Courthouse Steps Podcast on California v. Texas

In late June I recorded a Federalist Society “Courthouse Steps” podcase on California v. Texas with Mario Loyola. The audio of that teleforum is now available here.

We agree that the Court was correct to reject the plaintiffs’ claims in California v. Texas, but had some disagreement on how the Court should have gotten there. I hope the recording is of interest to some VC readers.

(Note: We had a zoom glitch in the middle, but it should not get in the way of the content.)

All told, California v. Texas was not the third, but the seventh ACA case to reach the Supreme Court. The contraception mandate and cost-sharing payment cases are ACA cases too. California v. Texas will also not be the last time the ACA reaches One First Street. For reasons I explained in this little paper from a few years back, the ACA’s text, structure, history, and content created a perfect storm for ongoing litigation, and the Supreme Court will eventually become as familiar with this statute as it is with the Clean Air Act or (even more likely) ERISA.

All of my prior blogging on California v. Texas is indexed here.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/3yoowPR
via IFTTT

Government Can Use Ghislaine Maxwell’s Deposition in Civil Case, Without Violating Maxwell’s Fourth or Fifth Amendment Rights

From the opinion in U.S. v. Maxwell by Judge Alison Nathan (S.D.N.Y.), decided June 25 but just unsealed on Thursday:

Maxwell moves to suppress evidence obtained through a grand jury subpoena to a law firm involved in earlier civil litigation against her. She contends that because the documents sought by the subpoena were previously subject to a protective order, the Government obtained them in violation of her rights against compelled self-incrimination, against unreasonable searches and seizures, and to due process of law. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the evidence should not be suppressed and that Maxwell is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing….

In late 2015, Virginia Giuffre sued Maxwell for defamation. Giuffre alleged that Maxwell defamed her by accusing her of lying about Maxwell and Jeffrey Epstein sexually abusing her. The law firm Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (BSF) represented Giuffre in the dispute. The parties litigated the case for about two years before signing a confidential settlement agreement.

Early in the civil litigation, one of the attorneys representing Giuffre approached an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) in the Southern District of New York and requested a meeting to provide the Government information on possible criminal conduct. The AUSA met with three attorneys who represented Giuffre on February 29, 2016. The AUSA’s notes from the meeting reflect that it focused primarily on Epstein. However, the notes also identify Maxwell as Epstein’s “head recruiter” of underage girls. The attorneys sent a few follow-up emails to the AUSA in the following weeks. The United States Attorney’s Office did not pursue a criminal investigation at that time….

About two weeks after the February 29, 2016 meeting, the judge presiding over the civil case entered a protective order that allowed the parties in that case to designate documents produced in discovery as confidential. That order prohibited the parties from disclosing confidential documents to anyone other than people involved in the case….

[The protective order] allowed the court to modify the order at any time for good cause after notice to the parties. It also allowed the parties to use any confidential information at trial, at which point that information would become public. It required the parties to return or destroy confidential records after the case ended.

Following entry of the protective order, Maxwell testified in two depositions in the civil case. The parties designated the depositions as confidential under the protective order. [Several counts of the] superseding indictment[s] in this case … charge that Maxwell made false statements under oath in each of the depositions.

The Government represents that the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York formally opened its investigation into Epstein on November 30, 2018, following a series of articles in the Miami Herald about Epstein’s conduct and the lenient plea deal he received in the Southern District of Florida. The same day, the AUSA who attended the February 2016 meeting forwarded the emails she received from attorneys in the civil case to the prosecutors working on the fledgling investigation. There is no indication that she was involved in the decision to begin the investigation into Epstein in 2018.

About two months later, the Government served a grand jury subpoena on BSF seeking to obtain documents for its investigation of Epstein. BSF informed the Government that many of the requested documents fell under the protective order. The Government then applied for an ex parte order modifying the protective order to allow BSF to comply with the subpoena. The Government made a second, similar application in connection with a protective order in a different case….

[In 2019,] Judge McMahon issued [an] order granting the Government’s application [to modify the protective order, for two reasons:] First, Maxwell did not reasonably rely on the protective order because it was subject to modification. Second, the Government had shown extraordinary circumstances supporting modification of the protective order because it could not otherwise obtain information about the high-profile targets of its investigation without tipping them off….

Following Judge McMahon’s order, BSF turned over its records from the civil litigation to the Government. Those documents included transcripts of Maxwell’s depositions. The Second Circuit later held that the court in the civil case withheld far too many documents from public view and ordered that many of them be made publicly available. Much of what the Government obtained through its subpoena, including the bulk of the deposition transcripts Maxwell now seeks to suppress, have since been unsealed by court order in the civil case.

The court concluded that this didn’t violate Maxwell’s privilege against self-incrimination:

Maxwell contends that the Government violated her right against compelled self-incrimination by obtaining copies of her deposition transcripts from her earlier civil case. She acknowledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would prevent the Government from obtaining her testimony and using it in a subsequent criminal case against her.

