This evening, a unanimous Supreme Court refused to grant Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton an injunction or other relief that would bar the selection of presidential electors in Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. As detailed in the just-released order, seven justices would deny the Texas AG’s Motion for Leave to file a complaint, citing a lack of Article III standing. Justices Alito and Thomas, citing their long-standing belief that the Court lacks the discretion to deny the motion, would have granted the motion, but would have provided Texas with no other relief. In other words, not a single justice believed Texas deserved the extraordinary relief it sought.
The Court’s order reads:
The State of Texas’s motion for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied for lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. Texas has not demonstrated a judicially
cognizable interest in the manner in which another State conducts its elections. All other pending motions are dismissed as moot.
Statement of Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas joins: In my view, we do not have discretion to deny the filing of a bill of complaint in a case that falls within our original jurisdiction. See Arizona v. California, 589 U. S. ___ (Feb. 24, 2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting). I would therefore grant the motion to file the bill of complaint but would not grant other relief, and I express no view on any other issue.
This puts an end to Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton’s effort to upend the results of the November election. It should also put an end to the efforts by the Trump campaign and its allies to delegitimize or otherwise challenge the election results.
This result was not a surprise. As I indicated in my prior posts on AG Paxton’s initial filing, the intervening briefs, amici, state defendants’ responses, and Paxton’s feeble replies, this case never had merit. As the Court concluded, Texas could not satisfy the requirements of Article III standing to challenge the election procedures utilized by other states to select presidential electors. What is more, even the two justices who believed the Court was obligated to hear the case–arguably the Court’s two most conservative justices–did not believe Texas was entitled to the extraordinary relief it sought, relief which would have been necessary for AG Paxton’s last-ditch effort to have any result on the electoral college. AG Paxton’s office submitted transparently weak arguments, and the Court summarily dispatched them.
. . . . developing . . . updating post
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This evening, a unanimous Supreme Court refused to grant Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton an injunction or other relief that would bar the selection of presidential electors in Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. As detailed in the just-released order, seven justices would deny the Texas AG’s Motion for Leave to file a complaint, citing a lack of Article III standing. Justices Alito and Thomas, citing their long-standing belief that the Court lacks the discretion to deny the motion, would have granted the motion, but would have provided Texas with no other relief. In other words, not a single justice believed Texas deserved the extraordinary relief it sought.
The Court’s order reads:
The State of Texas’s motion for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied for lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. Texas has not demonstrated a judicially
cognizable interest in the manner in which another State conducts its elections. All other pending motions are dismissed as moot.
Statement of Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas joins: In my view, we do not have discretion to deny the filing of a bill of complaint in a case that falls within our original jurisdiction. See Arizona v. California, 589 U. S. ___ (Feb. 24, 2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting). I would therefore grant the motion to file the bill of complaint but would not grant other relief, and I express no view on any other issue.
This puts an end to Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton’s effort to upend the results of the November election. It should also put an end to the efforts by the Trump campaign and its allies to delegitimize or otherwise challenge the election results.
This result was not a surprise. As I indicated in my prior posts on AG Paxton’s initial filing, the intervening briefs, amici, state defendants’ responses, and Paxton’s feeble replies, this case never had merit. As the Court concluded, Texas could not satisfy the requirements of Article III standing to challenge the election procedures utilized by other states to select presidential electors. What is more, even the two justices who believed the Court was obligated to hear the case–arguably the Court’s two most conservative justices–did not believe Texas was entitled to the extraordinary relief it sought, relief which would have been necessary for AG Paxton’s last-ditch effort to have any result on the electoral college. AG Paxton’s office submitted transparently weak arguments, and the Court summarily dispatched them.
. . . . developing . . . updating post
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Baltimore-based Johns Hopkins University, the leading provider of COVID-19 data, announced Wednesday that its founder owned slaves, contrary to the long-time narrative that Hopkins was a wealthy philanthropist and abolitionist.
