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Authored by ‘sundance’ via The Last Refuge,

Marco Rubio appears for an interview with John Micklethwait of Bloomberg News. The interview was pre-scheduled as a follow up to the rather historic speech in Munich at the security conference. Within the interview {video and transcript below} Rubio expands on the baseline of the speech, the ‘why‘ is the U.S-EU alliance important.

Beginning with the end in mind, Rubio reminds the interviewer that an alliance must first accept the purpose of the assembly. There are common values and common social components to the relationship that sit at the core of the decision to be allies.

We have a shared civilization based on shared values, and within that central component the Trump administration is staring at the Europeans and saying they have lost focus on these values. Europe is diminishing itself; it is fracturing its culture and has lost its sovereign identity. The United States wants to stay partnered with Europe, but we are not going to be a partner anchored to a collective mindset that has lost its identity.

This culturally Marxist status, a gathering of nations infected with political correctness, pontificating wokeness and apologetic self-flagellation, is the core problem the Europeans are not willing to face. President Trump and Marco Rubio are essentially telling the EU to shake it off, quit being woke, get proud of your heritage, institute political systems that give benefit to the population and regain pride in themselves and their identity.

The process begins with national security, but that is not just about military spending.  Their energy industry needs to support economic independence; they cannot outsource component manufacturing; they need to reestablish economic baselines that are not dependent on Russia, China, India or any other risk vector that could be used to manipulate.

Key Quotes:

These quotes capture the core themes of Rubio’s remarks: pride in Western civilization, the urgency of a capable alliance, lessons from history, pragmatic diplomacy (including with adversaries), and a push for negotiated resolutions in key conflicts.

On shared Western civilization and the transatlantic alliance

“Ultimately, it’s the fact that we are both heirs to the same civilization. And it’s a great civilization and it’s one we should be proud of. It’s one that’s contributed extraordinarily to the world and it’s one, frankly, upon which America is built, from our language to our system of government to our laws to the food we eat to the name of our cities and towns – all of it deeply linked to this Western civilization and culture that we should be proud of, and it’s worth defending.”

“People don’t fight and die for abstract ideas. They are willing to fight and defend who they are and what matters and is important to them.”

“When we come off as urgent or even critical about decisions that Europe has failed to make or made, it is because we care. It is because we understand that ultimately, our own fate will be intertwined with what happens with Europe.”

On the need for Europe to share the burden and be capable

“We want Europe to survive, we want Europe to prosper, because we’re interconnected in so many different ways and because our alliance is so critical. But it has to be an alliance of allies that are capable and willing to fight for who they are and what’s important.”

On the Cold War parallels and lessons for today (vs. China)

“It’s reminding people of what we’ve done together in the past. But it’s also a reminder that at the end of that era, when we won the Cold War, there was this euphoria that led us to make some terrible decisions that have now left us vulnerable – it deindustrialized the West; it left us increasingly dependent on others, including China, for our critical supplies. And that needs to be reversed in order to safeguard us.”

“We should never be in a situation where our alliance and our respective countries are vulnerable to extortion or blackmail because someone controls 99 percent of something that’s critical to national life.”

On European leaders engaging with China

“Nation-states need to interact with one another. […] I don’t think visiting Beijing or meeting with the Chinese is – on the contrary, I think it would be irresponsible for great powers not to have relationships and talk through things and, to the extent possible, avoid unnecessary conflict.”

On the alliance’s evolution and core foundation

“This alliance has to look different because the world looks different. This alliance has to be about different things than it’s been in the past because the challenges of the 21st century are different than the challenges of the 20th.”

“The fundamental thing that has to change is we have to remind ourselves of why it is we have an alliance in the first place. […] This is not just a military arrangement. […] It is what holds us together in the first place as an alliance is our shared civilizational values, the fact that we are all heirs to a common civilization and one we should be very proud of.”

On the Ukraine war

“I think that’s a difficult war to say anyone is winning. The Russians are losing seven to eight thousand soldiers a week – a week. […] Not wounded – dead.”

“In the end, this war will not be solved militarily. It will be – in the end, it will come to a negotiated settlement. We’d like to see that happen as soon as possible.”

“I don’t think it’s possible for Russia to even achieve whatever initial objectives they had at the beginning of this war. I think now it’s largely narrowed down to their desire to take 20 percent of Donetsk that they don’t currently possess.”

On Cuba and the regime

“Cuba’s fundamental problem is that it has no economy and its economic model is one that has never been tried and has never worked anywhere else in the world.”

“They would much rather be in charge of the country than allow it to prosper.”

“The people of Cuba – and that’s what this regime has not been willing to give them because they’re afraid that if the people of Cuba can provide for themselves, they lose control over them, they lose power over them.”

On Iran

“I think it’s pretty clear that Iran will never be allowed to have a nuclear weapon, that that poses a threat not just to the United States, to Europe, to world security, and to the region.”

“The President would always prefer to end problems with a deal. He would always prefer that, so we’re going to give it a chance here again and see if it works.”

Full Transcript:

QUESTION:  Marco Rubio, Secretary of State, thank you for talking to Bloomberg.  You’ve just made this rather remarkable speech where you talked about the destiny of Europe and America always being intertwined.  You talked about the alliance which has stretched all the way, culturally, from Michelangelo to the Rolling Stones – a first, I suspect, for a secretary of state – but a culture that has bled and died together.  But the very common theme of your speech was the need to share the burden, the need for Europe and America to do things together, which was slightly different from the Vice President last year.  Were you kind of offering a carrot where perhaps he was offering a stick?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  I think it’s the same message.  I think what the Vice President said last year very clearly was that Europe had made a series of decisions internally that were threatening to the alliance and ultimately to themselves, not because we hate Europe or we don’t like Europeans but because – what is it that we fight for, what is it that binds us together?  And ultimately, it’s the fact that we are both heirs to the same civilization.  And it’s a great civilization and it’s one we should be proud of.  It’s one that’s contributed extraordinarily to the world and it’s one, frankly, upon which America is built, from our language to our system of government to our laws to the food we eat to the name of our cities and towns – all of it deeply linked to this Western civilization and culture that we should be proud of, and it’s worth defending.