Second Circuit precedent expressly forecloses Maxwell’s argument. “A Rule 26(c) protective order, no matter how broad its reach, provides no guarantee that compelled testimony will not somehow find its way into the government’s hands for use in a subsequent criminal prosecution.” Andover Data Servs. v. Stat. Tabulating Corp. (2d Cir. 1989). As the Second Circuit has explained, a civil protective order may (as here) be overturned or modified by another court in another proceeding. A civil protective order may (as here) be limited by its terms to pretrial proceedings, in which case the parties must expect that confidential documents will come to light as the case progresses. A court may (as here) unseal documents covered by a civil protective order in the public interest. Civil litigants have neither a reasonable basis nor legal entitlement to rely on a civil protective order against the use of their testimony in a subsequent criminal proceeding….

The Government would also be entitled to use Maxwell’s deposition testimony against her in her perjury trial notwithstanding any violation of her right against compelled self-incrimination. The Supreme Court has held that a defendant may be prosecuted for false statements in unlawfully compelled testimony. See United States v. Wong (1977); United States v. Knox (1969)….

The court also concluded that the government’s use of the documents doesn’t violate the Fourth Amendment:

A person has a reasonable expectation of privacy only if they seek to keep something private and have an objectively reasonable expectation that it will remain private. The Supreme Court has held that people generally lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily disclose to others. This is true even if they expect that information to be safeguarded and used only for specific purposes. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that police may obtain bank records or a list of phone numbers a person has dialed without a warrant. In a lone exception to this rule, the Supreme Court has held that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in geographical information obtained from their cell phones, because that information provides a comprehensive account of a person’s movements akin to invasive physical surveillance.

Under this standard, Maxwell had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the documents produced during the civil litigation. Those documents may not have been public, but they were hardly private….

Second Circuit precedent makes clear that Maxwell had no reasonable expectation that documents covered by the protective order would remain shielded from view of the public or prosecutors. The Second Circuit has cautioned civil litigants that a civil protective order is no guarantee against the use of evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Second Circuit precedent allows a court in a subsequent proceeding to modify a protective order. And if confidential materials turn out to be relevant to a court’s ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. It is “unrealistic” to believe that deposition testimony central to a civil case of high public interest will remain effectively sealed indefinitely.

Maxwell claims that she did not expect the Government to be able to obtain her deposition testimony, and that if she knew it would, she never would have testified. If Maxwell subjectively harbored this belief, it was nonetheless unreasonable. The Court further notes that Maxwell was ably represented by a number of attorneys during the civil litigation, who the Court is confident were familiar with the precedents governing protective orders and public access to judicial documents.

And the court likewise rejected arguments based on the government’s apparent omission of certain information in the 2019 hearing before Judge McMahon.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/3yD5oOv
via IFTTT

Ex-City Official’s Attempt to Seal Lawsuit Against EEOC Rejected

From Jean v. EEOC (S.D.N.Y.), decided by Judge Louis L. Stanton in November, but just added to Westlaw:

Plaintiff claims that Defendant EEOC “mishandled” her employment discrimination case filed in Massachusetts; she also claims that her employer, the Town of Framingham, Massachusetts, “doxed” her by publicizing sensitive documents about her.

Three days after filing her complaint in this Court, Plaintiff filed a letter-motion requesting that the “case files” in this action be placed under seal because: (1) the “EEOC case information [is] confidential and not subject to FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] requests,” and (2) her “file includes many private information about myself and others.” …

Both the common law and the First Amendment protect the public’s right of access to court documents. This right of access is not absolute, and “the decision as to access [to judicial records] is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.”

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has set forth a three-part analysis to determine whether a document relating to a lawsuit should be made available to the public. First, the Court must determine whether the document is indeed a “judicial document,” to which the public has a presumptive right of access. Judicial documents are those that are “relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process.” Second, if the Court determines that the materials to be sealed are judicial documents, then the Court must determine the weight of the presumption of access. “[T]he weight to be given the presumption of access must be governed by the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial power and the resultant value of such information to those monitoring the federal courts.” Finally, “the court must balance competing considerations against it.” “Such countervailing factors include but are not limited to the danger of impairing law enforcement or judicial efficiency and the privacy interests of those resisting disclosure.” “The burden of demonstrating that a document submitted to a court should be sealed rests on the party seeking such an action.”

A litigant’s concern that information contained in court documents will bring her adverse publicity or negatively impact her are insufficient reasons for a court to seal documents. See, e.g., Bernsten v. O’Reilly (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (collecting cases); Doe I v. Individuals (D. Conn. 2008).

