.S. Supreme Court will review this eventually, and the fact that we now have a clear split makes reviewing Seo a definite possibility if the state seeks review.

On the other hand, there are two issues that give me some pause.

First, is the split deep enough?  The Justices like for the issues they get to “percolate,” giving lower courts a chance to take several cracks at them to really explore the different ways the law might apply before the U.S. Supreme Court steps in.  It’s a way to lessen the chances of error when cases reach Washington, DC. Lower courts explore all the options so the Justices are less likely to miss something important.

Would the Justices want this issue to percolate?  On one hand, they can.  The same legal issue is pending before the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Andrews case (argued January 21st, 2020) and the Supreme Court of Oregon in the Pittman case (scheduled to be argued September 15th, 2020).  We don’t know when those cases would come down, and especially in the COVID era cases can take a while. The Indiana Supreme Court took over a year after the oral argument to decide Seo. But other cases are coming down the pike.

On the other hand, it’s not clear to me what further percolation would add.  This issue has been bouncing around for years.  The decisions have explored the issue well, and the two camps of thought on it have pretty firmly emerged.  There’s a lot of legal scholarship on it *cough*.  And let’s face it, it’s a really cool legal issue, too.  So maybe they’ll want to step in sooner rather than later.

A second issue is what to make of the mootness problem.  I’m not sure, but it might get in the way of the Supreme Court’s review.

Here’s the scoop. Although the majority ruled that the case was not moot, it applied Indiana’s state mootness doctrine.  State courts are not bound by the Article III limits on the power of federal courts.  And it turns out that Indiana’s state mootness doctrine is less strict than federal Article III mootness doctrine.

This creates a really interesting dynamic. Although the case is not moot under state law’s standard, the dissenting Justices argue that would be moot under the federal Article III standard.  If that’s right, it means that the state court used a power that federal courts don’t have to decide the case. As Justice Massa notes, the court “use[d] a federally moot case to decide an important question of federal constitutional law.”

That raises a fun law nerd question I am not quite sure how to answer: Can the U.S. Supreme Court even agree to hear this case?  If a state case is moot under a federal Article III mootness standard, but the state court decides a federal issue under the more relaxed state law mootness standard, can the U.S. Supreme Court review the state court’s resolution of the federal question?

Justice Massa argues in his dissent that the U.S. Supreme Court can’t now step in, and that the inability for the Supreme Court to review the federal issue means that the state court is wrong to reach the merits:

As Justice Jackson so famously proclaimed about the U.S. Supreme Court, “[w]e are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added). “What, indeed, might then have been only prophecy”—that our Court now firmly establishes that it will reject that finality by deciding cases that can bypass the revising authority of the U.S. Supreme Court on important questions of federal constitutional law—”has now become fact.” Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 348. By deciding this case, the Court’s message is crystal clear: it will anoint itself, at times, as the final adjudicator of federal law. To this, I cannot assent.,

I don’t have a view of if this is right.  Maybe it just adds an interesting issue for Seo’s Brief in Opposition (or even an added Question Presented, if the Court grants).  But it might give the U.S. Supreme Court pause.

This post is long enough, but here’s one last thought about the Supreme Court’s possible thinking in taking cases in this area.

In addition to the compelled-pass-word-entry cases like Seo and Jones, there are also compelled-password-disclosure cases working their way up to the Supreme Court. Indeed, one of those cases is already before the Supreme Court, Pennsylvania v. Davis.  In the first kind of case, the government says, “go into a room, enter the password, and give us the phone, without telling us the password.” In the second kind of case, the government says, “tell us the password.”

Under current Fifth Amendment law, as I see it, the two kinds of cases raise different issues. The “foregone conclusion” analysis applies to compelled entry cases, as they involve acts with implied testimony.  But that doctrine shouldn’t apply to compelled disclosure cases, as they involve direct testimony. So although the facts are similar, I think the legal framework is different under existing doctrine.

The fact of these two lines of cases working their way up to the Supreme Court raises the question of whether the Court should take on the two issues together.  So far we have a split on the compelled entry issue but no split on the compelled disclosure issue. But there’s a ton of confusion about the two issues and how they relate to each other. And although I think they merit different treatment based on current doctrine, it’s unclear if the Court would stick with that doctrine when it reviews a compelled decryption case.

Where that leads me, at least, is to think that there’s a lot to be said for the Court deciding a compelled entry case and a compelled disclosure case together.  The government usually gets orders for compelled entry because they think the Fifth Amendment standard for compelled entry is easier to meet than that for compelled disclosure.  If the Court only took on a compelled entry case, where there is a clear split, you can bet that the Justices would spend a lot of time pondering how the law also applies to compelled disclosure.  Given that, I think it would make probably make sense for the Court to take on both aspects of problem at once.

As always, stay tuned.