And ultimately, that’s the point.  The point is that people – people don’t fight and die for abstract ideas.  They are willing to fight and defend who they are and what matters and is important to them.  And that was the foundation he laid last year in his speech – and we add on into this year – to explain to people that when we come off as urgent or even critical about decisions that Europe has failed to make or made, it is because we care.  It is because we understand that ultimately, our own fate will be intertwined with what happens with Europe.  We want Europe to survive, we want Europe to prosper, because we’re interconnected in so many different ways and because our alliance is so critical.  But it has to be an alliance of allies that are capable and willing to fight for who they are and what’s important.

QUESTION:  You see a parallel – you seem to see a parallel between the Cold War, which I think I would argue that the – America beat the Soviet Union because it had a common idea and it had allies on its side.  You’re now in a struggle with China.  As people say, you’ve often been a hawk on that subject.  You’re in a struggle with China.  Do you think you absolutely need Europe to be able to win that?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah.  I would say two things.  First, the mentions of the Cold War are to remind people of everything we’ve achieved together in the past in times when there was doubt.  I mean, it’s hard to imagine today, but there were those who believed, in the 60s and 70s, even, that at a minimum, we had reached a stalemate, and worse, that perhaps Soviet expansion was inevitable and that we needed to come to accept it.  There were voices that actually argued this.

And so it’s reminding people of what we’ve done together in the past.  But it’s also a reminder that at the end of that era, when we won the Cold War, there was this euphoria that led us to make some terrible decisions that have now left us vulnerable – it deindustrialized the West; it left us increasingly dependent on others, including China, for our critical supplies.  And that needs to be reversed in order to safeguard us.

And so I do think, yes, it would be ideal to have a Western supply chain that is free from extortion from anyone – leave aside China – anybody else.  We should never have to – we should never be in a situation where our alliance and our respective countries are vulnerable to extortion or blackmail because someone controls 99 percent of something that’s critical to national life.  So I think we do have a vested interest in that regard.

Today is different than yesterday, but it has parallels, not in that China’s the new Soviet Union but that in our future, collectively we’ll be stronger if we work on these things together.

QUESTION:  Do you worry from that perspective the fact that, especially in the recent period, various sort of allies – Mark Carney has just been to Beijing, Starmer has just been to Beijing, Merz is about to go there – do you worry that they’re beginning to drift off too much in that direction?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  No.  I think nation-states need to interact with one another.  Just because you’ve – I mean, remember, I serve under a President that’s willing to meet with anybody.

QUESTION:  Yes.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  I mean, to be frank, I’m pretty confident in saying that if the ayatollah said tomorrow he wanted to meet with President Trump, the President would meet him, not because he agrees with the ayatollah but because he thinks that’s the way you solve problems in the world, and he doesn’t view meeting someone as a concession.  Likewise, the President intends to travel to Beijing and has already met once with President Xi.  And in this very forum yesterday, I met with my counterpart, the foreign minister of China.

So we expect nation-states to interact with one another.  In the end, we expect nation-states to act in their national interest.  I don’t think that is – that in no way runs counter to our desire to work together on things that we share in common or threats we face in common.  But I don’t think visiting Beijing or meeting with the Chinese is – on the contrary, I think it would be irresponsible for great powers not to have relationships and talk through things and, to the extent possible, avoid unnecessary conflict.

But there will be areas we’ll never agree on, and those are the areas that I hope we can work together on.

QUESTION:  So you think the Russia that many people have spoken about is illusory, that hasn’t happened yet?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, there’s no – I mean, even as I speak to you now, there are U.S. troops deployed here on this continent on behalf of NATO.  There are still all kinds of cooperation that go on at every level; from intelligence to commercial and economic, the links remain.  I think there is a readjustment that’s happening, because I think we have to understand that we want to reinvigorate – this alliance has to look different because the world looks different.  This alliance has to be about different things than it’s been in the past because the challenges of the 21st century are different than the challenges of the 20th.  The world has changed and the alliance has to change.

But the fundamental thing that has to change is we have to remind ourselves of why it is we have an alliance in the first place.  This is not just a military arrangement.  This is not just some commercial arrangement.  It is what holds us together in the first place as an alliance is our shared civilizational values, the fact that we are all heirs to a common civilization and one we should be very proud of.  And only after we recognize that and make that the core of why it is we’re allies in the first place can we then build out all the mechanics of that alliance.  And then everything else we do together makes more sense.

QUESTION: The place where that’s being most obviously tested at the moment is Ukraine  You see all these numbers from the front where the Ukrainians do seem to be doing better in terms of what’s happening with the Russians.  Do you think Ukraine – or do you think Russia is still winning that war, or where you do you – where do you place it militarily?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  I think that’s a difficult war to say anyone is winning.  The Russians are losing seven to eight thousand soldiers a week – a week.

QUESTION:  Yes —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Not wounded – dead.  Ukraine has suffered extraordinary damage, including overnight, and again, to its energy infrastructure.  And it will take billions of dollars and years and years to rebuild that country.  So I don’t think anyone can claim to be winning it.  I think that both sides are suffering tremendous damage, and we’d like to see the war come to an end.  It’s a senseless war in our view.  The President believes that very deeply.  He believes the war would have never happened had he been president at the time.

So we’re doing two things.  Obviously we continue – look, we don’t provide arms to Russia; we provide arms to Ukraine.  We don’t sanction Ukraine; we sanction Russia.  But at the same time, we find ourselves in the unique position of serving as probably the only nation on Earth that can bring the two sides to discuss the potential for ending this war on negotiated terms.  And it’s an obligation we haven’t – we won’t walk away from because we think it’s a very unique one to have.

It may not come to fruition, unfortunately.  I hope it does, and I think there are days when I feel more optimistic about it than others.  But we’re going to keep trying because that is – in the end, this war will not be solved militarily.  It will be – in the end, it will come to a negotiated settlement.  We’d like to see that happen as soon as possible.

QUESTION:  Are you worried that if Ukraine loses the war it’s going to be a disaster for the transatlantic relationship?  Because the Americans will say the Europeans didn’t provide enough arms, and Europeans will look and remember the meeting in the White House and Zelenskyy and Trump, and they will blame (inaudible).

SECRETARY RUBIO:  No, but that – that would ignore reality.  Look, Ukraine – first of all, they deserve a lot of credit.  They have fought very bravely.  They have received an extraordinary amount of support from the United States to the tune of billions of dollars that preexist the war.  In fact, Ukraine probably wouldn’t have survived the early days of the war had it not been for American aid that came to them even before the war had started with the Javelin missile that disabled the tank (inaudible).