Researchers Martha S. Jones and Allison Seyler uncovered the new information in government census records as they were on a quest to explore the university’s history. For more than a century, the long-held narrative of Hopkins, an abolitionist, whose father freed the family’s slaves in 1807, has recently come into question.
University President Ronald J. Daniels and other school officials published an open letter Wednesday saying the findings “complicate the understanding we have long had of Johns Hopkins as our founder.”
“We now have government census records that state Mr. Hopkins was the owner of one enslaved person listed in his household in 1840 and four enslaved people listed in 1850,” the letter said. “By the 1860 census, there are no enslaved persons listed in the household.”
“It calls to mind not only the darkest chapters in the history of our country and our city but also the complex history of our institutions since then, and the legacies of racism and inequity we are working together to confront,” the letter continued.
Watch: University President Ronald J. Daniels Addresses The Life of Johns Hopkins
Hopkins died in 1873 at age 78. As an entrepreneur and investor, he accumulated a massive amount of wealth that was used to establish a hospital, orphanage, and the university.
Officials said the researchers would continue to dig deeper to get a better picture of the founder’s past.
As more and more schools begin to confront their connection with slavery, such as Princeton and Georgetown, in the last couple of years, they also may consider how to make amends in a world overrun by social justice warriors.
It’s only a matter of time before social justice warriors target a monument to Johns Hopkins at the university.
All Hopkins needs to do at this point is to launch a new scholarship program for slave descendants for everyone to forget about the founder’s history.
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The Supreme Court on Friday tossed a last-minute bid by the state of Texas to overturn the 2020 election by challenging the results of four battleground states.
Citing a lack of standing, Justice Samuel Alito wrote that the state “has not demonstrated a judicially cognizable interest in the manner in which another State conducts its elections,” adding “All other pending motions are dismissed as moot.”
There’s never been a better argument for national school choice – and freeing low-income children trapped in substandard big-city public education systems – than that idiotic tweet by the leaders of the Chicago Teachers Union.
“The push to reopen schools is rooted in sexism, racism and misogyny,” read the CTU tweet, posted Sunday at 1:03 p.m.
It was later deleted. CTU bosses might have realized that those racist, sexist misogynists trying to reopen the Chicago schools during the pandemic – the mayor and the school superintendent – just happen to be Black women. And, that plenty of parents who want their kids back in school happen to be Black and Latino.
There is nothing as delicious as watching those angry hard-left CTU bosses load up their identity politics bazooka only to blow off their own (rhetorical) feet.
Why don’t we make this a “teaching moment” for parents who want real choice?
And for the great public schoolteachers who might be intimidated by those union leaders who are fighting to keep schools closed?
Some of those teachers send their kids to private schools in Chicago where teachers are in the classroom. They would rather stay quiet. I don’t blame them.
The science does not support closed schools. Dr. Anthony Fauci and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Director Dr. Robert Redfield say that kids should be in school with proper precautions.
Most teachers want to teach in person. They’ve dedicated their lives to being educators. And they know, perhaps more than most of us, how closing schools hurts young people emotionally, socially and academically.
And many parents also want their children in school, not falling behind, trying to learn on a laptop. Chicago’s mayor and other Democratic elected officials know this, but they’re intimidated by the power of the CTU leadership.
Before I go any further, please remember I’m not anti-teacher. My wife is a teacher. One of our sons is a teacher. Don’t twist my words to suggest otherwise. Teachers perform the most important job in the country.
Yet many good teachers are, as I said, intimidated by union bosses. And the political actors tremble because teachers union bosses are their political bosses now.
I decided to reach out to a man who knows how this works and invited him to be a guest on “The Chicago Way” podcast: Paul Vallas, the former CEO of the Chicago Public Schools. He has been putting pressure on the union and the politicians to open up the schools.
Former Chicago Public Schools CEO Paul Vallas, shown Feb. 18, 2019, in Chicago. (Erin Hooley/Chicago Tribune)
Paul, what about that stupid yet revealing CTU tweet?
“If they want to talk about racism, there’s nothing more racist than closing schools (for the pandemic) and providing substandard education to the poorest children in the community who are disproportionately Black and Latino,” he said.