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Indiana Supreme Court Creates a Clear Split on Compelled Decryption and the Fifth Amendment

The Indiana Supreme Court has handed down a decision in a compelled decryption case, Seo v. State, that creates a clear split in the lower courts on how the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to compelled unlocking of a phone.  The split means that there’s a chance the U.S. Supreme Court might review the decision, and they’re likely to take a case on this issue soon even if they don’t take this particular one.

This post summarizes the legal issue, explains the new decision, and then considers the chances the U.S. Supreme Court might agree to take the case if the losing party seeks further review.  (It’s a long post, but I promise a fascinating federal courts problem at the end. No, really!)

I. Two Approaches to the Law of Compelled Unlocking

Imagine investigators have a search warrant to search a locked electronic device like a cell phone. They can’t unlock it, however, because they don’t know the password.  The government obtains an order directing a person known to use the phone to enter in the password (without disclosing the password to the government) and hand over the unlocked device.  But the recipient person refuses to comply,  asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

How should a court rule?

Under the relevant Supreme Court precedents, courts have to consider two questions.  First, what is the testimonial aspect of the compelled act?  In other words, what does the order try to compel the person to implicitly speak?  And second, does the government already know that implied speech, or is it using the compelled act to learn it?

If the government already knows the implicit speech, the Fifth Amendment is no barrier under what is called the “foregone conclusion” doctrine.  If the government is trying to compel the act to learn the implicit speech, however, the privilege applies and blocks the order.

Courts have struggled to answer how these principles apply to a compelled order to enter in a password to unlock a phone or other electronic device.  Two basic views have emerged.

The first view is that the only implicit testimony is “I know the password.” If you are ordered to enter in a password, and you enter in the password that unlocks the phone, the only implied statement you have made is that you knew the password and therefore could enter it.  Under this view, the government can compel an act of entering in the password, defeating the Fifth Amendment objection, when the government already knows that the person knows the password.

I have argued for this first view in a 2019 article, Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. This view has been adopted by a few courts, most importantly the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Jones (2019).

The second view is that unlocking the phone implies more testimony than just “I know the password.”  Unlocking the phone is a gateway to a treasure of potential evidence.  The ability to unlock the phone implies control of the phone, and control of the phone implies control of its contents.  Under this view, the government needs more evidence to compel an act of entering in the password than merely that the person knows the password. Exactly what else the government needs to know can vary, but it might include what incriminating contents are on the phone or what the person knows about those incriminating contents.

This second view has been argued for by scholarship including Laurent Sacharoff’s article responding to me, What Am I Really Saying When I Open My Smartphone? A Response to Orin S. Kerr.  This view also has been adopted by a few courts, although the most important decision, the 11th Circuit’s 2011 ruling in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, is notably unclear about its precise reasoning.

Despite all the lower court uncertainty on how the law applies to this important fact pattern, the missing link has been a clear split among courts recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court’s Rule 10.  Rule 10 is the rule on considerations about what cases to take.  Under that rule, the Supreme Court reviewing cert petitions mostly looks for splits within the set of federal circuit courts and state supreme courts.  We haven’t yet had a clear split for Rule 10 purposes, however, because the 11th Circuit’s ruling was too murky.

That is, until today.  As of this morning, we have our split thanks to the Supreme Court of Indiana’s ruling in Seo v. State.

II.  The Facts and New Ruling in Seo v. State

Katelin Seo was arrested for harassing and stalking a man we know only as “D.S.” Searching Seo upon her arrest revealed her locked iPhone 7 Plus.  The government obtained a search warrant to search the phone and a second warrant ordering Seo to unlock the phone to help the government execute the first warrant.  Seo asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege.

The Indiana Supreme Court sustained the assertion of privilege.  In its view, the government could not force Seo to unlock her phone.

The court adopted the second view described above.  According to the court, being forced to unlock a phone reveals a breadth of factual information beyond that a person knows the password:

[T]he act of production doctrine links the physical act to the documents ultimately produced. See Laurent Sacharoff, What Am I Really Saying When I Open My Smartphone? A Response to Orin S. Kerr, 97 Tex. L. Rev. Online 63, 68 (2019). And the foregone conclusion exception relies on this link by asking whether the government can show it already knows the documents exist, are in the suspect’s possession, and are authentic. Id. True, the documents’ contents are not protected by the Fifth Amendment because the government did not compel their creation. See Doe I, 465 U.S. at 611–12; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409–10. But the specific documents “ultimately produced” implicitly communicate factual assertions solely through their production. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36 & n.19, 45.

When extending these observations to the act of producing an unlocked smartphone, we draw two analogies. First, entering the password to unlock the device is analogous to the physical act of handing over documents. Sacharoff, supra, at 68. And second, the files on the smartphone are analogous to the documents ultimately produced. Id.

Thus, a suspect surrendering an unlocked smartphone implicitly communicates, at a minimum, three things: (1) the suspect knows the password; (2) the files on the device exist; and (3) the suspect possessed those files. And, unless the State can show it already knows this information, the communicative aspects of the production fall within the Fifth Amendment’s protection. Otherwise, the suspect’s compelled act will communicate to the State information it did not previously know— precisely what the privilege against self-incrimination is designed to prevent. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973).

