The Market Wants To Hear Something Very Specific From Powell Today

Submitted by Nicholas Colas of DataTrek Research

Markets want to hear something very specific from the FOMC and Chair Powell: that the Fed will cut rates today, again in September, and maybe once more at year-end, no excuses. Assuming the Fed wants to wrestle the policy-making wheel away from Mr. Market, Chair Powell will have to contextualize the novel reasons for these moves – inoculating the US economy from global weakness and spurring inflationary growth – at his press conference. His credibility is already low from his U-turn on rates in January; he has to get this one right.

* * *

If we hear today is “the most important Fed meeting ever” one more time, we may just lose it. Yes, we’ll certainly see the first rate cut since 2007. Yes, global capital markets have bullied the Fed into this move; if German bunds had a positive yield no one would be expecting anything from Chair Powell and the FOMC. But anyone who sat in front of a screen during the Financial Crisis knows today’s rate decision doesn’t even crack the top 5 list for the most consequential Fed meeting of all time.

Rant over… so let’s talk about market expectations for future Fed policy through the lens of Fed Funds Futures:

Today:

  • Odds overwhelmingly favor (78%) a 25 basis point cut.
  • Odds of a 50 bp cut are just 22%, down from 32% a month ago.

September 18th meeting:

  • With 7 weeks more economic data under our belt, markets expect the Fed will still be on an easing track.
  • Assuming the all-but-certain cut today, Futures put the odds of another cut at the meeting at 55%.
  • The odds the Fed will stand pat after today’s cut are just 33%.
  • The dark horse possibility (12%) is that the Fed has cut by 50 bp at either today’s meeting or in September.

October 30th meeting:

  • Futures pricing points to a pause here, even with the possible overhang of a Halloween Brexit (the current deadline).
  • The odds that Fed Funds are 50 bp lower than today (i.e. cuts in July and September) are 47%, the most likely outcome according to Futures pricing.
  • Odds that rates are 75 bp lower or just 25 bp lower are pretty even at 29% and 20% respectively.

December 2018 meeting:

Odds are split between Fed Funds that are 50 bp (37%) or 75 bp (35%) lower than today.

  • April 2020 meeting:
  • This is as far as the CME FedWatch Tool goes at present.
  • Quoted odds are all over the map, ranging from Fed Funds at 50-75 bp (0.4%) all the way to 2.00% – 2.25% (5.6%).
  • The most likely outcomes at present look to be 75 bp lower than today (32%), followed by 100 bp lower (26%) or just 50 bp lower (21%).

What all this means as we watch Chair Powell’s press conference today:

#1: Markets expect the Fed to communicate a policy of further rate cuts through the rest of 2019. That is the key takeaway from the Fed Funds Futures data. Any messaging that includes skipping the September meeting will cause investors to worry about a “one and done” strategy.

#2: Futures have largely taken a 50 bp cut at any 2019 meeting off the table, and the Fed would do well to echo that sentiment. NY Fed president Williams’ recent misstep on this count, where he publicly discussed the academic merits of a “go early, go big” rate cut and temporarily confused markets, should have been a teaching moment for policymakers.

#3: What investors really want from the Fed can be summarized in one word: “clarity”. That’s because…

  • We are in an unusual place just now with decent US economic growth but markets still expecting the Fed to cut rates at least twice in 2019.
  • The usual rate cut set-up – growing unemployment, weakening consumer confidence, and/or a geopolitical shock – does not apply.
  • The issues that concern the Fed just now – sluggish inflation and slack non-US growth – are new vectors to explain a rate cut. Are Fed Funds that are 50 bp lower than today enough to insulate the US from the rest of the world’s problems? And will 75 bp really spark incremental inflation? The truth is no one knows.

Bottom line: while this is not “the most important Fed meeting ever”, it is certainly one that will set the tone for the rest of 2019. Chair Powell has already shaken markets once with his late 2018 chatter about higher neutral rates. How he will communicate the exact opposite perspective just 8 months later will either allow him to start managing market expectations or just leave him as a passenger on the bus.

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/2GClkI8 Tyler Durden

Bitcoin Surges Back Above $10,000 As Fed Rate-Cut Looms

A weaker dollar (perhaps) and even more negative-yielding global debt are perhaps the two catalysts for the latest rebound in cryptos as Bitcoin bounces back above $10,000 after the weekend’s plunge.

With Bitcoin cash leading the rebound and Ethereum retracing its losses for the week…

And as The Fed kicks off the global rate-cut bonanza, so we suspect Bitcoin will re-engage with the global volume of negative-yielding debt…

As Bitcoin offers, like gold, a hedge against the idiocy of policymakers.

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/2LSUHD0 Tyler Durden

The Fed’s Massive Debt-For-Equity Swap

Authored by Michael Lebowitz via RealInvestmentAdvice.com,

All assets are priced where they are today because of central banks. That’s modern finance — it’s not about psychology or flows anymore, it’s about what the central banks are going to do next.”

– Mark Spitznagel

Cause and Effect

Rene Descartes, a 17th-century mathematician, asked the fundamental question of how causal power functions. He was interested in how things relate to each other in terms of causality and how the thought of an action gets translated into a physical action. The theory he came up with, called “Interactionism,” affirms the relationship between thought and action. Importantly for our discussion, Descartes knew that any effect must have an antecedent cause.

When we are unclear about something, Descartes teaches us to search diligently for first principles, those things about which we are certain, and then explore what might have caused an event or observed the effect.

Warnings

In recent weeks, we have heard a variety of pundits, including a parade of Federal Reserve (Fed) officials speaking about mounting risks in the credit markets. Steve Eisman, who correctly pre-identified the magnitude of the sub-prime mortgage debacle, expressed confidence in commercial banks but worried that a U.S. recession would bring “massive” losses to the corporate bond market. The Fed published a report stating that there are meaningful risks in the corporate bond markets due to the amount of issuance that has occurred over the past decade and the weak credit quality of much of that issuance. As documented in many prior articles, we concur with those concerns and suggest the effect has a nasty way of sneaking up on central bankers. For our latest on the topic please read The Corporate Maginot Line.

The potential problems brewing in the credit markets are an effect. Corporations did not just decide to issue mountains of debt, much of which is low rated and of poor quality, for no reason at all. They did it, in large part, as a result of the economic and market environment created by the Fed through low interest rates and quantitative easing (QE).

The Fed removed over $4 trillion of the highest quality bonds out of the domestic market. In doing so, they pushed interest rates to historic lows. The combined effect all but forced investors to seek out higher-yielding, riskier instruments. As a result, the demand was ready and more than willing to absorb the on-coming wave of corporate supply and to do so at remarkably low yields and therefore very favorable terms for the issuers.

Cause

At the depths of the financial crisis, the Fed advertised QE as a means to boost asset prices, create a wealth effect, and fuel consumer borrowing and spending. It was sold as an economic growth booster that would benefit everyone. The ultimate objective was to staunch the crisis and foster an economic recovery.

Through QE, the Fed did this by acquiring mortgage and Treasury bonds from large banks and crediting those banks’ reserve accounts with digitally manufactured U.S. dollars. From September 2008 until January 2015, when the third round of QE was completed, the Fed balance sheet swelled by nearly $4 trillion while bank reserves grew from $2 billion (that’s $0.002 trillion) in July 2008 to almost $3.0 trillion.

As the Fed acquired vast amounts of high quality fixed-income securities from banks through QE, it created a vacuum in the bond market that had to be filled. The vanishing high-quality Treasuries and mortgages generated fresh demand for investments of lower-quality bonds.

Strong investor demand was met by corporations increasingly anxious to issue cheap debt to fund their activities. While those activities included capital expenditures, the debt increasingly was used to fund dividend payouts and share buybacks. Not coincidently, while the Fed’s balance sheet was expanding by $4 trillion, corporate debt outstanding exploded from $5 trillion to well over $9 trillion.

Debt-for-equity

As mentioned, the Fed removed high-quality securities from the market enabling corporate issuers to step in to fill the resulting gap. Since QE began, nearly 30% of the new corporate debt issued was used for stock buybacks. Putting the pieces of the mosaic together, it is fair to say the most intense corporate debt-for-equity swap in recorded history was enabled by the Fed via monetary policy and the federal government through tax-cuts.

