China Looks To Build Espionage Hub In Iran Under 25-Year Deal

China Looks To Build Espionage Hub In Iran Under 25-Year Deal

Tyler Durden

Tue, 09/08/2020 – 21:00

Authored by Simon Watkins via OilPrice.com,

The next phase of the 25-year deal between China and Iran will focus on a large-scale roll-out of electronic espionage and warfare capabilities focused around the port of Chabahar and extending for a nearly 5,000 kilometer (3,000 mile) radius, and the concomitant build-out of mass surveillance and monitoring of the Iranian population, in line with the standard operating procedure across China, senior sources close to the Iranian government told OilPrice.com last week.

Both of these elements dovetail into Beijing’s strategic vision for Iran as a fully-functioning client state of China by the end of the 25-year period. By that time, Iran will be an irreplaceable geographical and geopolitical foundation stone in Beijing’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ project, as well as providing a large pool of young, well-educated, relatively cheap labor for Chinese industry. The mass surveillance, monitoring, and control systems to cover Iran’s population is to begin its full roll-out as from the second week of November, after the final agreement on event sequencing has been reached in the third week of October at a meeting between Iran’s most senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and intelligence services figures and their Chinese counterparts.

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, already agreed on the broad plans in July, according to the Iran sources.

“The plan is for nearly 10 million extra CCTV [closed-circuit television] cameras to be placed in Iran’s seven most populous cities, to begin with, plus another five million or so pinhole surveillance cameras to be placed at the same time in another 21 cities, with all of these being directly linked in to China’s main state surveillance and monitoring systems,” said an Iran source.

“This will enable the full integration of Iran into the next generation of China’s algorithmic surveillance system that allows for the targeting of behavior down to the level of the individual by combining these inputs with already-stored local, national, and regional records on each citizen, together with their virtual data footprints,” he said.

“At the same time as this, China will start to trial its own heavily-censored version of the internet via the Great Firewall of China [that prohibits foreign internet sites], in Iran, and to begin the broad roll-out of Mandarin as a key foreign language to be learned in school, initially alongside English, but then to replace English,” one of the Iran sources added.

“By the end of this process, these seven cities in Iran will be among the top 25 most surveilled cities in the world,” he underlined.

This Sino-technologicalisation of Iran is essential to the use of Iran’s labor force by China, as envisioned in the original 25-year plan that was agreed between Iran’s Foreign Minister, Mohammad Zarif, and his China counterpart, Wang Li, last year  – itself a development of the previous strategic co-operation deal agreed in 2016. Specifically, Beijing intends to build factories and other centers of business that function as extensions of existing businesses in China, with the same machinery, technology, and production lines, managed by Chinese personnel who have been overseeing identical production lines in mainland China.

“It will be exactly like a factory has been picked up from the middle of China by a giant hand and then placed into Iran, just like Apple operates in China or Chinese firms operate in various African countries,” one of the Iran sources said.

The resultant products will then be able to access Western markets by dint of another element of the new 25-year deal, which will be the new transport infrastructure to be financed and implemented by Chinese companies in Iran. Shortly after the new 25-year deal was presented by Iran’s Vice President, Eshaq Jahangiri (and senior figures from the Economic and Finance Ministry, the Petroleum Ministry, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei) late last year, Jahangiri announced that Iran had signed a contract with China to implement a project to electrify the main 900 kilometer railway connecting Tehran to the north-eastern city of Mashhad. Adjunct to this, Jahangiri added that there are also plans to establish a Tehran-Qom-Isfahan high-speed train line and to extend this upgraded network up to the north-west through Tabriz.

In tandem with this increased surveillance of the population, China will use the end of the global arms embargo on Iran on 18 October to begin fast-tracked preparations for its increased military presence in Iran, as part of the ‘China-Iran Integrated Defence Strategy’ of the 25-year deal exclusively revealed by OilPrice.com in July. The top priority in these preparations will be ensuring that the military hardware and personnel that China, and Russia, are set to deploy as from the second week of November, are not vulnerable to attack. This equally applies to the oil and gas resources upon which Chinese and Russian firms are still working, despite the U.S. sanctions on Iran, under the guise of standalone contracts. Such efforts would encompass each of the three key EW areas – electronic support (including early warning of enemy weapons use) plus electronic attack (including jamming systems) plus electronic protection (including of enemy jamming), although in the Chinese system, unlike in the traditional Western model, cyber and electronic warfare have been merged into a single discipline.

More specifically, Iran will be host to a range of technology, equipment, and systems coming from both China and Russia, as part of a three-pronged usage strategy for Iran that includes – in addition to the monitoring, surveillance of the workforce – proactive intelligence-gathering capabilities, and an extensive defensive apparatus, as part of, in particular, Russia’s standard anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) operational approach in these conditions. Included in the hardware of the military package, according to the Iran sources, will be the highly-regarded Russian S-400 anti-missile air defense system and the Krasukha-2 and -4 systems that proved successful in Syria. This equipment will function alongside the new dual-use civilian/military centers across Iran, for the air force and naval assets. “In the same way that the Russian military Khmeimim Air Base near Latakia functions alongside the civilian Bassel Al-Assad International Airport in Syria, sharing many facilities, so many of the existing Iranian airports that are designated for this dual-use will be extended to accommodate warplanes from China, and to a lesser degree, Russia,” according to one of the Iranian sources.

“This process will begin with purpose-built dual-use facilities next to the existing airports at Hamedan, Bandar Abbas, Chabahar, and Abadan,” he added.

Indeed, OilPrice.com understands from these sources that the bombers to be deployed in the first instance will be China-modified versions of the long-range Russian Tupolev Tu-22M3s, with a manufacturing specification range of 6,800 kilometers (2,410 km with a typical weapons load), and the fighters will be the all-weather supersonic medium-range fighter bomber/strike Sukhoi Su-34, plus the newer single-seat stealth attack Sukhoi-57. It is apposite to note that in August 2016, Russia used the Hamedan airbase to launch attacks on targets in Syria using both Tupolev-22M3 long-range bombers and Sukhoi-34 strike fighters.

At the same time, Chinese and Russian military vessels will be able to use newly-created dual-use facilities at Iran’s key ports at Chabahar, Bandar-e-Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas, constructed by Chinese companies. These companies will have attached to their workforces another 5,000 Chinese ‘security personnel’ on the ground to protect the Chinese projects, although many of these will be air force pilots, warship and submarine officers, special forces officers, and intelligence officers, in addition to straightforward army personnel. “This number will be increased to nearly 50,000 military and neo-military Chinese and Russian personnel within the next 14 months, with around half of that number focussed on developing and safeguarding China’s oil and gas assets in Iran and the other half being used in air force, navy, and intelligence hands-on and training roles,” one of the Iran sources said.

In tandem with all of this, as from the second week of November, China plans to build one of the biggest intelligence gathering listening stations in the world, in Chabahar.

“It will have a staff of nearly 1,000, comprising top Chinese intelligence and communications experts, plus some Russians to support their equipment and technology in the field, with a very small number of Iranians chosen from the top ranks of the IRGC in training, and will have a near-5,000 kilometer radius range,” he said.

“This will allow the station to intercept, monitor, and neutralize the C4ISR [Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] systems used by NATO members and associate members, including U.S.-friendly countries in the region, most notably, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel,” he added.