“And there’s nothing more sexist than closing schools, and hurting families, the majority of whom are led by single mothers.
“So, you want to talk racism and sexism and misogyny?” Vallas asked.
“The union leadership’s posturing and forcing the schools to be closed is all those things. Because what they’re really doing is committing educational malpractice.”
It’s disastrous for the teenagers who get lost. Some get lost on the streets of Chicago and die. And the little ones, the elementary school students?
“The youngest children are at risk,” Vallas said. “Their brains are developing at an accelerated rate.”
What’s being done to them, he said, is “permanent damage.”
Cops, firefighters and paramedics go to work every day. Cashiers at the supermarkets are at work every day. We thank them all as we sweat out this pandemic lockdown.
But if cashiers aren’t at work, they don’t get paid. Yet teachers don’t have to be in the classroom, and they get paid.
Why aren’t they at work, inside school buildings? If it’s not the science, it’s the politics. It’s a demonstration of control.
Politicians get paid too. But they’ve allowed the teachers unions to dictate education policy to the detriment of the students and their families.
The kids need teachers in schools, especially special-needs kids. A child with autism needs in-person instruction. And all children need their teachers. All kids need to be in school, at least for part of the time.
Most big-city school systems like Chicago serve a majority of low-income families. And as Vallas points out, many of the families are led by single mothers.
They have to work. And by work, I don’t mean working on Zoom, like a news columnist.
But who watches the children to make sure that they’re not playing “Call of Duty” on the Xbox?
Vallas sees those kids — from the city and suburbs in lockdown states across the country — as a lost generation, as casualties of a political war.
“All those children impacted by these school closings, by excessive remote learning, the children who have dropped out because schools have been closed for such an extensive period of time, these children are going to be permanently scarred.
“They’re like casualties of war. And the war is the teachers union maintaining or enhancing their benefits while minimizing their workload and placing their employees where there is no risk at all.”
There’s no risk for the union leaders, who sit in their home office, intimidating Democratic politicians like Lori Lightfoot because they can influence voters to come out when needed.
But what about the forgotten?
The children falling behind. Their parents wondering how they’ll be free of a system that treats them this way.
They’re the ones who should matter. But they don’t.
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For more on the state statutes like those discussed here, see this article (and in particular pp. 313-15 on the potentially broad scope of “political activity,” as extending beyond election campaigns). From Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty’s decision Wednesday in Patterson-Eachus v. United Airlines, Inc. (D. Colo.) (images added from the court record):
Plaintiff worked for Defendant for thirty-one years in several capacities, most recently as a supervisor of airport operations. Her conduct and performance were not an issue until, as Defendant describes it, she posted certain “divisive” messages on Facebook.
{Sometime in August 2017, on her personal time and computer, Plaintiff re-posted to her private Facebook page her support for preserving the “Rebels” mascot of her high school, Weld Central High, including a cartoon soldier superimposed on a Confederate flag (the “Rebels mascot post“).
Sometime also in August 2017, Plaintiff re-posted to her private Facebook page a video of an African American male in front of a Confederate flag who, among other things, opined that the Confederate flag is not the evil that many people say it is (the “Confederate flag post”).}
Defendant learned of those messages, investigated them, found other issues with Plaintiff’s on-the-job conduct, and terminated Plaintiff based on its purported findings that Plaintiff’s negative interactions with subordinates irreparably damaged her ability to supervise….
[1.] Under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.5:
It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice for an employer to terminate the employment of any employee due to that employee’s engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours….
This law “was meant to provide a shield to employees who engage in activities that are personally distasteful to their employer, but which activities are legal and unrelated to an employee’s job duties.” … Plaintiff contends she was terminated because of her private activity in posting material to her own Facebook account….
