Ukraine Between Biden And A Hard Place

Authored by J.Hawk exclusively for SouthFront,

Joe Biden’s extensive interest in Ukraine during his tenure as Obama’s vice president meant that US attention toward the country would be instantly elevated in the eyes of the new administration. The Burisma scandal which implicated Hunter Biden and which became a problem for Joe Biden on the campaign trail, combined with Biden’s own apparent frailty and avoidance of extensive public engagements, have meant that Biden is yet to have a telephone conversation with Zelensky.

Whether he deliberately chose to outsource Ukraine policy to his trusted advisors or they are taking initiative in order to fill the vacuum of power left by their boss’ incapacity, US-Ukraine policy has taken a number of new twists and turns in the less than two months of Biden Administration.

End of Indirect Control?

Biden Administration’s actions so far indicate a certain degree of impatience with the goings-on in Kiev which is behaving in an all too independent fashion on many issues. Kiev’s decision to nationalize Motor Sich, an aircraft engine manufacturer whose purchase was sought by Chinese investors robbed Ukraine of a significant influx of badly needed hard currency, took place after Washington expressed displeasure at Chinese companies’ foothold in Ukraine and moreover access to Soviet-era technologies attractive to China’s aerospace industries. This action was taken in spite of considerable risk of Chinese retaliation, which took the form of China’s Foreign Ministry informing its Ukrainian equivalent that it would no longer respect its wishes concerning economic activities in the Crimea, something that Chinese firms have shied away from so far. US Embassy in Kiev’s instant endorsement of Zelensky’s shutdown of three opposition TV stations and the placement of sanctions, in violation of Ukraine’s own laws, on one of Ukraine’s opposition leaders Medvedchuk on the grounds that they were involved in spreading so-called “Russian disinformation” suggests that Washington was at the very least aware of the move and may have even prompted it. US sanctioning of Igor Kolomoysky on the basis of his corrupting Ukraine’s politics indicates that Zelensky has not gone far enough in fulfilling Washington’s wishes. In doing so Washington demonstrated it is willing to publicly humiliate Zelensky should he fail to display appropriate deference to its wishes. The question at this point becomes, in what direction will Washington push Zelensky? How far, what means will Washington use to get its way, and to what extent will Zelensky resist?

Giving War Another Chance?

The greatest service that Ukraine could render Biden’s administration is by launching an all-out assault on Novorossia. A pitched battle between Ukrainian and DPR/LPR forces would instantly create necessary headlines, provide additional pretexts to condemn Russia and introduce more economic sanctions, and deliver the outcome that no amount of phony poisonings of Navalny could, namely the suspension or even shut-down of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline that has become a thorn in the side of the Anglo-Saxon powers and a matter of national self-assertion for Germany. A major military campaign involving several brigades supported by airpower and the now-operational Bayraktar TB-2 drones in an effort to replicate Azerbaijan’s success against Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh would place Moscow before the unenviable choice of abandoning the Donbass to its fate or committing its regular military forces to battle in Novorossia’s defense.

Whether Ukraine’s political leadership is willing to undertake such a desperate measure, in a country whose president suffers from a 20% approval rating and which has seen extensive recent protests against the increase in utility payment rates, is another question. On the one hand, Ukrainian troop movements on the Donbass have generated considerable attention, and exchanges of fire between Ukrainian and Novorossian forces appear to have continued at an elevated pace in the past several weeks. At the same time, no extraordinary measures such as the recall of reservists or closure of borders in order to prevent military-age males from leaving the country have been observed. While Ukraine’s Rada is considering laws making draft evasion more harshly punishable, these laws will not have an immediate impact, and appear to be a reaction to the failure to build up a professional army of volunteers or even to give the draftees a positive reason to serve. It has even been pointed out that the Ukrainian troop movements have been so ostentatious and lacking in even elementary efforts to preserve concealment and surprise that they represent a “war of nerves”, an exercise in brinksmanship, and possibly an effort to simulate action for the benefit of Washington, rather than genuine preparations for an offensive. A train carrying a reinforced tank company that has been spotted slowly passing three different railroad crossings in eastern Ukraine over the course of several days looks like an operation staged for the benefit of ubiquitous smart phone cameras.

Therefore the likelihood of Ukrainian military opting for a large-scale offensive remains low due to fear of heavy and pointless losses which might cause Ukraine’s military morale to collapse, with unpredictable consequences. Small-scale raids to capture select positions, shelling of Novorossia’s towns and cities, even a staged atrocity, remain more plausible and attractive from the political point of view. Ukraine’s most dangerous military capability is represented by Bayraktar drones, cruise missiles like the Neptun, and short-range ballistic missiles currently in service and being developed, because their use would not entail the danger of major Ukrainian personnel losses. Moreover, Novorossia’s forces would be hard pressed to retaliate against such strikes in kind, Russian efforts to do so would be highly provocative internationally, and moreover carry the risk of causing Ukrainian civilian casualties. Fortunately for Novorossia, the drone park remains fairly small and the drones themselves are vulnerable to Novorossia’s air defenses, while the cruise and ballistic missiles are still years from large-scale operational deployment. The sort of missile bombardment that would represent genuine threat to Novorossia’s unrecognized republics is still years away, if not beyond. By the time they are, Novorossia’s forces will likely have their own means of retaliation in the form of barrage munitions, also referred to as “suicide drones” that could be produced on the spot in Donetsk and Lugansk. However, Ukraine’s current capabilities are sufficient to launch provocations, including through bombardment of civilian targets as was the case in Mariupol in 2014.

The Blackmail Factor?

That Ukraine’s military is unwilling to risk another mis-adventure against Novorossia is evident enough, as is Zelensky’s reticence to go down in history as the president who destroyed Ukraine. These considerations are unlikely to be salient for decisionmakers in Washington who need Ukraine to advance US interests, rather than US to advance Ukraine’s. But the lengths to which Washington is willing to go to pressure Zelensky are still unclear, though the possibility of outright blackmail has raised its head when a prominent Maidan propagandist Dmitry Gordon announced that on March 15, the “Ides of March” immortalized by the assassination of Julius Caesar, would face a trial of historic proportions once a certain bombshell news story were revealed. While March 15 came and went with no bombshells or even duds, Gordon did reveal that the event consisted of a Bellingcat “investigation” into the SBU plot to lure Wagner PMC contractors into Ukraine in order to have them put on trial. The “bombshell” aspect of the Bellingcat effort is that the plot failed because of a highly placed source in Zelensky’s own presidential cabinet who leaked it to Russian intelligence services. Considering Bellingcat’s reputation as a firm which does info-warfare “hits” on designated targets, and Gordon’s hyping of the impact of the film once it becomes public, one has to consider the possibility Bellingcat is part of a campaign to blackmail or even oust Zelensky from office should he fail to satisfy Washington’s demands. According to Gordon, the movie’s release is planned for early April, which presumably gives Zelensky a bit of extra time to deliver the goods.

As noted above, Zelensky has taken a dim view of Washington’s meddling in Ukraine’s affairs, though it remains to be seen whether he is able to stand up to even his own national security officials who ostensibly are subordinate to him but in reality take orders from Washington. Lacking an independent power base that allowed Poroshenko to resist Washington’s initiatives in “reforming” Ukraine’s economy, Zelensky may yet prove the ideal president from Washington’s perspective, if not Ukraine’s.