California Lawmakers Pass Bill Limiting Police Use of Deadly Force

A bill requiring police to be more careful when applying deadly force against citizens has passed the California legislature and is now heading to the governor’s desk.

AB 392, first introduced by California Assemblymember Shirley Weber (D–San Diego), changes how police across the state are expected to evaluate conditions and dangers before resorting to deadly force. Currently, the state requires that police have a “reasonable fear” that they were in danger. Thus, police can argue that the use of deadly force is justified based on what they think might happen, even if it turns out that they were mistaken and there was no actual threat.

Under AB 392, these rules will change. In the text of the bill, a killing by a police officer will be considered justified when:

“the officer reasonably believes, based on the totality of the circumstances, that deadly force is necessary to defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person, or to apprehend a fleeing person for a felony that threatened or resulted in death or serious bodily injury, if the officer reasonably believes that the person will cause death or serious bodily injury to another unless the person is immediately apprehended.”

In other words, the police officer has to be able to argue that there is an actual imminent threat in order to justify using deadly force.

The bill was originally introduced in the wake of Stephon Clark’s killing by Sacramento Police in March 2018. Police, responding to 911 calls about vehicle break-ins, identified Clark as a suspect, and chased him into a backyard. There, two officers apparently mistook Clark’s cellphone for a gun and opened fire on Clark, shooting him eight times and killing him.

The incident was captured on officers’ body cameras, but the Sacramento District Attorney’s office ultimately decided not to charge the officers, taking the position that the two officers genuinely feared that Clark actually had a gun, and therefore the shooting was justified and the officers “acted lawfully.”

Clark’s death prompted outrage and calls for reform in the state’s rules on police deadly force. AB 392 passed the state’s Assembly in May and finally passed the state Senate on Monday by a vote of 34-3.

The bill has been watered down significantly in order to overcome resistance by law enforcement groups. The bill once had an objective definition of what it meant when it called deadly force “necessary” (that a reasonable police officer in the same situation would objectively conclude there was no alternative) that has been removed, leaving it for prosecutors and juries to determine. The bill has been amended to make it clear that officers do not have a duty to retreat when faced with a confrontation, nor do they lose the right to claim self-defense when using reasonable force to arrest somebody or to prevent them from escaping. It does, however, explain that retreating does not mean “tactical repositioning or other de-escalation tactics.” In the Clark case, the officers were in a position where they could have safely backed away from him and would have likely realized quickly he did not have a gun.

The bill now heads to the desk of Gov. Gavin Newsom, a Democrat. He praised the bill in May and is expected to sign it into law.

Use of force incidents by police in California is on the decline across the state, and perhaps AB 392 will help. A new report released last week shows a 20 percent drop in instances of use for force from 2016, declining from 782 incidents in a year to 628. In one-third of the 2018 cases, civilians were shot, and 146 were killed.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/2JoIkfl
via IFTTT

Flynn Designated As Co-Conspirator In FARA Case Against Ex-Business Partner

Federal prosecutors will not call on Michael Flynn to testify in the trial against his former business partner, and is instead being listed as a co-conspirator in the case which concerns illegal lobbying for Turkey in an effort to expel a Turkish cleric living in exile in the United States, according to The Hill

Ret. Gen. Michael Flynn

“the government will not be calling Michael T. Flynn as a witness in its case-in-chief,” reads an unsealed July 3 order from US District Judge Anthony Trenga in the Eastern District of Virginia.

Flynn’s attorney, Sidney Powell, took umbrage at the government’s label of “co-conspirator,” telling The Hill: “General Flynn followed the law and hired the FARA experts. The government is seeking to admit one document as ‘coconspirator hearsay’ even though it is otherwise admissible,” adding “Judge Trenga hasn’t ruled on anything yet but unsealing. General Flynn is still cooperating with the government even if they don’t call him as a witness.

Bijan Kian

Powell provided The Hill with a 113-page memo opposing the designation, which reads in part: “While Mr. Flynn does not dispute the government’s right to decide how to present its case and which witnesses to call, the government’s sudden decision to reverse its long-stated position that Mr. Flynn is its cooperating witness, and to turn him into an unindicted coconspirator, is extremely prejudicial to Mr. Flynn.” 

Kian was charged alongside Turkish national Kamil Ekim Alptekin last December with acting as an unregistered foreign agent in connection with the now-defunct Flynn Intel Group’s lobbying activities on behalf of the Turkish government.

Flynn was widely expected to testify at Kian’s trial, which is slated to begin on July 15.

Powell said at a status conference on June 24 in Washington, D.C. — where Flynn’s separate trial is being held — that her client still anticipated testifying against Kian.

Oh yes, sir. That cooperation is fully ongoing,” Powell told Judge Emmet Sullivan, a Clinton appointee. –The Hill

Flynn pleaded guilty in December 2017 to lying to the FBI about his discussions with the Russian ambassador, and agreed to cooperate with Robert Mueller’s now-over special counsel investigation as well as the Kian case. Mueller as recommended that Flynn receive little to no jail time.

Tuesday’s filing indicates that a hearing was held in Alexandria, Va., the same day that Flynn challenged the new designation, about whether the court filings should remain under seal.

Trenga said in the order that he determined that some of the court documents should be unsealed, while others — largely those made by government lawyers — should remain under guard.

Kian pleaded not guilty shortly after he was charged and is set to go to trial next week. –The Hill

Flynn’s sentencing, originally scheduled for last December, has been delayed several times in order to cooperate in the Kian case. 