[T]he record contains … evidence Plaintiff was terminated for her Facebook activity…. The termination letter dated October 16, 2017 begins with the statement that Plaintiff posted “inappropriate and racially insensitive” material to her Facebook account. It states that this posting “was a clear violation of our United Social Media Policy and the [UAL] Guidelines.” It informs her that, as a result of the Facebook post, she was being disciplined and investigated. The letter also accuses Plaintiff of “continu[ing] to deny that the racially insensitive Facebook post was inappropriate and that there was anything wrong with posting the racially offensive video on Facebook, where a number of your direct reports could see it.”
Next, the letter lists six distinct reasons why Defendant believed Plaintiff violated [employer] policies. Most of these reasons would apply equally to the Facebook posts as they would to Plaintiff’s direct interactions with subordinates.
Finally, the letter states Plaintiff has broken the trust Defendant placed on her, while explaining that Plaintiff will not be given progressive discipline because the “progressive discipline process is based on changing behavior but that is not possible if you do not acknowledge that what you did was wrong and take ownership of your offensive and inappropriate behavior.” Again, the letter directly accuses Plaintiff of denying the inappropriateness of the Facebook activity. Whether the Facebook posts were a contributing factor in the termination is a disputed material fact.
Defendant next relies on a statutory exception permitting the prohibition of conduct relating “to the employment activities and responsibilities of a particular employee or a particular group of employees, rather than to all employees of the employer.” The UAL Guidelines cited by Defendant apply to all employees, not just supervisory….
While it may be true United holds supervisors to a higher standard in some respects, that cannot change the plain meaning of a statute. If an employer’s policies explicitly apply to “all employees,” I cannot find, as a matter of law, that the statutory language of the exception has been met….
“[T]his portion of the statute was probably crafted to allow employers to require certain high profile members of their staff from foregoing involvement in activities that would call into question their competence.” The problem is Defendant’s attempt to shoehorn its after-the-fact “higher standard” testimony into a statutory exception allowing an employer to “require certain high profile members … from foregoing involvement in activities.” Just as … “[p]romotion of a positive image for Delta is not the exclusive province of baggage handlers” [the job category of employees in a previous case -EV] so too is the prohibition of racially offensive conduct not exclusively for supervisors….
Furthermore, the Colorado Court of Appeals has interpreted the statutory exception as applying to activities that are inherently connected with employment and emanate from the particular duties of the plaintiff’s job. Williams v. Rock-Tenn Servs., Inc. (Colo. App. 2016). “Such activities and responsibilities must be unique to or within the exclusive province of the particular employee or group of employees.”
In Williams, plaintiff was the manager of a cardboard manufacturing plant. The plant failed an internal audit. Corporate management scheduled a meeting to discuss the audit with plaintiff. Instead of attending the meeting, plaintiff went on vacation and was fired as a result. The court held, unremarkably, that attending such a meeting was an inherent requirement of a plant manager’s job: “[The Lawful Off-Duty Activities Statute] is designed to protect employees from termination for private, personal activities, not from adverse employment consequences resulting from going on a vacation that conflicted with a meeting reasonably and rationally related to the party’s employment.” …
To the extent Plaintiff can prove to a jury that Defendant relied on Plaintiff’s on-duty conduct in the termination, this statutory exception will not apply…. This will be a matter for a jury to decide….
[2.] Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-108 [a separate statute] … prohibits an employer from terminating an employee for “engaging in or participating in politics” or “political activity.” Defendant assumes for purposes of summary judgment that the conduct in question (supporting the Rebels mascot, commenting on the meaning of the Confederate flag) constitutes political activity under the statute.
Defendant’s only argument on summary judgment is that Plaintiff was not terminated because of her Facebook posts. I have already determined that the basis(es) for her termination creates a fact issue. Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate on this claim….
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For more on the state statutes like those discussed here, see this article (and in particular pp. 313-15 on the potentially broad scope of “political activity,” as extending beyond election campaigns). From Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty’s decision Wednesday in Patterson-Eachus v. United Airlines, Inc. (D. Colo.) (images added from the court record):
Plaintiff worked for Defendant for thirty-one years in several capacities, most recently as a supervisor of airport operations. Her conduct and performance were not an issue until, as Defendant describes it, she posted certain “divisive” messages on Facebook.