This is symptomatic of a variety of issues that have been created by prolonged extraordinary monetary policy. In the same way that corporate behavior has been seriously altered as described above, every central bank in the developed world has undertaken even more extreme measures to foster growth, dictating that the behavior of market participants transform in some manner.

The chart below is a stark reminder of how the Fed has changed the natural order of the corporate debt market. Over the past 25 years, when corporate debt loads became onerous, investors required higher yields and wider spreads to compensate them for the added risks.

Today, despite the extreme amount of corporate leverage and the low quality of corporate credit, junk spreads remain near all-time lows. As shown below and highlighted by the red arrow, the long-standing correlation between leverage and high yield spreads is broken.

Data Courtesy: Bloomberg

This gross distortion and many others throughout the market offer clues and compelling evidence of a “cause.” Collectively, they point to a monetary policy that is manipulating the price of money and fostering irrational behaviors.

Effect

In his book, Economics in One Lesson, Henry Hazlitt states, “…the whole of economics can be reduced to a single lesson, and that lesson can be reduced to a single sentence. The art of economics consists in looking not merely at the immediate but at the longer effects of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one group but for all groups.”

The side-effects of extraordinary monetary policy, especially those that have been left in place for a decade, have scarcely been considered by the Federal Reserve. What was great (as in “get filthy rich” great) for the banks and the wealthy was not such a hot deal for the rest of the American public. The side effects are becoming more apparent and serious every day. As an aside, the rolling wave of populism did not emerge unprompted. It too is an effect. As Deep Throat said to Woodward and Bernstein, “Follow the money.”

Instead of investing in new property, plant, equipment, innovation, and employee training for the long-term benefit of their shareholders, employees, and the communities in which they operate, companies instead are taking advantage of ultra-low funding costs to buy back expensive stock. In a desire to prop up stock prices to enhance their compensation and satisfy short term investors, corporate executives have and continue to make poor capital allocation choices.

If the goal was to increase shareholder value via a temporarily higher share price, then corporations succeeded, albeit temporarily. The goal always should be to increase long-term shareholder value via stronger growth; a goal corporations have largely ignored. After ten years of poor decision making, many companies are left with inflated stock prices but dim prospects for future growth to fund their obese debt structures.

Summary

A weak post-crisis economic recovery that hurt low income wage earners alongside monetary policy that fueled steady gains in the cost of living meant many people were going to be left behind. The calculus did not anticipate that effect would extend so far up into the middle class. Struggling to maintain their previous standard of living, consumers borrow at the Fed’s new cheap rates. Quoting from the book, The Big Short, “If you want to make poor people feel rich, give them cheap loans.

That is exactly what the Fed did after the financial crisis for more than a decade and counting. That game has an unhappy effect as the economy loses productive capacity and has little fuel to spur organic growth and wage gains.

The series of events playing out right before us, like a pre-release movie trailer, reveals teasing fragments of information. The corporate debt market is today’s teaser. The set-up for that was the Fed-induced debt-for-equity swap. To anyone willing to pay attention to the data, it is again plain to see the excesses brewing in today’s environment which is eerily similar to those of 2005 and 2006. Even Dallas Fed President Kaplan has raised a warning flag by highlighting the amount and poor quality of corporate debt which could add to the burden on the economy in a downturn. He diplomatically understates the problem but at least he acknowledges it.

Monetary policies of the Fed are the cause. Those policies enable imprudent deficit-spending and accumulation of leverage at ultra-low interest rates.

Debt loads in the government, corporate and household sector, and various other hidden imbalances are the effect. What we know about circumstances is a concern, but what should be especially troubling are those things of which we are not even yet aware.

Turning back to Descartes, he offers this wisdom: “The senses deceive from time to time, and it is prudent never to trust wholly those who have deceived us even once.”

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/2OvpbND Tyler Durden

UBS To Start Charging Rich Clients With Negative 0.75% Interest Rate

For years, European banks were leery of passing on the ECB’s negative -0.40% deposit rate to their clients for fears of deposit flight and other unintended consequences, in the process being forced to “eat” the difference and impacting their interest income.

However, after five years of NIRP, and with the ECB set to unleash even more negative rates in the immediate future, one bank has finally taken a stand: according to the FT, UBS plans to charge a negative interest rate on wealthy clients, those  who deposit more than CHF 2 million with the largest Swiss bank. 

While several, mostly smaller, banks in Switzerland and the eurozone already pass on the cost of negative official rates to corporate depositors, most large players have refrained from doing so with individual clients. But with the ECB expected to adopt a “lower for longer” stance as soon as the next central bank meeting, starting in November, UBS Switzerland will charge -0.75% a year on individual cash balances above 2 million Swiss francs, the same rate as the SNB’s rate.

The move, as the FT notes, “underscores how banks in Europe and the US are scrambling to prepare for a protracted spell of lower rates that threatens their profitability, having previously wagered that central bankers would tighten monetary policy.”

Last month the Swiss National Bank said it would hold the negative rate it charges on commercial banks’ deposits at -0.75%, while the ECB deposit rate is -0.4%, but is widely expected to drop by another 10-20bps, which in turn will prompt even more negative rates in Switzerland. In a note to clients last month, UBS forecast that the SNB would lower its rate on deposits to -1% in September, approaching dangerously close to the infamous “reversal rate”, below which accomodative monetary policy reverse and once again becomes contractionary for lending, i.e., the true lower bound of NIRP.

“A year ago everyone thought interest rates would go up. Now it doesn’t look like that,” said one senior wealth manager at UBS quoted by the FT.

To preempt the inevitable howls of rage from wealthy clients who will soon see their total savings shrink by 1% (or more) every year just to hold their money in the bank, UBS relationship managers have started discussing the forthcoming charges with some wealthy clients and are preparing to issue a letter outlining the changes. Some of the bank’s smaller rivals, such as Julius Baer and Pictet, already charge some clients with large cash deposits.

“We assume that this period of low interest rates will last even longer and that banks will continue to have to pay negative interest rates on customer deposits at central banks,” UBS said. “Following similar moves by a number of other banks here in Switzerland, we confirm that we’ve decided to adjust cash deposit fees for Swiss francs held in Switzerland.”

The UBS announcement comes on the same day as Credit Suisse, UBS’s main rival, said it was also thinking about imposing a negative deposit rate on some wealthy clients: “In Switzerland, we are considering measures on deposits to mitigate pressure of negative interest rates,” Tidjane Thiam, Credit Suisse CEO said during a discussion of the bank’s half-year results. And like UBS, the Credit Suisse levy would be “targeted on people . . . that measure their cash balances in millions.”

UBS did provide one loophole, saying that clients who want to avoid the levy can move their balances into non-cash assets or into “fiduciary call deposits” that can be transferred back to the customer’s main account within 48 hours. Such FDCs are held in third-party banks or UBS entities based outside Switzerland, meaning the lender does not have to pay negative rates to the SNB.

However, the lack of immediate access to funds – as UBS implements the effective equivalent of a 2-day certificate of deposit – raises the risk of unintended consequences, such as runs on various other assets should there be a dramatic change in financial circumstances and depositors seek access to any and all liquidity at a moment’s notice.

Whether such negative rates encourage savers to spend their money as central banks have been hoping all along, remains to be seen. In any case, one thing is certain: the unintended consequences of passing on the most destructive monetary policy onto end consumers and savers, will be dire and widespread, and could potentially result in the next financial crisis which, with some luck, will also be the last one.

For now, however, keep an eye on cryptocurrencies: last we checked, there was no cost, and no way to impose punitive rates, to keeps one’s savings in bitcoin and its peers, which should have obvious consequences on its price.

via ZeroHedge News https://ift.tt/2Yx1LLv Tyler Durden

Is Money Speech? Free Speech Rules (Episode 5)

Can the government restrict people’s ability to spend money on speech?

Here are the four rules of free speech and money.

Rule 1: Generally, your right to speak includes the right to spend money to speak. The government can’t limit, for instance, a newspaper’s budget, even if it thinks newspapers have too much influence over elections and politicians.  The government can’t stop the National Rifle Association or the Sierra Club from spending money to praise the candidates they like, and it can’t limit what other Americans spend, either.

Sometimes people frame the question as “Is money speech?” But that’s not right. Here’s an analogy: The Sixth Amendment protects criminal defendants’ right to hire a lawyer. Say the government said, “You can hire any lawyer you like, but you can’t pay them more than $1000.” It would be unfair, the theory goes, for rich people to hire better lawyers than poor people can. That restriction would violate the Sixth Amendment—but not because “money is a lawyer,” but because the right to a lawyer includes the right to spend money on a lawyer.