As such, the Chabahar facility will allow Beijing to extend its reach in monitoring and disrupting the communications of its perceived enemies across an area ranging from the edge of Austria in the West (including all the former Yugoslav states, Greece, and Turkey), to Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya in the south, and back to the East across all of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Thailand. The Chabahar facility will also be connected into Russia’s intelligence gathering stations in and around its core military bases in Syria – the naval facility in Tartus, and the Khmeimim Air Base near Latakia – which, in turn, would allow it to be easily be tied in to Russia’s Southern Joint Strategic Command 19th EW Brigade (Rassvet) near Rostov-on-Don, which links into the corollary Chinese systems.

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/2ZfUsXC Tyler Durden

Secondary-Market ‘Rolex Bubble’ At Risk Of Imploding, Top Watch Trader Warns

Secondary-Market ‘Rolex Bubble’ At Risk Of Imploding, Top Watch Trader Warns

Tyler Durden

Tue, 09/08/2020 – 20:40

At the start of September, the new Rolex Submariner was launched by the famed Swiss watchmaker in eight different variations. As new subs are released, the second market for mass-produced Rolex’s are in a “bubble” and at risk of ‘imploding,’ said WatchPro, quoting one of the world’s largest pre-owned watch traders. 

WatchBox’s chief revenue officer Mike Manjos said new watch launches from Rolex were unveiled on Sept. 1. He said a global shortage of watches developed after the pandemic-related lockdowns that resulted in price increases for Rolex watches on the secondary market. 

“Now that [Rolex] retailers have reopened, we are seeing global shortages and prices continuing to rise,” Manjos said.

“We have offices all over the world, and everywhere we find empty cases,” he added.

Manjos said investors bidding up Swiss watches with limited quantities or ones that are being discontinued would make sense, but he warned Subs and Daytonas, ones that are manufactured on an industrial scale, could soon see a shift in the market as new references are released that would result in declining prices on the secondary market. 

“I understand rising prices for Hulks and Batmans that are no longer produced, but I am nervous about Submariners and Daytonas. These are watches that are produced in decent quantities,” he suggested.

“Yesterday a dealer was asking $11,500 for a stainless steel Sub. This is watch that used to sit in a case. I do not know why people would want that watch when a new one comes out, so it scares me that the air could come out of that bubble,” he said.

Manjos said “white Daytonas are selling for well over $25,000 and heading quickly towards $30,000. I think that is a piece we might see come back to reality in the coming weeks. 

Manjos described, in the video below, the secondary market bubble developing in Subs and Daytonas. 

Readers may recall, the Swiss watch industry experienced an “unparalleled shock” in the first half of the year as watch exports crashed thanks to the virus-related lockdowns. Though our reporting in August suggested the worst could be over for the industry. 

To sum up, readers should probably avoid purchasing used Subs and Daytonas as supply comes online. 

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/33bENJX Tyler Durden

Did the Ninth Circuit Create a New Fourth Amendment Notice Requirement for Surveillance Practices?

The Ninth Circuit handed down a new decision last week, United States v. Moalin, on the telephony metadata program that Edward Snowden revealed in 2013.  The opinion, by Judge Marsha Berzon, has drawn some attention for its rulings on the lawfulness of the now-expired program. But there’s a part of the opinion that has been mostly overlooked that strikes me as much more important.  Starting around page 36 of the opinion, the court appears to articulate a new Fourth Amendment notice requirement.  It suggests that that defendants charged with crimes must be notified about surveillance practices that led to evidence that may be used in their case.

This holding was easy to miss if you weren’t looking for it, in part because the court doesn’t even apply its own test. Because the defendants learned of the surveillance anyway, the court rules, there was no prejudice and the court doesn’t need to reach whether the notice requirement applied to the facts of Moalin.  But although this passage ends up having no bearing on this one case, it strikes me as potentially a pretty big deal going forward for the field of surveillance law.

I thought I would blog about the passage, and its potential significance, to alert practitioners and interested readers.

I. The Traditional Fourth Amendment Notice Requirement

Here’s the context. The Fourth Amendment traditionally has only one notice requirement.  When the government executes a search warrant, the government has to give notice—even if delayed notice—that the warrant was executed.  See, e.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 US 238, 247-48 (1979).  Normally the search itself will give notice, as it’s hard to miss when the police knock down your door and take away your stuff.  But even if the search itself doesn’t provide notice, the government has to give post-search notice that the search occurred. See id.

In the past, at least, this notice requirement has been understood to be pretty modest.  For example, say the government gets a warrant to seize all of your e-mails held by your e-mail provider.  The provider shares all of your e-mails, and the government looks through them.  Do you get notice?  No, the courts say.  The Fourth Amendment notice requirement is satisfied by notice to the e-mail provider rather than to you. The search occurred there, and what matters is that notice was provided where the search occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Scully, 108 F. Supp.3d 59, 83-84 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).

II. The Ninth Circuit’s Notice Requirement

Enter the new Ninth Circuit decision.  As I read it, it has a very different concept of the Fourth Amendment’s notice requirement.

In Moalin, the question was whether defendants had to be notified about a warrantless national security program involving collection of telephone metadata that had been collected about them as part of the investigation.  I would have thought the answer is “no.”  Most obviously, there was no search warrant about which to give notice.  And beyond that, the program under then-existing precedent would have thought to not be a search at all.

The Ninth Circuit imagines a different kind of notice requirement, though.  Instead of a notice requirement that a warrant was executed, flowing from the warrant itself, this is a notice requirement that appears to be triggered only if and when criminal charges are filed providing notice that evidence about a person was collected using a surveillance practice that may or may not be a search.  In effect, it’s a notice to criminal defendants to consider filing a motion to suppress to challenge the investigation and vindicate any Fourth Amendment rights that may or may not have been at stake.

Here’s the passage from the opinion reproduced in full:

The Fourth Amendment requires that a person subject to a government search receive notice of the search, absent “exigent circumstances.” Berger v. State of New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967); see United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts have excused advance notice in the wiretapping context for a practical reason: if the subject of a wiretap were “told in advance that federal officers intended to record his conversations, the point of making such recordings would obviously [be] lost.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 355 n.16. In such circumstances, the government must provide a “constitutionally adequate substitute for advance notice.” Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 248 (1979). Dalia explained that the Wiretap Act, which governs the use of electronic surveillance in criminal investigations, meets this requirement by instructing that “once the surveillance operation is completed the authorizing judge must cause notice to be served on those subjected to surveillance.” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d)); see United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 429 n.19 (1977).

The government argues that Berger and Dalia are inapposite here because they dealt with ordinary criminal investigations, and the Fourth Amendment requirements are different in the foreign intelligence context. The government points to United States v. Cavanagh, which quoted United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322–23 (1972), for the proposition that a different standard may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment in the intelligence-gathering context if it is “reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens.” 807 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1987). Cavanagh held that “FISA satisfies the constraints the Fourth Amendment places on foreign intelligence surveillance conducted by the government.” Id.

For our purposes, the essential insight of Cavanagh is that even if the Fourth Amendment applies differently in the foreign intelligence context, it still applies, at least if U.S. persons are involved.

Cavanagh did not address the Fourth Amendment’s notice requirement, but the insight we glean from it bears on our analysis here: because the Fourth Amendment applies to foreign intelligence investigations, U.S. criminal defendants against whom the government uses evidence obtained or derived from foreign intelligence surveillance may have Fourth Amendment rights to protect. The principal remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is the exclusionary rule: a criminal defendant may seek suppression of evidence obtained from an unlawful search or seizure, as well as of the “fruits” of that evidence—additional evidence to which it led. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. But criminal defendants who have no knowledge that a potentially unconstitutional search has played a part in the government’s case against them have no opportunity to vindicate any Fourth Amendment-protected rights through suppression.