The Court concludes that the circumstances here are not sufficiently extraordinary to outweigh the presumption in favor of public access to court records. Although Plaintiff does allege that sensitive information about her was publicized by her employer, she does not describe the nature of that information in her complaint. Moreover, the attachments to her complaint—which include a generic chart and three articles from the online news site, Vox—do not contain any information specific to Plaintiff. The only document that concerns Plaintiff personally is a decision from a Massachusetts state agency (the Executive Office of Labor and Workforce Development) regarding her separation from her employer. But Plaintiff has redacted the personal information in this document; moreover, the facts described are only of concern to Plaintiff and her reputation. While the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s desire to maintain her privacy, the public’s right to access court documents prevails. The Court therefore denies Plaintiff’s request to seal her complaint.

The underlying dispute appears to be the one discussed in this newspaper article, which suggests that the plaintiff was the Community Development Coordinator of Framingham, Massachusetts:

“The apartheid-like and hostile environment where an entire institution used its full strength of force without any external protection for me from its abuses literally made me sick,” Jean wrote in a statement she released on Tuesday.

City officials vehemently deny Jean’s charge of discrimination, and members of the Finance Subcommittee say their questioning was only an attempt to understand how the block grant funds under Jean’s management were administered. The city typically receives about $500,000 a year in community development block grants.

The judge also dismissed the lawsuit against the EEOC, on the grounds that the EEOC can’t be sued with regard to its supposed mishandling of complaints.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/3jPIhfr
via IFTTT

Why Israel Receives Such Disproportionate World Attention and Criticism

Why does Israel attract so much attention and criticism relative to other states involved in much bloodier conflicts? For a long time, I was in the camp that it wasn’t primarily related to antisemitism, but to leftist anticolonialist ideology, hatred of the U.S. by proxy, and so on. While such things are factors, I’ve changed my mind about the importance of the role that Israel as a state of the Jews plays in the attention Israel gets, and I wrote a blog post for the Times of Israel about it.

In short, people are fascinated by Jews, after two thousand years of exile and oppression, having sovereignty and wielding collective military power. Many people are enthralled by it, which accounts for some of the attention. But many more around the world, especially in the Christian and Muslim world, are repulsed by it, for reasons that are ultimately antisemitic.

The relevant antisemitism is rarely Nazi-like right-wing antisemitism. Rather, it’s expecting Jews to behave in ways that conform to ideological expectations with roots in Christianity, Islam, and Marxism. As explained in the Times of Israel piece, the relevant ideologies have something in common, which is that they can’t abide Jews having a sovereign, militarily powerful state in Israel.

One point worth I thought I would highlight here: while Israel-haters like to go on and on about Israeli “hasbara” (public diplomacy, less charitably interpreted as propaganda), the ideologies I discuss are products in large part of much more intensive state-sponsored antisemitic campaigns run over the decades by the Vatican, Czarist Russia, Nazi Germany, the USSR, and various Arab and Muslim states. The USSR’s antisemitic propaganda campaign against Israel has had especially dramatic influence. Young leftists today repeat slogans from Soviet propaganda organs Izvestia and Pravda of fifty years ago without even being aware of their provenance.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/3dITdrl
via IFTTT

Ross Douthat on Structural Racism

Brilliant column by Douthat:

What’s really inflaming today’s fights, though, is that the structural-racist diagnosis isn’t being offered on its own. Instead it’s yoked to two sweeping theories about how to fight the problem it describes.

First, there is a novel theory of moral education, according to which the best way to deal with systemic inequality is to confront its white beneficiaries with their privileges and encourage them to wrestle with their sins.

Second, there is a Manichaean vision of public policy, in which all policymaking is either racist or antiracist, all racial disparities are the result of racism — and the measurement of any outcome short of perfect “equity” may be a form of structural racism itself…

The impulses these ideas encourage take different forms in different institutions, but they usually circle around to similar goals. First, the attempt to use racial-education programs to construct a stronger sense of shared white identity, on the apparent theory that making Americans of European ancestry think of themselves as defined by a toxic “whiteness” will lead to its purgation. Second, the deconstruction of standards that manifest racial disparities, on the apparent theory that if we stop using gifted courses or standardized tests, the inequities they reveal will cease to matter… The [latter idea] extends structural analysis beyond what it can reasonably bear, into territory where white supremacy supposedly explains Asian American success on the SAT.

But precisely because they don’t follow from modest and defensible conceptions of systemic racism, smart progressives in the media often retreat to those modest conceptions when challenged by conservatives — without acknowledging that the dubious conceptions are a big part of what’s been amplifying controversy, and conjuring up dubious Republican legislation in response.

Back in 1991, I heard Derrick Bell, one of the founders of Critical Race Theory, defend the importance of making white people more aware of their whiteness, and congratulate himself on persuading some of his students, particularly a Jewish one, think of themselves as white. So at least some of this is deeply ingrained, but the idea that making Americans of European descent more inclined toward white identitarianism is going to have long-term positive consequences is, well, nuts.