The same is true for most other rights. The Supreme Court has held that people have a right to send their children to private school. If the government were to say, “you can’t spend more than $1000 per year on private schooling,” that would violate the right to educate your children; but again, not because “money is an education,” but because the right to educate your children includes the right to spend money on schooling.

Justice Breyer, who’s actually open to substantial restrictions on spending money for speech, put this well:

“A decision to contribute money to a campaign is a matter of First Amendment concern—not because money is speech (it is not); but because it enables speech.”

So restrictions on spending money to speak, the Supreme Court has held, are restrictions on speech, and are thus generally unconstitutional.

Rule #2: The government can, though, limit direct contributions to candidates, as opposed to just spending money to speak about candidates. In 1976, for instance, the Supreme Court upheld a cap on contributions to federal candidates. The Court has also upheld even lower caps (as low as $250) for state and local candidates.

Part of the reasoning behind that conclusion is that contribution restrictions limit speech less than expenditure restrictions, precisely because restrictions on contributions to candidates still leave people free to say whatever they like independently of the candidate.

Rule #3: The government may also bar nonprofit organizations from spending tax-deductible contributions on political campaigning. The charitable tax deduction is viewed as a sort of a subsidy. Say you’re in the 40% tax bracket; if you give $1000 to a charity, you save $400 in taxes. That contribution is thus equivalent to your paying $600 non-tax-exempt to the charity, and the government forking over the $400.

Based on this subsidy theory, the Supreme Court has held that the government may attach conditions to this tax deduction. One such condition is that groups (whether religious or secular) that collect tax-deductible money aren’t supposed to use it to endorse or oppose political candidates. If they want to engage in such speech, they can—just with money they get without the tax exemption.

That’s why many groups, such as the ACLU, the NRA, the Sierra Club, actually have two related groups—a so-called “501(c)(3)” group that collects tax-deductible donations and can’t use them for political campaigning, and a “501(c)(4)” group that collects non-tax-deductible donations that it can use for politics.

Rule #4: The government may completely bar people who aren’t citizens or lawful permanent residents from spending money to advocate for or against candidates. Though non-citizens present in the U.S. generally have broad First Amendment rights, a federal court held that these rights can be limited when it comes to spending even small sums of money related to elections. The Supreme Court upheld that decision, though the Justices didn’t issue a written opinion.

So, to sum up:

Rule #1: Your right to speak, like most of your other rights, includes the right to spend your money to speak.

Rule #2: Contributions given to candidates can be restricted, though speech said independently of the candidates is protected.

Rule #3: The government can insist that tax-deductible contributions can’t be used to support or oppose candidates, though nonprofits are free to politick for candidates using non-tax-deductible donations.

Rule #4: The rule is different for non-citizens, at least those who aren’t lawful permanent residents; they can be barred from spending money to support or oppose candidates.

Written by Eugene Volokh, who is a First Amendment law professor at UCLA.
Produced and edited by Austin Bragg, who is not.
Additional graphics by Joshua Swain.

This is the fifth episode of Free Speech Rules, a video series on free speech and the law. Volokh is the co-founder of The Volokh Conspiracy, a blog hosted at Reason.com.

This is not legal advice.
If this were legal advice, it would be followed by a bill.
Please use responsibly.

Music: “Lobby Time,” by Kevin MacLeod (Incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 3.0 License
https://ift.tt/oKTIFM

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/2Yij5V5
via IFTTT

Is Money Speech? Free Speech Rules (Episode 5)

Can the government restrict people’s ability to spend money on speech?

Here are the four rules of free speech and money.

Rule 1: Generally, your right to speak includes the right to spend money to speak. The government can’t limit, for instance, a newspaper’s budget, even if it thinks newspapers have too much influence over elections and politicians.  The government can’t stop the National Rifle Association or the Sierra Club from spending money to praise the candidates they like, and it can’t limit what other Americans spend, either.

Sometimes people frame the question as “Is money speech?” But that’s not right. Here’s an analogy: The Sixth Amendment protects criminal defendants’ right to hire a lawyer. Say the government said, “You can hire any lawyer you like, but you can’t pay them more than $1000.” It would be unfair, the theory goes, for rich people to hire better lawyers than poor people can. That restriction would violate the Sixth Amendment—but not because “money is a lawyer,” but because the right to a lawyer includes the right to spend money on a lawyer.

The same is true for most other rights. The Supreme Court has held that people have a right to send their children to private school. If the government were to say, “you can’t spend more than $1000 per year on private schooling,” that would violate the right to educate your children; but again, not because “money is an education,” but because the right to educate your children includes the right to spend money on schooling.

Justice Breyer, who’s actually open to substantial restrictions on spending money for speech, put this well:

“A decision to contribute money to a campaign is a matter of First Amendment concern—not because money is speech (it is not); but because it enables speech.”

So restrictions on spending money to speak, the Supreme Court has held, are restrictions on speech, and are thus generally unconstitutional.

Rule #2: The government can, though, limit direct contributions to candidates, as opposed to just spending money to speak about candidates. In 1976, for instance, the Supreme Court upheld a cap on contributions to federal candidates. The Court has also upheld even lower caps (as low as $250) for state and local candidates.

Part of the reasoning behind that conclusion is that contribution restrictions limit speech less than expenditure restrictions, precisely because restrictions on contributions to candidates still leave people free to say whatever they like independently of the candidate.

Rule #3: The government may also bar nonprofit organizations from spending tax-deductible contributions on political campaigning. The charitable tax deduction is viewed as a sort of a subsidy. Say you’re in the 40% tax bracket; if you give $1000 to a charity, you save $400 in taxes. That contribution is thus equivalent to your paying $600 non-tax-exempt to the charity, and the government forking over the $400.

Based on this subsidy theory, the Supreme Court has held that the government may attach conditions to this tax deduction. One such condition is that groups (whether religious or secular) that collect tax-deductible money aren’t supposed to use it to endorse or oppose political candidates. If they want to engage in such speech, they can—just with money they get without the tax exemption.

That’s why many groups, such as the ACLU, the NRA, the Sierra Club, actually have two related groups—a so-called “501(c)(3)” group that collects tax-deductible donations and can’t use them for political campaigning, and a “501(c)(4)” group that collects non-tax-deductible donations that it can use for politics.

Rule #4: The government may completely bar people who aren’t citizens or lawful permanent residents from spending money to advocate for or against candidates. Though non-citizens present in the U.S. generally have broad First Amendment rights, a federal court held that these rights can be limited when it comes to spending even small sums of money related to elections. The Supreme Court upheld that decision, though the Justices didn’t issue a written opinion.

So, to sum up:

Rule #1: Your right to speak, like most of your other rights, includes the right to spend your money to speak.

Rule #2: Contributions given to candidates can be restricted, though speech said independently of the candidates is protected.

Rule #3: The government can insist that tax-deductible contributions can’t be used to support or oppose candidates, though nonprofits are free to politick for candidates using non-tax-deductible donations.

Rule #4: The rule is different for non-citizens, at least those who aren’t lawful permanent residents; they can be barred from spending money to support or oppose candidates.

Written by Eugene Volokh, who is a First Amendment law professor at UCLA.
Produced and edited by Austin Bragg, who is not.

This is the fifth episode of Free Speech Rules, a video series on free speech and the law. Volokh is the co-founder of The Volokh Conspiracy, a blog hosted at Reason.com.

This is not legal advice.
If this were legal advice, it would be followed by a bill.
Please use responsibly.

Music: “Lobby Time,” by Kevin MacLeod (Incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 3.0 License
https://ift.tt/oKTIFM

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/2Yij5V5
via IFTTT

What is the Plaintiffs’ Cause of Action in the Wall Litigation?

[This post is co-authored with Seth Barrett Tillman, Lecturer, Maynooth University Department of Law. It is based on an amicus brief which we co-filed with the Judicial Education Project.]

On Friday, the Supreme Court stayed the District Court’s decision in Trump v. Sierra Club, which had halted the administration’s plan to construct a border fence. The Court’s short entry on the “shadow docket” offered only a single explanatory sentence:

Among the reasons is that the Government has made a sufficient showing at this stage that the plaintiffs have no cause of action to obtain review of the Acting Secretary’s compliance with Section 8005.