QUESTION:  I wasn’t saying it was fair.  I was just saying there’s a – you have to deal with perceptions.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, I mean people are saying – no, but I’m not worried about that because I can tell you that I think history will understand it.  But I don’t think the war is going to end in a traditional loss in the way people think.  I don’t think it’s possible for Russia to even achieve whatever initial objectives they had at the beginning of this war.  I think now it’s largely narrowed down to their desire to take 20 percent of Donetsk that they don’t currently possess.

And that’s hard.  It’s a hard concession for Ukraine to make for obvious reasons, both from a tactical standpoint and also from a political one.  And so that’s kind of where this thing has narrowed, and we’ll continue to search for ways to see if there is a solution to that unique problem that’s acceptable to Ukraine and that Russia will also accept.  And it may not work out, but we are going to do everything we can to see if we can find a deal.

Like I said, there are days like last week where you felt we had made some pretty substantial progress.  But ultimately, we have to see a final resolution to this to feel that it’s been worth the work, but we’re going to keep trying.  And our negotiator, Steve Witkoff – now Jared Kushner’s involved – have dedicated a tremendous amount of time to this, and they’ll have meetings again on Tuesday in regards to this.

QUESTION:  What about a country with which you’ve had a long interest: Cuba?  You mentioned it obliquely in the speech talking about the Cuban Missile Crisis.  How long do you think the regime can last without oil?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah, I think the regime in Cuba is – look, the revolution in Cuba ended a long time ago and – Cuba’s fundamental problem is that it has no economy and its economic model is one that has never been tried and has never worked anywhere else in the world, okay?  It just – it doesn’t have a real economic policy.  It doesn’t have a real economy.

Now, forget – put aside for a moment the fact that it has no freedom of expression, no democracy, no respect for human rights.  The fundamental problem Cuba has it is has no economy, and the people who are in charge of that country, in control of that country, they don’t know how to improve the everyday life of their people without giving up power over sectors that they control.  They want to control everything.  They don’t want the people of Cuba to control anything.

So they don’t know how to get themselves out of this.  And to the extent that they have been offered opportunities to do it, they don’t seem to be able to comprehend it or accept it in any ways.  They would much rather be in charge of the country than allow it to prosper.

QUESTION:  Is there any kind of off-ramp for the regime?  I mean, previous ones – when you negotiated with Venezuela, you said if they agreed with various things it would be possible to continue.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Sure.  I mean, there is.  I mean, look, I think you have to —

QUESTION:  What could – what could the Cuban regime do to —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, I’m not going to tell you or announce this in an interview here because obviously these things require space and time to do in the right way.  But I will say this, that that is that it is important for the people of Cuba to have more freedom, not just political freedom but economic freedom.  The people of Cuba – and that’s what this regime has not been willing to give them because they’re afraid that if the people of Cuba can provide for themselves, they lose control over them, they lose power over them.

So I think there has to be that opening and it has to happen, and I think now Cuba is faced with such a dire situation.  Remember this is a regime that has survived almost entirely on subsidies – first from the Soviet Union, then from Hugo Chavez, and how for the first time it has no subsidies coming in from anyone, and the model has been laid bare.

And it’s not just – look, multiple countries have gone in and helped, but the problem is that you lose money in Cuba.  They never pay their bills.  They never end up paying.  It never ends up working out.  There were European countries that went to Cuba and made what they thought were investments in certain sectors, only to have them – the contracts canceled and get themselves kicked out because the Cuban regime has no fundamental understanding of what business and industry looks like, and the people are suffering as a result of it.

So I think certainly their willingness to begin to make openings in this regard is one potential way forward.  I would also say – and this has not been really talked about a lot, but the United States has been providing humanitarian assistance directly to the Cuban people via the Catholic Church.  We did it after the hurricane.  We actually just recently announced an increase in the amount we’re willing to give.  And that’s something we’re willing to continue to explore, but obviously that’s not a long-term solution to the problems on the island.

QUESTION:  One last thing: Iran.  You’ve just sent a carrier – a second carrier – there.  Is that – and President Trump has talked about a month to give people time.  Are you running out of patience there?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, I’d say twofold.  Number one is I think it’s pretty clear that Iran will never be allowed to have a nuclear weapon, that that poses a threat not just to the United States, to Europe, to world security, and to the region.  There’s no doubt about it.

The second is we obviously want to have forces in the region because Iran has shown the willingness and the capability to lash and strike out at the United States presence in the region.  We have bases because of our alliances in the region, and Iran has shown in the past that they are willing to attack us and/or threaten our bases.  So we have to have sufficient firepower in the region to ensure that they don’t make a mistake and come after us and trigger something larger.

Beyond that, the President has said that his preference is to reach a deal with Iran.  That’s very hard to do, but he’s going to try.  And that’s what we’re trying to do right now, and Steve Witkoff and Jared have some meetings lined up fairly soon.  We’ll see if we can make any progress.

The President would always prefer to end problems with a deal.  He would always prefer that, so we’re going to give it a chance here again and see if it works.

QUESTION:  Secretary Marco Rubio, thank you very much for talking to Bloomberg.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Thank you.  Thank you.

The Kremlin on Sunday issued an important battlefield update with Russian army chief Valery Gerasimov having newly declared that a dozen more eastern villages were seized in February.

“In two weeks of February, despite severe winter conditions, combined forces and military units of the joint task force liberated 12 settlements,” Gerasimov said while visiting Russian troops operating inside Ukraine.

Gerasimov described Moscow’s forces are advancing toward Sloviansk, the industrial city that has been center of fighting between pro-Kiev and pro-Moscow forces going all the way back to 2014.

According to Gerasimov, Russian troops are now roughly 15 kilometers (nine miles) from the city.

Gerasimov said Russian forces are “expanding a security zone” along border areas in the northeastern Sumy and Kharkiv regions, where Moscow holds limited footholds.

He added that he would confer with senior officers on “further actions in the Dnipropetrovsk direction,” signaling potential expansion of operations beyond currently claimed territories – as quoted in AFP.

As also related in TASS:

Russian troops liberated 12 settlements in the first half of February, bringing over 200 square kilometers under their control, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Army General Valery Gerasimov, announced during an inspection of the Battlegroup Center units.