I would add one more factor to Douthat’s analysis. As with the 1619 Project and Kendi and Reynolds, Stamped: Racism, Antiracism and You, activist historians and journalists play fast and loose with facts to suit their historical narratives. They also seem impervious to acknowledging, much less correcting, even the most glaring errors when pointed out to them. For example (in honor of Independence Day), no, the American Revolution was not fought primarily to prevent Great Britain from abolishing slavery in the colonies. Those who insist that public schools should teach made-up nonsense as historical fact in service of radical ideologies that most Americans don’t agree with will rightly get political blowback.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/3hmqH0Z
via IFTTT

Immigration and the Principles of the Declaration of Independence


DeclarationofIndependence

The Declaration of Independence.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Millions of people around the world know the stirring words of the Declaration of Independence announcing that “all men are created equal” and that they have the rights to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” But relatively few know that, among the grievances the Declaration enumerates as justification for renouncing allegiance to King George III is the following:

He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither….

This complaint against the King was aimed at a series of royal orders issued in  1772 and 1773, which forbade the colonies from naturalizing aliens, banned the passage of any laws facilitating that purpose, including laws promoting migration, and overrode a North Carolina law exempting immigrants from Europe from taxation for a period of four years.

It’s tempting dismiss this as just a disagreement over policy. But it  actually goes further than that, since it is one of the items on the list of “repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States.”

The King’s efforts to restrict immigration to Britain’s American colonies were not just a flawed policy, the Declaration claims, but a step towards the “establishment of an absolute Tyranny.”

Nor was it merely a tyranny over the colonial governments’ supposed right to determine immigration policy for themselves. It was also a tyrannical action towards the would-be immigrants.

Many of the leaders of the American Revolution saw the new nation as a refuge for the oppressed of the world. In his famous General Orders to the Continental Army, issued on the occasion of the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783, George Washington stated that one of the reasons the United States was founded was to create “an Asylum for the poor and oppressed of all nations and religions.” He expressed similar views on other occasions, including writing to a group of newly arrived Irish immigrants that “[t]he bosom of America is open to receive not only the opulent & respectable Stranger, but the oppressed & persecuted of all Nations & Religions.”

Thomas Jefferson, the principal author of the Declaration, similarly wrote, in 1781, that “It [has] been the wise policy of these states to extend the protection of their laws to all those who should settle among them of whatever nation or religion they might be and to admit them to a participation of the benefits of civil and religious freedom.” Other leading Founders expressed similar sentiments, including James Madison and James Wilson, among others.

The idea of accepting immigrants without regard to their national origin and religion was an extension of the more general principle that the United States was founded on the basis of universal liberal principles, not ties of ancestry, culture, or faith.  This is what the Declaration refers to in the famous passage avowing that all men are created equal and have the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

There can be no such liberty and equality if where people are allowed to live is limited by their parentage and place of birth. Just as the leaders of the Revolution rejected more traditional hereditary aristocracy, their principles were also at odds with what we might today call the hereditary aristocracy of citizenship, under which only those born to the right parents or in the right place have a right to live in the United States, while all others can be excluded for virtually any reason the government might come up with.

The Founders established a Constitution under which, Madison and most others argued, the federal government had no general power to exclude immigrants. When the Federalist Party pushed through the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, giving the president broad power to deport immigrants he deemed “dangerous,” Jefferson and Madison denounced the law as both unjust and unconstitutional. They and their allies mobilized such strong resistance to the Alien Friends Act that the federal government never actually managed to deport anyone under it.

When Jefferson became president in 1800, he allowed the Act to expire, and federal immigration policy remained almost completely free of restrictions until the enactment of racially motivated exclusionary laws targeting Chinese immigrants in the 1870s and 1880s. The successful resistance to the Alien Acts was a triumph for liberty and equality that deserves to be far better known than it currently is.

None of this proves that America’s founding generation was free of prejudices against immigrants. The Federalist Party, as noted, sought to use the Alien Friends Act to deport many immigrants, fearing that they might spread French revolutionary ideas to the United States and—perhaps even worse from the Federalist point of view –  support the rival Democratic-Republican Party.

Despite his defense of open immigration on many occasions, Thomas Jefferson wrote, in his 1782 Notes on Virginia, that America had reason to fear immigrants from “absolute monarchies,” because “[t]hey will bring with them the principles of the governments they leave, imbibed in their early youth; or, if able to throw them off, it will be in exchange for an unbounded licentiousness, passing, as is usual, from one extreme to another.” As with many later Americans who feared that immigrants would spread harmful political political values, Jefferson did not give sufficient weight to the reality that people fleeing oppressive regimes usually do so precisely because they abhor those governments, not because they want to recreate them elsewhere.

But even in that same passage, Jefferson rejected the idea of barring immigrants from oppressive governments, instead recognizing that “[i]f they come of themselves, they are entitled to all the rights of citizenship.” He merely  “doubt[ed] the expediency of inviting them by extraordinary encouragements.” Later, of course, Jefferson took a more favorable view of the political impact of immigrants—perhaps, in part, because many of them supported him and his party!