What is the Plaintiffs’ cause of action in Sierra Club v. Trump? The Ninth Circuit observed

Throughout this litigation, Plaintiffs’ claim has been framed in various ways. The lack of compliance with section 8005 has sometimes been labeled ultra vires as outside statutory authority or as outside the President’s Article II powers, and spending without an appropriation has been described as a violation of the Appropriations Clause. However their claim is labeled, Plaintiffs’ theory is ultimately the same.

Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found there were two possible causes of action: 

Plaintiffs may bring their challenge through an equitable action to enjoin unconstitutional official conduct, or under the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., as a challenge to a final agency decision that is alleged to violate the Constitution, or both.

Slip op. at 4 (bold added). The Sierra Club argued that “Plaintiffs have an ultra vires cause of action.” The brief adds, “For two centuries, this Court has permitted judicial review of ultra vires executive action without invoking a zone-of-interests test.”

This argument closely resembles the briefing in the Emoluments Clauses cases. In District of Columbia & Maryland v. Trump, for example, the two plaintiffs framed their constitutional causes of action in a very similar fashion. They contended that “[t]he ability to sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is the creation of courts of equity, and reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back to England.” Both of these cases invoke “equity” in some fashion. However, it is unclear if plaintiffs are referring to the type of remedy sought (i.e., injunctive relief) or the jurisdiction of the court to hear a class of cases (i.e., equitable jurisdiction). The two concepts are related, but they are not the same.

Without question, the federal courts have the equitable jurisdiction to enjoin unconstitutional, or ultra vires actions of governmental officials. There is a long tradition of such cases. Plaintiffs argue that the zone-of-interests test–a relatively recent introduction in federal law–does not apply to constitutional claims. The case law developing this zone-of-interests doctrine largely relates to statutory law, not constitutional law. We take no view whether the zone of interests test also applies to constitutional claims, or if its reach is limited to the claims based on statutory causes of action, or claims based on the Administrative Procedure Act.

However, we do disagree with Plaintiffs’ understanding of the federal courts’ “equitable jurisdiction.” The constitutional claims in the Wall litigation, as well as in the Emoluments Clauses cases, cannot invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts. Why? In order to invoke a federal court’s equitable jurisdiction, Plaintiffs cannot simply assert in a conclusory fashion that the conduct of federal officers is ultra vires, and, on that basis, seek equitable relief. “Equity” cannot be used as a magic talisman to transform the plaintiffs into private attorneys general who can sue the government merely for acting illegally. Rather, in order to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts, plaintiffs must put forward a prima facie equitable cause of action

We think the absence of such an equitable cause of action was precisely the defect the Supreme Court highlighted in Sierra Club. Recall the order stated, “Among the reasons is that the Government has made a sufficient showing at this stage that the plaintiffs have no cause of action to obtain review of the Acting Secretary’s compliance with Section 8005.” We also think that similar concerns animated the recent remand order in the DC Circuit’s Emoluments Clause case: Blumenthal v. Trump. In its remand order, the court noted: “The question of whether the Foreign Emoluments Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 8, or other authority gives rise to a cause of action against the President is unsettled ….” Neither of these orders referenced the zone-of-interests test. Both orders did reference whether the plaintiffs had an equitable cause of action. 

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. (1999) recognized that “the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is the jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the original Judiciary Act, 1789 (1 Stat. 73).” In order to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts, a plaintiff must put forward a cause of action within (or analogous to) the jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery in England as it stood in 1789. 

At that time, as a general matter, litigants could invoke the court’s equitable jurisdiction to stop ultra vires actions by government officers, but only if plaintiff’s rights or duties regarding its own property (i.e., as the legal or beneficial owner) were at issue. Alternatively, the court’s equitable jurisdiction could be invoked if a cause of action were otherwise supplied by the common law (such as contractual rights or obligations) or by statute.

A plaintiff’s mere request for equitable or injunctive relief does not invoke a federal court’s equitable jurisdiction. Likewise, even if the plaintiff has an Article III injury-in-fact, his bare assertion of illegal or ultra vires conduct by federal officers is insufficient to invoke the federal court’s equitable jurisdiction. As a general matter, such a claim could only go forward if there is an invasion (or imminent invasion) of the plaintiff’s property rights, or if the case presents an analogous concrete dispute involving the plaintiff’s rights or duties regarding his own property. For example, the plaintiff relies on a cause of action within (or analogous to) the jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery in England as it stood in 1789.

In other words, in both the Wall litigation and Emoluments Clauses cases, the plaintiffs must identify a cause of action (or an analogous cause of action) that would have been available under the equitable jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery in England at it stood in 1789. Plaintiffs have not even attempted to make such a showing. Indeed, the United States attempted and failed to make such a showing in Grupo Mexicano. As a result, the government’s request for relief was rejected. Plaintiffs’ purported equitable cause of action, based only on an ultra vires claim, would have been unknown to William Blackstone, Chancellor Kent, or Justice Story.

Moreover, their rule offers no limiting principle: it would open the courthouse door to every plaintiff with Article III standing, who asserts that a federal official engaged in illegal conduct. It is not enough for an injured person to merely assert a violation of the Constitution. To open the federal courthouse door, a proper plaintiff in a federal lawsuit needs both a court with jurisdiction and a cause of action. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (distinguishing jurisdiction from cause of action, where both are necessary to maintain suit in federal court). For example, in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center (2015), the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that “the Supremacy Clause creates a cause of action for its violation” in the federal court’s equitable jurisdiction. (Plaintiffs in the Emoluments Clauses cases repeatedly cite Armstrong, but fail to note that this case cuts against their free-floating claim to an equitable cause of action based on a purported constitutional violation.)

Finally, plaintiffs’ approach would allow any plaintiff who invokes “equity” to evade the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirements for seeking a judicial remedy. Such a “wrenching departure from past practice,” as Grupo Mexicano put it, must be carefully scrutinized. Equity jurisdiction is not a tabula rasa or constitutional free-for-all in which litigants may prosecute claims that would otherwise fail under the APA and in law. The Plaintiffs in the Wall litigation do not have an independent cause of action, other than their claim that the government is acting illegally. Neither do the plaintiffs in the Emoluments Clauses cases.

But what about the Supreme Court’s leading separation of powers decisions that arose in equity? Was there an independent cause of action–separate from the allegation of ultra vires governmental action–in cases like Ex Parte Young (1908), Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce (1949), Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981), Clinton v. City of New York (1998), and Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB (2010)? The answer is yes.

In each of these cases, the underlying substantive law—e.g., common law or statutory—provided the necessary cause of action. As a result, once the federal courts’ equitable jurisdiction had been properly invoked, and the plaintiffs alleged both Article III injury and an independent cause of action, the courts had the power to issue an equitable remedy (i.e., injunctive relief). Equitable jurisdiction is not properly invoked merely be requesting equitable relief. It works the other way around: once equitable jurisdiction is properly invoked, then the court has the power to grant equitable relief

Let’s consider each case.

 

Ex Parte Young

In this old chestnut, the Supreme Court held that the federal courts could issue injunctive relief to prevent state officials from prospectively violating the Constitution. From this well-known holding, plaintiffs in the Emoluments Clauses Cases have asserted that the district court had equitable jurisdiction. Here, plaintiffs only discussed the remedial aspect of Young–i.e., equitable relief. However, Plaintiffs neglected to mention that the underlying cause of action in Young concerned a run-of-the-mill dispute: a governmental regulation of Plaintiffs’ private property. The Court observed that “the question really to be determined under this objection is whether the acts of the legislature and the orders of the railroad commission, if enforced, would take property without due process of law.” Such disputes about contested rights and duties involving property (e.g., interpleader) lie at the very core of historical equitable jurisdiction. Specifically, the Young plaintiffs sought to prevent the state from regulating their property. To accomplish this goal, they invoked the court’s equitable jurisdiction to sue state officers before those state officers could regulate the plaintiffs’ property through an imminent coercive lawsuit. 

Not so in the Emoluments Clauses cases. The plaintiffs’ suit concerns property belonging to private commercial entities affiliated with Donald Trump. Even if we were willing to counterfactually recharacterize such property as Trump’s property, these cases do not involve the government’s efforts to regulate the plaintiffs’ property. Nor does that case involve a threatened coercive suit brought by the government to take or regulate plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs make no such claim. As a result, plaintiffs’ claim is beyond the orbit of what is permissible under Young or under the federal courts’ equitable jurisdiction. Again in the Emoluments Clauses cases, Donald Trump’s purported constitutional tort—that is, accepting or receiving purported emoluments in private commercial transactions—does not involve plaintiffs’ property. Nor is the President regulating Plaintiffs’ property. What Plaintiffs need to establish, but do not and cannot, is equitable jurisdiction or an equitable cause of action.