The Kremlin officially claims the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions as Russian territory, but still doesn’t exercise full control over them, but its forces are still slowly advancing, regional reports indicate.

In parallel with the grinding ground war, a more intense nightly aerial conflict continues. Ukrainian cities can barely keep the lights on, with many plunged into near permanent darkness, as Russia targets the national power grid.

NEW: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated Ukraine’s willingness to compromise ahead of trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian talks in Geneva, Switzerland on February 17 to 18.

Other Key Takeaways:

Russian officials continue to insist that the issues and terms impeding a… pic.twitter.com/t8xLPA97us

— Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar) February 14, 2026

But overnight and into the early Sunday hours, Russia’s military reported downing over 100 inbound Ukrainian drones within a four hour period. The cross-border attacks have wreaked havoc on Russian oil refineries and export sites, in some cases.

Authored by Jacki Thrapp via The Epoch Times,

No arrests have been made in the Nancy Guthrie case after a night of heavy police activity two miles from the missing 84-year-old’s home.

Nancy Guthrie, who is the mother of “Today” show co-anchor Savannah Guthrie, was last seen on Jan. 31 after she had dinner with her family.

As the search for Guthrie entered its third week, a large police presence responded to a road near the missing woman’s home in the Tucson, Arizona area on the night of Feb. 13, which included a series of sheriff’s and FBI vehicles as well as SWAT and forensics teams.

The Pima County Sheriff’s Department confirmed the police activity was related to the case, but did not release details about what happened inside the blocked-off scene.

“Law enforcement activity is underway at a residence near E Orange Grove Rd & N First Ave related to the Guthrie case,” the Pima County Sheriff’s Department shared in an X post.

“Because this is a joint investigation, at the request of the FBI, no additional information is currently available.”

The Epoch Times contacted the Pima County Sheriff’s Department and the FBI for more information, but had received no response at the time of publishing.

Around the same time that police activity was taking place in Nancy Guthrie’s neighborhood late Friday night, a separate incident was happening at a Culver’s restaurant, also two miles away from her home.

The FBI and the sheriff’s department tagged and towed a Range Rover SUV from a Culver’s restaurant parking lot, which confirmed the activity was part of the Nancy Guthrie case.

Nancy Guthrie was last seen on Jan. 31 when a relative drove her back home from a family dinner at 9:48 p.m.

The 84-year-old’s doorbell camera was disconnected in the early morning hours of Feb. 1.

The FBI accessed footage from her Nest camera and released video of a suspect, without a time stamp, on Feb. 12.

FBI Phoenix described the suspect in the video as a male, approximately 5 feet, 9 inches to 5 feet, 10 inches tall, with an average build.

A combination of images from a video shows a masked person outside Nancy Guthrie’s home in Catalina Foothills, Arizona. FBI via The Epoch Times

The agency identified the suspect’s bag in the video as a black, 25-liter “Ozark Trail Hiker Pack” backpack that was sold at Walmart.

Law enforcement believes Nancy Guthrie was removed against her will.

On Feb. 12, the FBI doubled its reward for a tip leading to an arrest in the case to $100,000.

Multiple ransom notes have been reported by local outlets and TMZ.

Savannah Guthrie previously said that her family “will pay” for the return of her mother, but it’s unclear whether any payment was made to the person who sent the ransom note.

In the (alleged) interests of transparency, AG Pam Bondi and Deputy AG Todd Blanche released a statement overnight that included a list of all government officials and politically-exposed persons that appeared in The Epstein Files.

SCOOP: The Department of Justice has sent over a letter to Congress outlining why it made redactions to the Epstein files.

The six-page letter also includes a list of all “government officials and politically exposed persons” in the files. pic.twitter.com/aRCmS2p1Bg

— Aaron Parnas (@AaronParnas) February 15, 2026

The term “politically exposed persons” was not defined in the Act, but consistent with Section 3 of the Act, Department reviewers were directed to notate “all government officials and politically exposed persons named or referenced” in any document, including videos and images, reviewed during this process.

This list includes (as directed by the Act) all persons where (1) they are or were a government official or politically exposed person and (2) their name appears in the files released under the Act at least once. Names appear in the files released under the Act in a wide variety of contexts.

For example, some individuals had extensive direct email contact with Epstein or Maxwell while other individuals are mentioned only in a portion of a document (including press reporting) that on its face is unrelated to the Epstein and Maxwell matters.

So, while we have seen ‘lists’ before, this is the official DoJ list of potential pedophiles, pizza eaters, or island-partiers (allegedly)…