Notice is therefore a critical component of the Fourth Amendment in the context of a criminal prosecution. And although the Fourth Amendment may apply differently to foreign intelligence surveillance than to searches undertaken in ordinary criminal investigations, notice of a search plays the same role in the criminal proceeding: it allows the defendant to assess whether the surveillance complied with the Fourth Amendment’s requirements, whatever the parameters of those requirements are. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the notice provisions in FISA and the FAA serve precisely that function. See Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. at 421 & n.8.

At the same time, the need for secrecy inherent in foreign intelligence investigations justifies a more circumscribed notice requirement than in the ordinary criminal context. See Kris & Wilson, supra note 5, § 29:2 (discussing the need for secrecy). Whereas the Wiretap Act requires notice at the end of an investigation regardless of whether an indictment is filed, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d), the FISA and FAA notice provisions are more limited, requiring notice only when the “Government intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial . . . or other proceeding in or before any court . . . or other authority of the United States, against an aggrieved person, any information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance of that aggrieved person pursuant to the authority of this subchapter,” 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c); see id. §§ 1825(d) (physical search), 1845(c) (pen register and trap-and-trace surveillance); 1881e(a)(1) (FAA).16 According to the Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying FISA, Congress was aware that it was “depart[ing] from traditional Fourth Amendment criminal procedures,” but it concluded that the “need to preserve secrecy for sensitive counterintelligence sources and methods justifies elimination” of the “requirement of subsequent notice to the surveillance target . . . unless the fruits are to be used against him in legal proceedings.” S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 11–12 (1978) (emphasis added).

At a minimum, then, the Fourth Amendment requires notice to a criminal defendant when the prosecution intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose information obtained or derived from surveillance of that defendant conducted pursuant to the government’s foreign intelligence authorities. See Dalia, 441 U.S. at 248; Berger, 388 U.S. at 60.

This constitutional notice requirement applies to surveillance conducted under FISA and the FAA, which codify the requirement with respect to several types of surveillance. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(c), 1825(d), 1845(c), 1881e(a)(1). It also applies to surveillance conducted under other foreign intelligence authorities, including Executive Order 12,333 and the FAA’s predecessor programs. Indeed, the notice requirement is of particular importance with regard to these latter, non-statutory programs precisely because these programs lack the statutory protections included in FISA. Where statutory protections are lacking, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement takes on importance as a limit on executive power, and notice is necessary so that criminal defendants may challenge surveillance as inconsistent with that requirement.

We emphasize that notice is distinct from disclosure. Given the need for secrecy in the foreign intelligence context, the government is required only to inform the defendant that surveillance occurred and that the government intends to use information obtained or derived from it. Knowledge of surveillance will enable the defendant to file a motion with the district court challenging its legality. If the government avers that disclosure of information relating to the surveillance would harm national security,  then the court can review the materials bearing on its legality in camera and ex parte. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (allowing in camera, ex parte review of the legality of electronic surveillance under FISA Subchapter I if “the Attorney General files an affidavit under oath that disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the national security of the United States”).

Continue reading “Did the Ninth Circuit Create a New Fourth Amendment Notice Requirement for Surveillance Practices?”

Did the Ninth Circuit Create a New Fourth Amendment Notice Requirement for Surveillance Practices?

The Ninth Circuit handed down a new decision last week, United States v. Moalin, on the telephony metadata program that Edward Snowden revealed in 2013.  The opinion, by Judge Marsha Berzon, has drawn some attention for its rulings on the lawfulness of the now-expired program. But there’s a part of the opinion that has been mostly overlooked that strikes me as much more important.  Starting around page 36 of the opinion, the court appears to articulate a new Fourth Amendment notice requirement.  It suggests that that defendants charged with crimes must be notified about surveillance practices that led to evidence that may be used in their case.

This holding was easy to miss if you weren’t looking for it, in part because the court doesn’t even apply its own test. Because the defendants learned of the surveillance anyway, the court rules, there was no prejudice and the court doesn’t need to reach whether the notice requirement applied to the facts of Moalin.  But although this passage ends up having no bearing on this one case, it strikes me as potentially a pretty big deal going forward for the field of surveillance law.

I thought I would blog about the passage, and its potential significance, to alert practitioners and interested readers.

I. The Traditional Fourth Amendment Notice Requirement

Here’s the context. The Fourth Amendment traditionally has only one notice requirement.  When the government executes a search warrant, the government has to give notice—even if delayed notice—that the warrant was executed.  See, e.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 US 238, 247-48 (1979).  Normally the search itself will give notice, as it’s hard to miss when the police knock down your door and take away your stuff.  But even if the search itself doesn’t provide notice, the government has to give post-search notice that the search occurred. See id.

In the past, at least, this notice requirement has been understood to be pretty modest.  For example, say the government gets a warrant to seize all of your e-mails held by your e-mail provider.  The provider shares all of your e-mails, and the government looks through them.  Do you get notice?  No, the courts say.  The Fourth Amendment notice requirement is satisfied by notice to the e-mail provider rather than to you. The search occurred there, and what matters is that notice was provided where the search occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Scully, 108 F. Supp.3d 59, 83-84 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).

II. The Ninth Circuit’s Notice Requirement

Enter the new Ninth Circuit decision.  As I read it, it has a very different concept of the Fourth Amendment’s notice requirement.

In Moalin, the question was whether defendants had to be notified about a warrantless national security program involving collection of telephone metadata that had been collected about them as part of the investigation.  I would have thought the answer is “no.”  Most obviously, there was no search warrant about which to give notice.  And beyond that, the program under then-existing precedent would have thought to not be a search at all.

The Ninth Circuit imagines a different kind of notice requirement, though.  Instead of a notice requirement that a warrant was executed, flowing from the warrant itself, this is a notice requirement that appears to be triggered only if and when criminal charges are filed providing notice that evidence about a person was collected using a surveillance practice that may or may not be a search.  In effect, it’s a notice to criminal defendants to consider filing a motion to suppress to challenge the investigation and vindicate any Fourth Amendment rights that may or may not have been at stake.

Here’s the passage from the opinion reproduced in full:

The Fourth Amendment requires that a person subject to a government search receive notice of the search, absent “exigent circumstances.” Berger v. State of New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967); see United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts have excused advance notice in the wiretapping context for a practical reason: if the subject of a wiretap were “told in advance that federal officers intended to record his conversations, the point of making such recordings would obviously [be] lost.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 355 n.16. In such circumstances, the government must provide a “constitutionally adequate substitute for advance notice.” Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 248 (1979). Dalia explained that the Wiretap Act, which governs the use of electronic surveillance in criminal investigations, meets this requirement by instructing that “once the surveillance operation is completed the authorizing judge must cause notice to be served on those subjected to surveillance.” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d)); see United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 429 n.19 (1977).

The government argues that Berger and Dalia are inapposite here because they dealt with ordinary criminal investigations, and the Fourth Amendment requirements are different in the foreign intelligence context. The government points to United States v. Cavanagh, which quoted United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322–23 (1972), for the proposition that a different standard may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment in the intelligence-gathering context if it is “reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens.” 807 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1987). Cavanagh held that “FISA satisfies the constraints the Fourth Amendment places on foreign intelligence surveillance conducted by the government.” Id.