Kian, meanwhile, (who also goes by Bijan Rafiekian and Alptekin) “conspired covertly and unlawfully to influence U.S. politicians and public opinion concerning a Turkish citizen living in the United States whose extradition was then being sought by the Government of Turkey,” according to filings. 

While Flynn’s name is not in the original indictment against Kian, he matches the description of “Person A,” who is one of the co-founders of “Company A.” 

And now, Flynn is known as “co-conspirator.” 

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/2XBtLsH Tyler Durden

California Lawmakers Pass Bill Limiting Police Use of Deadly Force

A bill requiring police to be more careful when applying deadly force against citizens has passed the California legislature and is now heading to the governor’s desk.

AB 392, first introduced by California Assemblymember Shirley Weber (D–San Diego), changes how police across the state are expected to evaluate conditions and dangers before resorting to deadly force. Currently, the state requires that police have a “reasonable fear” that they were in danger. Thus, police can argue that the use of deadly force is justified based on what they think might happen, even if it turns out that they were mistaken and there was no actual threat.

Under AB 392, these rules will change. In the text of the bill, a killing by a police officer will be considered justified when:

“the officer reasonably believes, based on the totality of the circumstances, that deadly force is necessary to defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person, or to apprehend a fleeing person for a felony that threatened or resulted in death or serious bodily injury, if the officer reasonably believes that the person will cause death or serious bodily injury to another unless the person is immediately apprehended.”

In other words, the police officer has to be able to argue that there is an actual imminent threat in order to justify using deadly force.

The bill was originally introduced in the wake of Stephon Clark’s killing by Sacramento Police in March 2018. Police, responding to 911 calls about vehicle break-ins, identified Clark as a suspect, and chased him into a backyard. There, two officers apparently mistook Clark’s cellphone for a gun and opened fire on Clark, shooting him eight times and killing him.

The incident was captured on officers’ body cameras, but the Sacramento District Attorney’s office ultimately decided not to charge the officers, taking the position that the two officers genuinely feared that Clark actually had a gun, and therefore the shooting was justified and the officers “acted lawfully.”

Clark’s death prompted outrage and calls for reform in the state’s rules on police deadly force. AB 392 passed the state’s Assembly in May and finally passed the state Senate on Monday by a vote of 34-3.

The bill has been watered down significantly in order to overcome resistance by law enforcement groups. The bill once had an objective definition of what it meant when it called deadly force “necessary” (that a reasonable police officer in the same situation would objectively conclude there was no alternative) that has been removed, leaving it for prosecutors and juries to determine. The bill has been amended to make it clear that officers do not have a duty to retreat when faced with a confrontation, nor do they lose the right to claim self-defense when using reasonable force to arrest somebody or to prevent them from escaping. It does, however, explain that retreating does not mean “tactical repositioning or other de-escalation tactics.” In the Clark case, the officers were in a position where they could have safely backed away from him and would have likely realized quickly he did not have a gun.

The bill now heads to the desk of Gov. Gavin Newsom, a Democrat. He praised the bill in May and is expected to sign it into law.

Use of force incidents by police in California is on the decline across the state, and perhaps AB 392 will help. A new report released last week shows a 20 percent drop in instances of use for force from 2016, declining from 782 incidents in a year to 628. In one-third of the 2018 cases, civilians were shot, and 146 were killed.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/2JoIkfl
via IFTTT

Be Skeptical About Bernie Sanders’ Financial Transactions Tax

Taxing financial transactions is a popular proposal among Democrats to fund new government programs—but some on the center-left have called into question how much revenue such a tax would generate.

Democratic presidential candidates Sen. Bernie Sanders (I–Vt.) and Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D–N.Y.), along with several other members of Congress, have introduced a bill that would tax financial transactions. It would levy a tax of 0.5 percent on stock trades, 0.1 percent on bond trades, and 0.005 percent on derivatives trades. Sanders promises that this new tax will raise $2.4 trillion over the next decade, citing a study from University of Massachusetts economists; he plans to use that revenue to fund free college, student loan debt forgiveness, expanded Pell Grants, support for historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs), and increased investment in K-12 education. 

Sanders says the bill will help “rein in the recklessness of Wall Street billionaires and build an economy that works for all Americans.”

But even if you buy that premise, there are plenty of questions about how effective a financial transactions tax would be in raising revenue. 

As senior fellow Howard Gleckman of the center-left Tax Policy Center wrote recently, Sanders proposed a similar financial transactions tax (FTT) in 2016, and some economists promised it would generate almost $3 trillion in tax revenue over a decade. Meanwhile, the Tax Policy Center found that the tax would raise only $400 billion over ten years. Why the difference? The Tax Policy Center estimated that the tax would dramatically reduce the number of transactions on financial markets, reducing both the FTT’s tax base and revenue from taxes on realized capital gains. By raising transaction costs, fewer investors will sell stocks, which means less taxable capital gains income.

The Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) analysis mirrors the Tax Policy Center’s, estimating that a FTT similar to the one Sanders proposed would raise under $800 billion over a decade. The CBO has also reported that FTTs pose a threat for public finances of federal, state, and local governments, by reducing liquidity in the bond market and increasing costs faced by pension programs.  

Other countries’ experiences with FTTs suggest that it is right to be skeptical about Sanders’ claims. When Sweden implemented the tax, 60 percent of transactions on Sweden’s stock market moved to other countries, and as a result, overall tax revenue actually went down. Not only did the FTT not raise as much revenue as hoped, but moving stock market transactions to other countries and increasing transaction costs also reduced revenue from taxes on capital gains.