As on many other issues, particularly slavery, the Founders didn’t always live up to their own principles when it comes to immigration. The Federalist advocates of the Alien Acts obviously did not. Nor did Congress when it enacted the Naturalization Act of 1790, and limited eligibility for citizenship to those immigrants who were “free white person[s].” Black immigrants were not made eligible for citizenship until 1870. Explicit racial restrictions on naturalization were not fully ended until 1952.

Restrictions on naturalization did not amount to restrictions on immigration itself. Black  immigrants came to the United States in substantial numbers even when many of them were ineligible for  citizenship, beginning with numerous refugees from Haiti in the 1790s. Still, black immigrants in this era suffered severe discrimination, as did native-born free African-Americans (to say nothing of the millions of slaves).

But despite these unjust limitations, the principles of the Declaration of Independence did lead to the establishment of a nation that, for the first century of its history, had very few limitations on immigration, and thus became a refuge for millions of people fleeing poverty and tyranny.

Washington’s vision of a refuge for “the oppressed & persecuted of all Nations & Religions” was never fully achieved. But the early United States did realize it to a astonishingly impressive degree. In some important ways, the early republic was actually more enlightened on these matters than we are today. Our immigration policies bar the vast majority of those seeking refuge from oppression, and even include such perversions as barring escaped slaves on the grounds that the forced labor they performed for terrorist organizations qualifies as “material support for terrorism” rendering them ineligible or asylum.

Jefferson and Washington were not far from the only ones who saw a connection between openness to immigration and America’s founding principles of liberty and equality. The great African-American abolitionist Frederick Douglass made much the same point in an 1869 speech, in which he compared immigration restrictions to racial discrimination, and argued that America must be a “composite nation” open to to people of all races and cultures who wished to settle there.

Abraham Lincoln, who was a strong supporter of open immigration,  also saw the connection between immigrant rights and the Declaration of Independence:

When [immigrants] look through that old Declaration of Independence, they find that those old men say that “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal”; and then they feel that that moral sentiment, taught in that day, evidences their relation to those men… and that they have a right to claim it as though they were blood of the blood, and flesh of the flesh, of the men who wrote that Declaration; and so they are.

The America of Founding era and of Lincoln’s day didn’t fully live up these high ideals. The same remains true even today, in some respects even more so. But, at its best, the nation has indeed been a refuge for the oppressed, and they have been major contributors to its growth and success. Immigrants and natives alike have much to gain from a more consistent adherence to the principles of the Declaration of Independence.

On immigration, as elsewhere, we would do well to heed Lincoln’s admonition that the Declaration “set up a standard maxim for free society which should be familiar to all: constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even, though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people, of all colors, every where.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/2Upq1Pi
via IFTTT

What the Declaration of Independence Said and Meant

[This year, my annual post celebrating the Fourth of July is drawn from a chapter of Our Republican Constitution: Securing the Liberty and Sovereignty of We the People, and from a short essay on the same topic, The Declaration of Independence and the American Theory of Government: First Come Rights, and Then Comes Government.” It also draws upon Sean Wilentz, No Property in Man: Slavery and Antislavery at the Nation’s Founding]

The Declaration of Independence used to be read aloud at public gatherings every Fourth of July. Today, while all Americans have heard of it, all too few have read more than its second sentence. Yet the Declaration shows the natural rights foundation of the American Revolution, and provides important information about what the founders believed makes a constitution or government legitimate. It also raises the question of how these fundamental rights are reconciled with the idea of “the consent of the governed,” another idea for which the Declaration is famous.

The adoption of the Declaration, and the public affirmation of its principles, led directly to the phased in abolition of slavery in half of the United States by the time the Constitution was drafted as well as the abolition of slavery in the Northwest Territory. The Rhode Island gradual abolition law of 1784 read:

All men are entitled to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness, and the holding Mankind in a State of Slavery, as private property, which has gradually obtained by unrestrained Custom and the Permission of the Law, is repugnant to this Principle, and subversive of the Happiness of Mankind.

Later, the Declaration also assumed increasing importance in the struggle to abolish slavery. It became a lynchpin of the moral and constitutional arguments of the nineteenth-century abolitionists. As one New Yorker opposed to slavery wrote in 1797:

The right of property which every man has to his personal liberty is paramount to all the laws of property…. All I contend for at present is, that no claims of property can ever justly interfere with, or be suffered to impede the operation of that noble and eternal principle, that “all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights–and that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

The Declaration was much relied upon by Abraham Lincoln and many others before him:

Without the Constitution and the Union, we could not have attained the result; but even these, are not the primary cause of our great prosperity. There is something back of these, entwining itself more closely about the human heart. That something, is the principle of “Liberty to all”–the principle that clears the path for all–gives hope to all–and, by consequence, enterprize, and industry to all.