This leads us to the following inquiry: has the State shown that (1) Seo knows the password for her iPhone; (2) the files on the device exist; and (3) she possessed those files?

The state failed to meet that burden.  True, the government had a search warrant based on probable cause to search the phone. That satisfied the Fourth Amendment.  But the court suggests that the wish to search the phone also makes it problematic from a Fifth Amendment perspective.  The government was using the search warrant to “scour the device” for evidence, and that evidence was incriminating.

Thus, the Fifth Amendment blocked the compelled unlocking:

Even if we assume the State has shown that Seo knows the password to her smartphone, the State has failed to demonstrate that any particular files on the device exist or that she possessed those files. Detective Inglis simply confirmed that he would be fishing for “incriminating evidence” from the device. He believed Seo—to carry out the alleged crimes—was using an application or internet program to disguise her phone number.

Yet, the detective’s own testimony confirms that he didn’t know which applications or files he was searching for:

“There are numerous, and there’s probably some that I’m not even aware of, numerous entities out there like Google Voice and Pinger and Text Now and Text Me, and I don’t know, I don’t have an all-encompassing list of them, however if I had the phone I could see which ones she had accessed through Google.”

In sum, law enforcement sought to compel Seo to unlock her iPhone so that it could then scour the device for incriminating information. And Seo’s act of producing her unlocked smartphone would provide the State with information that it does not already know. But, as we’ve explained above, the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against compulsory self-incrimination prohibits such a result. Indeed, to hold otherwise would sound “the death knell for a constitutional protection against compelled self-incrimination in the digital age.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 117 N.E.3d 702, 724 (Mass. 2019) (Lenk, J., concurring); see also Davis, 220 A.3d at 549 (“[T]o apply the foregone conclusion rationale in these circumstances would allow the exception to swallow the constitutional privilege.”).

The court next offered three reasons why “extending” the foregone conclusion doctrine to smartphones was “concerning.”  First, phones store a tremendous amount of information:

Recall that, in Hubbell, the Government had not shown that it had any prior knowledge of either the existence or location of 13,120 pages of documents. 530 U.S. at 45. Though not an insignificant amount of information, it pales in comparison to what can be stored on today’s smartphones. Indeed, the cheapest model of last year’s top-selling smartphone, with a capacity of 64 gigabytes of data, can hold over 4,000,000 pages of documents—more than 300 times the number of pages produced in Hubbell. 5 It is no exaggeration to describe a smartphone’s passcode as “the proverbial ‘key to a man’s kingdom.'” United States v. Djibo, 151 F. Supp. 3d 297, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).

Second, allowing the government to compel unlocking the phone would raise additional complicated questions once the search was underway that were avoided by not allowing the search at all:

For example, if officers searching a suspect’s smartphone encounter an application or website protected by another password, will they need a separate motion to compel the suspect to unlock that application or website? And would the foregone conclusion exception apply to that act of production as well? Suppose law enforcement opens an application or website and the password populates automatically. Can officers legally access that information? Or what if a suspect has a cloud-storage service—like iCloud or Dropbox—installed on the device, which could contain hundreds of thousands of files. Can law enforcement look at those documents, even though this windfall would be equivalent to identifying the location of a locked storage facility that officers did not already know existed? Such complexity is neither necessary nor surprising: the foregone conclusion exception is, in this context, a low-tech peg in a cutting-edge hole.

Third, it was unwise to take a broad view of the foregone conclusion doctrine in light of its uncertain basis,  its uncertain future at the U.S. Supreme Court, and the effect of technological change:

Not only was the exception crafted for a vastly different context, but extending it further would mean expanding a decades-old and narrowly defined legal exception to dynamically developing technology that was in its infancy just a decade ago. And it would also result in narrowing a constitutional right.

Two Justices dissented, mostly (but not entirely) on mootness grounds.  Here’s the potential problem.  Seo had refused to unlock the phone, had been held in contempt, appealed, and then, while the case was on appeal, reached a deal with the government and pled guilty to the crime.  Wait, the dissenters argued, isn’t the case now moot?  Seo was held in civil contempt, but there is no longer a case left on which the civil contempt can relate.  The court shouldn’t reach the constitutional question.  (I’ll say more on this below.)

One of the two dissents, by Justice Massa, did express a view on the underlying Fifth Amendment question:

[T]his Fifth Amendment question is the closest of close calls. Courts around the country split, falling into two camps. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 767 (2019); Laurent Sacharoff, What Am I Really Saying When I Open My Smartphone? A Response to Orin S. Kerr, 97 Tex. L. Rev. Online 63 (2019). Reasonable minds can disagree; indeed, many have. Our Court’s decision on the merits today is thus not unreasonable, though I would come out the other way for the reasons further explained by Professor Kerr.