• Acosta, Alexander
• Adelson, Miriam
• Allen, Woody
• Allred, Gloria
• Assange, Julian
• Audrey, Strauss
• Avakian, Stephanie
• Babino, Vincent
• Baldwin, Alec
• Band, Doug
• Bannon, Steve
• Barak, Ehud
• Barr, William
• Becerra, Xavier
• Belohlavek, Lanna
• Berman, Geoffrey
• Beyonce
• Bezos, Jeff
• Biden, Ashley
• Biden, Hunter
• Biden, Jill
• Biden, Joe
• Birger, Laura
• Bistricer, David
• Bistricer, Marc
• Black, Leon
• Blanche, Todd
• Blinken, Antony
• Boies, David
• Bondi, Pam
• Bongino, Dan
• Bono
• Book, Lauren
• Booker, Cory
• Bowdich, David
• Boyd, Stephen E.
• Bradshaw, Ric
• Branson, Richard
• Brennan, John
• Brockman, John
• Brunel, Jean Luc
• Buckley, Sean
• Bull, Gerald
• Bush Jr., George
• Bush, George W.
• Bush, Jeb
• Byrne, Patrick
• Calk, Stephen
• Capone, Russell
• Carlson, Tucker
• Carper, Tom
• Castro, Fidel
• Cheney, Dick
• Cher
• Chomsky, Noam
• Clayton, Jay
• Clinton, Bill
• Clinton, Chelsea
• Clinton, Hillary
• Clooney, George
• Cobain, Kurt
• Cohen, Michael
• Colleran, Brian
• Collins, Linda
• Comey, James
• Comey, Maureen
• Conway, George
• Copperfield, David
• Cosby, Bill
• De Niro, Robert
• Dershowitz, Alan
• Desantis, Ron
• Diller, Barry
• Donahue, Phil
• Donaleski, Rebekah
• Dupont, Kathleen
• Economou, George
• Egauger, Michael
• Eisenberg, John
• Elizabeth II
• Ellison, Keith
• Emmanuel, Rahm
• Epstein, Jeffrey
• Erben, Germann
• Feinberg, Stephen
• Ferguson, Sarah
• Filip, Mark
• Flynn, Michael
• Foley, Mark
• Fortelni, Marius
• Friedland, Edward
• Frost, Phillip
• Gates, Bill
• Gates, Melinda
• Garland, Merrick
• Geithner, Timothy
• Giuliani, Rudy
• Goldman, Dan
• Graham, Lindsey
• Guinness, Arthur Edward Rory
• Haley, Nikki
• Harrish, Joshua
• Harris, Kamala
• Hatch, Orin
• Hawk, Rony
• Heiss, Howard
• Higgins, Tony
• Ho, Stanley
• Holder, Eric
• Hoffman, Reid
• Horowitz, Andreesen
• Horowitz, Michael
• Hosenball, Mark
• Hoyer, Steny
• Huckabee, Mike
• Huckabee, Sarah
• Hutner, Florence
• Inge Rokke, Kjell
• Iveagh, Clare
• Jackson, Michael
• Jagger, Mick
• Jarecki, Henry
• Jayapal, Pramila
• JayZ
• Jeffries, Hakeem
• Johnson, Hank
• Jones, Alex
• Joplin, Janis
• Kasich, John
• Kendall Rowlands, John
• Kennedy Jr., Robert F.
• Kerry, John
• Khanna, Ro
• Kline, Carl
• Krisher, Barry
• Kudlow, Larry
• Kushner, Jared
• Kyl, Jon
• Lady Victoria Hervey
• Lefkowitz, Jay
• Lefroy, Jeremy
• Leo, Leonard
• Lew, Jack
• Lewinsky, Monica
• Lieu, Ted
• Lofgren, Zoe
• Lonergan, Jessica
• Lorber, Howard
• Lord Robert May
• Lutnick, Howard
• Lynch, Loretta
• Mace, Nancy
• Mandelson, Peter
• Mao, Coreen
• Margolin, James
• Markey, Ed
• Markle, Meghan
• Massie, Thomas
• Maxwell, Ghislaine
• Maxwell, Robert
• May, Theresa
• McCain, John
• McFarland, Nicole
• Meadows, Mark
• Menendez, Robert
• Milano, Alyssa
• Milikowski, Nathan
• Milken, Michael
• Mnuchin, Steve
• Moe, Alison
• Monaco, Lisa
• Monroe, Marilyn
• Mook, William
• Moskowitz, Jared
• Mueller III, Robert s.
• Mulvaney, Mick
• Murdoch, Rupert
• Musk, Elon
• Nadler, Jerry
• Napolitano, Janet
• Nassar, Larry
• Netanyahu, Benjamin
• Newsom, Gavin
• Obama, Barack
• Obama, Michelle
• Ocasio Cortez, Alexandria
• O’Donnell, Rosie
• Oz, Mehmet
• Papapetru, Sophia
• Parker, Daniel
• Patel, Kash
• Paul, Ron
• Pecorino, Joseph
• Pelosi, Nancy
• Pence, Mike
• Pestana, Diego
• Phelan, John
• Plaskett, Stacey
• Plourde, Lee
• Podesta, Tony
• Pomerantz, Lara
• Pompeo, Mike
• Pope John Paul II
• Pope, Susan
• Power, Samantha
• Presley, Elvis
• Presley, Lisa Marie
• Prince Harry, Duke of Sussex
• Price Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor
• Prince Philip
• Princess Diana
• Pritzker, JB
• Pritzker, Thomas
• Quayle, Dan
• Raskin, Jamie
• Ratcliffe, John
• Ratner, Brett
• Readler, Chad
• Reagan, Ronald
• Recarey, Joseph
• Reiter, Michael
• Reno, Janet
• Reynolds, Tom
• Rice, Susan
• Richardson, Bill
• Rod-Larsen, Terje
• Rogers, Matthew
• Rohrbach, Andrew
• Romney, Mitt
• Roos, Nicolas
• Rosen, Jeffrey
• Rosenstein, Rod
• Ross, Diana
• Rossmiller, Alexander
• Roth, John
• Routch, Timothy
• Rove, Karl
• Rowan, Marc
• Rubenstein, Howard
• Rubio, Marco
• Ruemmler, Kathy
• Ryan, Paul
• Salinger, Pierre
• Sasse, Ben
• Scanlon, Mary Gay
• Scarola, John
• Schenberg, Janis
• Schiff, Adam
• Schlaff, Martin
• Schumer, Amy
• Schumer, Chuck
• Schwarzman, Stephen
• Scott, Tim
• Sekulow, Jay
• Senatore, Adrienne
• Sessions, Jeff
• Shamir, Yitzhak
• Shapiro, Ben
• Shappert, Gretchen
• Shea, Timothy
• Siad, Daniel
• Snowden, Edward
• Soros, Alex
• Soros, George
• Spacey, Kevin
• Spitzer, Eliot
• Springsteen, Bruce
• Stabenow, Debbie
• Staley, Jes
• Starmer, Keir
• Starr, Kenneth
• Stoltenberg, Jens
• Stordalen, Gunhild
• Stordalen, Petter
• Straub, Glenn
• Streisand, Barbara
• Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem
• Summers, Larry
• Swalwell, Eric
• Sweency Jr., William
• Thomas-Jacobs, Carol
• Taylor Green, Marjorie
• Thatcher, Margaret
• Thiel, Peter
• Trump, Donald
• Trump, Ivanka
• Trump, Melania
• Tucker, Chris
• Vance, JD
• Villafana, Marie
• Walker, Richard
• Warsh, Kevin
• Wexner, Abigail
• Wexner, Les
• Williams, Damian
• Wolff, Michael
• Woodward, Stanley
• Wyden, Ron
• Yung, Mark
• Zampolli, Paolo
• Zucker, Jeff
• Zuckerberg, Mark

The list contains hundreds of names, spanning politicians, celebrities, business leaders, historical figures, deceased individuals, and others, but leans somewhat left overall due to the inclusion of numerous Democratic politicians and Hollywood figures, but it includes prominent right-leaning ones (especially business donors). 