For our purposes, the essential insight of Cavanagh is that even if the Fourth Amendment applies differently in the foreign intelligence context, it still applies, at least if U.S. persons are involved.

Cavanagh did not address the Fourth Amendment’s notice requirement, but the insight we glean from it bears on our analysis here: because the Fourth Amendment applies to foreign intelligence investigations, U.S. criminal defendants against whom the government uses evidence obtained or derived from foreign intelligence surveillance may have Fourth Amendment rights to protect. The principal remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is the exclusionary rule: a criminal defendant may seek suppression of evidence obtained from an unlawful search or seizure, as well as of the “fruits” of that evidence—additional evidence to which it led. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. But criminal defendants who have no knowledge that a potentially unconstitutional search has played a part in the government’s case against them have no opportunity to vindicate any Fourth Amendment-protected rights through suppression.

Notice is therefore a critical component of the Fourth Amendment in the context of a criminal prosecution. And although the Fourth Amendment may apply differently to foreign intelligence surveillance than to searches undertaken in ordinary criminal investigations, notice of a search plays the same role in the criminal proceeding: it allows the defendant to assess whether the surveillance complied with the Fourth Amendment’s requirements, whatever the parameters of those requirements are. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the notice provisions in FISA and the FAA serve precisely that function. See Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. at 421 & n.8.

At the same time, the need for secrecy inherent in foreign intelligence investigations justifies a more circumscribed notice requirement than in the ordinary criminal context. See Kris & Wilson, supra note 5, § 29:2 (discussing the need for secrecy). Whereas the Wiretap Act requires notice at the end of an investigation regardless of whether an indictment is filed, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d), the FISA and FAA notice provisions are more limited, requiring notice only when the “Government intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial . . . or other proceeding in or before any court . . . or other authority of the United States, against an aggrieved person, any information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance of that aggrieved person pursuant to the authority of this subchapter,” 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c); see id. §§ 1825(d) (physical search), 1845(c) (pen register and trap-and-trace surveillance); 1881e(a)(1) (FAA).16 According to the Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying FISA, Congress was aware that it was “depart[ing] from traditional Fourth Amendment criminal procedures,” but it concluded that the “need to preserve secrecy for sensitive counterintelligence sources and methods justifies elimination” of the “requirement of subsequent notice to the surveillance target . . . unless the fruits are to be used against him in legal proceedings.” S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 11–12 (1978) (emphasis added).

At a minimum, then, the Fourth Amendment requires notice to a criminal defendant when the prosecution intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose information obtained or derived from surveillance of that defendant conducted pursuant to the government’s foreign intelligence authorities. See Dalia, 441 U.S. at 248; Berger, 388 U.S. at 60.

This constitutional notice requirement applies to surveillance conducted under FISA and the FAA, which codify the requirement with respect to several types of surveillance. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(c), 1825(d), 1845(c), 1881e(a)(1). It also applies to surveillance conducted under other foreign intelligence authorities, including Executive Order 12,333 and the FAA’s predecessor programs. Indeed, the notice requirement is of particular importance with regard to these latter, non-statutory programs precisely because these programs lack the statutory protections included in FISA. Where statutory protections are lacking, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement takes on importance as a limit on executive power, and notice is necessary so that criminal defendants may challenge surveillance as inconsistent with that requirement.

We emphasize that notice is distinct from disclosure. Given the need for secrecy in the foreign intelligence context, the government is required only to inform the defendant that surveillance occurred and that the government intends to use information obtained or derived from it. Knowledge of surveillance will enable the defendant to file a motion with the district court challenging its legality. If the government avers that disclosure of information relating to the surveillance would harm national security,  then the court can review the materials bearing on its legality in camera and ex parte. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (allowing in camera, ex parte review of the legality of electronic surveillance under FISA Subchapter I if “the Attorney General files an affidavit under oath that disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the national security of the United States”).

Continue reading “Did the Ninth Circuit Create a New Fourth Amendment Notice Requirement for Surveillance Practices?”

Can The US Recover All COVID-Fueled Job Losses By Early 2021?

Can The US Recover All COVID-Fueled Job Losses By Early 2021?

Tyler Durden

Tue, 09/08/2020 – 20:20

Authored by Daniel Lacalle, op-ed via The Epoch Times,

The employment recovery in the United States is as impressive as the collapse due to the lockdowns.

In April, I wrote a column stating that the U.S. labor market can heal quickly, and the improvement has been positive. Very few would have expected the unemployment rate to be at 8.4 percent in August after soaring to almost 15 percent in the middle of the pandemic.

This means that the unemployment rate is in August 2020 lower than what analysts projected for the end of 2020. Even the measure of underemployment (U-6) has fallen from 22.8 percent to 14.2 percent.

In August, the number of people who usually work full time rose by 2.8 million to 122.4 million, or 8.5 million below the level of August 2019, and the number of people not in the labor force who currently want a job declined by 747,000 to 7 million, which is still 2 million higher than in February. This means both incredibly positive news and that there’s a lot left to do. Few would have expected full-time employment to be as close to last year’s level by now.

Since the reopening, the United States has recovered almost 11 million jobs, continuing jobless claims have fallen rapidly from 25 million to 13.25 million, and full-time employment is rising strongly, while the Atlanta Fed median wage growth tracker remains at 3.9 percent for 2020.

It’s true that the good jobs data for August includes part-time workers hired for census activity, but the truth is that those accounted for about one out of every six new jobs created.

Even acknowledging that there’s a lot of work to do to recover the record levels of employment of February 2020, at this rate the United States would be able to return to all-time high levels of employment by the first quarter of 2021, instead of 2023 as the Federal Reserve estimates. We must remember that the track record of the Federal Reserve in estimating unemployment has been to err on the side of pessimism, particularly in the past three years.

What the United States needs to do to recover jobs and return to real wage growth and the path to full employment is both easy and challenging.

The United States needs to cut red tape and bureaucratic burdens to new business creation, lift regulatory and fiscal burdens that prevent small and medium enterprises from growing into large companies, and maintain an attractive tax system that incentivizes investment, capital repatriation, and supports job creation.

Anyone can understand this. Why is it challenging, then?

In the middle of an election year there are too many misguided proposals from the left demanding higher taxes, more government interventionism, and more regulatory burdens. It seems that many politicians cannot learn from the mistakes of the eurozone.

Higher taxes and more interventionism will not deliver better public services and stronger finances. The eurozone is the proof that higher taxes still drove most countries to historic high levels of debt and unemployment while public services did not improve. Deficit spending is not solved by raising taxes but by cutting unnecessary spending. With a rising tax wedge, growth is weaker, job creation is poorer, and the deficit remains stubbornly high because expenditures rise in growth and crisis periods significantly above receipts.

The French Prime Minister Jean Castex announced last week at the presentation of the country’s latest tax cut and stimulus plan that “there will be no tax increase.”

“We will not reproduce the past mistake of making tax increases that weaken our growth and send negative signals to both households and companies,” he said.

France has one of the highest tax wedges in the world and has suffered stagnation for two decades, high deficits, and constant public service cuts due to the unsustainability of its finances. The United States should not fall into the trap that France is slowly trying to get out of.

The best social policy is strong job creation and rising wages. Entitlements do not make a society more prosperous and ultimately drive it to stagnation.

The employment recovery in the United States has been a positive surprise for most commentators, but the path to full employment will not be achieved by putting the brakes on job creation and investment. This is a time in which no politician should be doing any other job than to listen to employers, investors, and businesses. Copying European mistakes is not just pointless, it’s irresponsible.