 

III.  Will the U.S. Supreme Court Take the Case?

So the battle is joined.  If the state seeks further review, will the U.S. Supreme Court take the case?

On one hand, we now have a clear split.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the Indiana Supreme Court clearly and completely disagree on how the law applies.  Even putting aside the 11th Circuit’s opinion, given its murkiness, we now have a very stark split. The courts disagree in a way that will be outcome determinative in many cases.

Further, this is a very important question in modern criminal investigations.  Indeed, 22 states recently joined an amicus brief asking the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene and settle this area.  It seems very likely that the U.S. Supreme Court will review this eventually, and the fact that we now have a clear split makes reviewing Seo a definite possibility if the state seeks review.

On the other hand, there are two issues that give me some pause.

First, is the split deep enough?  The Justices like for the issues they get to “percolate,” giving lower courts a chance to take several cracks at them to really explore the different ways the law might apply before the U.S. Supreme Court steps in.  It’s a way to lessen the chances of error when cases reach Washington, DC. Lower courts explore all the options so the Justices are less likely to miss something important.

Would the Justices want this issue to percolate?  On one hand, they can.  The same legal issue is pending before the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Andrews case (argued January 21st, 2020) and the Supreme Court of Oregon in the Pittman case (scheduled to be argued September 15th, 2020).  We don’t know when those cases would come down, and especially in the COVID era cases can take a while. The Indiana Supreme Court took over a year after the oral argument to decide Seo. But other cases are coming down the pike.

On the other hand, it’s not clear to me what further percolation would add.  This issue has been bouncing around for years.  The decisions have explored the issue well, and the two camps of thought on it have pretty firmly emerged.  There’s a lot of legal scholarship on it *cough*.  And let’s face it, it’s a really cool legal issue, too.  So maybe they’ll want to step in sooner rather than later.

A second issue is what to make of the mootness problem.  I’m not sure, but it might get in the way of the Supreme Court’s review.

Here’s the scoop. Although the majority ruled that the case was not moot, it applied Indiana’s state mootness doctrine.  State courts are not bound by the Article III limits on the power of federal courts.  And it turns out that Indiana’s state mootness doctrine is less strict than federal Article III mootness doctrine.

This creates a really interesting dynamic. Although the case is not moot under state law’s standard, the dissenting Justices argue that would be moot under the federal Article III standard.  If that’s right, it means that the state court used a power that federal courts don’t have to decide the case. As Justice Massa notes, the court “use[d] a federally moot case to decide an important question of federal constitutional law.”

That raises a fun law nerd question I am not quite sure how to answer: Can the U.S. Supreme Court even agree to hear this case?  If a state case is moot under a federal Article III mootness standard, but the state court decides a federal issue under the more relaxed state law mootness standard, can the U.S. Supreme Court review the state court’s resolution of the federal question?

Justice Massa argues in his dissent that the U.S. Supreme Court can’t now step in, and that the inability for the Supreme Court to review the federal issue means that the state court is wrong to reach the merits:

As Justice Jackson so famously proclaimed about the U.S. Supreme Court, “[w]e are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added). “What, indeed, might then have been only prophecy”—that our Court now firmly establishes that it will reject that finality by deciding cases that can bypass the revising authority of the U.S. Supreme Court on important questions of federal constitutional law—”has now become fact.” Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 348. By deciding this case, the Court’s message is crystal clear: it will anoint itself, at times, as the final adjudicator of federal law. To this, I cannot assent.,

I don’t have a view of if this is right.  Maybe it just adds an interesting issue for Seo’s Brief in Opposition (or even an added Question Presented, if the Court grants).  But it might give the U.S. Supreme Court pause.

This post is long enough, but here’s one last thought about the Supreme Court’s possible thinking in taking cases in this area.

In addition to the compelled-pass-word-entry cases like Seo and Jones, there are also compelled-password-disclosure cases working their way up to the Supreme Court. Indeed, one of those cases is already before the Supreme Court, Pennsylvania v. Davis.  In the first kind of case, the government says, “go into a room, enter the password, and give us the phone, without telling us the password.” In the second kind of case, the government says, “tell us the password.”

Under current Fifth Amendment law, as I see it, the two kinds of cases raise different issues. The “foregone conclusion” analysis applies to compelled entry cases, as they involve acts with implied testimony.  But that doctrine shouldn’t apply to compelled disclosure cases, as they involve direct testimony. So although the facts are similar, I think the legal framework is different under existing doctrine.

The fact of these two lines of cases working their way up to the Supreme Court raises the question of whether the Court should take on the two issues together.  So far we have a split on the compelled entry issue but no split on the compelled disclosure issue. But there’s a ton of confusion about the two issues and how they relate to each other. And although I think they merit different treatment based on current doctrine, it’s unclear if the Court would stick with that doctrine when it reviews a compelled decryption case.