• Left-aligned: Approximately 130–150 (strong Democratic politicians, entertainers, and donors dominate this side in the list).

• Right-aligned: Approximately 90–110 (strong Republican politicians, recent big-money conservative donors like Musk/Adelson/Thiel, and conservative figures).

• Unclear/Other: The remainder (many historical, foreign, or non-political figures).

Counts are estimates derived from cross-referencing donations, public endorsements/statements, and party registrations/affiliations. Not every name has donation records or explicit statements, so some placements rely on broader consensus from reliable sources.

Still quite a list…

Authored by Lance Roberts via RealInvestmentAdvice.com,

We have spent a lot of time over the last year debunking “narratives,” which are dangerous to investors, as “narratives” create a rationalization for overpaying for assets. Nonetheless, Wall Street loves a simple story and is happy to jump on a trend with momentum, selling products to unwitting consumers. A good example of that lately has been the “weak dollar” narrative, which has pushed investors to chase foreign assets. The negative correlation between a weak dollar and rising international stock exposure appears to be a free return. Unsurprisingly, the story spreads fast because performance charts look clean during a dollar slide.

Reuters recently reported that the US dollar hit a four-year low in late January after President Donald Trump said the “value of the dollar” was “great.” Reuters tied the move to rate cut expectations, policy volatility, and concerns about fiscal deficits and central bank independence. However, in reality, President Trump was more correct than not, as Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick confirmed the dollar trading at a more “neutral level,” as shown below.

There are two very important points to take away from the chart above.

1. The dollar has been in a very strong uptrend since the Financial Crisis and remains there.

2. Despite the recent pullback in the dollar, it is trading at its “Neutral Value” and is at the same level it was in 1970. Such certainly does not support the “debasement” or “demise of the US Dollar” narratives.

What is true is that the decline in the value of the dollar, after its strong surge starting in 2021, does make foreign assets more appealing as investors seek a hedge against a weaker dollar. However, while the “purveyors of perpetual doom” claim this is evidence of the end of the US Dollar dominance, the recent decline in the dollar, as shown above, is simply part of its long history of rallies and declines as the dollar adjusts to flows as foreign governments seek to balance their currencies against the US Dollar.

If you take a look at the dollar chart above, you will notice that it trades in a band above and below 100 (the “neutral value.) This is because the US Dollar is measured against a “basket” of foreign currencies. It is crucial to understand that foreign governments manage their currency against the dollar through a “peg” or a managed band to reduce exchange rate swings and support trade. As such, foreign central banks set a target rate versus the dollar and defend that target by buying or selling dollars from foreign exchange reserves. This is why, when the dollar was “above neutral,” foreign central banks like China reduced their holdings of US Treasuries to strengthen the Yuan.

When demand for the local currency rises, the central bank buys dollars and sells local currency to keep the rate from rising. When demand falls, the central bank sells dollars and buys local currency to keep the rate from falling too much. Many countries also align short-term interest rates, capital controls, and bank liquidity rules with the peg, since rate differentials and hot money flows pressure the exchange rate.

There are several very important reasons why all countries need a stable currency relative to the dollar:

1. It helps exporters price goods with less uncertainty,

2. Supports long-term contracts,

3. Limits imported inflation on energy and commodity prices priced in dollars, and

4. Lowers currency risk for foreign investors.

The trade-off is less monetary policy freedom, greater reserve requirements, and a higher risk of sharp adjustments when the peg level no longer aligns with inflation, growth, or external deficits.

However, none of this supports any commentary about the “death of the dollar,” or the failure of fiat currencies in general. What those commentaries do is push portfolio behavior. When the dollar falls, international stock exposure often rises in the allocation model. The risk lies in the assumption that a weak dollar stays in place indefinitely.

Looking at the chart above, it is clear that currency trends reverse when positioning crowds in either direction. A weak-dollar narrative encourages investors to pay less attention to valuation, earnings, and country-level fundamentals, leaving portfolios exposed when the thesis breaks.

A Potential For A Dollar Rally

Currency markets move on expectations more than anything else. Yes, interest rates, economic growth, and inflation can all impact the dollar, but it is more about the “expectations” of those variables for the dollar, trade, etc., that move the price. Therefore, investors need to be on the lookout for factors that could reverse expectations. Currently, several conditions are forming that could begin to reverse those expectations.

First, positioning and technicals matter. From a long-term technical perspective, the U.S. Dollar Index is attempting to stabilize after a 2025 downside move. As shown, using a 3-year price momentum measure, the dollar is as oversold now as it was at previous dollar bottoms. The current move lower is becoming increasingly stretched, reducing the catalyst needed to trigger a sharp reversal.

A weak dollar trend also encourages leverage through unhedged international stock exposure. As shown, investors have piled into global sector funds (excluding technology) over the past year to boost returns. However, the last time we saw that kind of exposure shift was in 2021, just before the counter-trend rally in the dollar that hit returns fast.

Second, relative economic growth still supports the U.S. over international economies. As we noted previously,

“While investors are exceedingly bullish on the stock market, forecasts for 2026 are sobering. Even the IMF, which recently produced its global growth estimates, has the US economy growing at 2% for the next two years, and the Eurozone near 1%.”.

Relative growth drives capital flows, and capital flows drive currencies. Therefore, when U.S. growth beats expectations while other regions disappoint, the weak-dollar theme loses its power.

Lastly, policy messaging still matters. Reuters reported that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent reaffirmed “a strong dollar policy.” Furthermore, the expected monetary policy under Kevin Warsh, the new Federal Reserve chairman, is also dollar-bullish. While a single statement does not set a multi-month trend, repeated statements and eventual actions will shift short-term psychology toward a stronger dollar view.

Most crucially, a dollar rally does not require booming U.S. growth. A dollar rally only requires growth and rates to look less negative than they’re priced, and the current oversold conditions lower that hurdle.

The International Valuation Risk

Investors often stack a second argument on top of the weak dollar story. International markets look cheaper than the U.S.; therefore, international stock exposure offers better value. The problem lies in relative valuation, when we should really look at each market’s valuation relative to its own history and earnings path. As shown, when you do that, those markets trade at historically high valuations.