{Sometime in August 2017, on her personal time and computer, Plaintiff re-posted to her private Facebook page her support for preserving the “Rebels” mascot of her high school, Weld Central High, including a cartoon soldier superimposed on a Confederate flag (the “Rebels mascot post“).
Sometime also in August 2017, Plaintiff re-posted to her private Facebook page a video of an African American male in front of a Confederate flag who, among other things, opined that the Confederate flag is not the evil that many people say it is (the “Confederate flag post”).}
Defendant learned of those messages, investigated them, found other issues with Plaintiff’s on-the-job conduct, and terminated Plaintiff based on its purported findings that Plaintiff’s negative interactions with subordinates irreparably damaged her ability to supervise….
[1.] Under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.5:
It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice for an employer to terminate the employment of any employee due to that employee’s engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours….
This law “was meant to provide a shield to employees who engage in activities that are personally distasteful to their employer, but which activities are legal and unrelated to an employee’s job duties.” … Plaintiff contends she was terminated because of her private activity in posting material to her own Facebook account….
[T]he record contains … evidence Plaintiff was terminated for her Facebook activity…. The termination letter dated October 16, 2017 begins with the statement that Plaintiff posted “inappropriate and racially insensitive” material to her Facebook account. It states that this posting “was a clear violation of our United Social Media Policy and the [UAL] Guidelines.” It informs her that, as a result of the Facebook post, she was being disciplined and investigated. The letter also accuses Plaintiff of “continu[ing] to deny that the racially insensitive Facebook post was inappropriate and that there was anything wrong with posting the racially offensive video on Facebook, where a number of your direct reports could see it.”
Next, the letter lists six distinct reasons why Defendant believed Plaintiff violated [employer] policies. Most of these reasons would apply equally to the Facebook posts as they would to Plaintiff’s direct interactions with subordinates.
Finally, the letter states Plaintiff has broken the trust Defendant placed on her, while explaining that Plaintiff will not be given progressive discipline because the “progressive discipline process is based on changing behavior but that is not possible if you do not acknowledge that what you did was wrong and take ownership of your offensive and inappropriate behavior.” Again, the letter directly accuses Plaintiff of denying the inappropriateness of the Facebook activity. Whether the Facebook posts were a contributing factor in the termination is a disputed material fact.
Defendant next relies on a statutory exception permitting the prohibition of conduct relating “to the employment activities and responsibilities of a particular employee or a particular group of employees, rather than to all employees of the employer.” The UAL Guidelines cited by Defendant apply to all employees, not just supervisory….
While it may be true United holds supervisors to a higher standard in some respects, that cannot change the plain meaning of a statute. If an employer’s policies explicitly apply to “all employees,” I cannot find, as a matter of law, that the statutory language of the exception has been met….
“[T]his portion of the statute was probably crafted to allow employers to require certain high profile members of their staff from foregoing involvement in activities that would call into question their competence.” The problem is Defendant’s attempt to shoehorn its after-the-fact “higher standard” testimony into a statutory exception allowing an employer to “require certain high profile members … from foregoing involvement in activities.” Just as … “[p]romotion of a positive image for Delta is not the exclusive province of baggage handlers” [the job category of employees in a previous case -EV] so too is the prohibition of racially offensive conduct not exclusively for supervisors….
Furthermore, the Colorado Court of Appeals has interpreted the statutory exception as applying to activities that are inherently connected with employment and emanate from the particular duties of the plaintiff’s job. Williams v. Rock-Tenn Servs., Inc. (Colo. App. 2016). “Such activities and responsibilities must be unique to or within the exclusive province of the particular employee or group of employees.”