Where that leads me, at least, is to think that there’s a lot to be said for the Court deciding a compelled entry case and a compelled disclosure case together.  The government usually gets orders for compelled entry because they think the Fifth Amendment standard for compelled entry is easier to meet than that for compelled disclosure.  If the Court only took on a compelled entry case, where there is a clear split, you can bet that the Justices would spend a lot of time pondering how the law also applies to compelled disclosure.  Given that, I think it would make probably make sense for the Court to take on both aspects of problem at once.

As always, stay tuned.

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ECB : An Update On The German Constitutional Court’s Ruling

ECB : An Update On The German Constitutional Court’s Ruling

Tyler Durden

Wed, 06/24/2020 – 03:30

Submitted by Christopher Dembik, head of Macro Analysis at Saxo Bank

Summary:  Over the past week, several signals from Germany have tended to indicate an easing of tension between the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) and the ECB. The GFCC has until early August to decide whether or not the Bundesbank should keep participating to the ECB’s bond-buying program. Overall, we continue to believe tensions will continue de-escalating and a political crisis resulting from the Bundesbank being forbidden to repurchase assets is unlikely to happen. However, we are fully aware that further legal cases will be launched in Germany – all of them doomed to fail, but it will fuel ongoing noise.

We are halfway through the process started on May 5 when the GFCC ruled that the 2015 bond-buying program (Public Sector Purchase Programme – PSPP) by the ECB would be illegal under German law unless the ECB can provide adequate justification by early August. Over the past weeks several developments tend to indicate that a fair solution to the dispute will be found, thus avoiding a political crisis that could endanger the ECB’s ability to face the impact of the crisis.

First, Bundesbank President Weidmann expressed confidence that the ECB will be able to demonstrate the proportionality of the PSPP and that the ECB may produce such an assessment as early as this week. Though it is not clear, Weidmann was perhaps referring to the release of the ECB account of June 3-4 meeting on Thursday that is likely to stress repeatedly proportionality of policy actions by members of the Governing Council. Yesterday, he reiterated that PEPP should be flexible, but not unbound, and that capital key remains a very useful benchmark to guide the ECB’s action. It shows that he has clearly softened its tone over the past few weeks and wants to serve as an intermediary between the ECB and the GFCC to appease tensions.

Second, two prominent GFCC judges (Hubert, who drafted the ruling requesting further clarification from the ECB, and Wallrabeinstein, who is the new president, replacing the controversial president Voßkuhle) suggested that a solution might be found following elements of responses provided by Lagarde and that a formal new ECB Governing Council decision might not be necessary to satisfy the judges. These are particularly positive signals that tend to corroborate the idea that Europe might avoid a political crisis caused by few politicized judges at the worst possible time – when everyone is normally on holiday and in the middle of the economic crisis.

However, the debate about the legality of QE is not going to disappear anytime soon. The right-wing AfD party has unsurprisingly challenged the ECB by suing the German government and the Bundesbank over the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), arguing it is violating the prohibition of monetary financing. However, at the moment of writing, it seems that the AfD is not asking the GFCC to rule about PEPP – which means it does not create a real threat against the ongoing bond-buying program that is desperately needed to avoid an increase in interest rates on the sovereign bond market. We continue to expect that further legal cases will be launched in Germany in the coming months and years against the EBC’s monetary policy measures, reflecting a deep split, which is partially generational, on QE in German public opinion but that is also visible in other countries, like in the United States. In that sense, it is a much broader issue than we commonly think.

That being said, we believe that legal cases that might be launched in the future in Germany are all doomed to fail and should not represent a real threat to QE. It will mostly fuel, from time to time, ongoing noise against the central bank.

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WTO Says ‘Historic’ World Trade Plunge Could Have Been Worse, Cushioned By Government Response

WTO Says ‘Historic’ World Trade Plunge Could Have Been Worse, Cushioned By Government Response

Tyler Durden

Wed, 06/24/2020 – 02:45

The World Trade Organization (WTO) outlines, in a new report, that “rapid government responses helped temper the contraction” in the world trade and likely thwarted the worst-case scenario projected in April.

WTO is referring to massive fiscal stimulus deployed by governments, and the balance sheet of the G-6 central banks that has exploded, with the Fed’s total asset expected to double in 2020 amid an avalanche of money printing that has helped arrest the collapse in world trade. 

The Geneva-based organization said the volume of merchandise trade contracted 3% YoY in the first quarter and plunged 18.5% in the second. 

WTO’s previous outlook in April set out two growth models: an optimistic scenario in which world trade in 2020 would contract by 13%, and a pessimistic scenario in which trade would drop by 32%. 

As things currently stand, the report said, “trade would only need to grow by 2.5% per quarter for the remainder of the year to meet the optimistic projection. However, looking ahead to 2021, adverse developments, including a second wave of COVID‑19 outbreaks, weaker than expected economic growth, or widespread recourse to trade restrictions, could see trade expansion fall short of earlier projections.” 