 

Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce

Plaintiffs have cited Larson for the proposition that a plaintiff with standing can sue for prospective injunctive relief against ultra vires government conduct. Plaintiffs have misread this relatively straightforward case. Larson involved a simple common-law cause of action: breach of contract. The Court explained, “The basis of the action . . . was that a contract had been entered into with the United States”–a contract claim. Again, causes of action for specific performance based on a breach of contract have long-standing roots in the law of equity. There is no analogous historical equitable cause of action for claims under the Emoluments Clauses or the Appropriations Clause, even when brought in conjunction with allegations involving ultra vires conduct by government officers. 

 

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer

In this seminal separation-of-powers case, the federal government seized control of private steel mills. The action was brought by the mills’ owners. Youngstown’s brief explained its cause of action:

A simple cloud on title has always moved equity to grant relief because no other remedy is complete or adequate. Wickliffe v. Owings, 17 How. 47, 50 (1854); Southern Pacific v. United States, 200 U. S. 341, 352 (1906); Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576, 587 (1914); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 48 (1920). The seizure of the properties and business of the plaintiffs, with its host of uncertainties and legal and practical problems arising from the ambiguous position in which the owners are left, should appeal to equity at least as strongly as a cloud on title. In these circumstances, any remedy at law would necessarily be inadequate. 

The steel mill owners had a concrete, property interest that was impaired by the government’s actions. The plaintiffs did not rely on a generalized allegation of ultra vires action by the Secretary of Commerce; instead, they relied on an analogous cause of action to quiet title–their title to their property. Here too, we are in the heartland of historical equity jurisdiction involving disputed property rights. 

 

Dames & Moore v. Regan

Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Dames & Moore, which was drafted very quickly, did not consider the Court’s equitable jurisdiction. (Fun fact: A young John G. Roberts clerked for Justice Rehnquist when Dames & Moore was decided.) However, Rehnquist observed that the plaintiffs sought to “prevent enforcement of the Executive Orders and Treasury Department regulations implementing the Agreement with Iran.” Without question, the plaintiffs asserted that the government acted ultra vires: “In its complaint, petitioner alleged that the actions of the President and the Secretary of the Treasury implementing the Agreement with Iran were beyond their statutory and constitutional powers.” 

But the plaintiffs pleaded an important, additional fact: that the government’s actions “were unconstitutional to the extent they adversely affect petitioner’s final judgment against the Government of Iran and the Atomic Energy Organization, its execution of that judgment in the State of Washington, its prejudgment attachments, and its ability to continue to litigate against the Iranian banks.” The suit was not a generalized grievance about the President’s foreign policy decisions. Rather, jurisdiction was premised on a final judgment involving vested property rights that the government sought to extinguish. The executive order that nullified Dames & Moore’s judgments operated in a similar fashion to the executive order which gave rise to the Steel Seizure Case. The federal courts had jurisdiction to resolve both cases. In both cases, plaintiffs were seeking to protect concrete property rights–the vindication of these interests lies at the core of historical equity jurisdiction. 

 

Clinton v. City of New York

In Clinton v. City of New York, the Court observed “Plaintiffs suffered an immediate, concrete injury the moment that the President used the Line Item Veto to cancel section 4722(c) and deprived them of the benefits of that law.” The Supreme Court did not address whether the plaintiffs had an equitable cause of action. However, Justice Stevens drew an analogy between the cancellation of funds and a familiar cause of action in the courts:

His action was comparable to the judgment of an appellate court setting aside a verdict for the defendant and remanding for a new trial of a multibillion dollar damages claim. Even if the outcome of the second trial is speculative, the reversal, like the President’s cancellation, causes a significant immediate injury by depriving the defendant of the benefit of a favorable final judgment. The revival of a substantial contingent liability immediately and directly affects the borrowing power, financial strength, and fiscal planning of the potential obligor.

The City of New York could invoke the federal court’s equitable jurisdiction in either set of circumstances: if the executive branch, or the court cancelled a financial windfall. Equitable jurisdiction was proper in this case.

 

Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB

We address one final case that has often been cited by plaintiffs in the Emoluments Clauses cases as a basis for equitable jurisdiction: Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB (2010). This citation is perplexing, because that case does not discuss the federal court’s equitable jurisdiction. Rather, a footnote in that decision cited Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko (2001) for the proposition that “equitable relief ‘has long been recognized as the proper means for preventing entities from acting unconstitutionally.'” Once again, plaintiffs’ argument conflates equitable remedies with equitable jurisdiction. Moreover, Malesko involved an unsuccessful cause of action under Bivens for damages—not equitable jurisdiction as a basis for equitable relief. 

Plaintiffs in the Emoluments Clauses cases have characterized Free Enterprise Fund as standing for the proposition that a plaintiff with an Article III injury can obtain prospective injunctive relief if he simply alleges government officers acts illegally. Plaintiffs err. Free Enterprise Fund involved a cause of action based on a statute: the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Plaintiffs sued based on a threat of a future coercive action by the SEC under that statute.

The Supreme Court has never recognized an amorphous, open-ended equitable jurisdiction permitting plaintiffs to act as private attorneys general to control purported illegal government conduct merely predicated on the low threshold associated with Article III injury. At bottom, the federal court’s “flexible” equitable jurisdiction must be “confined within the broad boundaries of traditional equitable relief.” Grupo Mexicano (emphasis added). Only “in a proper case [may] relief . . . be given in a court of equity . . . to prevent an injurious act by a public officer.” Armstrong.

The Emoluments Clauses cases plaintiffs are not proper: unlike the Free Enterprise Fund plaintiffs, the Emoluments Clauses cases plaintiffs are not threatened by the Government with a future coercive lawsuit, much less a threatened future coercive lawsuit that involves taking or regulating their property. Indeed, the Emoluments Clauses cases do not involve any allegation that plaintiffs’ property is being taken or regulated by any government conduct: legal or illegal. Rather, the gravamen of plaintiffs’ allegations in the Emoluments Clauses cases involves private commercial conduct of commercial entities affiliated with President Trump. On these alleged facts, we are well beyond the realm of “traditional equitable relief.” Grupo Mexicano.

 

Conclusion

We suspect a similar argument prevailed upon the Supreme Court in Trump v. Sierra Club. The Court could have cited the zone-of-interests test. But it didn’t. Instead, the brief order likely used the term “cause of action” in the same sense the Grupo Mexicano Court used the term “equity jurisdiction.” This conclusion is basic: equitable jurisdiction is merely the set of causes of action that the High Court of Chancery could hear. Could the High Court of Chancery in England in 1789 have exercised jurisdiction over an analogous case to that of the Sierra Club, based solely on plaintiffs’ claim of ultra vires conduct by government officials, absent any claim that Sierra Club’s property was being taken or regulated? The answer is no

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/2SSykOF
via IFTTT

Medicare for All Is Defining the 2020 Democratic Race

A decade ago, Democrats in Congress were deep into the process of designing and debating the health care law that would become Obamacare. Tea Party protests were about to spring up around the country in opposition to the law. And President Barack Obama was on the verge of delivering a major address defending the law from its critics, and hoping to rally support from his own party. 

In that speech, Obama positioned his approach as a middle ground between two extremes. “There are those on the left,” he said, “who believe that the only way to fix the system is through a single-payer system like Canada’s, where we would severely restrict the private insurance market and have the government provide coverage for everyone. On the right, there are those who argue that we should end the employer-based system and leave individuals to buy health insurance on their own.” 

The following year, Obamacare became the law of the land, and the signature initiative of Obama’s two-term presidency. But in last night’s Democratic primary debate, which featured a full half-hour segment focused on health care—which was introduced as “the number-one issue for Democratic voters”—it was virtually absent. Instead, the evening’s leading contenders extensively defended Medicare for All, a single-payer plan that captured elements of both the extremes Obama said he wanted to avoid. 