The expression of that principle, in our Declaration of Independence, was most happy, and fortunate. Without this, as well as with it, we could have declared our independence of Great Britain; but without it, we could not, I think, have secured our free government, and consequent prosperity. No oppressed, people will fight, and endure, as our fathers did, without the promise of something better, than a mere change of masters.

The assertion of that principle, at that time, was the word, “fitly spoken” which has proved an “apple of gold” to us. The Union, and the Constitution, are the picture of silver, subsequently framed around it. The picture was made, not to conceal, or destroy the apple; but to adorn, and preserve it. The picture was made for the apple—not the apple for the picture.

The Declaration had to be explained away–quite unconvincingly–by the Supreme Court in Dred Scott. And eventually it was repudiated by some defenders of slavery in the South because of its inconsistency with that institution.

When reading the Declaration, it is worth keeping in mind two very important facts. The Declaration constituted high treason against the Crown. Every person who signed it would be executed as traitors should they be caught by the British. Second, the Declaration was considered to be a legal document by which the revolutionaries justified their actions and explained why they were not truly traitors. It represented, as it were, a literal indictment of the Crown and Parliament, in the very same way that criminals are now publicly indicted for their alleged crimes by grand juries representing “the People.”

But to justify a revolution, it was not thought to be enough that officials of the government of England, the Parliament, or even the sovereign himself had violated the rights of the people. No government is perfect; all governments violate rights. This was well known. So the Americans had to allege more than mere violations of rights. They had to allege nothing short of a criminal conspiracy to violate their rights systematically. Hence, the famous reference to “a long train of abuses and usurpations” and the list that follows the first two paragraphs. In some cases, these specific complaints account for provisions eventually included in the Constitution and Bill of Rights.

In Our Republican Constitution: Securing the Liberty and Sovereignty of We the People, I explain how the Declaration encapsulated the political theory that lead the Constitution some eleven years later. To appreciate all that is packed into the two paragraphs that comprise the preamble to the list of grievances, it is useful to break down the Declaration into some of its key claims.

“When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.”

This first sentence is often forgotten. It asserts that Americans as a whole (and not as members of their respective colonies) are a distinct “people.” To “dissolve the political bands” revokes the “social compact” that existed between the Americans and the rest of “the People” of the British commonwealth, reinstates the “state of nature” between Americans and the government of Great Britain, and makes “the Laws of Nature” the standard by which this dissolution and whatever government is to follow are judged. “Declare the causes” indicates they are publicly stating the reasons and justifying their actions rather than acting as thieves in the night. The Declaration is like the indictment of a criminal that states the basis of his criminality. But the ultimate judge of the rightness of their cause will be God, which is why the revolutionaries spoke of an “appeal to heaven”—an expression commonly found on revolutionary banners and flags. As British political theorist John Locke wrote: “The people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to heaven.” The reference to a “decent respect to the opinions of mankind” might be viewed as a kind of an international public opinion test. Or perhaps the emphasis is on the word “respect,” recognizing the obligation to provide the rest of the world with an explanation they can evaluate for themselves.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. “

The most famous line of the Declaration. On the one hand, this will become a great embarrassment to a people who permitted slavery. On the other hand, making public claims like this has consequences—that’s why people make them publicly. To be held to account. This promise will provide the heart of the abolitionist case in the nineteenth century, which is why late defenders of slavery eventually came to reject the Declaration. And it forms the basis for Martin Luther King’s metaphor of the civil rights movement as a promissory note that a later generation has come to collect.

Notice that the rights of “life,” “liberty” and “the pursuit of happiness” are individual, not collective or group rights. They belong to “We the People”—each and every one. This is not to say that government may not create collective, positive rights; but only that the rights that the next sentence tells us are to be secured by government belong to us as individuals.

What are “unalienable,” or more commonly, “inalienable rights”? Inalienable rights are those you cannot give up even if you want to and consent to do so, unlike other rights that you can agree to transfer or waive. Why the claim that they are inalienable rights? The Founders want to counter England’s claim that, by accepting the colonial governance, the colonists had waived or alienated their rights. The Framers claimed that with inalienable rights, you always retain the ability to take back any right that has been given up.

A standard trilogy throughout this period was “life, liberty, and property.” For example, the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (1774) read: “That the inhabitants of the English colonies in North-America, by the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English constitution, and the several charters or compacts, have the following RIGHTS: Resolved, 1. That they are entitled to life, liberty and property: and they have never ceded to any foreign power whatever, a right to dispose of either without their consent.” Or, as John Locke wrote, “no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.”