“The fall in trade we are now seeing is historically large – in fact, it would be the steepest on record. But there is an important silver lining here: it could have been much worse,” said Director‑General Roberto Azevedo.

Policy decisions have been critical in softening the ongoing blow to output and trade, and they will continue to play an important role in determining the pace of economic recovery. For output and trade to rebound strongly in 2021, fiscal, monetary, and trade policies will all need to keep pulling in the same direction,” said Azevedo. 

The report said the dark green line in Chart 1 could suggest a 5% to 20% rebound next year, which is in line with the optimistic scenario. But there are many uncertainties, including the second wave of Covid-19 outbreak and the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy (something we outlined here). 

“For output and trade to rebound strongly in 2021, fiscal, monetary, and trade policies will all need to keep pulling in the same direction,” Azevedo said.

To sum up, the outlook for the global economy over the next several years remains highly uncertain – though unprecedented money printing has cushioned the global crash in trade – that doesn’t necessary mean a V-shaped recovery will be seen. 

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NATO 2030: How To Make A Bad Idea Worse

NATO 2030: How To Make A Bad Idea Worse

Tyler Durden

Wed, 06/24/2020 – 02:00

Authored by Matthew Ehret via The Strategic Culture Foundation,

Just when you thought the leaders of NATO could not push the limits of insanity any further, something like NATO 2030 is announced.

After helping blow up the Middle East and North Africa, dividing the Balkans into zones of war and tension, turning Ukraine upside down using armadas of neo Nazis, and encircling Russia with a ballistic missile shield, the leaders of this Cold War relic have decided that the best way to deal with instability of the world is… more NATO.

In a June 8th online event co-sponsored by the Atlantic Council, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced the launch of a planning project to reform NATO called NATO 2030. Stoltenberg told his audience that in order to deal with Russia and China’s strategic partnership which is transforming the global balance of power, “we must resist the temptation of national solutions and we must live up to our values: freedom, democracy and the rule of law. To do this, we must stay strong militarily, be more united politically and take a broader approach globally.”

In the mind of Stoltenberg, this means expanding NATO’s membership into the Pacific with a high priority on the absorption of Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea into NATO’s dysfunctional family. It also means extending NATO’s jurisdiction beyond a military alliance to include a wider political and environmental dimension (the war on climate change is apparently just as serious as the war on terrorism and should thus be incorporated into NATO’s operating system).

Analyzing China’s intentions through the most Hobbesian dark age lens on the market, Stoltenberg stated “they are investing heavily in modern military capabilities, including missiles that can reach all NATO allied countries. They are coming closer to us in cyberspace. We see them in the Arctic, in Africa… and they are working more and more together with Russia.”

In spite of NATO’s Cold War thinking, Russia and China have continuously presented olive branches to the west over the years– offering to cooperate on such matters as counter-terrorism, space exploration, asteroid defense, and global infrastructure projects in the Arctic and broader Belt and Road Initiative. In all instances, these offers have been met with a nearly unanimous cold shoulder by the western military industrial complex ruling NATO and the Atlantic alliance.

The Engine of War Heats Up

As Stoltenberg spoke these words, the 49th Baltic Operations running from June 1-16th were underway as the largest NATO exercise in the Baltic Sea featuring “30 ships and submarines, and 30 aircraft, conducting air defence, anti-submarine warfare, maritime interdiction and mine countermeasure operations.” In response Moscow reinforced its armored forces facing Europe.

Meanwhile in China’s backyard, three aircraft carriers all arrived in the Pacific (the USS Theodore Roosevelt, USS Ronald Reagan and USS Nimitz) with a senate Armed Services Committee approval of $6 billion in funds for the Pacific Defense Initiative which Defense News stated will “send a strong signal to the Chinese Communist Party that America is deeply committed to defending our interests in the Indo-Pacific”. The committee also approved a U.S. Airforce operating location in the Indo-Pacific for F-35A jets in order to “prioritize the protection of the air bases that might be under attack from current or emerging cruise missiles and advanced hypersonic missiles, specifically from China.”

Another inflammatory precursor for confrontation came from a House Republican Study Committee report co-authored by Secretary of State Pompeo calling for sanctioning China’s leadership, listing Russia as a state sponsor of terror and authorizing the use of military force against anyone on a Foreign Terrorist Organization list. When one holds in mind that large sections of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard happen to be on this list, it is not hard to see how quickly nations doing business with Iran can be considered “state sponsors of terror”, justifying a use of military force from America.

With this level of explicit antagonism and duplicity, it is no wonder that China’s foreign ministry announced on June 10th that it would not participate in joint three-way arms talks between the USA and Russia. If America demonstrated a coherent intention to shift its foreign policy doctrine towards a genuine pro-cooperation perspective, then it is undoubtably the case that China would enthusiastically embrace such proposals. But until then, China is obviously unwilling to loose any part of its already small nuclear deterrent of 300 warheads (compared to Russia and the USA, who each own 6000).