This debate, between firebrand progressives and the more moderate center-left, mirrors a recent back-and-forth about fellow presidential contender Elizabeth Warren’s wealth tax.

Both the wealth tax and the financial transactions tax are appealing revenue sources to progressives, as they both target clear villains: wealthy heirs and greedy Wall Street traders. Both taxes seem deceptively modest, with a seemingly low tax rate: Warren often calls her wealth tax proposal “the two-cent tax” on the “tippy-top.” 

But the problem with this framing in the case of the FTT, as Nicole Kaeding, the nonpartisan Tax Foundation’s vice president of federal projects, points out, is that a very low tax rate that promises to raise a lot of revenue is probably a result of “tax pyramiding,” or the taxation of the same money over and over again.

As Reason’s Peter Suderman wrote, to pay for their extravagant spending proposals, Democratic presidential candidates wouldn’t be able to rely on these targeted tax hikes on the super-rich. Instead, they’d have to tax like Scandinavia, which would mean major tax increases across the middle class. Bernie himself admitted that the middle-class would have to pay higher taxes at the most recent Democratic debate.

It’s worth noting, too, that the FTT wouldn’t just hit Wall Street traders. It would hit middle-class retirement savings and local pension programs. By raising the cost of investment, it could reduce long-run economic growth. All that, and it would probably fall short of raising the promised revenue, too.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/2Lb46p7
via IFTTT

Second Circuit: Unconstitutional for @RealDonaldTrump to Block Twitter Users Based on Viewpoint

From today’s opinion in Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump: written by Judge Barrington D. Parker and joined by Judges Peter W. Hall and Christopher F. Droney:

[A.] The President contends that [his @RealDonaldTrump Twitter] Account is exclusively a vehicle for his own speech to which the Individual Plaintiffs have no right of access and to which the First Amendment does not apply.

Secondarily, he argues that, in any event, the Account is not a public forum and that even if the Account were a public forum, blocking the Individual Plaintiffs did not prevent them from accessing the forum.

The President further argues that, to the extent the Account is government‐controlled, posts on it are government speech to which the First Amendment does not apply.

We are not persuaded. We conclude that the evidence of the official nature of the Account is overwhelming. We also conclude that once the President has chosen a platform and opened up its interactive space to millions of users and participants, he may not selectively exclude those whose views he disagrees with.

[B.] The President concedes that he blocked the Individual Plaintiffs because they posted tweets that criticized him or his policies. He also concedes that such criticism is protected speech.

The issue then for this Court to resolve is whether, in blocking the Individual Plaintiffs from the interactive features of the Account, the President acted in a governmental capacity or as a private The President maintains that Twitter is a privately owned and operated social media platform that he has used since 2009 to share his opinions on popular culture, world affairs, and politics.

Since he became President, he contends, the private nature of the Account has not changed. In his view, the Account is not a space owned or controlled by the government. Rather, it is a platform for his own private speech and not one for the private expression of others. Because the Account is private, he argues, First Amendment issues and forum analysis are not implicated. Although Twitter facilitates robust public debate on the Account, the President contends that it is simply the means through which he participates in a forum and not a public forum in and of itself.

No one disputes that the First Amendment restricts government regulation of private speech but does not regulate purely private speech. If, in blocking, the President were acting in a governmental capacity, then he may not discriminate based on viewpoint among the private speech occurring in the Account’s interactive space.

As noted, the government argues first that the Account is the President’s private property because he opened it in 2009 as a personal account and he will retain personal control over the Account after his presidency. However, the fact that government control over property is temporary, or that the government does not “own” the property in the sense that it holds title to the property, is not determinative of whether the property is, in fact, sufficiently controlled by the government to make it a forum for First Amendment purposes. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547‐52 (1975) (holding privately‐owned theater leased to and operated by city was public forum). {5 See also Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 749 (1996) (plurality opinion) (stating that “public forums are places that the government has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity” (internal quotation marks omitted)); S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (considering “question of whether a particular piece of personal or real property owned or controlled by the government” is a public forum (emphasis added)).} Temporary control by the government can still be control for First Amendment purposes.

The government’s contention that the President’s use of the Account during his presidency is private founders in the face of the uncontested evidence in the record of substantial and pervasive government involvement with, and control over, the Account. First, the Account is presented by the President and the White House staff as belonging to, and operated by, the President. The Account is registered to “Donald J. Trump, ’45th President of the United States of America, Washington, D.C.'” App’x at 54. The President has described his use of the Account as “MODERN DAY PRESIDENTIAL.” The White House social media director has described the Account as a channel through which “President Donald J. Trump . . . [c]ommunicat[es] directly with you, the American people!” The @WhiteHouse account, an undoubtedly official Twitter account run by the government, “directs Twitter users to ‘Follow for the latest from @POTUS @realDonaldTrump and his Administration.” Further, the @POTUS account frequently republishes tweets from the Account…. [A]ccording to the National Archives and Records Administration, the President’s tweets from the Account “are official records that must be preserved under the Presidential Records Act.”

Second, since becoming President he has used the Account on almost a daily basis “as a channel for communicating and interacting with the public about his administration.” The President utilizes White House staff to post tweets and to maintain the Account. He uses the Account to announce “matters related to official government business,” including high‐level White House and cabinet‐level staff changes as well as changes to major national policies. He uses the Account to engage with foreign leaders and to announce foreign policy decisions and initiatives.