In Williams, plaintiff was the manager of a cardboard manufacturing plant. The plant failed an internal audit. Corporate management scheduled a meeting to discuss the audit with plaintiff. Instead of attending the meeting, plaintiff went on vacation and was fired as a result. The court held, unremarkably, that attending such a meeting was an inherent requirement of a plant manager’s job: “[The Lawful Off-Duty Activities Statute] is designed to protect employees from termination for private, personal activities, not from adverse employment consequences resulting from going on a vacation that conflicted with a meeting reasonably and rationally related to the party’s employment.” …
To the extent Plaintiff can prove to a jury that Defendant relied on Plaintiff’s on-duty conduct in the termination, this statutory exception will not apply…. This will be a matter for a jury to decide….
[2.] Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-108 [a separate statute] … prohibits an employer from terminating an employee for “engaging in or participating in politics” or “political activity.” Defendant assumes for purposes of summary judgment that the conduct in question (supporting the Rebels mascot, commenting on the meaning of the Confederate flag) constitutes political activity under the statute.
Defendant’s only argument on summary judgment is that Plaintiff was not terminated because of her Facebook posts. I have already determined that the basis(es) for her termination creates a fact issue. Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate on this claim….
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Tom Goldstein writes that the Supreme Court should do more than dismiss Texas’s original jurisdiction case in a summary order. He says that the Supreme Court should “decimate” the motion with a written opinion.
It is perfectly ordinary and appropriate for the justices to write an opinion explaining the various reasons why they are rejecting Texas’ request. . . A simple five-page per curiam opinion genuinely could end up in the pantheon of all-time most significant rulings in American history. Every once in a long while, the court needs to invest some of its accumulated capital in issuing judgments that are not only legally right but also respond to imminent, tangible threats to the nation. That is particularly appropriate when, as here, the court finds itself being used as a tool to actively undermine faith in our democratic institutions — including by the members of the court’s bar on whom the justices depend to act much more responsibly.
Tom adds that the people supporting the President may be swayed by a unanimous decision from a conservative Supreme Court.
In a time that is so very deeply polarized, I cannot think of a person, group or institution other than the Supreme Court that could do better for the country right now. Supporters of the president who have been gaslighted into believing that there has been a multi-state conspiracy to steal the election recognize that the court is not a liberal institution. If the court will tell the truth, the country will listen.
I am skeptical.
First, I doubt the Supreme Court would be able to muster a majority opinion that actually engages with the merits. Several Justices have already expressed support for the independent state legislature doctrine. A sound rejection of Texas’s case could foreclose further refinement of that theory in the Pennsylvania case. And some errant dicta in a standing analysis could mess up other, related original jurisdiction cases. Moreover, the question of mootness for election challenges is in need of refinement. In any event, the Supreme Court often makes a hash of constitutional law when it rushes. It shouldn’t try so here.
Second, obtaining unanimity in a short time crunch has historically not fared well. Youngstown was decided a month after it was argued. And the 6-3 ruling yielded a majority opinion, five concurrences, and a dissent. Bush v. Gore, decided on an even tighter deadline, was far more fragmented. Perhaps the only outlier, in recent memory, of a rapid unanimous decision was Dames & Moore v. Regan. The important, but non-ideological case was decided within a week.
Third, Tom suggests that Trump supporters “will listen” to a five-page Supreme Court opinion. What about the last four years have taught us that a unanimous Supreme Court decision would convince people that the election was fair? Over the past week, I have done many interviews criticizing Texas’s case. And I routinely receive emails from well-meaning people who correct my understanding of constitutional law. They know better. A 9-0 decision will not change hearts and minds. The Supreme Court cannot do that. No, not even Brown v. Board fo Education, which was met with violent, massive resistance. In some regards, a Supreme Court decision could create an even bigger backlash.
Finally, John Roberts is not Earl Warren. Hell, he isn’t even Warren Burger. During his tenure, Roberts has tried, unsuccessfully to unite the left and right of his Court. And according to press reports, he has created rancor among the Justices. That history makes uniting the Court much more difficult.
I fully expect the Court to deny the motion for leave. I’m not sure on what grounds. I think the Court would be prudent not to try to settle this national debate in any way. It won’t work.