Medicare for All, as proposed by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I–Vt.) and vigorously supported by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D–Mass.), would end the nation’s employer-based health care system and, in the space of four years, replace it with a fully government-run system that is closest to Canada’s, but even more restrictive, leaving virtually no room for private insurance. It would, according to both independent estimates and Sanders himself, raise government spending on health care by something like $30 or $40 trillion over the next decade. And it would require tax hikes or tax-like fees or premiums on the middle class.  In terms of both cost and transition complexity, it would dwarf Obamacare. 

Sanders and Warren spent much of the debate’s opening segment defending these ideas from tough questioning by the moderators and criticism from more moderate candidates who argued that the plan was too radical, too unpopular, and too unworkable. The polls, at least, suggest that there is some truth to this: Medicare for All is popular in the abstract, but quickly becomes unpopular when respondents are told that it would eliminate private health insurance or raise taxes. 

Arguably the strongest criticisms came from John Delaney, a Maryland Democrat who in the early 1990s founded a health care financing company. Delaney warned that the radicalism espoused by Warren and Sanders would turn off more moderate voters in an election. “We don’t have to go around and be the party of subtraction, and telling half the country, who has private health insurance, that their health insurance is illegal,” he said. “My dad, the union electrician, loved the health care he got from the IBEW. He would never want someone to take that away. Half of Medicare beneficiaries now have Medicare Advantage, which is private insurance, or supplemental plans. It’s also bad policy. It’ll underfund the industry, many hospitals will close.” 

This was a point that Delaney had made before: the Sanders plan, as expensive as it already is, calls for paying Medicare rates for all services, which would mean a substantial reduction in rates for doctors and hospitals. He repeated it later in the evening. “I’ve been going around rural America,” he said, “and I ask rural hospital administrators one question, ‘If all your bills were paid at the Medicare rate last year, what would happen?’ And they all look at me and say, ‘We would close.'”  

Warren and Sanders had essentially no response to this. Warren accused moderates on the stage of spinelessness, and both she and Sanders argued that questions and criticisms about single-payer health care amounted to “Republican talking points.” They took shots at drug makers, which represent about 10 percent of total U.S. health care spending, and insurance companies, which on average have profit margins of less than 3 percent, for profiting off of health care, but never addressed questions about payment rates for providers. 

Nor would Warren respond directly to a question about whether she would raise taxes on the middle class to fund the plan. Sanders has admitted that it would require higher taxes, and Warren has said she’s with him on his ideas. But when asked by moderator Jake Tapper whether she’s “‘with Bernie’ on Medicare for all when it comes to raising taxes on middle-class Americans to pay for it?” she prevaricated. “So giant corporations and billionaires are going to pay more,” she said. “Middle-class families are going to pay less out of pocket for their health care.” And then she went on to attack insurance companies, repeating the same basic formulation about “total costs” going down when Tapper pressed her again on taxes. Warren clearly didn’t want to answer the question.

Following the debate, CNN’s Anderson Cooper pressed her on the question of upheaval: What would she say to people to liked their current health plans? How did she respond to the idea that Obamacare was already a tough sell politically, and Medicare for All would therefore be even more difficult? Once again, Warren deflected, accusing critics of timidity and spinelessness. 

Looked at one way, Medicare for All had a rough night, facing difficult questions and a phalanx of criticism from the stage’s more moderate contenders. But the critics who fought with Warren and Sanders last night have essentially zero support in the party. Delaney, for example, currently polls at 0.7 percent. The only Democratic candidate who has strongly attacked Medicare for All who has performed well so far is former Vice President Joe Biden, who will appear in the debate’s second round tonight. And even Biden’s plan has been framed largely as a response to Medicare for All, a way of pushing back against its excesses. 

Somehow, in the space of 10 years, Democrats have drifted away from Obama’s performative centrism, his (at least rhetorical) sense that what Americans want is a middle way, an anti-radical solution rather than the “big structural change” that Warren insists is needed. Medicare for All, and all the troublesome questions it raises, is defining the 2020 Democratic race—and the Democratic Party with it. 

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/2ysdk7W
via IFTTT

What is the Plaintiffs’ Cause of Action in the Wall Litigation?

[This post is co-authored with Seth Barrett Tillman, Lecturer, Maynooth University Department of Law. It is based on an amicus brief which we co-filed with the Judicial Education Project.]

On Friday, the Supreme Court stayed the District Court’s decision in Trump v. Sierra Club, which had halted the administration’s plan to construct a border fence. The Court’s short entry on the “shadow docket” offered only a single explanatory sentence:

Among the reasons is that the Government has made a sufficient showing at this stage that the plaintiffs have no cause of action to obtain review of the Acting Secretary’s compliance with Section 8005.

What is the Plaintiffs’ cause of action in Sierra Club v. Trump? The Ninth Circuit observed

Throughout this litigation, Plaintiffs’ claim has been framed in various ways. The lack of compliance with section 8005 has sometimes been labeled ultra vires as outside statutory authority or as outside the President’s Article II powers, and spending without an appropriation has been described as a violation of the Appropriations Clause. However their claim is labeled, Plaintiffs’ theory is ultimately the same.

Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found there were two possible causes of action: 

Plaintiffs may bring their challenge through an equitable action to enjoin unconstitutional official conduct, or under the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., as a challenge to a final agency decision that is alleged to violate the Constitution, or both.

Slip op. at 4 (bold added). The Sierra Club argued that “Plaintiffs have an ultra vires cause of action.” The brief adds, “For two centuries, this Court has permitted judicial review of ultra vires executive action without invoking a zone-of-interests test.”

This argument closely resembles the briefing in the Emoluments Clauses cases. In District of Columbia & Maryland v. Trump, for example, the two plaintiffs framed their constitutional causes of action in a very similar fashion. They contended that “[t]he ability to sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is the creation of courts of equity, and reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back to England.” Both of these cases invoke “equity” in some fashion. However, it is unclear if plaintiffs are referring to the type of remedy sought (i.e., injunctive relief) or the jurisdiction of the court to hear a class of cases (i.e., equitable jurisdiction). The two concepts are related, but they are not the same.

Without question, the federal courts have the equitable jurisdiction to enjoin unconstitutional, or ultra vires actions of governmental officials. There is a long tradition of such cases. Plaintiffs argue that the zone-of-interests test–a relatively recent introduction in federal law–does not apply to constitutional claims. The case law developing this zone-of-interests doctrine largely relates to statutory law, not constitutional law. We take no view whether the zone of interests test also applies to constitutional claims, or if its reach is limited to the claims based on statutory causes of action, or claims based on the Administrative Procedure Act.

However, we do disagree with Plaintiffs’ understanding of the federal courts’ “equitable jurisdiction.” The constitutional claims in the Wall litigation, as well as in the Emoluments Clauses cases, cannot invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts. Why? In order to invoke a federal court’s equitable jurisdiction, Plaintiffs cannot simply assert in a conclusory fashion that the conduct of federal officers is ultra vires, and, on that basis, seek equitable relief. “Equity” cannot be used as a magic talisman to transform the plaintiffs into private attorneys general who can sue the government merely for acting illegally. Rather, in order to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts, plaintiffs must put forward a prima facie equitable cause of action

We think the absence of such an equitable cause of action was precisely the defect the Supreme Court highlighted in Sierra Club. Recall the order stated, “Among the reasons is that the Government has made a sufficient showing at this stage that the plaintiffs have no cause of action to obtain review of the Acting Secretary’s compliance with Section 8005.” We also think that similar concerns animated the recent remand order in the DC Circuit’s Emoluments Clause case: Blumenthal v. Trump. In its remand order, the court noted: “The question of whether the Foreign Emoluments Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 8, or other authority gives rise to a cause of action against the President is unsettled ….” Neither of these orders referenced the zone-of-interests test. Both orders did reference whether the plaintiffs had an equitable cause of action. 

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. (1999) recognized that “the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is the jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the original Judiciary Act, 1789 (1 Stat. 73).” In order to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts, a plaintiff must put forward a cause of action within (or analogous to) the jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery in England as it stood in 1789. 

At that time, as a general matter, litigants could invoke the court’s equitable jurisdiction to stop ultra vires actions by government officers, but only if plaintiff’s rights or duties regarding its own property (i.e., as the legal or beneficial owner) were at issue. Alternatively, the court’s equitable jurisdiction could be invoked if a cause of action were otherwise supplied by the common law (such as contractual rights or obligations) or by statute.