Finally, he uses the “like,” “retweet,” “reply,” and other functions of the Account to understand and to evaluate the public’s reaction to what he says and does. In sum, since he took office, the President has consistently used the Account as an important tool of governance and executive outreach. For these reasons, we conclude that the factors pointing to the public, non‐private nature of the Account and its interactive features are

The government’s response is that the President is not acting in his official capacity when he blocks users because that function is available to all users, not only to government officials. However, the fact that any Twitter user can block another account does not mean that the President somehow becomes a private person when he does so. Because the President, as we have seen, acts in an official capacity when he tweets, we conclude that he acts in the same capacity when he blocks those who disagree with him.

Here, a public official and his subordinates hold out and use a social media account open to the public as an official account for conducting official business. That account has interactive features open to the public, making public interaction a prominent feature of the account. These factors mean that the account is not private. Accordingly, the President excluded the Individual Plaintiffs from government‐controlled property when he used the blocking function of the Account to exclude disfavored

Of course, not every social media account operated by a public official is a government account. Whether First Amendment concerns are triggered when a public official uses his account in ways that differ from those presented on this appeal will in most instances be a fact‐specific inquiry. The outcome of that inquiry will be informed by how the official describes and uses the account; to whom features of the account are made available; and how others, including government officials and agencies, regard and treat the account.

But these are concerns for other cases and other days and are ones we are not required to consider or resolve on this Once it is established that the President is a government actor with respect to his use of the Account, viewpoint discrimination violates the First Amendment.

[C.] The government makes two responses. First, it argues that the Account is not a public forum and that, even if it were a public forum, the Individual Plaintiffs were not excluded from it. Second, the government argues that the Account, if controlled by the government, is government speech not subject to First Amendment …

[1.] To determine whether a public forum has been created, courts look “to the policy and practice of the government” as well as “the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity to discern the government’s ” Opening an instrumentality of communication “for indiscriminate use by the general public” creates a public forum. The Account was intentionally opened for public discussion when the President, upon assuming office, repeatedly used the Account as an official vehicle for governance and made its interactive features accessible to the public without limitation. We hold that this conduct created a public forum.

If the Account is a forum—public or otherwise—viewpoint discrimination is not permitted. A blocked account is prevented from viewing any of the President’s tweets, replying to those tweets, retweeting them, or liking them. Replying, retweeting, and liking are all expressive conduct that blocking inhibits. Replying and retweeting are messages that a user broadcasts, and, as such, undeniably are speech. Liking a tweet conveys approval or acknowledgment of a tweet and is therefore a symbolic message with expressive content.

Significantly, the parties agree that all of this expressive conduct is communicated to the thousands of users who interact with the Account. By blocking the Individual Plaintiffs and preventing them from viewing, retweeting, replying to, and liking his tweets, the President excluded the Individual Plaintiffs from a public forum, something the First Amendment

[2.] The government … argues that blocking did not ban or burden anyone’s speech. Specifically, the government contends that the Individual Plaintiffs were not prevented from speaking because “the only material impact that blocking has on the individual plaintiffs’ ability to express themselves on Twitter is that it prevents them from speaking directly to Donald Trump by replying to his tweets on the @realDonaldTrump web “

That assertion is not well‐grounded in the facts presented to us. The government is correct that the Individual Plaintiffs have no right to require the President to listen to their speech. However, the speech restrictions at issue burden the Individual Plaintiffs’ ability to converse on Twitter with others who may be speaking to or about the President. {If, for example, the President had merely prevented the Individual Plaintiffs from sending him direct messages, his argument would have more force.} President Trump is only one of thousands of recipients of the messages the Individual Plaintiffs seek to communicate. While he is certainly not required to listen, once he opens up the interactive features of his account to the public at large he is not entitled to censor selected users because they express views with which he

{The government extends this argument to suggest that the Individual Plaintiffs are claiming a right to “amplify” their speech by being able to reply directly to the President’s tweets. The government can choose to “amplify” the speech of certain individuals without violating the rights of others by choosing to listen or not listen…. That is not what occurred here; the Individual Plaintiffs were not simply ignored by the President, their ability to speak to the rest of the public users of the Account was burdened. In any event, the government is not permitted to “amplify” favored speech by banning or burdening viewpoints with which it disagrees.}

The government’s reply is that the Individual Plaintiffs are not censored because they can engage in various “workarounds” such as creating new accounts, logging out to view the President’s tweets, and using Twitter’s search functions to find tweets about the President posted by other users with which they can

Tellingly, the government concedes that these “workarounds” burden the Individual Plaintiffs’ speech. And burdens to speech as well as outright bans run afoul of the First Amendment. When the government has discriminated against a speaker based on the speaker’s viewpoint, the ability to engage in other speech does not cure that constitutional shortcoming.

Similarly, the fact that the Individual Plaintiffs retain some ability to “work around” the blocking does not cure the constitutional violation. Neither does the fact that the Individual Plaintiffs can post messages elsewhere on Accordingly, we hold that the President violated the First Amendment when he used the blocking function to exclude the Individual Plaintiffs because of their disfavored speech.

[3.] Finally, the government argues that to the extent the Account is controlled by the government, it is government speech. Under the government speech doctrine, “[t]he Free Speech Clause does not require government to maintain viewpoint neutrality when its officers and employees speak” about governmental endeavors. For example, when the government wishes to promote a war effort, it is not required by the First Amendment to also distribute messages discouraging that effort.