The Resistance to the Warhawks

I have said it many times before, but there is currently not one but two opposing American military doctrines at war with each other and no assessment of American foreign policy is complete without a sensitivity to that fact.

On the one hand, there is the sociopathic doctrine which I outlined summarily above, but on the other hand, there exists a genuine intention to stop the “forever wars”, pull out of the Middle East, disengage with NATO and realign with a multipolar system of sovereign nation states.

This more positive America expressed itself in Trump’s June 7th counter-attack on former Secretary of Defense Gen. James Mattis who had fueled the American Maidan now unfolding by stating his belife that solutions can happen without the President. Trump had fired Mattis earlier over the Cold Warrior’s commitment to endless military enmeshment in Syria, Turkey, Afghanistan and Iraq. In this Oval Office interview, the President called out the Military industrial complex which Mattis represents saying “The military-industrial complex is unbelievably powerful… You have no idea. Some legit, and some non-legit.”

Another aspect of Trump’s resistance to the neo-cons running the Pentagon and CIA is reflected in the June 11 joint U.S.-Iraq statement after the Strategic Dialogues summit of American and Iraqi delegates which committed to a continued reduction of troops in Iraq stating:

“Over the coming months, the U.S. would continue reducing forces from Iraq and discuss with the government of Iraq the status of remaining forces as both countries turn their focus towards developing a bilateral security relationship based on strong mutual interests”.

This statement coincides with Trump’s May 2020 call to accelerate U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan which has seen a fall from 12000 troops in February to under 9000 as of this writing.

Most enraging to the NATO-philes of London, Brussels and Washington was Trump’s surprising call to pull 9500 American troops out of Germany hours before Stoltenberg gave his loony NATO 2030 speech with Johann Wadephul (Deputy head of the CDU) saying “these plans demonstrate once again that the Trump administration neglects a central element of leadership: the involvement of alliance partners in the decision-making process”. In his next breath, Wadephul made his anti-Eurasian delusion transparent saying “Europe gains from the Alliance being unified. Only Russia and China gain from strife.”

Just a few months earlier, the President showed his disdain for the NATO bureaucracy by unilaterally pulling 3000 American military personnel out of the Trident Juncture exercise held annually every March.

In Defense of President Trump

In spite of all of his problems, Trump’s resistance to the dark age/neocon faction which has been running a virtually independent military-industrial-intelligence complex since FDR’s death in 1945 demonstrates a high degree of courage unseen in American presidents for many decades.

Most importantly, this flawed President represents a type of America which is genuinely compatible with the pro-nation state paradigm now being led by Russia and China.

Trump’s recent attempt to reform the G7 into a G11 (incorporating Russia, India, South Korea and Australia) is a nice step in that direction but his exclusion of China has made it an unworkable idea.

To solve this problem, American University in Moscow President Edward Lozansky stated in his recent Washington Times column that adding China to the list making it a G12 would be a saving grace to the idea and one of the best flanking maneuvers possible during this moment of crisis. Lozansky’s concept is so important that I wish to end with a larger citation from his article:

“Both Russia and China got the message a long time ago that they need to stay together to withstand the efforts to destroy them in sequence… The G-7 indeed is an obsolete group and it definitely needs a fresh blood. Therefore, a G-12 meeting in New York in late September during the annual meeting of the U.N. General Assembly would be a perfect place and timing since Mr. Trump had already announced that he is willing to hold a G-5 summit with the leaders of Russia, China, Britain and France — the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council — to discuss nuclear security issues. China so far is reluctant to join these talks, arguing that its smaller nuclear force is defensive and poses no threat. However, for the discussion in the G-12 format Mr. Putin might be able to convince his pal Xi to accept Mr. Trump’s invitation. This would be a huge achievement for the world’s peace and at the same time allow Mr. Trump to score lots of political points not only from his electoral base but from undecided and even from his opponents who want to save their families from nuclear holocaust.”

Unless world citizens who genuinely wish to avoid the danger of a nuclear holocaust learn how to embrace the idea of a G-12, and let the NATO/Cold War paradigm rot in the obsolete trash bin of history where it rightfully belongs, then I think it is safe to say that the future will not be something to look forward to.

For the next installment, we will take a look at the British Imperial origins of NATO and the American deep state in order to help shed greater light on the nature of the “two Americas” which I noted above, have been at war with each other since 1776.

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F-35 Stealth Jets “Elephant Walk” In Japan Amid Rising Sino-US Trade Tensions

F-35 Stealth Jets “Elephant Walk” In Japan Amid Rising Sino-US Trade Tensions

Tyler Durden

Wed, 06/24/2020 – 01:00

On the same day White House trade advisor Peter Navarro told Fox News the trade deal with China is “over” (and immediately, the White House reversed Navarro’s comments because of market gyrations) – a massive show off force, likely directed at China, took place Monday at a Japanese airbase involving stealth fighter jets. 