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Real Vision managing editor Ed Harrison welcomes senior editor Ash Bennington to discuss water futures, “bubblicious” market froth, and potential anti-competitive behavior by Big Tech. After Ed and Ash give their brief review of political news, Ed shares his analysis of the recent IPOs of DoorDash and Airbnb with Ash noting parallels between current market conditions and those that preceded the Dot-com bubble. Ed and Ash then explore the significance of the recent addition of water futures to the CME exchange. In the intro, Jack Farley and Weston Nakamura embark on a chart-filled journey on the Nikkei 225, the Japanese Yen, and currency pairs. For greater details and more charts from Weston and Jack, check out their conversation in the Real Vision Exchange: https://exchange.realvision.com/post/follow-up-to-my-daily-briefing-int….
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“They’re Sweeping It Under The Rug”: FBI Accused Of Covering Up Rampant Sexual Misconduct Among Top Ranks Tyler Durden Fri, 12/11/2020 – 18:00
As if you didn’t have any doubts before, it appears that everything may not be as buttoned-down as it appears a the Federal Bureau of Investigations.
In fact, a stunning new investigation has revealed “at least six sexual misconduct allegations involving senior FBI officials” over the last 5 years, inclusive of two new claims that have been lodged this week alone. The investigation, conducted by the Associated Press, found that each of the accused perpetrators of sexual misconduct “appears to have avoided discipline.” Others were “transferred or retired”, but were still allowed to keep their full pensions and benefits.
The latest claims come from a 17th woman who joined a federal lawsuit that alleges systemic sexual harassment at the FBI’s training academy in Quantico, Virginia. The lawsuit claims that FBI instructors made “sexually charged” comments about women needing to “take their birth control to control their moods.”
In some cases, internal probes against the accused substantiated the claims made against them. The accused are then allowed anonymity, enabling them to “land on their feet” in the private sector after leaving the agency. One woman claimed that a special agent who retired without discipline in 2016 was able to open his own law firm after he “imprisoned, tortured, harassed, blackmailed, stalked and manipulated” her into having several “non-consensual sexual encounters”.
The woman’s attorney commented: “It is the policy and practice of the FBI and its OIG to allow senior executives accused of sexual assault to quietly retire with full benefits without prosecution.”
Other cases AP reviewed included “an assistant director and special agents in charge of entire field offices” and allegations that ran the gamut from “unwanted touching” to “sexual advances and coercion”.
A former FBI analyst who said her supervisor “licked her face” and “groped her” at a farewell party in 2017 said: “They’re sweeping it under the rug. As the premier law enforcement organization that the FBI holds itself out to be, it’s very disheartening when they allow people they know are criminals to retire and pursue careers in law enforcement-related fields.”
Another incident involved an assistant director driving a female subordinate home after a happy hour, where he allegedly wrapped his arm around her waist and “moved his hand down onto her bottom” once they arrived at her apartment building. “Assistant directors should not be putting themselves in these situations,” the accused admitted, while still disputing the woman’s account. He retired in 2018 after an internal investigation substantiated the woman’s claims.
The AP investigation noted that its count of “at least six” does not include a “growing number” of FBI supervisors that have “failed to report romantic relationships with subordinates in recent years”.
Now, congress is calling for whistleblower protections. U.S. Rep. Jackie Speier, a California Democrat, said: “They need a #MeToo moment. It’s repugnant, and it underscores the fact that the FBI and many of our institutions are still good ol’-boy networks. It doesn’t surprise me that, in terms of sexual assault and sexual harassment, they are still in the Dark Ages.”
The FBI responded by saying it “maintains a zero-tolerance policy toward sexual harassment” and by saying that claims against supervisors have resulted in them being removed from positions while the cases were adjudicated internally. The agency said it looks at “the credibility of the allegations, the severity of the conduct, and the rank and position of the individuals involved.”
“Earlier this year, the Inspector General found that the special agent in charge of the Albany, New York, office, James N. Hendricks, sexually harassed eight subordinates at the FBI,” the report continued.
Yet the last time the OIG did an “extensive probe” on the agency, it found 343 sexual misconduct offenses from 2009 to 2012, including three instances of “videotaping undressed women without consent.”
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