It is clear that if President Trump were engaging in government speech when he blocked the Individual Plaintiffs, he would not have been violating the First Amendment. Everyone concedes that the President’s initial tweets (meaning those that he produces himself) are government speech.

But this case does not turn on the President’s initial tweets; it turns on his supervision of the interactive features of the Account. The government has conceded that the Account “is generally accessible to the public at large without regard to political affiliation or any other limiting criteria,” and the President has not attempted to limit the Account’s interactive feature to his own speech.

Considering the interactive features, the speech in question is that of multiple individuals, not just the President or that of the government. When a Twitter user posts a reply to one of the President’s tweets, the message is identified as coming from that user, not from the President.

There is no record evidence, and the government does not argue, that the President has attempted to exercise any control over the messages of others, except to the extent he has blocked some persons expressing viewpoints he finds distasteful. The contents of retweets, replies, likes, and mentions are controlled by the user who generates them and not by the President, except to the extent he attempts to do so by blocking. Accordingly, while the President’s tweets can accurately be described as government speech, the retweets, replies, and likes of other users in response to his tweets are not government speech under any formulation….

I had earlier expressed some skepticism about this position, because I thought that there was a good argument that @RealDonaldTrump—which was created well before President Trump was elected—was Trump’s personal account, even if it was used to announce governmental decisions (just as an official’s campaign speech is the politician’s own speech, even if it announces some important decisions). But I think the Second Circuit’s analysis is quite persuasive, especially since “The President operates the Account with the assistance of defendant Daniel Scavino, the White House Director of Social Media and Assistant to the President” (a matter the court notes but doesn’t rely on); this, I think, helps distinguish the account from campaign speech, which federal law generally says must be created without the help of government employees.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/2G0IlUI
via IFTTT

Be Skeptical About Bernie Sanders’ Financial Transactions Tax

Taxing financial transactions is a popular proposal among Democrats to fund new government programs—but some on the center-left have called into question how much revenue such a tax would generate.

Democratic presidential candidates Sen. Bernie Sanders (I–Vt.) and Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D–N.Y.), along with several other members of Congress, have introduced a bill that would tax financial transactions. It would levy a tax of 0.5 percent on stock trades, 0.1 percent on bond trades, and 0.005 percent on derivatives trades. Sanders promises that this new tax will raise $2.4 trillion over the next decade, citing a study from University of Massachusetts economists; he plans to use that revenue to fund free college, student loan debt forgiveness, expanded Pell Grants, support for historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs), and increased investment in K-12 education. 

Sanders says the bill will help “rein in the recklessness of Wall Street billionaires and build an economy that works for all Americans.”

But even if you buy that premise, there are plenty of questions about how effective a financial transactions tax would be in raising revenue. 

As senior fellow Howard Gleckman of the center-left Tax Policy Center wrote recently, Sanders proposed a similar financial transactions tax (FTT) in 2016, and some economists promised it would generate almost $3 trillion in tax revenue over a decade. Meanwhile, the Tax Policy Center found that the tax would raise only $400 billion over ten years. Why the difference? The Tax Policy Center estimated that the tax would dramatically reduce the number of transactions on financial markets, reducing both the FTT’s tax base and revenue from taxes on realized capital gains. By raising transaction costs, fewer investors will sell stocks, which means less taxable capital gains income.

The Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) analysis mirrors the Tax Policy Center’s, estimating that a FTT similar to the one Sanders proposed would raise under $800 billion over a decade. The CBO has also reported that FTTs pose a threat for public finances of federal, state, and local governments, by reducing liquidity in the bond market and increasing costs faced by pension programs.  

Other countries’ experiences with FTTs suggest that it is right to be skeptical about Sanders’ claims. When Sweden implemented the tax, 60 percent of transactions on Sweden’s stock market moved to other countries, and as a result, overall tax revenue actually went down. Not only did the FTT not raise as much revenue as hoped, but moving stock market transactions to other countries and increasing transaction costs also reduced revenue from taxes on capital gains.

This debate, between firebrand progressives and the more moderate center-left, mirrors a recent back-and-forth about fellow presidential contender Elizabeth Warren’s wealth tax.

Both the wealth tax and the financial transactions tax are appealing revenue sources to progressives, as they both target clear villains: wealthy heirs and greedy Wall Street traders. Both taxes seem deceptively modest, with a seemingly low tax rate: Warren often calls her wealth tax proposal “the two-cent tax” on the “tippy-top.” 

But the problem with this framing in the case of the FTT, as Nicole Kaeding, the nonpartisan Tax Foundation’s vice president of federal projects, points out, is that a very low tax rate that promises to raise a lot of revenue is probably a result of “tax pyramiding,” or the taxation of the same money over and over again.

As Reason’s Peter Suderman wrote, to pay for their extravagant spending proposals, Democratic presidential candidates wouldn’t be able to rely on these targeted tax hikes on the super-rich. Instead, they’d have to tax like Scandinavia, which would mean major tax increases across the middle class. Bernie himself admitted that the middle-class would have to pay higher taxes at the most recent Democratic debate.

It’s worth noting, too, that the FTT wouldn’t just hit Wall Street traders. It would hit middle-class retirement savings and local pension programs. By raising the cost of investment, it could reduce long-run economic growth. All that, and it would probably fall short of raising the promised revenue, too.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/2Lb46p7
via IFTTT

Second Circuit: Unconstitutional for @RealDonaldTrump to Block Twitter Users Based on Viewpoint

From today’s opinion in Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump: written by Judge Barrington D. Parker and joined by Judges Peter W. Hall and Christopher F. Droney:

[A.] The President contends that [his @RealDonaldTrump Twitter] Account is exclusively a vehicle for his own speech to which the Individual Plaintiffs have no right of access and to which the First Amendment does not apply.