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/3h5RsTS Tyler Durden

Tokyo Olympics Will Happen In 2021 ‘With Or Without Coronavirus’: IOC VP

Tokyo Olympics Will Happen In 2021 ‘With Or Without Coronavirus’: IOC VP

Tyler Durden

Tue, 09/08/2020 – 20:00

The 2021 Olympics will proceed as scheduled ‘with or without Covid,’ according to the Vice President of the International Olympic Committee, adding that the competition in Japan would be the “Games that conquered Covid.”

It will take place with or without Covid. The Games will start on July 23 next year,” said John Coates, head of the IOC’s Coordination Commission for the Tokyo Games, according to the Daily Mail.

The Games were going to be the Reconstruction Games after the devastation of the tsunami,” Coates added, referring to the 2011 Fukushima disaster. “Now very much these will be the Games that conquered Covid, the light at the end of the tunnel.”

Originally scheduled to take place in 2020, the Olympics was postponed due to the pandemic, and are now scheduled to begin on July 23, 2021 – just over ten months from now, despite the fact that Japan’s borders are still largely closed to foreign visitors, and a vaccine is nowhere in sight. That said, Japanese officials have made clear, according to the Mail, that they won’t delay the event a second time beyond 2021.

There are signs that public enthusiasm in Japan is waning after a recent poll found just one in four Japanese want them to go ahead next year, with most backing either another postponement or a cancellation.

Coates said the Japanese government ‘haven’t dropped the baton at all’ following the postponement, despite the ‘monumental task’ of putting the event back a year. –Daily Mail

“Before Covid, (IOC president) Thomas Bach said this is the best prepared Games we’ve ever seen, the venues were almost all finished, they are now finished, the village is amazing, all the transport arrangements, everything is fine,” Coates added. “Now it’s been postponed by one year, that’s presented a monumental task in terms of re-securing all the venues… something like 43 hotels we had to get out of those contracts and re-negotiate for a year later.”

“Sponsorships had to be extended a year, broadcast rights.”

In order to pull off the games amid the pandemic, a task force has been assembled to assess everything from how border controls will affect athlete movements, to whether fans will be able to pack stadiums (as tight as a BLM rally?).

IOC officials met with Japanese officials for the first time last week to discuss.

“Their job now is to look at all the different counter-measures that will be required for the Games to take place,” said Coates – who has served as the president of the Australian Olympic Committee since 1990 after becoming an executive in 1982.

Some countries will have it (Covid) under control, some won’t. We’ll have athletes therefore coming from places where it’s under control and some where it is not,” he added. “There’s 206 teams… so there’s a massive task being undertaken on the Japanese side.

Tokyo 2020 chief Toshiro Muto on Friday repeated that organisers hoped to avoid a Games without spectators — an option that has been mooted given Japan is still limiting audiences at sports events.

While the country is cautiously reopening its economy, with professional baseball, football and sumo resuming in front of limited numbers of fans, the nation continues to see a steady stream of new coronavirus cases.

Japan has already ploughed billions of dollars into the Olympics, with the delay only adding to the cost.Daily Mail

According to Coates, the IOC is doing its part – contributing “something like an extra $800 million to support the international federations, whose income isn’t happening this year, and national Olympic Committees.”

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GoFundMe For Salon Owner Who Exposed Pelosi’s Maskless Hypocrisy Raises Over $310K

GoFundMe For Salon Owner Who Exposed Pelosi’s Maskless Hypocrisy Raises Over $310K

Tyler Durden

Tue, 09/08/2020 – 19:40

Authored by Ben Wilson via SaraACarter.com,

The salon owner, who released footage of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) getting her hair done without a mask, has received over $310,000 on GoFundMe at the time of publication.

Pelosi notably said owner Erica Kious had created a “set-up” to sting her but supporters across the nation have rallied behind the San Francisco small business owner on the crowd fundraising site.

The video was released by Kious last week and showed a maskless Pelosi walking through the salon after thousands of hair shops across the nation have closed, many permanently and some were even jailed, as a result of the policies encouraged by Pelosi.

Pelosi took to her podium at a news conference and trashed on the salon, calling it a “set-up” and claiming that she deserved an apology for the video release. Kious held a news conference on Sep. 3 to give her side of the story.

Thousands of Americans have rallied behind Kious, who now has over 78 thousand Twitter followers. She tweets frequently in support of the President and against Democrats. She even claims the whole situation made her a “Patriot.”

Even the President has taken to Twitter to defend the shop and call out the hypocrisy by Pelosi.

How business is going at the salon in California is not known, but perhaps if the location was moved to other states across the nation, Kious would have lines out the door.

The GoFundMe can be found here.

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Magazine confiscation splits Third and Ninth Circuits

California and New Jersey have enacted laws to confiscate firearms magazines holding more than 10 rounds. On Aug. 14, a 2-1 panel of the Ninth Circuit ruled California’s confiscation unconstitutional, in Duncan v. Becerra. The Third Circuit, Sept. 1, upheld by 2-1 confiscation in New Jersey in Association of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs Inc v. Attorney General New Jersey (NJ Rifle II). In combination, Duncan and NJ Rifle II cases provide a good view of the state of the Second Amendment argument today.

Below is a summary and analysis of the opinions, and what might happen next. Because the history of magazines was important in both cases, this post also provides background on magazine history, including photos of historic guns holding at least 16 rounds. Such guns have been around since at least 1580. The Lewis & Clark expedition, 1803-06, carried one. Multishot guns were expensive when the Second Amendment was ratified, in 1791. By 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, they had become broadly affordable.

En banc? On August 28, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra filed a petition for rehearing en banc. All filings in the case are available at the excellent case page of Michel & Associates, the firm that won the case in district court and then before the three-judge panel.

In the past, every Ninth Circuit panel ruling in favor of the Second Amendment was later overturned en banc. That could still happen, but it’s no longer certain, thank to President Trump’s many judicial appointments. The Ninth Circuit has 27 judges on active status. (Senior status judges do not vote on or participate in en bancs.) A majority vote is needed to take up a case en banc. Here is a flow chart for the procedural steps towards a decision to take a case en banc; and here is a written description of procedures, by Michel & Associates.

Because the Ninth Circuit is so large, an en banc does not include all active judges. According to Ninth Circuit Rule 35-3, an en banc panel always includes the Chief Judge. The present Chief Judge, Sidney Thomas (Clinton, 1996), has been active in effectuating en banc reversals.  For the rest of the en banc panel, ten additional active judges are chosen at random, to create a panel of 11.  Active judges on the Ninth Circuit include 10 appointed by Donald Trump, 7 by Barack Obama, 3 by George W. Bush, and 9 by Bill Clinton. That’s a total of 16 appointed by Democrats versus 13 by Republicans.

At present, no announcement has been made about whether the New Jersey plaintiffs will file a petition for en banc review by the Third Circuit. The active judges on the court currently consist of two Clinton appointees, four Obama, four George W. Bush, and four Trump.

Supreme Court: If the panel decision in Duncan survives, or if an en banc Third Circuit reverses the panel, there would be a circuit split. Magazine bans have been upheld by the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits. In the latter three circuits there were strong dissents. The D.C. dissent, in the Heller II case, was written by then-Judge Kavanaugh.