A plaintiff’s mere request for equitable or injunctive relief does not invoke a federal court’s equitable jurisdiction. Likewise, even if the plaintiff has an Article III injury-in-fact, his bare assertion of illegal or ultra vires conduct by federal officers is insufficient to invoke the federal court’s equitable jurisdiction. As a general matter, such a claim could only go forward if there is an invasion (or imminent invasion) of the plaintiff’s property rights, or if the case presents an analogous concrete dispute involving the plaintiff’s rights or duties regarding his own property. For example, the plaintiff relies on a cause of action within (or analogous to) the jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery in England as it stood in 1789.

In other words, in both the Wall litigation and Emoluments Clauses cases, the plaintiffs must identify a cause of action (or an analogous cause of action) that would have been available under the equitable jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery in England at it stood in 1789. Plaintiffs have not even attempted to make such a showing. Indeed, the United States attempted and failed to make such a showing in Grupo Mexicano. As a result, the government’s request for relief was rejected. Plaintiffs’ purported equitable cause of action, based only on an ultra vires claim, would have been unknown to William Blackstone, Chancellor Kent, or Justice Story.

Moreover, their rule offers no limiting principle: it would open the courthouse door to every plaintiff with Article III standing, who asserts that a federal official engaged in illegal conduct. It is not enough for an injured person to merely assert a violation of the Constitution. To open the federal courthouse door, a proper plaintiff in a federal lawsuit needs both a court with jurisdiction and a cause of action. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (distinguishing jurisdiction from cause of action, where both are necessary to maintain suit in federal court). For example, in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center (2015), the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that “the Supremacy Clause creates a cause of action for its violation” in the federal court’s equitable jurisdiction. (Plaintiffs in the Emoluments Clauses cases repeatedly cite Armstrong, but fail to note that this case cuts against their free-floating claim to an equitable cause of action based on a purported constitutional violation.)

Finally, plaintiffs’ approach would allow any plaintiff who invokes “equity” to evade the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirements for seeking a judicial remedy. Such a “wrenching departure from past practice,” as Grupo Mexicano put it, must be carefully scrutinized. Equity jurisdiction is not a tabula rasa or constitutional free-for-all in which litigants may prosecute claims that would otherwise fail under the APA and in law. The Plaintiffs in the Wall litigation do not have an independent cause of action, other than their claim that the government is acting illegally. Neither do the plaintiffs in the Emoluments Clauses cases.

But what about the Supreme Court’s leading separation of powers decisions that arose in equity? Was there an independent cause of action–separate from the allegation of ultra vires governmental action–in cases like Ex Parte Young (1908), Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce (1949), Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981), Clinton v. City of New York (1998), and Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB (2010)? The answer is yes.

In each of these cases, the underlying substantive law—e.g., common law or statutory—provided the necessary cause of action. As a result, once the federal courts’ equitable jurisdiction had been properly invoked, and the plaintiffs alleged both Article III injury and an independent cause of action, the courts had the power to issue an equitable remedy (i.e., injunctive relief). Equitable jurisdiction is not properly invoked merely be requesting equitable relief. It works the other way around: once equitable jurisdiction is properly invoked, then the court has the power to grant equitable relief

Let’s consider each case.

 

Ex Parte Young

In this old chestnut, the Supreme Court held that the federal courts could issue injunctive relief to prevent state officials from prospectively violating the Constitution. From this well-known holding, plaintiffs in the Emoluments Clauses Cases have asserted that the district court had equitable jurisdiction. Here, plaintiffs only discussed the remedial aspect of Young–i.e., equitable relief. However, Plaintiffs neglected to mention that the underlying cause of action in Young concerned a run-of-the-mill dispute: a governmental regulation of Plaintiffs’ private property. The Court observed that “the question really to be determined under this objection is whether the acts of the legislature and the orders of the railroad commission, if enforced, would take property without due process of law.” Such disputes about contested rights and duties involving property (e.g., interpleader) lie at the very core of historical equitable jurisdiction. Specifically, the Young plaintiffs sought to prevent the state from regulating their property. To accomplish this goal, they invoked the court’s equitable jurisdiction to sue state officers before those state officers could regulate the plaintiffs’ property through an imminent coercive lawsuit. 

Not so in the Emoluments Clauses cases. The plaintiffs’ suit concerns property belonging to private commercial entities affiliated with Donald Trump. Even if we were willing to counterfactually recharacterize such property as Trump’s property, these cases do not involve the government’s efforts to regulate the plaintiffs’ property. Nor does that case involve a threatened coercive suit brought by the government to take or regulate plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs make no such claim. As a result, plaintiffs’ claim is beyond the orbit of what is permissible under Young or under the federal courts’ equitable jurisdiction. Again in the Emoluments Clauses cases, Donald Trump’s purported constitutional tort—that is, accepting or receiving purported emoluments in private commercial transactions—does not involve plaintiffs’ property. Nor is the President regulating Plaintiffs’ property. What Plaintiffs need to establish, but do not and cannot, is equitable jurisdiction or an equitable cause of action.

 

Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce

Plaintiffs have cited Larson for the proposition that a plaintiff with standing can sue for prospective injunctive relief against ultra vires government conduct. Plaintiffs have misread this relatively straightforward case. Larson involved a simple common-law cause of action: breach of contract. The Court explained, “The basis of the action . . . was that a contract had been entered into with the United States”–a contract claim. Again, causes of action for specific performance based on a breach of contract have long-standing roots in the law of equity. There is no analogous historical equitable cause of action for claims under the Emoluments Clauses or the Appropriations Clause, even when brought in conjunction with allegations involving ultra vires conduct by government officers. 

 

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer

In this seminal separation-of-powers case, the federal government seized control of private steel mills. The action was brought by the mills’ owners. Youngstown’s brief explained its cause of action:

A simple cloud on title has always moved equity to grant relief because no other remedy is complete or adequate. Wickliffe v. Owings, 17 How. 47, 50 (1854); Southern Pacific v. United States, 200 U. S. 341, 352 (1906); Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576, 587 (1914); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 48 (1920). The seizure of the properties and business of the plaintiffs, with its host of uncertainties and legal and practical problems arising from the ambiguous position in which the owners are left, should appeal to equity at least as strongly as a cloud on title. In these circumstances, any remedy at law would necessarily be inadequate. 

The steel mill owners had a concrete, property interest that was impaired by the government’s actions. The plaintiffs did not rely on a generalized allegation of ultra vires action by the Secretary of Commerce; instead, they relied on an analogous cause of action to quiet title–their title to their property. Here too, we are in the heartland of historical equity jurisdiction involving disputed property rights. 

 

Dames & Moore v. Regan

Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Dames & Moore, which was drafted very quickly, did not consider the Court’s equitable jurisdiction. (Fun fact: A young John G. Roberts clerked for Justice Rehnquist when Dames & Moore was decided.) However, Rehnquist observed that the plaintiffs sought to “prevent enforcement of the Executive Orders and Treasury Department regulations implementing the Agreement with Iran.” Without question, the plaintiffs asserted that the government acted ultra vires: “In its complaint, petitioner alleged that the actions of the President and the Secretary of the Treasury implementing the Agreement with Iran were beyond their statutory and constitutional powers.” 

But the plaintiffs pleaded an important, additional fact: that the government’s actions “were unconstitutional to the extent they adversely affect petitioner’s final judgment against the Government of Iran and the Atomic Energy Organization, its execution of that judgment in the State of Washington, its prejudgment attachments, and its ability to continue to litigate against the Iranian banks.” The suit was not a generalized grievance about the President’s foreign policy decisions. Rather, jurisdiction was premised on a final judgment involving vested property rights that the government sought to extinguish. The executive order that nullified Dames & Moore’s judgments operated in a similar fashion to the executive order which gave rise to the Steel Seizure Case. The federal courts had jurisdiction to resolve both cases. In both cases, plaintiffs were seeking to protect concrete property rights–the vindication of these interests lies at the core of historical equity jurisdiction. 

 

Clinton v. City of New York

In Clinton v. City of New York, the Court observed “Plaintiffs suffered an immediate, concrete injury the moment that the President used the Line Item Veto to cancel section 4722(c) and deprived them of the benefits of that law.” The Supreme Court did not address whether the plaintiffs had an equitable cause of action. However, Justice Stevens drew an analogy between the cancellation of funds and a familiar cause of action in the courts:

His action was comparable to the judgment of an appellate court setting aside a verdict for the defendant and remanding for a new trial of a multibillion dollar damages claim. Even if the outcome of the second trial is speculative, the reversal, like the President’s cancellation, causes a significant immediate injury by depriving the defendant of the benefit of a favorable final judgment. The revival of a substantial contingent liability immediately and directly affects the borrowing power, financial strength, and fiscal planning of the potential obligor.