Secondarily, he argues that, in any event, the Account is not a public forum and that even if the Account were a public forum, blocking the Individual Plaintiffs did not prevent them from accessing the forum.

The President further argues that, to the extent the Account is government‐controlled, posts on it are government speech to which the First Amendment does not apply.

We are not persuaded. We conclude that the evidence of the official nature of the Account is overwhelming. We also conclude that once the President has chosen a platform and opened up its interactive space to millions of users and participants, he may not selectively exclude those whose views he disagrees with.

[B.] The President concedes that he blocked the Individual Plaintiffs because they posted tweets that criticized him or his policies. He also concedes that such criticism is protected speech.

The issue then for this Court to resolve is whether, in blocking the Individual Plaintiffs from the interactive features of the Account, the President acted in a governmental capacity or as a private The President maintains that Twitter is a privately owned and operated social media platform that he has used since 2009 to share his opinions on popular culture, world affairs, and politics.

Since he became President, he contends, the private nature of the Account has not changed. In his view, the Account is not a space owned or controlled by the government. Rather, it is a platform for his own private speech and not one for the private expression of others. Because the Account is private, he argues, First Amendment issues and forum analysis are not implicated. Although Twitter facilitates robust public debate on the Account, the President contends that it is simply the means through which he participates in a forum and not a public forum in and of itself.

No one disputes that the First Amendment restricts government regulation of private speech but does not regulate purely private speech. If, in blocking, the President were acting in a governmental capacity, then he may not discriminate based on viewpoint among the private speech occurring in the Account’s interactive space.

As noted, the government argues first that the Account is the President’s private property because he opened it in 2009 as a personal account and he will retain personal control over the Account after his presidency. However, the fact that government control over property is temporary, or that the government does not “own” the property in the sense that it holds title to the property, is not determinative of whether the property is, in fact, sufficiently controlled by the government to make it a forum for First Amendment purposes. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547‐52 (1975) (holding privately‐owned theater leased to and operated by city was public forum). {5 See also Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 749 (1996) (plurality opinion) (stating that “public forums are places that the government has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity” (internal quotation marks omitted)); S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (considering “question of whether a particular piece of personal or real property owned or controlled by the government” is a public forum (emphasis added)).} Temporary control by the government can still be control for First Amendment purposes.

The government’s contention that the President’s use of the Account during his presidency is private founders in the face of the uncontested evidence in the record of substantial and pervasive government involvement with, and control over, the Account. First, the Account is presented by the President and the White House staff as belonging to, and operated by, the President. The Account is registered to “Donald J. Trump, ’45th President of the United States of America, Washington, D.C.'” App’x at 54. The President has described his use of the Account as “MODERN DAY PRESIDENTIAL.” The White House social media director has described the Account as a channel through which “President Donald J. Trump . . . [c]ommunicat[es] directly with you, the American people!” The @WhiteHouse account, an undoubtedly official Twitter account run by the government, “directs Twitter users to ‘Follow for the latest from @POTUS @realDonaldTrump and his Administration.” Further, the @POTUS account frequently republishes tweets from the Account…. [A]ccording to the National Archives and Records Administration, the President’s tweets from the Account “are official records that must be preserved under the Presidential Records Act.”

Second, since becoming President he has used the Account on almost a daily basis “as a channel for communicating and interacting with the public about his administration.” The President utilizes White House staff to post tweets and to maintain the Account. He uses the Account to announce “matters related to official government business,” including high‐level White House and cabinet‐level staff changes as well as changes to major national policies. He uses the Account to engage with foreign leaders and to announce foreign policy decisions and initiatives.

Finally, he uses the “like,” “retweet,” “reply,” and other functions of the Account to understand and to evaluate the public’s reaction to what he says and does. In sum, since he took office, the President has consistently used the Account as an important tool of governance and executive outreach. For these reasons, we conclude that the factors pointing to the public, non‐private nature of the Account and its interactive features are

The government’s response is that the President is not acting in his official capacity when he blocks users because that function is available to all users, not only to government officials. However, the fact that any Twitter user can block another account does not mean that the President somehow becomes a private person when he does so. Because the President, as we have seen, acts in an official capacity when he tweets, we conclude that he acts in the same capacity when he blocks those who disagree with him.

Here, a public official and his subordinates hold out and use a social media account open to the public as an official account for conducting official business. That account has interactive features open to the public, making public interaction a prominent feature of the account. These factors mean that the account is not private. Accordingly, the President excluded the Individual Plaintiffs from government‐controlled property when he used the blocking function of the Account to exclude disfavored

Of course, not every social media account operated by a public official is a government account. Whether First Amendment concerns are triggered when a public official uses his account in ways that differ from those presented on this appeal will in most instances be a fact‐specific inquiry. The outcome of that inquiry will be informed by how the official describes and uses the account; to whom features of the account are made available; and how others, including government officials and agencies, regard and treat the account.

But these are concerns for other cases and other days and are ones we are not required to consider or resolve on this Once it is established that the President is a government actor with respect to his use of the Account, viewpoint discrimination violates the First Amendment.