MSCI data shows the MSCI EAFE Index (ex-US) forward P/E at 15.3 as of January 30, 2026. The level looks reasonable in isolation; however, the key issue is what investors receive for that multiple. Given that earnings growth rates, margins, and sector mix are vastly weaker than in the U.S., overvaluation will matter in those countries, just as it does in the U.S.

On the U.S. side, FactSet reported S&P 500 analysts project 2026 earnings growth of 14.1 percent and a forward 12-month P/E of 21.5, below 22.0 at the end of the fourth quarter. The U.S. multiple still sits above long-run averages, yet the direction matters, as the U.S. has cheapened at the margin while earnings expectations have remained resilient and profit margins have improved.

International markets also carry concentration risk. A significant portion of EAFE performance is tied to financials, industrials, and exporters, all of which are sensitive to global trade cycles and demand from China. Those forces can change quickly, but when the weak-dollar narrative drives the trade, investors often ignore the macro risk.

A currency-driven bid also inflates valuation abroad. A weak dollar lifts translated returns and encourages inflows, which in turn raise price multiples. However, when the dollar turns higher, international stock exposure faces a double drag as currency hedging reverses. When that translation turns negative, the valuation premium compresses as flows reverse.

While international stock exposure is fine, and there are certainly periods when it performs better than domestic markets, over the last 17 years it has trailed domestic markets by a large margin. Such is because, at the end of the day, it isn’t about dollar weakness; it is about earnings growth, profit margins, and future expectations. Currently, that growth remains in the U.S.

Investment Tactics Dollar Reversal

As shown, the move in Emerging Market Stocks (EEM) has been extremely sharp, making it much more exposed to a deep reversal if the dollar rallies.

Therefore, investors should treat international stock exposure as a tool, not a narrative. The goal, as always, is to maintain diversification but only to the point where you can control risk. Once it becomes a momentum chase, that risk control fails.

• Start with position sizing. Set a strategic range for international stock exposure based on your risk tolerance and drawdown limits. Critically, keep that range stable and don’t allow the recent weakness in the dollar to dictate long-term weights.

• Use rules-based rebalancing. When foreign equities run above target due to a weak dollar surge, trim toward policy weight. When foreign equities lag, add slowly. Rebalancing reduces the damage of an unexpected reversal.

• Add currency awareness. Consider a split allocation between hedged and unhedged developed exposure. Hedged exposure reduces the impact of a dollar rally, while unhedged exposure keeps diversification benefits when the weak dollar resumes. MSCI publishes a 100% hedged EAFE benchmark that helps investors compare results across hedged and unhedged frameworks.

• Focus on earnings quality as fundamentals will always matter in the end. Continue to favor markets and sectors with stable cash flows, strong balance sheets, and pricing power, as those traits matter when currencies swing and financial conditions tighten.

• Avoid valuation shortcuts. Do not rely on “cheaper than the U.S.” Use local history and earnings trends. If international multiples rise while earnings lag, reduce exposure, even if the weak-dollar story remains popular.

• Finally, stress test the portfolio. Model a 5 percent to 10 percent dollar rally and a 10 percent drawdown in foreign equities at the same time. If the model shows unacceptable damage, reduce unhedged international stock exposure before the market enforces the change.

The weak-dollar narrative is just a narrative, and a reversal will arrive again. That is just how markets operate. The question is whether your process will protect you or hurt you when that reversal comes.

The Munich Security Conference, once regarded as a heavyweight diplomatic forum, has devolved into a spectacle that favors “performance over substance,” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi complained after his country was snubbed.

Organizers barred senior Iranian officials from attending this year’s gathering after deadly protests and unrest shook the country last month, threatening the stability of the Islamic Republic. Tehran has lashed out:

“Sad to see the usually serious Munich Security Conference turned into the ‘Munich Circus’ when it comes to Iran,” FM Araghchi wrote Saturday in a series of posts on X.

“The EU appears confused, rooted in an inability to understand what is happening inside Iran… An aimless EU has lost all geopolitical weight in our region,” he added.

“Europe’s overall trajectory is dire, to say the least,” Araghchi said, branding the bloc “an empty-handed and peripheral” actor irrelevant to serious negotiations – particularly over Iran’s nuclear program.

Instead of inviting Iran – which has permanent representation at the United Nations – the Munich Security Conference invited Reza Pahlavi. He is the exiled son of Iran’s former US-backed shah ousted in the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Pahlavi has supporters in the West, including among some Iranians in the diaspora, but the reality remains is that he is barely known among the Iranian populace. For the over 90 millions Iranians in the Islamic Republic, he’s not in reality a recognizable figure – but his last name is simply connected with history from a half century ago.

As expected Pahlavi used the platform to push for regime change and to appear at a rally. He went so far as to tell Reuters that Washington should bomb Iran rather than negotiate with it.

Tens of thousands of pro-Monarchist Iranians gathered in Munich, Germany, to protest the Iranian regime. pic.twitter.com/ZSOixiM9nD

— Moshe Schwartz (@YWNReporter) February 15, 2026

He claims that he can lead Iran into a “secular democracy” – though ironically his name is connected with the historic monarchy which is remembered by Iranians today for its harsh repression and overseeing a system of extreme poverty for the non-royal masses.

He’s long worked with Washington-backed opposition groups, and he has lobbied the White House to officially back him as a legitimate ruler of Tehran, but it remains unclear to the degree he might have the current Trump’s administration’s ear.

Authored by Steve Watson via modernity.news,

Pennsylvania Senator John Fetterman has once again set himself apart from the radical elements in his party by admitting that his own parents support President Trump—and using that as a reason to reject the Democrats’ over-the-top attacks on MAGA voters.

In a recent interview with Politico’s Dasha Burns, Fetterman again explained why he won’t join the chorus labeling Trump supporters as threats to democracy, emphasizing personal connections over partisan hysteria.

Burns asked Fetterman directly about Trump’s praise for him as the “most sensible Democrat,” questioning if it’s a “badge of honor or kryptonite for a Democrat in 2026.”

Fetterman responded, “My parents would appreciate it.”

He continued, “I know, and I love a lot of people that vote for Trump. And that’s part of why I refuse to call these people Nazis, or they’re brownshirts, or they’re trying to destroy our democracy.”