Navarro’s comments suggest the phase one trade deal is trouble. It also signals tensions are rising between both countries over the origins of COVID-19 and China’s assertion of power over Hong Kong. At the moment, China is lagging significantly behind phase one targets it promised, and as we’ve noted, Chinese buyers ditched U.S. markets for Brazilian ones.

Now it’s hard to say if around the time Navarro made the comments that a fleet of warplanes conducting an “elephant walk” at the Misawa base in Japan was connected – but it certainly implies tensions are heating up. 

Readers may recall the U.S. has built an “F-35 friends circle” in the Asia-Pacific region, mainly around China. So when an elephant walk and or military exercise is conducted in the area, it’s usually to stimulate war with China. 

According to Misawa Air Base, F-35 stealth jets from the Japan Air Self-Defense (JASDF) joined the U.S. Air Force F-16s, MC-130Js, and U.S. Navy EA-18Gs, C-12 and P-8A in an elephant walk, which is an exercise that prepares a military base for an incoming attack. The objective is to have all fighters and bombers in the air within fifteen minutes. 

Misawa officials took pictures of the elephant walk, conducted on June 22. 

Earlier this year, an elephant walk was conducted with 52 Lockheed Martin F-35s at Hill Air Force base in Utah, which was around the time tensions exploded between the U.S. and Iran. 

While it’s hard to say if the elephant walk in Japan, occurring on the same day as Navarro’s trade comments, are connected in any which way, one thing is certain, tensions between China and the U.S. are likely to rise through the summer. 

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The New Censors

StosselTV

Do you say what you think? That’s risky! You may get fired!

You’ve probably heard about a New York Times editor resigning after approving an opinion piece by Senator Tom Cotton that suggested the military to step in to end riots.

Many Times reporters tweeted out the same alarmist wording, “Running this puts Black NY Times staffers in danger.”

Really? How?

In my new video, Robby Soave, a Reason magazine editor who writes about young radicals, explains, “They only claim it because that’s their tactic for seizing power in the workplace.”

They learned this tactic from so-called woke professors and fellow activists at expensive colleges, says Soave.

Last year, Harvard students demanded that law professor Ron Sullivan resign as a resident dean. Why? He’d agreed to be part of Harvey Weinstein’s legal defense team.

A female student said, “I don’t feel safe!” although Sullivan had been a dean for many years. Sullivan resigned.

At UCLA, business school lecturer Gordon Klein rejected a request to give black students different treatment on their final exam because of George Floyd’s death. Klein pointed out that since the class was online, he had no way of knowing which students were black. He also told students: “remember that MLK famously said that people should not be evaluated based on the color of their skin.”

The activist group Color of Change (which once demanded that I be fired) launched a petition to have Klein “terminated for his extremely insensitive, dismissive, and woefully racist response.” UCLA quickly caved. Klein is on mandatory leave.

Now that many former college radicals have jobs at elite media companies, they demand that newspapers not say certain things.

When, in response to looting during George Floyd protests, the Philadelphia Inquirer ran the insensitive headline, “Buildings Matter, Too,” 44 staff members claimed that “puts our lives at risk.” Their letter didn’t give any evidence as to how it threatened their lives (in fact, today both blacks and whites are safer than ever), but they won. The editor resigned.

A week later, young activists at NBC news tried to silence The Federalist, a respected conservative site that NBC labelled as “far-right.” The Federalist had published a column that said, correctly, that the media falsely claimed that violent riots were peaceful. But the column did contain a mistake. It quoted a government official saying tear gas was not used, when it had been used.

NBC then ran an article bragging that Google blocked The Federalist‘s ads after an “NBC news verification unit” brought The Federalist‘s “racism” to Google’s attention. NBC’s reporter even thanked left-wing activist groups for their “collaboration.”

But NBC was wrong. Google didn’t cut off The Federalist. Google merely threatened that if The Federalist didn’t police its comments section.

It was one time when the activist mob’s smears failed. But they keep trying to kill all sorts of expression.

Some now even want the children’s TV show Paw Patrol canceled because it suggests law enforcement is noble.

When activists decide that certain words or arguments are “offensive,” no one must use those words.

But “we’re supposed to occasionally offend each other,” says Soave, “because you might be wrong. We have to have a conversation about it. We have to challenge dogma. What if we were still with the principle that you couldn’t speak out against the King?! That’s the history of the Middle Ages.”

That’s when authorities arrested Galileo for daring to say that the earth revolved around the sun.

“That’s the condition that all humans lived under until just the last 300 years, and it was a much less happy place,” says Soave. “Then we came to an idea that we improve society by having frank and sometimes difficult conversations about policy issues, philosophy, about how we’re going to get along and live together.”

Life has been much better since people acquired the right to speak freely.

Elite colleges spread the idea that speech can be a form of violence. “Words are like bullets!” they say.

But words are words; bullets are bullets. We must keep them apart.

When entitled leftists declare themselves the sole arbiters of truth, it’s crucial that we all speak up for free speech.

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