[C.] The government makes two responses. First, it argues that the Account is not a public forum and that, even if it were a public forum, the Individual Plaintiffs were not excluded from it. Second, the government argues that the Account, if controlled by the government, is government speech not subject to First Amendment …

[1.] To determine whether a public forum has been created, courts look “to the policy and practice of the government” as well as “the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity to discern the government’s ” Opening an instrumentality of communication “for indiscriminate use by the general public” creates a public forum. The Account was intentionally opened for public discussion when the President, upon assuming office, repeatedly used the Account as an official vehicle for governance and made its interactive features accessible to the public without limitation. We hold that this conduct created a public forum.

If the Account is a forum—public or otherwise—viewpoint discrimination is not permitted. A blocked account is prevented from viewing any of the President’s tweets, replying to those tweets, retweeting them, or liking them. Replying, retweeting, and liking are all expressive conduct that blocking inhibits. Replying and retweeting are messages that a user broadcasts, and, as such, undeniably are speech. Liking a tweet conveys approval or acknowledgment of a tweet and is therefore a symbolic message with expressive content.

Significantly, the parties agree that all of this expressive conduct is communicated to the thousands of users who interact with the Account. By blocking the Individual Plaintiffs and preventing them from viewing, retweeting, replying to, and liking his tweets, the President excluded the Individual Plaintiffs from a public forum, something the First Amendment

[2.] The government … argues that blocking did not ban or burden anyone’s speech. Specifically, the government contends that the Individual Plaintiffs were not prevented from speaking because “the only material impact that blocking has on the individual plaintiffs’ ability to express themselves on Twitter is that it prevents them from speaking directly to Donald Trump by replying to his tweets on the @realDonaldTrump web “

That assertion is not well‐grounded in the facts presented to us. The government is correct that the Individual Plaintiffs have no right to require the President to listen to their speech. However, the speech restrictions at issue burden the Individual Plaintiffs’ ability to converse on Twitter with others who may be speaking to or about the President. {If, for example, the President had merely prevented the Individual Plaintiffs from sending him direct messages, his argument would have more force.} President Trump is only one of thousands of recipients of the messages the Individual Plaintiffs seek to communicate. While he is certainly not required to listen, once he opens up the interactive features of his account to the public at large he is not entitled to censor selected users because they express views with which he

{The government extends this argument to suggest that the Individual Plaintiffs are claiming a right to “amplify” their speech by being able to reply directly to the President’s tweets. The government can choose to “amplify” the speech of certain individuals without violating the rights of others by choosing to listen or not listen…. That is not what occurred here; the Individual Plaintiffs were not simply ignored by the President, their ability to speak to the rest of the public users of the Account was burdened. In any event, the government is not permitted to “amplify” favored speech by banning or burdening viewpoints with which it disagrees.}

The government’s reply is that the Individual Plaintiffs are not censored because they can engage in various “workarounds” such as creating new accounts, logging out to view the President’s tweets, and using Twitter’s search functions to find tweets about the President posted by other users with which they can

Tellingly, the government concedes that these “workarounds” burden the Individual Plaintiffs’ speech. And burdens to speech as well as outright bans run afoul of the First Amendment. When the government has discriminated against a speaker based on the speaker’s viewpoint, the ability to engage in other speech does not cure that constitutional shortcoming.

Similarly, the fact that the Individual Plaintiffs retain some ability to “work around” the blocking does not cure the constitutional violation. Neither does the fact that the Individual Plaintiffs can post messages elsewhere on Accordingly, we hold that the President violated the First Amendment when he used the blocking function to exclude the Individual Plaintiffs because of their disfavored speech.

[3.] Finally, the government argues that to the extent the Account is controlled by the government, it is government speech. Under the government speech doctrine, “[t]he Free Speech Clause does not require government to maintain viewpoint neutrality when its officers and employees speak” about governmental endeavors. For example, when the government wishes to promote a war effort, it is not required by the First Amendment to also distribute messages discouraging that effort.

It is clear that if President Trump were engaging in government speech when he blocked the Individual Plaintiffs, he would not have been violating the First Amendment. Everyone concedes that the President’s initial tweets (meaning those that he produces himself) are government speech.

But this case does not turn on the President’s initial tweets; it turns on his supervision of the interactive features of the Account. The government has conceded that the Account “is generally accessible to the public at large without regard to political affiliation or any other limiting criteria,” and the President has not attempted to limit the Account’s interactive feature to his own speech.

Considering the interactive features, the speech in question is that of multiple individuals, not just the President or that of the government. When a Twitter user posts a reply to one of the President’s tweets, the message is identified as coming from that user, not from the President.

There is no record evidence, and the government does not argue, that the President has attempted to exercise any control over the messages of others, except to the extent he has blocked some persons expressing viewpoints he finds distasteful. The contents of retweets, replies, likes, and mentions are controlled by the user who generates them and not by the President, except to the extent he attempts to do so by blocking. Accordingly, while the President’s tweets can accurately be described as government speech, the retweets, replies, and likes of other users in response to his tweets are not government speech under any formulation….

I had earlier expressed some skepticism about this position, because I thought that there was a good argument that @RealDonaldTrump—which was created well before President Trump was elected—was Trump’s personal account, even if it was used to announce governmental decisions (just as an official’s campaign speech is the politician’s own speech, even if it announces some important decisions). But I think the Second Circuit’s analysis is quite persuasive, especially since “The President operates the Account with the assistance of defendant Daniel Scavino, the White House Director of Social Media and Assistant to the President” (a matter the court notes but doesn’t rely on); this, I think, helps distinguish the account from campaign speech, which federal law generally says must be created without the help of government employees.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/2G0IlUI
via IFTTT

Peso Plunges After Mexican FinMin Unexpectedly Resigns, Questions “Conflicts Of Interest”

The mexican peso is sliding fast this morning following the surprise resignation of finance minister Carlos Urzua.