Fetterman made it clear he’s not engaging in that rhetoric, stating, “I’m not defending the president, but I will say he hasn’t defied a single court order yet. He hasn’t. And there was the big freak out that he was going to run in 28.”

“And I’m like, no, he’s not going to run. That’s not going to happen. And now, of course he’s not going to run,” the Senator added.

When Burns pressed on his relationship with Trump, Fetterman said, “If I have something to say it’s not going to be, you know, in an insult. It’s not going to be extreme things…when you have members of Congress calling him a piece of shit.”

“And I think it’s crazy, it’s like you just don’t, you know, I’ll always talk and speak, you know, with respect, because I really want to find a way forward.”

This admission underscores Fetterman’s ongoing pushback against his party’s extremes, a stance that has increasingly isolated him from Democratic insiders.

As we previously reported, Democrat extremists are already plotting to primary Fetterman ahead of his 2028 reelection bid, viewing his moderate positions as a betrayal. Despite his popularity in Pennsylvania, including strong support from Republicans, party officials are contemplating challenges because he won’t fully embrace their radical agenda.

Fetterman recently warned Democrats that socialism and far-left ideas are electoral poison, stating that such policies “pushed our party over the cliff” and led to recent losses. He called for “common sense” to prevail, highlighting the party’s shift toward figures like New York City’s socialist mayor Zohran Mamdani as a warning sign.

Fetterman has also urged his colleagues to dial back the constant outrage, telling them to stop turning everything into a “national freak out.” He criticized Democrats for overreacting to issues like the firing of Jimmy Kimmel and risking government shutdowns over partisan squabbles, emphasizing that “people need to just chill a little about a lot of things.”

These repeated calls for moderation have earned Fetterman bipartisan respect, even as they fuel internal Democratic discord. His refusal to demonize Trump voters, rooted in his own family’s views, exposes the growing divide between the party’s base and its leadership’s ideological purity tests.

Republicans stand to benefit from this chaos, as Fetterman’s crossover appeal could complicate Democratic efforts in swing states like Pennsylvania. If pushed too far, he might even consider running independently, further splintering the left.

Fetterman’s approach highlights a rare willingness to prioritize respect and practicality over division, a move that contrasts sharply with the Democrats’ ongoing embrace of extremism. As the party grapples with its identity, his voice serves as a reminder that alienating everyday Americans—including Trump supporters—only weakens their position.

Your support is crucial in helping us defeat mass censorship. Please consider donating via Locals or check out our unique merch. Follow us on X @ModernityNews.

Authored by Andrew Korybko via Substack,

German Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil recently declared that “Now is the time for a two-speed Europe. Germany, together with France and other partners, will therefore now take the lead in making Europe stronger and more independent. As the six biggest economies in Europe, we can now be the driving force.” Apart from those two, this exclusive tier will also include Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Poland. The goal is to optimize decision-making by going around the EU’s consensus requirement.

According to the Washington Post, Klingbeil also sent a letter to his counterparts from the aforesaid countries announcing his intent for them to prioritize “a savings and investment union to improve financing conditions for businesses; strengthening the euro’s role as an international currency; better cooperation on defense spending; and securing resilient supply chains for critical raw materials.” His “two-speed Europe” proposal essentially functions as the EU’s adaptation to Great Power geopolitics.

Trump returned this approach to the fore of International Relations after authorizing the capture Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and the seizure of a Russian-flagged tanker in the Atlantic. The resumption of Great Powers prioritizing their national interests without being concerned anymore about accusations of violating international law bodes ill for the EU’s interests. After all, the US now wants EU member Denmark’s territory of Greenland, and the EU can’t stop the US even if it really wanted to.

This newfound self-consciousness of EU powerlessness has been brewing for a while, especially since the bloc was coerced by Trump’s tariff threats into agreeing to a lopsided trade deal with the US last summer, apparently inspired its de facto German leader to finally take action to rectify it to a degree. To be sure, the EU will probably never be able to restore its “strategic autonomy” vis-à-vis the US, but it could still possibly function more cohesively for making itself more competitive on the world stage.

For that to happen, member states will have to surrender more of their sovereignty to Brussels, thus furthering Germany’s long-running goal of federalizing the EU under its de facto leadership. This goal is being pursued through multiple means, including the EU’s planned transformation into a military union and creating a bigger pool of common debt through more funding for Ukraine. The challenge is that the EU’s consensus requirement for such major decisions allows smaller states like Hungary to stop this.

Therein lies the importance of Germany assembling an exclusive tier of EU members for making such decisions amongst themselves and then coercing their smaller peers into following suit through the momentum unleashed by them creating tangible facts on the ground. The clock is ticking since Poland’s ruling liberal-globalist coalition might be replaced by a conservative-populist one after fall 2027’s next parliamentary elections, however, ergo why Germany wants to get as much done as soon as possible.

These plans could be foiled even before then if Poland’s conservative president vetoes legislation associated with it since the ruling liberal-globalist coalition lacks the two-thirds majority to overrule him. Any moves by this exclusive tier that don’t require legislative approval to advance the EU’s de facto federalization could also be challenged by Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal and Supreme Court, which are at the center of a highly partisan dispute, thus possibly delaying implementation till the next elections.

Poland’s role in this German-proposed process is pivotal. Participation and tangible progress could create facts on the ground that are difficult to reverse even if the government changes after fall 2027. Likewise, resistance through the means described above could impede the aforesaid progress and possibly avert the associated consequences. If a conservative-populist coalition comes to power in Poland, it might then assemble regional allies to collectively and thus more effectively oppose these plans.

In that scenario, the EU could bifurcate into German- and Polish-led tiers, the first representing its legacy members and the second its new ones. Just like the German-led tier plans to make decisions amongst themselves and then coerce their smaller peers into following suit, so too could the Polish-led one do the same vis-à-vis their larger peers. These dynamics could result in the EU’s de facto dissolution into two distinct blocs that only remain united through their inherited policies like freedom of movement.

It’s therefore ironic that Germany considers its “two-speed Europe” proposal to be an adaptation to Great Power geopolitics that’ll enable the EU to function more cohesively for making itself more competitive on the world stage when this proposal actually risks dealing a deathblow to the EU as it now exists. The odds are still in Germany’s favor, but they could decisively shift after fall 2027’s next parliamentary elections in Poland, which are shaping up to be consequential for the entire continent.