When drafting the Declaration in June of 1776, Jefferson based his formulation on a preliminary version of the Virginia Declaration of Rights that had been drafted by George Mason at the end of May for Virginia’s provincial convention. Here is how Mason’s draft read:

THAT all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent natural rights, of which they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; among which are, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

Notice how George Mason’s oft-repeated formulation combines the right of property with the pursuit of happiness. And, in his draft, not only do all persons have “certain . . . natural rights” of life, liberty, and property, but these rights cannot be taken away “by any compact.” Again, these rights each belong to individuals. And these inherent individual natural rights, of which the people—whether acting collectively or as individuals—cannot divest their posterity, are therefore retained by them, which is helpful in understanding the Ninth Amendment’s reference to the “rights…retained by the people.”

Interestingly, Mason’s draft was slightly altered by the Virginia Convention in Williamsburg on June 11, 1776. After an extensive debate, the officially adopted version read (with the modifications in italics):

That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

This version is still in effect today.

According to historian Pauline Meier, by changing “are born equally free” to “are by nature equally free,” and “inherent natural rights” to “inherent rights,” and then by adding “when they enter into a state of society,” defenders of slavery in the Virginia convention could contend that slaves were not covered because they “had never entered Virginia’s society, which was confined to whites.” Yet it was the language of Mason’s radical draft—rather than either Virginia’s final wording or Jefferson’s more succinct formulation—that became the canonical statement of first principles. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Vermont adopted Mason’s original references to “born equally free” and to “natural rights” into their declarations of rights while omitting the phrase “when they enter into a state of society.” Indeed, it is remarkable that these states would have had Mason’s draft language, rather than the version actually adopted by Virginia, from which to copy. Here is Massachusetts’ version:

All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.

Virginia slaveholders’ concerns about Mason’s formulation proved to be warranted. In 1783, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court relied upon this more radical language to invalidate slavery in that state. And its influence continued. In 1823, it was incorporated into an influential circuit court opinion by Justice Bushrod Washington defining the “privileges and immunities” of citizens in the several states as “protection by the Government, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety.”

Justice Washington’s opinion in Corfield (to which we will return), with Mason’s language at its core, was then repeatedly quoted by Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress when they explained the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reads: “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” It was this constitutional language that Republicans aimed at the discriminatory Black Codes by which Southerners were seeking to perpetuate the subordination of blacks, even after slavery had been abolished.

That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men.… “

Another overlooked line, which is of greatest relevance to our discussion of the first underlying assumption of the Constitution: the assumption of natural rights. Here, even more clearly than in Mason’s draft, the Declaration stipulates that the ultimate end or purpose of republican governments is “to secure these” preexisting natural rights that the previous sentence affirmed were the measure against which all government—whether of Great Britain or the United States—will be judged. This language identifies what is perhaps the central underlying “republican” assumption of the Constitution: that governments are instituted to secure the preexisting natural rights that are retained by the people. In short, that first come rights and then comes government.

…deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”

Today, there is a tendency to focus entirely on the second half of this sentence, referencing “the consent of the governed,” to the exclusion of the first part, which refers to securing our natural rights. Then, by reading “the consent of the governed” as equivalent to “the will of the people,” the second part of the sentence seems to support majoritarian rule by the people’s “representatives.” In this way, “consent of the governed” is read to mean “consent to majoritarian rule.” Put another way, the people can consent to anything, including rule by a majority in the legislature who will then decide the scope of their rights as individuals.

But read carefully, one sees that in this passage the Declaration speaks of “just powers,” suggesting that only some powers are “justly” held by government, while others are beyond its proper authority. And notice also that “the consent of the governed” assumes that the people do not themselves rule or govern, but are “governed” by those individual persons who make up the “governments” that “are instituted among men.”

The Declaration stipulates that those who govern the people are supposed “to secure” their preexisting rights, not impose the will of a majority of the people on the minority. And, as the Virginia Declaration of Rights made explicit, these inalienable rights cannot be surrendered “by any compact.” Therefore, the “consent of the governed,” to which the second half of this sentence refers, cannot be used to override the inalienable rights of the sovereign people that are reaffirmed by the first half.

In modern political discourse, people tend to favor one of these concepts over the other—either preexistent natural rights or popular consent—which leads them to stress one part of this sentence in the Declaration over the other. The fact that rights can be uncertain and disputed leads some to emphasize the consent part of this sentence and the legitimacy of popularly enacted legislation. But the fact that there is never unanimous consent to any particular law, or even to the government itself, leads others to emphasize the rights part of this sentence and the legitimacy of judges protecting the “fundamental” or “human” rights of individuals and minorities.

If we take both parts of this sentence seriously, however, this apparent tension can be reconciled by distinguishing between (a) the ultimate end or purpose of legitimate governance and (b) how any particular government gains jurisdiction to rule. So, while the protection of natural rights or justice is the ultimate end of governance, particular governments only gain jurisdiction to achieve this end by the consent of those who are governed. In other words, the “consent of the governed” tells us which government gets to undertake the mission of “securing” the natural rights that are retained by the people. After all, justifying the independence of Americans from the British government was the whole purpose of the Declaration of Independence.

“That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”

People have the right to take back power from the government. Restates the end—human safety and happiness—and connects the principles and forms of government as means to this end.

“Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.”

Affirms at least two propositions: On the one hand, long-established government should not be changed for just any reason. The mere fact that rights are violated is not enough to justify revolution. All governments on earth will sometimes violate rights. But things have to become very bad before anyone is going to organize a resistance. Therefore, the very existence of this Declaration is evidence that things are very bad indeed.

“But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.”

Revolution is justified only if there “is a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object”—evidence of what amounts to an actual criminal conspiracy by the government against the rights of the people. The opposite of “light and transient causes,” that is, the more ordinary violations of rights by government.

Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain [George III—Eds.] is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.

What follows is a bill of indictment. Several of these items end up in the Bill of Rights. Others are addressed by the form of the government established—first by the Articles of Confederation, and ultimately by the Constitution.

The assumption of natural rights expressed in the Declaration of Independence can be summed up by the following proposition: “First comes rights, then comes government.” According to this view: (1) the rights of individuals do not originate with any government, but preexist its formation; (2) the protection of these rights is the first duty of government; and (3) even after government is formed, these rights provide a standard by which its performance is measured and, in extreme cases, its systemic failure to protect rights—or its systematic violation of rights—can justify its alteration or abolition; (4) at least some of these rights are so fundamental that they are “inalienable,” meaning they are so intimately connected to one’s nature as a human being that they cannot be transferred to another even if one consents to do so. This is powerful stuff.

At the Founding, these ideas were considered so true as to be self-evident. However, today the idea of natural rights is obscure and controversial. Oftentimes, when the idea comes up, it is deemed to be archaic. Moreover, the discussion by many of natural rights, as reflected in the Declaration’s claim that such rights “are endowed by their Creator,” leads many to characterize natural rights as religiously based rather than secular. As I explain in The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law, I believe this is a mistake.

The political theory announced in the Declaration of Independence can be summed up in a single sentence: First come rights, and then comes government. This proposition is not, as some would say, a libertarian theory of government. The Declaration of Independence shows it to be the officially adopted American Theory of Government.

  • According to the American Theory of Government, the rights of individuals do not originate with any government but pre-exist its formation;
  • According to the American Theory of Government, the protection of these rights is both the purpose and first duty of government;
  • According to the American Theory of Government, at least some of these rights are so fundamental that they are inalienable, meaning that they are so intimately connected to one’s nature as a human being that they cannot be transferred to another even if one consents to do so;
  • According to the American Theory of Government, because these rights are inalienable, even after a government is formed, they provide a standard by which its performance is measured; in extreme cases, a government’s systemic violation of these rights or failure to protect them can justify its alteration and abolition. In the words of the Declaration, “whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends,” that is the securing of these rights, “it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”

The original public meaning of the text of the Declaration of Independence is distinct from the original public meaning of the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution, however it is properly interpreted, does not justify itself. To be legitimate, it must be consistent with political principles that are capable of justifying it. Moreover, these same publicly identified original principles are needed inform how the original public meaning of the Constitution is to be faithfully to be applied when the text of
the Constitution is not alone specific enough to decide a case or controversy.

The original principles that the Founders thought underlie and justify the Constitution were neither shrouded in mystery nor to be found by parsing the writings of Locke, Montesquieu, or Machiavelli.

On July 2nd, 1776, the Congress of the United States voted for independence from Great Britain. On July 4th, 1776, it officially adopted the American Theory of Government, which was publicly articulated in the Declaration of Independence.

Happy Independence Day!

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/3jIPJZp
via IFTTT

Reflections on the Declaration of Independence and the American Revolution


DeclarationofIndependence

The Declaration of Independence.

 

Over the years, I have written a number of Independence Day pieces. Many of them have obvious continuing relevance to such issues as identity politics, nationalism, immigration, the role of slavery in American history, and others.

In this post, I compile what I hope will be a useful list of links to those works. Enjoy!

The Declaration of Independence and the Case for Non-Ethnic Secession,” July 4, 2009.

The Declaration of Independence and the Case for a Polity Based on Universal Principles,” July 4, 2017.

“The Universalist Principles of the Declaration of Independence,” July 4, 2019.

“The Case Against the Case Against the American Revolution,” July 4, 2019. A rebuttal to longstanding claims—advanced by critics on both right and left—that the Revolution did more harm than good

“Slavery, the Declaration of Independence and Frederick Douglass’ ‘What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?'”, July 4, 2020. Douglass’s famous speech sheds light on some of America’s greatest evils—but also on the great good done by the Revolution and Founding.

“Juneteenth and the Universalist Principles of the American Revolution,” June 19, 2021. Why there is no inconsistency in celebrating both July 4 and the abolition of slavery. Indeed, the two are mutually reinforcing.

Immigration and the Principles of the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 2021.

UPDATE: I have updated the above to include today’s post on immigration and the Declaration.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/36g7sQd
via IFTTT