Can a “schoolyard dispute” warrant federal court intervention? Do first-graders have First Amendment rights? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit just gave a resounding yes to both questions.

The case centers on a first-grader identified in court documents as B.B. After her teacher read a story about Martin Luther King Jr., B.B. drew a picture of her and her multiracial friend group. “Black Lives Mater [sic] any life,” it said. Sweet, right?

Apparently not to the administrators at Viejo Elementary School in California’s Capistrano Unified School District. The school’s principal, Jesus Becerra, spoke with B.B. about her drawing, allegedly telling her that it was inappropriate. According to B.B., she was also barred from recess for two weeks.

B.B.’s mother, Chelsea Boyle, sued, alleging that her daughter’s First Amendment rights had been violated.

A federal district court sided with the school and Becerra, holding that B.B.’s drawing was not protected by the First Amendment. “This schoolyard dispute—like most—does not warrant federal court intervention,” wrote U.S. District Judge David O. Carter in the court’s 2024 opinion.

Now, the 9th Circuit has weighed in and reversed course. “We hold that elementary students’ speech is protected by the First Amendment,” the appeals court ruled, vacating the lower court’s decision and sending the case back for reconsideration.

“Schools may restrict students’ speech only when the restriction is reasonably necessary to protect the safety and well-being of its students,” the 9th Circuit judges wrote.

‘I Do Not Trust the Place Where the “Any Life” Is Coming From’

From the court record, it doesn’t seem like the drawing impacted student safety or well-being at all. It did, however, offend the sensibilities of one student’s mom.

The drawing incident happened in March 2021, when racial justice sentiments and efforts were prominent, as was pushback to them. It’s only in this particular context that any of this makes sense; statements like all lives matter or any life matters are hardly inflammatory on their own. At the time, however, adults sometimes said “all lives matter” as a way to criticize, counter, or diminish the Black Lives Matter movement.

But B.B. was a first-grader. It’s unlikely she had a sophisticated grasp of the particular nuances of these phrases.

“B.B. did not know that ‘Black Lives Matter’ had any particular meaning but included the phrase because it was at the end of the book her teacher read to the class,” states the 9th Circuit decision. “She stated that she included the phrase ‘any life’ in her drawing because ‘all lives matter.'”

B.B.’s drawing looks like four slightly different-colored blobs, but according to what the girl told the court, it was “all her friends holding hands.”

After making the drawing, B.B. gave it to a black classmate, M.C. When M.C.’s mother discovered it, she emailed the school principal.

“While we can appreciate the sentiment of Black Lives Matter, my husband and I do not trust the place where the ‘any life’ is coming from,” the girl’s mom wrote. “We do not want this to become a larger issue. My husband and I will not tolerate any more messages given to our daughter because of her skin color.…As the administrator we trust you know the actions that need to be taken to address this issue.”

Maybe the mom thought “any lives matter” was coming from the teacher or someone other than another first-grader. Or maybe she just really expects 6- and 7-year-olds to grasp complex culture war nuances, who knows? Ultimately, the views or intent of this mother are not important; what matters is how the school handled the case.

Disputed Facts

According to B.B. and her mother, the school principal admonished B.B. for the drawing. They said Becerra told her the drawing was “racist” and “not appropriate,” that she couldn’t give drawings to other students, and that she needed to apologize to M.C. They also say B.B. lost recess privileges for two weeks.

For his part, Becerra denies calling the drawing inappropriate or racist, and denies that B.B. was punished in any way.

Nearly a year after B.B. made the drawing, Boyle learned from another parent about what happened and filed a complaint with the school district. The district found that the “weight of the evidence” did not support the allegation that B.B. “was punished or disciplined” for her artwork.

That’s when Boyle filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. That court ultimately granted Becerra and the school district summary judgment. That means, essentially, that they win with no need for a trial because the court decided there were no factual matters in dispute and the school and Becerra were substantially likely to win if the case did proceed.

So Boyle appealed.

“Part of the frustration of this appeal is that it had to happen in the first place,” the Pacific Legal Foundation’s Caleb Trotter told Courthouse News. “I thought it was obvious that the district court was wrong about young elementary students having rights.”

“If a factfinder later determines that B.B. was not actually punished for her drawing, her First Amendment claim will fail,” the 9th Circuit points out in its ruling. But “B.B. has raised genuine disputes of material fact, and Becerra is not entitled to summary judgment.”

Even Elementary School Students Have Free Speech

In making its decision, the 9th Circuit relies a lot on Tinker v. Des Moines (1969)—a seminal case for student speech rights—in which a school principal threatened students with suspension if they wore black arm bands to school in protest of the Vietnam War.

“As established in Tinker…students do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,'” notes the 9th Circuit. But Tinker also acknowledged that school officials could regulate speech in some circumstances, including when it “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder” or when it invades “the rights of others” and interferes with other students’ safety or well-being.

In B.B.’s case, “there is no suggestion that B.B.’s drawing created a reasonable likelihood of material disruption of classwork or substantial disorder at her school,” notes the 9th Circuit. So the question is whether the school acted to protect the rights of other students.

“Becerra presents some evidence suggesting that the school could reasonably believe the drawing invaded M.C.’s right to ‘be secure and let alone’ at school,” the court points out. “But there is also evidence that M.C. was unaffected by the drawing and thus did not experience the kind of expressive attack on the basis of a core identifying characteristic required for a restriction on speech under Tinker.”

In essence, this is an issue of material fact that could be sorted out at trial.

B.B.’s family and Becerra also “dispute whether B.B. was punished for the drawing” and what Becerra said about it. This is another issue of material fact in dispute.

Not in dispute, according to the court: First-graders have First Amendment rights, and federal court can be the proper venue for protecting them when necessary.

“Although schools have comprehensive authority to ‘prescribe and control conduct’ in schools,” the 9th Circuit concludes, citing Tinker, “when their actions infringe on a student’s First Amendment rights to expression, even for an elementary school student, the school has the burden of showing that its actions were reasonably undertaken to protect the safety and well-being of its students.”

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From Toles v. Toles, decided yesterday by the Washington Court of Appeals (opinion by Judge Leonard Feldman, joined by Judges Linda Coburn and David Mann):

On May 23, 2024, following many months of ongoing conflict and related legal proceedings, Mia, an unemancipated minor child at the time, filed a petition for a DVPO alleging that George had committed various acts that constituted “domestic violence” as defined in RCW 7.105.010(10)(b).

In her petition, Mia claimed George had assaulted her; taken away her cell phone; “attempted to thwart” her academic success by requiring that she unenroll in the Running Start educational program; placed tracking devices on her vehicles; asked one of friends to bring her to an agreed location so George and his wife, Phuong Toles (Mia’s biological mother), could bring her home; “yelled at” {“about how ungrateful I was,” “for forgetting to wash the dishes,” “about my attitude,” and that “I’m to blame for the fact that he does not have a relationship with his sons”} and “berated” her; and filed in court evidence that she had shared intimate photos with a romantic partner. {Although George admittedly failed to file the photos under seal in accordance with GR 15, the trial court immediately rectified this serious oversight.}

George characterizes these behaviors as “helping his wife recover their runaway child from an unlawful, dangerous situation,” while Mia describes them as “an escalation of physical and mental abuse at the hands of her step-father.”

[T]he [trial] court found insufficient evidence that George had assaulted Mia but concluded she had established “stalking-type behavior … and/or harassing-type of behavior” and “coercive control.” It then found, “Mia has met her burden to prove domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence.” The court described the matter as “a very close case” and “not a straightforward resolution.” It nevertheless granted Mia’s petition, entered a two-year DVPO protecting her from George (expiring on September 24, 2026), and entered a related order to surrender and prohibit weapons….

RCW 7.105.010(10)(b) defines “domestic violence” for purposes of a DVPO involving family or household members as

[p]hysical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; nonconsensual sexual conduct or nonconsensual sexual penetration; coercive control; unlawful harassment; or stalking of one family or household member by another family or household member.

… As noted previously, the trial court found insufficient evidence that George had assaulted Mia. Mia has not cross-appealed that finding, so it is a verity on appeal. Nor did the court find “unlawful harassment” or “stalking.” Instead, the court found that Mia had established “stalking-type behavior … and/or harassing-type of behavior.”

These “findings” are wholly inadequate, as the DVPO statute requires “unlawful harassment” or “stalking” and expressly defines the meaning of those terms in RCW 7.105.010(37) and (35), respectively. Here, the most this court can conclude is that the trial court found that George’s actions resembled stalking or harassment but not necessarily either. In so ruling, the trial court failed to make an express finding of “unlawful harassment” or “stalking” as defined by the statute.

While the trial court expressly found “coercive control,” it again failed to correctly apply the controlling statutory provision. The DVPO statute defines “coercive control” as “a pattern of behavior that is used to cause another to suffer physical, emotional, or psychological harm, and in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty.” Also relevant here, the statute provides a non-exclusive list of examples of coercive control that includes (1) “intimidation” by “[d]amaging, destroying … or forcing the other party to relinquish, goods, property, or items of special value,” (2) “[d]epriving the other party of basic necessities,” (3) “monitoring the other party’s movements,” and (4) “[e]ngaging in psychological aggression.”

But the statutory definition also recognizes the salutary interests of parental caregivers such as those at issue here. It does that in two ways.

First, subsection (a) provides that “[i]n determining whether the interference is unreasonable, the court shall consider the context and impact of the pattern of behavior from the perspective of a similarly situated person.” Second, subsection (b) states that coercive control “does not include protective actions taken by a party in good faith for the legitimate and lawful purpose of protecting … children from the risk of harm posed by the other party.” Thus, context matters; while the actions described in subsection (a) may warrant judicial intervention in some circumstances, they may be both appropriate and permissible when their intended purpose and effect is to locate, protect, and retrieve a runaway minor.

Here, the trial court identified only two actions that purportedly constituted “coercive control”: the first was “coordinating with someone Mia thought was her friend to deliver her” to her parents, and the second was an “unreasonable level of monitoring a nearly grown woman,” which the trial court stated “is concerning.” As to both instances, George testified without contradiction that these behaviors were intended to protect and retrieve Mia (who was an unemancipated minor at the time) from what George and his wife believed was a destructive lifestyle that included “running away,” driving cars without insurance, and various other “illegal, high-risk activities.”

Contrary to the plain language of RCW 7.105.010(4)(a) and (b), as discussed above, the trial court failed to sufficiently consider the protective purpose and effect of George’s actions. Nor did it identify any behavior that is not plausibly related to purported protection of an unemancipated minor.

Based on our careful review of the trial court record alongside both parties’ arguments, we conclude the trial court failed to correctly apply the controlling statutory provisions (as detailed above) to the conduct at issue and thereby abused its discretion in entering the DVPO and related order to surrender and prohibit weapons….

The post "Stalking-Type Behavior"/"Coercive Control" of Minor Stepdaughter, or "Salutary" "Parental" Behavior? appeared first on Reason.com.

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From McCaffery v NYU School of Law, decided yesterday by Judge John Murphy (E.D. Pa.):

This is a defamation case. The challenged statements are recent, but they describe an earlier legal proceeding. The story begins in 2007, when Dontia Patterson was arrested and charged with murder in Philadelphia. His first trial, prosecuted by Assistant District Attorney Beth McCaffery, ended in a hung jury. His second jury trial, prosecuted by Assistant District Attorney Richard Sax, resulted in his conviction.

Years later, Mr. Patterson’s convictions and related charges were vacated and he got a new trial. At this point, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office (DAO) assessed whether to try Mr. Patterson a third time and the DAO charged its Conviction Integrity Unit (CIU) with investigating the case.

The DAO determined that Mr. Patterson was probably innocent, so it sought to drop the case against him. As part of these proceedings, Patricia Cummings—then-Chief of the CIU—drafted a motion that alleged prosecutorial misconduct, asserting that the original prosecutors hid exculpatory evidence from the defense. The motion succeeded.

Six years later, New York University and NYU School of Law—where Ms. Cummings was serving as a Research Scholar—published a report focused on prosecutorial misconduct in the Philadelphia DAO. The report included 55 case studies—one of which focused on Mr. Patterson’s case. The report’s case study on Mr. Patterson included specific allegations from the Nol Pros Motion, and it named Ms. McCaffery and Mr. Sax as the prosecutors involved. Ms. McCaffery ardently rejects, as defamatory, the allegations made against her in the Nol Pros Motion and later published in the report, and she seeks relief for defamation and related torts. {Often shortened, as in this opinion, to “nol pros[,]” “[a] nolle prosequi is a voluntary withdrawal by the prosecuting attorney of proceedings on a particular bill or information, which can at any[ ]time be retracted to permit a revival of proceedings on the original bill or information.”} …

The case largely turned on the “fair report” privilege, which protects accurate accounts of government proceedings, including of court filings (whether or not the filings being reported on contain errors). The court noted that the N.Y. and Pennsylvania fair report privileges differ:

New York’s privilege is absolute and applies despite allegations of malice or bad faith by the alleged defamer who publishes the allegedly defamatory statements from the underlying proceeding, whereas Pennsylvania’s privilege is qualified and is waived if the alleged defamer publishes the defamatory material solely for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed (in other words, if she publishes the material in bad faith or with malice). Here, defendants would be shielded by the New York privilege if they published a fair and true report of the Patterson proceeding, with the sole purpose of publishing the material to harm the targets of the reporting (i.e., Ms. McCaffery and Mr. Sax). But under such circumstances, defendants would not be shielded by the Pennsylvania privilege. Indeed, the only situation in which the New York fair report privilege would not apply is if the underlying proceeding was brought maliciously and solely for the purpose of later defaming the plaintiff….

The court concluded that the N.Y. privilege should apply:

Second, compared to Pennsylvania, New York has a more significant relationship to the events and parties involved. The allegedly defamatory statements regarding Ms. McCaffery in the Zimroth Report originated in New York and were made by a New York-based publisher (NYU) and an individual (Ms. Cummings) who was then employed by NYU to assist with the report.

The fair report privilege shares a closer nexus with the speaker that it protects than the allegedly defamed party. And the speakers in this case were in New York when they published the allegedly defamatory statements. Because the privilege protects the speaker, the absolute nature of the New York privilege suggests that New York’s policy interest in broadly protecting the speaker outweighs Pennsylvania’s policy interest in providing more limited, qualified, speaker protections.

Further, the alleged defamation was national in scope, thus decreasing the relevance of the state of the plaintiff’s injury (Pennsylvania) to determining which substantive law to apply. Finally, applying New York’s fair report privilege to alleged defamation from New York publishers promotes certainty, predictability, and uniformity.

And under the New York privilege, the court held, the account was immune from defamation liability:

Based upon our review of these documents, we conclude that the Zimroth Report’s summary of the Patterson proceedings constitutes a “fair and true” report under Section 74. The report very closely summarized the contents of the Nol Pros Motion—in many places, it did so verbatim—and it clearly cites to this motion as a source for the summary. Given the citations and context of the Zimroth Report’s summary of the Patterson case, the ordinary reader must know that this section was reporting on Mr. Patterson’s judicial proceedings.

Additionally, the most damaging allegations against Ms. McCaffery are found in the Nol Pros Motion itself, some of which the Zimroth Report directly quotes: that she, as well as Mr. Sax, committed “egregious … prosecutorial misconduct” by “hiding evidence” and “violating the law” with respect to the government’s Brady obligations in their prosecution of “a man who is probably innocent and whose case is so lacking in integrity.” Such summaries or restatements of the Nol Pros Motion’s allegations against Ms. McCaffery and Mr. Sax “are the type of statements that fall within [S]ection 74’s privilege[.]”

As for the information included in the Zimroth Report’s discussion of the Patterson proceedings that did not facially derive from the Nol Pros Motion—which describes the background of the shooting, the two jury trials, the post-conviction proceedings, and the nol pros proceedings—that information is derived fairly from the sources cited in the report. There really is no white space here: the sources cited by the report say what the report says. And the publication was not required to “report the plaintiff’s side of the controversy” or include specific information from the underlying proceedings so long as the publication was “substantially accurate[.]”

To recapitulate, the information about the Patterson proceedings contained in the Zimroth Report is substantially accurate vis-à-vis the documents it cites as its sources, and that is what matters for purposes of the fair report privilege. That Ms. McCaffery disagrees with, and finds scandalous, the allegations in the Nol Pros Motion, and those reported on in the various media articles, cannot change the result. Her disagreement, even accepted as true, “does not affect whether the statement is a fair and true report of the allegations it paraphrases.”

And the court concluded that the privilege wasn’t defeated by the so-called “Williams exception” in N.Y. law:

Williams concluded that the same person could not “maliciously institute a judicial proceeding alleging false and defamatory charges” and subsequently “circulate a press release or other communication based thereon” yet escape liability under the fair report privilege…. [But] the Williams exception is narrow—and for good reason, given New York’s strong policy interests in promoting expression, which the absolute privilege protects. To invoke this privilege, Ms. McCaffery would have to plausibly allege that the nol pros proceeding regarding Mr. Patterson was “to maliciously institute a judicial proceeding alleging false and defamatory charges” against Ms. McCaffery and then “circulate a press release or other communication based thereon.”

Ms. McCaffery does not make a plausible claim that the nol pros proceeding was brought solely for the purpose of defaming Ms. McCaffery. We need look no further than her amended complaint, which alleges various other purposes for the nol pros proceedings, such that the face of her complaint defeats any allegation that those proceedings had the sole purpose of defaming her. See DI 26 at ¶¶ 52-53, 65, 67, 209 (alleging that the motion presented “a convenient opportunity for a high-profile first exoneration” during “[DA] Krasner’s first term”; a chance to reverse a conviction and publicly disparage Richard Sax, who was DA Krasner’s “longtime nemesis”; an opportunity “to defame and ruin Beth McCaffery and Richard Sax”; and a vehicle for creating “a public record defaming the prosecutors who handled the case.”). According to Ms. McCaffery’s own pleadings, the nol pros proceedings and motion had multiple purposes. It follows that it plausibly could not have the sole purpose of defaming Ms. McCaffery.

Additional considerations undermine any reliance on the Williams exception. For one, the nol pros proceeding was brought by the DAO—not Ms. Cummings, NYU, or NYU Law—distinguishing this case from Williams. And unlike Williams, the allegations suggest no overarching plan to initiate a sham proceeding for the purpose of later defaming the target of that proceeding through publication of the proceeding. The Zimroth Report was published six years after the nol pros proceedings occurred, and at the time of those proceedings, Ms. Cummings was in no way affiliated with NYU or NYU Law.

It would require more than a reasonable inference to understand how proceedings brought six years prior to a university-sponsored report—when that university had no connection to the proceedings at the time they occurred—could be brought solely for the purpose of defaming an individual or individuals involved in those proceedings. No one disputes that NYU and NYU Law had nothing to do with the nol pros proceedings, rendering Williams clearly, and entirely, inapplicable to them—and Ms. McCaffery has provided no persuasive argument to the contrary.

Alexandra Perloff-Giles, Geoffrey S Brounell, Jeremy A. Chase, and Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel (Davis Wright Tremaine LLP) represent the NYU defendants, and Jason A. Levine, John S. Summers, and Nicholas Jordan Bellos (Hangley Aronchick Segal & Pudlin) represent Cummings.

The post No Defamation Liability for NYU Report Summarizing Court Filing Alleging Prosecutorial Misconduct appeared first on Reason.com.

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From today’s opinion in Doe v. Combs, by Second Circuit Judges Michael Park, William Nardini, and Maria Araújo Kahn, the key paragraphs:

“[O]ur review of a district court’s decision to grant or deny an application to litigate under a pseudonym is for abuse of discretion.” Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant (2d Cir. 2008). “A district court abuses its discretion when (1) its decision rests on an error of law … or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or (2) its decision … cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.”

As numerous courts have observed, “concealing the name of a party could deprive a litigant and the court of the chance that a yet unknown witness would, upon learning … about the case, know to step forward with valuable information about the events or the credibility of witnesses.” Doe v. Del Rio (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Public trials come to the attention of key witnesses unknown to the parties.”)). The loss of such witnesses would be particularly prejudicial here given that the incidents complained of allegedly occurred decades ago and would “be difficult to defend even with information about Plaintiff[s’] identit[ies].” The district court thus reasonably concluded that the sixth Sealed Plaintiff factor strongly favored Defendants.

More details:

In these tandem appeals, Plaintiffs-Appellants John Doe, Jane Doe, and John Doe sued Sean Combs and his related business entities … alleg[ing] that Combs sexually assaulted and/or raped them between 1991 and 2007. [One of the three alleges he was 16 when he was sexually assaulted. -EV] On appeal, they challenge the district court’s orders denying their motions to proceed under a pseudonym….

“[O]ur review of a district court’s decision to grant or deny an application to litigate under a pseudonym is for abuse of discretion.” Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant (2d Cir. 2008). “A district court abuses its discretion when (1) its decision rests on an error of law … or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or (2) its decision … cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.”

Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he title of [a] complaint must name all the parties.” “This requirement, though seemingly pedestrian, serves the vital purpose of facilitating public scrutiny of judicial proceedings and therefore cannot be set aside lightly.” A plaintiff seeking to proceed pseudonymously must rebut the presumption of openness and demonstrate that his “need for anonymity” outweighs the “countervailing interests in full disclosure,” including “the public interest in disclosure and any prejudice to the defendant.” In balancing those interests, courts in this Circuit consider the ten non-exhaustive factors set out in Sealed Plaintiff …{: “(1) whether the litigation involves matters that are of a highly sensitive and of a personal nature; (2) whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the party seeking to proceed anonymously or even more critically, to innocent non-parties; (3) whether identification presents other harms and the likely severity of those harms, including whether the injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity; (4) whether the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable to the possible harms of disclosure, particularly in light of his age; (5) whether the suit is challenging the actions of the government or that of private parties; (6) whether the defendant is prejudiced by allowing the plaintiff to press his claims anonymously, whether the nature of that prejudice (if any) differs at any particular stage of the litigation, and whether any prejudice can be mitigated by the district court; (7) whether the plaintiff’s identity has thus far been kept confidential; (8) whether the public’s interest in the litigation is furthered by requiring the plaintiff to disclose his identity; (9) whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigants’ identities; and (10) whether there are any alternative mechanisms for protecting the confidentiality of plaintiff.”}

With respect to Plaintiffs’ interest in anonymity, the district court found that, although Plaintiffs’ claims were of a highly sensitive and personal nature (factor one), each Plaintiff failed convincingly to show a risk of harm from proceeding publicly (factors two and three). First, though Plaintiffs generally alluded to a fear of retaliation from Defendants, they did not allege any individualized facts to support that fear; instead, they pointed to non-specific threats allegedly made to other litigants. {Plaintiff Jane Doe did allege that after Combs assaulted her, he threatened her with violence should she report what happened. But, as the district court noted, that threat was allegedly made more than three decades ago, and Doe did not otherwise identify “any present threat of physical harm.”}

Second, Plaintiffs’ claims that disclosure would cause them mental harm were similarly generic and unsupported by any plaintiff-specific evidence. In fact, the memoranda of law in support of Plaintiffs’ motions contained the exact same paragraph describing the purported risk to their mental health. Finally, the district court found that any risk of harm was further diminished because Plaintiffs were all adults (factor four) and alternative methods, such as a protective order, could shield their confidential information (factor ten).

On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the district court should have treated the first factor “as dispositive or nearly dispositive” because sexual assault cases are the paradigmatic example of “when plaintiffs may desire to proceed anonymously.” But making the first factor dispositive or near-dispositive would create a presumption in favor of anonymity in every sexual assault case, which is contrary to settled law. Cf. U.S. v. Pilcher (2d Cir. 2020) (rejecting the argument that “the default position should be anonymity whenever [a plaintiff] can argue that he has a reasonable fear of harm that would otherwise cause him not to file a petition” because “pseudonyms are the exception and not the rule” and the moving party bears the burden of “rebutting [the] presumption” of disclosure). Plaintiffs’ argument is thus unavailing, and the district court did not err in its assessment of the risk of harm to Plaintiffs. See id. (affirming denial of a motion to proceed under a pseudonym when the moving party’s claims of harm amounted to “unsubstantiated speculation,” even though his suit otherwise involved highly sensitive and personal matters).

The district court also determined that Defendants would be highly prejudiced should Plaintiffs proceed under a pseudonym because of likely asymmetries in fact-gathering (factor six). As numerous courts have observed, “concealing the name of a party could deprive a litigant and the court of the chance that a yet unknown witness would, upon learning … about the case, know to step forward with valuable information about the events or the credibility of witnesses.” Doe v. Del Rio (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Public trials come to the attention of key witnesses unknown to the parties.”)). The loss of such witnesses would be particularly prejudicial here given that the incidents complained of allegedly occurred decades ago and would “be difficult to defend even with information about Plaintiff[s’] identit[ies].” The district court thus reasonably concluded that the sixth Sealed Plaintiff factor strongly favored Defendants.

In sum, across all three cases on appeal, the district court considered the Sealed Plaintiff factors, balanced the competing interests, and concluded that, in light of Plaintiffs’ weak showing of harm and the significant risk of prejudice to Defendants, anonymity was not warranted. We discern no abuse of discretion in any of the district court’s orders, so we affirm….

I think this is the correct result, for reasons given in my One-Sided Pseudonymity article and in this amicus brief (thanks to Stanford law student Mary Rose Fetter for her work on the brief); here’s the Introduction:

“[P]seudonymity generally, and one-sided pseudonymity particularly, is not without its risks.” Doe v. Sidar (4th Cir. 2024) (Wilkinson, J., concurring). Permitting a plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously while naming an accused defendant is generally unfair to the defendant:

Allowing one party to proceed anonymously increases the potential for abusive suits that use the threat of reputational damage to exact revenge or to extract settlements from innocent parties. Having one party incognito but not the other can tilt the scales of justice in the direction of guilt by anonymous accusation, a prospect which would be just as abhorrent to civil litigation as it is to our criminal justice system…. Pseudonymity may enhance the incentives for well-founded complaints to be filed, but it may also serve as a cover for actions that tarnish the innocent.

This brief elaborates on Judge Wilkinson’s reasoning to explain why there should be an especially strong presumption against one-sided pseudonymity in cases (such as cases alleging sexual assault, fraud, and the like) where an accusation can by itself cause severe reputational harm.

First, being identified as a litigant can seriously harm a defendant even if a court eventually finds that the accusations were unfounded. This harm can be as great as the harm that a plaintiff seeks to avoid by suing pseudonymously.

Second, and extending beyond sexual assault and other highly stigmatizing claims, allowing a plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously increases the potential for unfounded or overstated suits. Pseudonymity may reduce the plaintiff’s sense of accountability, making it easier to pursue speculative or exaggerated allegations without reputational cost.

Third, one-sided pseudonymity can be unfair to the named party during the litigation process; as courts have recognized, one-sided pseudonymity can

• make it less likely that witnesses will come forward with information about the plaintiff or about the incident over which the plaintiff is suing;
• make it harder for publicly accused individuals to publicly defend themselves against public allegations, for example by challenging the plaintiff’s credibility;
• skew settlement dynamics, asymmetrically pressuring defendants into settling early or allowing the pseudonymous party to hold out for a larger settlement while facing fewer costs; and
• potentially cause jury prejudice, subtly framing one party as endangered and thus deserving of protection.

In each respect, the imbalance created by one-sided pseudonymity tends to undermine the fairness of judicial proceedings.

To be sure, one possible solution to the problem—mutual pseudonymity—interferes with the public’s right of access to court proceedings even more than one-sided pseudonymity does. Courts might therefore conclude that the better solution is no pseudonymity in such cases, or perhaps they might conclude that the better solution is two-sided pseudonymity. But on balance, they should generally not allow one-sided pseudonymity.

Finally, though there may be situations where one-sided pseudonymity is justified, such as those involving institutional defendants like large corporations or governments or individual defendants who had already been found guilty, this case does not present such an exception.

The post No Pseudonymity for Plaintiffs Alleging Sean Combs (P. Diddy) Sexually Assaulted Them appeared first on Reason.com.

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Hello and welcome to another edition of Free Agent! Happy St. