From Friday’s decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Munsell v. Munsell (opinion by Justice Derek Vaughn):
Jacob and Libby married in 2010 and had two children, one born in 2016 and the second born in 2018. In February 2024, Libby filed a complaint seeking dissolution of the marriage.
The parties stipulated to the division of their property, and they agreed to share joint physical custody of the children under a rotating parenting schedule that gave each parent equal time. Trial was had on the contested issues of legal custody, the children’s involvement in the church attended by Jacob (church), and the children’s attendance at the church camp during Jacob’s parenting time. Jacob appeals the district court’s decision on legal custody and church camp attendance.
The trial court concluded that the parents were in sufficient conflict that joint legal custody wasn’t feasible, and therefore awarded legal custody to Libby, and the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld this. But the trial court also concluded that Jacob couldn’t have the children attend the church camp even during his own parenting time, and on this the state supreme court disagreed:
Jacob and Libby were raised in the same religion as that of the church Jacob currently attends. Jacob testified the church follows the tenet that women should be “subservient” to men and that the church should be led by men. During their marriage, the parties and the children attended the church. However, Libby testified that she “left the church” about 5 months before filing for divorce, no longer agreed with some of the church’s teachings, and did not like that there were “no women leaders and wom[e]n were silenced and subjugated.” She also testified that she did not like the “culture of fear and shame that the church brings on, fear of hell and fear of punishment.” After the parties separated, the children continued to attend the church with Jacob during his parenting time, and Libby initially supported this practice. At trial, however, the parties disagreed on whether the children should continue to attend the church….
[As to the church camp, the camp] director testified campers rotate through four classes that are each 30 to 45 minutes long and consist of a Bible class, as well as “crafts[,] activities[,] and nature” with five classes in a full weeklong session. The Bible class usually follows a vacation Bible school curriculum with a rotating religious theme. There is a main Bible verse for the church camp, and Bible class time is spent learning the verse, usually doing a coloring sheet, and completing a quick Bible “devote.” Campers do not have to be affiliated with any religious organization to attend the church camp. The primary focus is on having fun, making friends, and being independent.
Jacob’s parents live on the church camp’s property as caretakers. Jacob testified the church camp was a “huge part” of his life, he had been a camp counselor, and he was currently serving on the church camp’s board of directors. He testified the church camp was a place he went to “figure out what [he] believed” and “who [he] wanted to be” away from his parents and is something he wants his children to experience. He testified he met Libby at the church camp, and he admitted that after they began dating, they were sexually intimate on the church camp’s property in violation of the church camp rules. But there was no evidence that the church camp’s staff or directors were aware of, or sanctioned, such activity. Jacob also testified that these relations took place only while Libby attended as a staff member and not during a church camp session….
Libby testified she enjoyed attending the church camp as a child but now believes the church camp, like the church, teaches lack of self-worth, and she does not want the children to attend the church camp, even during Jacob’s parenting time. She did not object, however, to the children attending a nonchurch camp….
Libby, as the sole legal custodian, has the authority and responsibility under state law to make fundamental decisions regarding the children’s education and welfare, including their religious education and their extracurricular activities. But … absent a clear showing of substantial harm to the child, the noncustodial parent retains his or her fundamental right to direct the child’s religious upbringing during his or her parenting time….
[T]he [trial] court expressly found that “there is little or no evidence that [Jacob’s] religious practice presents any threat to the children’s well-being.” The court thus concluded that “[t]he record does not support any restriction on [Jacob’s] ability to discuss his beliefs and involve the children in church activities during his parenting time.” No one has appealed this finding, and our de novo review persuades us that it is amply supported by the record.
But this leaves the question of whether the trial court erred by allowing Libby the unilateral authority to decide whether the children could attend the church camp during Jacob’s parenting time. The trial court decided this issue by analyzing whether the church camp was properly characterized as a religious practice or instead was an “extracurricular activity” that the parent with legal custody had authority to determine. On this record, we do not think such an analysis was necessary.
Here, there was no dispute that the church camp was supported by the same religious organization that encompassed Jacob’s church and included religious education; indeed, Libby’s primary objection to the children’s attendance was the church camp’s religious affiliation. She had no objection to the children attending a nonchurch camp, so the basis for her objection was not the extracurricular activities in which they would participate at the church camp, but the religious activities in which they would participate.
In other words, although the church camp included a mix of religious activities and extracurricular activities, it was not necessary to determine which activity predominated the daily camp schedule, because the evidence showed that both parties considered the church camp to be a “church activity.” Neither do we see evidence that allowing the children to attend the church camp would expose the children to harm. The trial court made an express factual finding that the record did not support placing any restriction on Jacob’s ability to involve the children in “church activities during his parenting time,” and our review of the record confirms the same. For similar reasons, in our de novo review, we see an absence of evidence that allowing the children to attend the church camp would pose “an immediate and substantial threat to a child’s temporal well-being.”
Accordingly, we see no basis to restrict Jacob’s ability to enroll the children in the church camp during his parenting time. We therefore modify the decree to remove the provision that allowed Libby to determine whether Jacob could enroll the children in the church camp during his parenting time….
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