A circuit split is, in itself, not necessarily sufficient to get the Supreme Court’s attention. Even a well-established circuit split may just be left as is. For example: If an adult passes a fingerprint-based background check and safety training, should the person be allowed to carry a concealed handgun, for lawful self-defense? The D.C. and Seventh Circuits have answered “yes.” Five other circuits have said that the right to bear arms may be denied unless the applicant shows a special need. (1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 9th Cirs.) In some states, such as Hawaii, special need is construed to be non-existent.

In May 2020, the Supreme Court denied cert. in ten cases involving the Second Amendment—including a New Jersey case, Rogers v. Grewal, that would have been perfect to examine the right to bear arms.

According to CNN journalist Joan Biskupic, “sources have told CNN that the justices on the right did not believe they could depend on a fifth vote from Roberts.” Joan Biskupic, Behind closed doors during one of John Roberts’ most surprising years on the Supreme Court, CNN.com, July 27, 2020.

Magazine bans in the Pacific: Hawaii bans handgun magazines over 10 rounds. A proposal to extend the ban to rifles was defeated in the 2020 legislature. If the Duncan panel decision remains good law, the Hawaii handgun magazine ban would have to fall.

Like Hawaii, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands is part of the Ninth Circuit. The Commonwealth bans magazines over 10 rounds. That ban too would be invalid under Duncan.

The Third Circuit covers New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. None of the other jurisdictions in the Circuit have magazine bans. (Virgin Islands laws are here.)

Case histories. California in 2000 prohibited the manufacture, import, and sale of so-called “large capacity magazines,” defined as magazines holding more than 10 rounds. A 2013 revision forbade purchase or receipt of such magazines. In 2016, the California legislature outlawed mere possession. Magazine owners must remove the magazines from  the  state,  sell  them  to  a  firearms  dealer,  or  surrender  them to law enforcement for destruction. There are exemptions for police, retired police, government use, and film-making. Cal. Penal Code sect. 32310.

In Duncan, the federal district court issued a preliminary injunction against confiscation. That decision was upheld by a 2-1 panel in the Ninth Circuit, which emphasized district judges’ broad discretion to issue a preliminary injunction, or not. The panel discussed some of the pro/con evidence that had been introduced thus far; in the majority view, the district judge’s weighing and interpretation of the evidence was not an abuse of discretion. 742 F. Appx. 218 (9th Cir. 2018). I filed an Amicus brief in support of upholding the preliminary injunction. I wrote about the Ninth Circuit decision here.

While the preliminary injunction appeal was proceeding, the district court moved the case forward. In March 2019, U.S. District Judge Roger T. Benitez ruled in favor of plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and held the confiscation statute unconstitutional. My analysis of the 86 page opinion is here.  Shortly after the district court decision, the California Attorney General sought and a Ninth Circuit motions panel granted a temporary stay. Under the stay, confiscation did not take place, but Californians were not allowed to acquire magazines over 10 rounds.  That status quo remains today, as explained in a FAQ from the California Rifle & Pistol Association.

New Jersey in 1990 enacted a 15 round limit, with a limited form of grandfathering for larger magazines. In 2018, the legislature reduced the limit to 10 rounds, and ordered the confiscation of magazines larger than 10 rounds.

The day the law went into effect, plaintiffs filed the case Association of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs (NJ Rifle I). The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. On expedited appeal in 2018, the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the injunction by 2-1. 910 F.3d 106. When the case returned to the district court, the court declared that the Third Circuit panel opinion on the preliminary injunction had conclusively resolved all the legal merits in the case, and so the district court was bound to uphold the confiscation statute.

The district court’s decision in NJ Rifle II was appealed. I filed an amicus brief in the case, and wrote about the case here, along with a detailed history of magazines holding more than 10 rounds.

By 2-1, the Third Circuit in agreed that the prior panel decision, on the preliminary injunction, had conclusively resolved all the legal issues, and was binding. Accordingly, the majority did not address constitutional merits.

The dissent in NJ Rifle II disagreed that the preliminary injunction panel had been binding on the merits; the dissent presented arguments why the confiscation violates the Second Amendment under various standards of review.

The Duncan and Association opinions. The Duncan panel decision was written by Judge Kenneth K. Lee (Trump 2019, replacing Stephen Reinhardt), joined by Consuelo M. Callahan (G.W. Bush 2003). Barbara M. G. Lynn, Chief Judge of the Northern District of Texas (Clinton 1999) sat on the panel by designation, and dissented.

The NJ Rifle II panel decision was written by Kent A. Jordan (G.W. Bush 2006) and joined by Jane R. Roth (G.H.W. Bush 2001, senior status 2006).  Judge Paul B. Matey (Trump 2018) dissented.

Here are some key differences and agreements among the judges in the two circuits–with the caveat that the NJ Rifle II majority did not address the merits.

Structure of Review. All circuits except the Eighth employ a two-part test for Second Amendment cases: “(1) whether the law burdens conduct protected by  the  Second  Amendment;  and  (2)  if  so,  what  level  of  scrutiny to apply to the regulation.”

The first part of the test asks whether the case involves a Second Amendment issue. In Heller, the Supreme Court said that “dangerous and unusual weapons” are not protected by the Second Amendment. So if someone brought a Second Amendment challenge against a statute the prohibited possession of sarin gas, a court would reject the challenge at part one, because sarin gas is not protected by the Second Amendment.

All the judges in Duncan and NJ Rifle I used the two-part test. Dissenting in NJ Rifle II, Judge Matey wrote that text, history, and tradition was the proper test under Heller, and the that confiscation law plainly failed the test. (For reasons discussed below.) Then-Judge Kavanaugh had used text, history, and tradition in his Heller II dissent. As Judge Matey explained, the two-part test has often devolved into judicial interest-balancing—which is precisely what the Heller majority had rejected, and which Justice Breyer had advocated in his Heller dissent. Like the NJ Rifle II dissent, the district court in Duncan did use the two part-test as one mode of analysis, but criticized it as excessively complicated compared to Heller‘s “simple test” of text, history, tradition. The Ninth Circuit panel in Duncan briefly noted the criticism, did not disagree with it, but stated that the panel was bound by Ninth Circuit precedent to use the test.

How common are the banned magazines, and how much does that matter? Magazines holding over 10 rounds number in the many tens of millions. They are nearly half of all magazines currently possessed in the United States. Magazines are integral to the operation of a firearm. All judges were in agreement on these facts.

According to some judges, the confiscation of property that is widely owned to exercise constitutional rights should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. According to other judges, magazines over 10 rounds aren’t important for lawful defense of self or others. So intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review.

In terms of objective standards for what is useful for the lawful defense of self and others, it might be noted United States Marshals, who guard the federal courts, often carry .40 caliber Glock pistols. Their standard magazine is 15 rounds.  The standard arm of the New Jersey State Police is a handgun with a 15 round magazine. (NJ Rifle II, at 7).

Pursuant to Heller (which had brushed aside D.C.’s argument that long guns are adequate substitutes for handguns for defensive purposes), the Duncan majority wrote: “the Second Amendment limits the state’s ability to second-guess  a  citizen’s  choice  of  arms  if  it  imposes  a  substantial  burden on her right to self-defense.” “Simply  put,  any  law  that  comes  close to categorically banning the possession of arms that are commonly   used   for   self-defense   imposes   a   substantial   burden on the Second Amendment.” Moreover:

We would be looking through the wrong end  of  a  sight-glass  if  we  asked  whether  the  government  permits  the  people  to  retain  some  of  the  core  fundamental  and enumerated right. Instead, Heller counsels us to look at whether   the   government   regulation   restricts   the   core   fundamental right from the outset. In other words, we look to  what  a  restriction  takes  away  rather  than  what  it  leaves  behind. …Here,  the  state  effectively  intrudes  into  the  homes  of  law-abiding citizens to forcibly confiscate arms that they rely on for  self-defense…..When  the  government  bans  tens  of  millions  of  protected arms that are staples of self-defense and threatens to confiscate them from the homes of law-abiding citizens, that   imposes   a   substantial   burden   on   core   Second   Amendment rights.