The City of New York could invoke the federal court’s equitable jurisdiction in either set of circumstances: if the executive branch, or the court cancelled a financial windfall. Equitable jurisdiction was proper in this case.

 

Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB

We address one final case that has often been cited by plaintiffs in the Emoluments Clauses cases as a basis for equitable jurisdiction: Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB (2010). This citation is perplexing, because that case does not discuss the federal court’s equitable jurisdiction. Rather, a footnote in that decision cited Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko (2001) for the proposition that “equitable relief ‘has long been recognized as the proper means for preventing entities from acting unconstitutionally.'” Once again, plaintiffs’ argument conflates equitable remedies with equitable jurisdiction. Moreover, Malesko involved an unsuccessful cause of action under Bivens for damages—not equitable jurisdiction as a basis for equitable relief. 

Plaintiffs in the Emoluments Clauses cases have characterized Free Enterprise Fund as standing for the proposition that a plaintiff with an Article III injury can obtain prospective injunctive relief if he simply alleges government officers acts illegally. Plaintiffs err. Free Enterprise Fund involved a cause of action based on a statute: the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Plaintiffs sued based on a threat of a future coercive action by the SEC under that statute.

The Supreme Court has never recognized an amorphous, open-ended equitable jurisdiction permitting plaintiffs to act as private attorneys general to control purported illegal government conduct merely predicated on the low threshold associated with Article III injury. At bottom, the federal court’s “flexible” equitable jurisdiction must be “confined within the broad boundaries of traditional equitable relief.” Grupo Mexicano (emphasis added). Only “in a proper case [may] relief . . . be given in a court of equity . . . to prevent an injurious act by a public officer.” Armstrong.

The Emoluments Clauses cases plaintiffs are not proper: unlike the Free Enterprise Fund plaintiffs, the Emoluments Clauses cases plaintiffs are not threatened by the Government with a future coercive lawsuit, much less a threatened future coercive lawsuit that involves taking or regulating their property. Indeed, the Emoluments Clauses cases do not involve any allegation that plaintiffs’ property is being taken or regulated by any government conduct: legal or illegal. Rather, the gravamen of plaintiffs’ allegations in the Emoluments Clauses cases involves private commercial conduct of commercial entities affiliated with President Trump. On these alleged facts, we are well beyond the realm of “traditional equitable relief.” Grupo Mexicano.

 

Conclusion

We suspect a similar argument prevailed upon the Supreme Court in Trump v. Sierra Club. The Court could have cited the zone-of-interests test. But it didn’t. Instead, the brief order likely used the term “cause of action” in the same sense the Grupo Mexicano Court used the term “equity jurisdiction.” This conclusion is basic: equitable jurisdiction is merely the set of causes of action that the High Court of Chancery could hear. Could the High Court of Chancery in England in 1789 have exercised jurisdiction over an analogous case to that of the Sierra Club, based solely on plaintiffs’ claim of ultra vires conduct by government officials, absent any claim that Sierra Club’s property was being taken or regulated? The answer is no

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/2SSykOF
via IFTTT

Medicare for All Is Defining the 2020 Democratic Race

A decade ago, Democrats in Congress were deep into the process of designing and debating the health care law that would become Obamacare. Tea Party protests were about to spring up around the country in opposition to the law. And President Barack Obama was on the verge of delivering a major address defending the law from its critics, and hoping to rally support from his own party. 

In that speech, Obama positioned his approach as a middle ground between two extremes. “There are those on the left,” he said, “who believe that the only way to fix the system is through a single-payer system like Canada’s, where we would severely restrict the private insurance market and have the government provide coverage for everyone. On the right, there are those who argue that we should end the employer-based system and leave individuals to buy health insurance on their own.” 

The following year, Obamacare became the law of the land, and the signature initiative of Obama’s two-term presidency. But in last night’s Democratic primary debate, which featured a full half-hour segment focused on health care—which was introduced as “the number-one issue for Democratic voters”—it was virtually absent. Instead, the evening’s leading contenders extensively defended Medicare for All, a single-payer plan that captured elements of both the extremes Obama said he wanted to avoid. 

Medicare for All, as proposed by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I–Vt.) and vigorously supported by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D–Mass.), would end the nation’s employer-based health care system and, in the space of four years, replace it with a fully government-run system that is closest to Canada’s, but even more restrictive, leaving virtually no room for private insurance. It would, according to both independent estimates and Sanders himself, raise government spending on health care by something like $30 or $40 trillion over the next decade. And it would require tax hikes or tax-like fees or premiums on the middle class.  In terms of both cost and transition complexity, it would dwarf Obamacare. 

Sanders and Warren spent much of the debate’s opening segment defending these ideas from tough questioning by the moderators and criticism from more moderate candidates who argued that the plan was too radical, too unpopular, and too unworkable. The polls, at least, suggest that there is some truth to this: Medicare for All is popular in the abstract, but quickly becomes unpopular when respondents are told that it would eliminate private health insurance or raise taxes. 

Arguably the strongest criticisms came from John Delaney, a Maryland Democrat who in the early 1990s founded a health care financing company. Delaney warned that the radicalism espoused by Warren and Sanders would turn off more moderate voters in an election. “We don’t have to go around and be the party of subtraction, and telling half the country, who has private health insurance, that their health insurance is illegal,” he said. “My dad, the union electrician, loved the health care he got from the IBEW. He would never want someone to take that away. Half of Medicare beneficiaries now have Medicare Advantage, which is private insurance, or supplemental plans. It’s also bad policy. It’ll underfund the industry, many hospitals will close.” 

This was a point that Delaney had made before: the Sanders plan, as expensive as it already is, calls for paying Medicare rates for all services, which would mean a substantial reduction in rates for doctors and hospitals. He repeated it later in the evening. “I’ve been going around rural America,” he said, “and I ask rural hospital administrators one question, ‘If all your bills were paid at the Medicare rate last year, what would happen?’ And they all look at me and say, ‘We would close.'”  

Warren and Sanders had essentially no response to this. Warren accused moderates on the stage of spinelessness, and both she and Sanders argued that questions and criticisms about single-payer health care amounted to “Republican talking points.” They took shots at drug makers, which represent about 10 percent of total U.S. health care spending, and insurance companies, which on average have profit margins of less than 3 percent, for profiting off of health care, but never addressed questions about payment rates for providers. 

Nor would Warren respond directly to a question about whether she would raise taxes on the middle class to fund the plan. Sanders has admitted that it would require higher taxes, and Warren has said she’s with him on his ideas. But when asked by moderator Jake Tapper whether she’s “‘with Bernie’ on Medicare for all when it comes to raising taxes on middle-class Americans to pay for it?” she prevaricated. “So giant corporations and billionaires are going to pay more,” she said. “Middle-class families are going to pay less out of pocket for their health care.” And then she went on to attack insurance companies, repeating the same basic formulation about “total costs” going down when Tapper pressed her again on taxes. Warren clearly didn’t want to answer the question.

Following the debate, CNN’s Anderson Cooper pressed her on the question of upheaval: What would she say to people to liked their current health plans? How did she respond to the idea that Obamacare was already a tough sell politically, and Medicare for All would therefore be even more difficult? Once again, Warren deflected, accusing critics of timidity and spinelessness. 

Looked at one way, Medicare for All had a rough night, facing difficult questions and a phalanx of criticism from the stage’s more moderate contenders. But the critics who fought with Warren and Sanders last night have essentially zero support in the party. Delaney, for example, currently polls at 0.7 percent. The only Democratic candidate who has strongly attacked Medicare for All who has performed well so far is former Vice President Joe Biden, who will appear in the debate’s second round tonight. And even Biden’s plan has been framed largely as a response to Medicare for All, a way of pushing back against its excesses. 

Somehow, in the space of 10 years, Democrats have drifted away from Obama’s performative centrism, his (at least rhetorical) sense that what Americans want is a middle way, an anti-radical solution rather than the “big structural change” that Warren insists is needed. Medicare for All, and all the troublesome questions it raises, is defining the 2020 Democratic race—and the Democratic Party with it. 

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/2ysdk7W
via IFTTT