Urzua tweeted his resignation letter: “I appreciate the opportunity to have been able to serve Mexico.”

Urzua proclaimed that “administration decisions were made without sufficient backing” and added that “some government officials held conflicts of interest.”

And the immediate reaction is selling pesos on uncertainty…

Mexican stocks are also fading.

 

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/2YISe0J Tyler Durden

Egypt Seizes Tanker Carrying Iranian Crude

Tehran’s threats of retaliation against the UK for seizing a tanker carrying Iranian crude oil for export have prompted a British vessel to shelter in the Gulf, but the rest of the world doesn’t seem to be taking them too seriously.

Tanker

Citing local press reports, Middle East Monitor said Tuesday that a Ukrainian tanker carrying Iranian oil as it passed through the Suez Canal ten days ago was seized by the Egyptian government, just as Egypt’s State Security Criminal Court was sentencing six people to lengthy jail terms allegedly for spying for Iran.

Those defendants have all been sentenced to between 15 and 25 years in jail, a $30,000 fine and the confiscation of their computers and phones.

Egyptian Al-Azhar Professor Alaa Moawad, who was present at the trial on Sunday, was accused of harming Egypt’s national interests and receiving money to spread Iranian Shiism in Sunni Egypt by launching a website, issuing publications and attracting recruits.

Egypt is a staunch ally of the US, and as a Sunni-majority country, would naturally align with the UAE and Saudi Arabia in their efforts to contain Iran. Egypt also supports the Saudi-backed coalition in Yemen that is fighting to retain control in that country’s brutal civil war. Cairo has  condemned the Houthis for the recent spate of attacks on Saudi infrastructure that have inflamed tensions in the region.

Washington and Riyadh have blamed Iran for a series of attacks on oil tankers in and around the Strait of Hormuz, though there is some disagreement on this subject.

Egypt’s decision to seize the tanker adds another wrinkle to the intensifying tensions in the region, at a time when Iran is threatening to enrich uranium to any level it deems necessary, in contravention of the terms of the JCPOA.

At the very least, the seizures of the two tankers represent blows to Iran’s increasingly fragile economy, and will force ships carrying the contraband crude to rely more on techniques like ‘going dark’ to avoid enforcement.

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/2G3dGpZ Tyler Durden

Billionaire Tom Steyer Enters Presidential Race, Vowing To Get Corporations Out of Politics

Billionaire Tom Steyer—whose name recognition of late centers around his campaign to impeach President Donald Trump—officially entered the presidential race on Tuesday, vowing to confront corporations and lessen their sway over the political system.

“I think people believe that the corporations have bought the democracy. That the politicians don’t care about them or respect them,” he said in a video announcement. “Really what we’re trying to do is make democracy work by pushing power down to the people.”

Although Steyer has not yet outlined a policy platform, he has been an ardent climate change activist, as well as a vocal opponent of Trump’s, launching a $10 million national advertisement to unseat the president. “He’s brought us to the brink of nuclear war, obstructed justice at the FBI, and in direct violation of the U.S. Constitution, he’s taken money from foreign governments, and threatened to shut down news organizations that report the truth,” Steyer says in the ad.

The former hedge fund manager brands himself as another American citizen. I’m just like you, he implores. But while his impeachment rhetoric and anti-corporatist positioning will surely resonate among many Democrats, Steyer will likely have to confront some cognitive dissonance as a billionaire in a crowded field of populist contenders, some of whom say that such personal wealth should not even exist.

That’s certainly not lost on the newly minted candidate, who has a net worth of $1.6 billion and has already pledged to spend $100 million on his primary campaign. “I’m Tom Steyer, and like you, I’m a citizen who knows it’s up to us to do something,” he says in his push for impeachment—an apparent attempt to convince listeners that his fortune doesn’t alienate him from the Little Guy.

Wealth aside, his business ventures in and of themselves are expected to draw scrutiny now that he’s thrown his hat into the ring. His successful private sector run at Farallon Capital Management included hefty investments in oil, private prisons, and subprime lending—all of which are industries that progressives are increasingly critical of as the party moves farther left. He also has little traction with the establishment. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D–Calif.) reportedly expressed her displeasure to Steyer over his impeachment blitz, calling it a “distraction” in 2017 when she was still the minority leader.

Leveraging the elephant in the room, the Republican National Committee came out swinging. “After a false start, left-wing extremist Tom Steyer has finally formalized his self-promotion tour under the guise of a presidential campaign,” RNC spokesman Steve Guest said in a statement. “The only thing Steyer’s campaign will do is light more of his money on fire as he joins the rest of the 2020 Democrat field in pushing policies that are way outside the mainstream.”

Steyer has been a prolific donor to liberal causes as well as a grassroots mobilizer, founding NextGen America, which advocates for increased youth voter turnout. He will resign from his leadership role at that group, as well as at Need to Impeach, although he said he will donate more than $50 million to ensure their continued sucess through 2020.

In order to make it to the Democratic debate stage later this month, he will need to amass 65,000 individual donors by July 16, as a 1 percent polling margin this late in the game is likely an impossible feat.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/2XAY2rC
via IFTTT