As the Duncan dissent pointed out, magazines over 10 rounds might be common in the United States as a whole, but they are presumably not so common in California, thanks to the 2000 ban on sales. The Duncan majority retorted that a prohibition cannot be its own justification. In the Supreme Court’s District of Columbia v. Heller, the District had banned handguns, so lawful handguns were uncommon in the District. The Heller decision looked at how common handguns were in the United States, not just in a single jurisdiction.

Legal History. Heller had stated that certain “longstanding” laws were “presumptively” (but not conclusively) constitutional. As examples, the opinion listed bans on firearms possession by felons and the mentally ill; prohibitions against carrying firearms in schools and government buildings; and regulations on the commercial sale of firearms. The California magazine ban did not fit any of the presumptively constitutional categories.

Magazine bans have been the exception, not the norm, in American history. The current set of magazine bans in some states dates back only to 1990, with a New Jersey statute that banned the acquisition of magazines over 15 rounds.

During alcohol prohibition in the 1920s, a few states enacted firearms capacity laws, but none of those were was sweeping as the current California and New Jersey statutes. Nor was the capacity as low as 10. All of the alcohol prohibition state laws were later repealed, so they are not “longstanding.”

The above legal history was presented by the judges who found confiscation unconstitutional, and was not disputed by the other judges.

Not “dangerous and unusual.” According to Heller, arms that are “dangerous and unusual” are not protected by the Second Amendment. Magazines over 10 rounds are common, and therefore not unusual. Therefore, they cannot be dangerous and unusual. The Duncan majority cited evidence that there are 115 million such magazines in circulation. Whatever the exact numbers, such magazines number in the many tens of millions in the United States. Like handguns in Heller, magazines over 10 rounds are “commonly  owned  and  typically  possessed  for  lawful  purposes.” (Duncan, slightly paraphrasing Heller.) No judge in the United States has ever accepted the claim that magazines over 10 rounds are “dangerous and unusual.”

Applying strict scrutiny. The three judges who used strict scrutiny did so straightforwardly. Under strict scrutiny, the government’s restriction on a right must be “narrowly  tailored.” It must be “the least restrictive means of achieving” the government’s interests. Confiscation was just the opposite: “a statewide   blanket ban on possession everywhere and for nearly everyone.” (Duncan). As Judge Matey pointed out in NJ Rifle II, the state had produced no evidence that magazine bans save lives, and no justification why a 15 round limit was alright in 1990 but confiscation of everything over 10 was necessary in 2020.

Applying intermediate scrutiny. All judges who addressed the merits examined the statute under intermediate scrutiny, at least as an alternative approach.

Intermediate scrutiny looks for “a  reasonable  fit  between  the  challenged  regulation and the asserted objective.”

According to the Duncan majority, a blanket ban for everyone “is excessive and sloppy.”

It applies  to  rural  and  urban  areas,  in  places  with  low  crime  rates  and  high  crime  rates,  areas  where  law  enforcement  response  times  may  be  significant,  to  those  who  may  have  high degrees of proficiency in their use for self-defense, and to  vulnerable  groups  who  are  in  the  greatest  need  of  self-defense. The law also prohibits possession outright. And it applies  to  all  firearms,  including  handguns  that  are  the  “quintessential   self-defense   weapon.” (citing Heller)…. The  state  could  ban  virtually  anything  if  the  test  is  merely  whether  something  causes  social  ills  when  someone  other  than its  lawful  owner  misuses  it.  Adopting  such  a  radical  position would give the government carte blanche to restrict the people’s liberties under the guise of protecting them.

Under either intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny, the government bears the burden of proof. Yet the California Attorney General’s evidence was “thin.” A survey of mass shootings in California found that only 3 of 17 involved a magazine over 10 rounds. None of these magazines were legally obtained in California. So the rationale for confiscating all such magazines from legal owners in California was unsupported.

Dissenting in Duncan, Judge Lynn was agnostic about whether magazine confiscation burdened Second Amendment conduct at all (Part 1 of the two-part test.) But she was sure that the confiscation passed intermediate scrutiny. The Attorney General had presented some evidence that magazine bans were effective, and that was sufficient; at least, the case should not have been decided at the summary judgment stage.

In NJ Rifle II, the state had argued that that that time needed to replace an empty magazine (2-4 seconds) allowed some victims of a mass shooting to escape or to counter-attack the shooter. But this was just speculation, replied dissenting Judge Matey. The evidence showed that that large majority of mass shooters use more than one gun. Moreover, the average interval between shots in a mass shooting is more than 2-4 seconds, so a magazine could be switched without missing a beat. The N.J. Attorney General had not met the intermediate scrutiny standard of “reasonable inferences based   on substantial evidence.”

Material history: Heller stated that the Second Amendment, like the First Amendment, is not limited to the technology that existed in 1791.

However, as the Ninth Circuit and Judge Matey detailed, firearms holding more than ten rounds predate the Second Amendment by two centuries. No judge in the United States has disputed the accuracy of the history detailed by the Duncan majority and the N.J. Rifle II dissent.

The Duncan opinion provided three pages of gun technology history, from the sixteenth century to the present. Judge Matey’s NJ Rifle II dissent also surveyed material history.

Below is a photo of a 16-shot wheel-lock firearm, built sometime before the 1600. (Photo by Michael Ives, for an article in America’s 1st Freedom.)

16-Shot Wheel Lock

When the user pulled the trigger, all sixteen shots would fire in sequence. By the 1700s, gun designers had figured out how to let the user fire one shot at a time.

At the time the Second Amendment was ratified, the state of the art was the 22 shot Girandoni air rifle. Carried on the Lewis & Clark expedition, it was ballistically equal to a powder gun. (This photo and ones below are used courtesy of NRA Museums.)

Although the Lewis and Clark expedition, consisting of a few dozen people, was often outnumbered, they made a point of demonstrating the Girandoni when encountering a new group. As a result, they were rarely molested. (For details, see the video by NRA Museum Senior Curator Phil Schrier, at the bottom of the NRA Museum page on the Girandoni.)

That is one of the purposes of magazines with adequate ammunition capacity: to allow self-defense by someone who is outnumbered. The Duncan opinion addressed anti-mob utility in detail, explaining how repeating rifles were used to deter lynch mobs during Jim Crow.

Such guns were expensive in the eighteenth, seventeenth, and sixteenth centuries. By 1866, when Congress sent the Fourteenth Amendment to the States for ratification, improved manufacturing techniques (such as interchangeable parts) had made such guns broadly affordable. Examples include the Winchester Model 66, below. The Winchester’s  capacity was up to 18 rounds, depending on caliber.

Before the turn of the 20th century, semi-automatic handguns with detachable magazines were being produced. The picture below is a Luger pistol with its optional 32-round snail drum magazine. (Picture of a 1914 exemplar.)

Since then, handguns haven’t changed all that much, other than in better quality. Improvements in machine tools mean that parts are better made these days. Plastic polymers were introduced to firearms manufacturing in the 1950s, so many guns today use plastic for some of the parts. (While adhering to federal law, 18 U.S.C. 922(r), that a firearm must have at least 4 1/2 ounces of metal, in the silhouette of a gun.) The invention of double-stack magazines made magazines more compact, so in the Glock 17 pistol below (invented early 1980s), the 17 round magazine fits entirely inside the grip.

For more on magazine history, see my article The History of Firearm Magazines and Magazine Prohibitions, 78 Albany Law Review 849 (2015), and see also Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, Pistols, Crime, and Public: Safety In Early America, 44 Willamette L. Rev. 699 (2008). Both articles were cited in Duncan, and the first article was cited by the dissent in NJ Rifle II.

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New Footage Of Sino-Indian Border Hand-To-Hand Clash Hits The Web As Tensions Soar

New Footage Of Sino-Indian Border Hand-To-Hand Clash Hits The Web As Tensions Soar

Tyler Durden

Tue, 09/08/2020 – 19:20

New dramatic video is circulating on Chinese social media purporting to show a recent fierce clash along the flashpoint Himalayan Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control (LAC).

The video, which appears to show a major hand-to-hand combat incident between large groups of Chinese PLA and Indian soldiers, is of unknown date and origin but is being described as the “newest” among circulating border fight videos.

While nearly impossible to verify the precise location or authenticity of the video, it was reposted by Carl Zha, who Western media reports often describe as a Chinese-American Twitter user and “pro-Beijing influencer”.

The video may be months old, and is being circulated on the same day that China and India have each accused the other of firing shots across the LAC. The footage shows sticks and metal rods being used, and possibly the butts of rifles, given some of the soldiers appear to be armed, but no shots are fired in the clip.

Beijing charged India with a “severe military provocation” after it claimed Indian troops breached the LAC and entered the Chinese administered side. The Indian troops then “opened fire to threaten the Chinese border defense patrol officers,” according to the PLA charge on Tuesday.

Other videos showing intense border clashes, such as the one below posted to YouTube in early June, sometimes involve sticks and rocks, and other makeshift weapons.

The initial events of June 15 were what set off current soaring tensions, with both sides lately seeking to deescalate through a series of talks by each’s military high command.

The June 15 clash, considered the single deadliest border incident not involving firearms in the contested region’s history, saw the rival sides enter hand-to-hand combat, resulting in 20 Indian troop deaths and a presumed unknown number of PLA casualties. 

The Indian troops may have actually fallen to their deaths amid the high altitude nighttime melee, though details remain disputed and unclear. 

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The Trojan Donkey

The Trojan Donkey

Tyler Durden

Tue, 09/08/2020 – 19:00

Authored by Jeff Thomas via InternationalMan.com,

Since earning the nomination as the 2020 Democratic candidate for the presidency, Joe Biden has stated that he is a “transition candidate.”

This was an odd statement, especially for someone who has hardly begun his formal campaign. (He’s not even in office yet and he’s discussing being on the way out?)

Yet this was not just another one-off Biden gaff, as has been suggested by some. Since announcing his pick for vice president, he has stated, “Look, I view myself as a bridge, not as anything else.”

So what’s up here? The candidate is only a place-holder for the real, intended president?

Well, let’s have a look at that possibility.

Joe Biden, by any measure, is a poor candidate for the office. After almost half a century in politics, he’s had a career mostly as a political hack who would support any issue that seemed popular at the time. Similarly, his voting record in the Senate has been that of a man who supported whatever bill would please his peers and further his career.

Seemingly, he either has no inner core of belief, or he’s been willing to sacrifice it at a moment’s notice, if it might help his next election. After forty-seven years of elected office, he’s not regarded as having a commitment to… well, anything.

And yet he became the choice of the Democratic party as one candidate after another dropped out of the presidential race. Clearly this was a party that was not only leaderless, but couldn’t even seem to invent a leader for the sake of the election.

Kamala Harris, his presumptive vice president, dropped out of the presidential race in December 2019, when her popularity amongst democrats dropped to 3.4%. Since democrats make up roughly half of the population, this means that less than 2% of Americans would have wanted her as their president.

And yet, as stated above, candidate Biden announces, “Look, I view myself as a bridge, not as anything else.”

That’s quite curious. He apparently is stating that his only purpose is to win the election, then pass the baton to the next leader. Presumably, his vice president.

This has never occurred in US politics, although it is true that, at this point, Mr. Biden may well be too far gone to even begin to handle the job.

And that leads us to the possibility that the deal has already been brokered – that Mr. Biden would win the election, then have, let’s say, a “medical emergency,” at which point he would pass the reins to the new president – Kamala Harris.

Clearly, Ms. Harris could not have been elected on her own merit, as even democrats found her to be fundamentally lacking last December. Even the more radical elements of the party have sensed that she is untrustworthy and even dangerous.

At this point in America’s history, there’s much debate as to whether the president is the supreme leader, or whether he or she is merely the face presented by the Deep State, who run the country from the background and give the president his marching orders.

Either way, this eventuality would not bode well for the US. As supreme leader, Ms. Harris, based upon her reputation, would be an autocratic figure who behaved rather ruthlessly toward those who failed to comply with her edicts.

But as the figurehead for the Deep State, she would be a very powerful tool, implementing the loss of freedoms that were passed into law with the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act and the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act.

These two acts, taken together, essentially eliminate the US Constitution in practical terms. All that’s necessary to implement them would be for a highly demonstrative president to declare a national emergency. Both acts would then be in force.

It would not be difficult to imagine Ms. Harris in this role.

Presently, we’re watching a very odd set of events unfolding in the US.

Major cities have seen months of continual protests and even rioting, which apparently have been very organized and well-funded.

In a normal situation, the mayors and governors would call in the police to quell such riots.

Yet we’re seeing the opposite. Local political leaders are consistently hamstringing local police, making it impossible for them to do their jobs, thereby increasing the extent of devastation by rioters.

Rioters are routinely let off with a slap on the wrist, whilst those who defend their homes from rioters are arrested and charged.

This, of course, is the exact opposite of what the Rule of Law is meant to achieve.

There’s every reason to believe that this condition will continue to worsen well after the 2020 election, and at some point, Americans from both the right and left will find themselves begging for the federal government to step in – to return the US to a state of relative safety.

Central governments, of course, perennially dislike local policing, as local police tend to be loyal their own communities. However, federal troops have no such loyalty. They perform as their superiors dictate, regardless of where they are deployed.

But once the local police have been gotten out of the way, it would be quite easy for an authoritarian president to deploy federal troops to re-establish order, and initially, this would meet with the approval of worried Americans.

Historically, this has occurred countless times throughout the world. In every case, martial law is instituted as a “temporary measure,” to quell existing unrest. But, as Milton Friedman said,Nothing is so permanent as a temporary government program.”

If this development is in America’s future, as events indicate, it’s likely that the media will repeat the words, “public safety” endlessly as the situation unfolds. The words “martial law” and “police state” may be heard amongst some of the populace, but will be unlikely to dominate the news programmes.

Another word that’s unlikely to appear often in the media is “tyranny,” yet this will be precisely the result of the introduction of a police state.

But all the above is dependent upon a political leader who has the forceful demeanour to ensure that the job gets done with a minimum of dissent.

The American public are therefore left to ponder whether it may be that a vastly unpopular Trojan donkey may be closer to the presidency than she presently appears.

*  *  *

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via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/3ibeIkN Tyler Durden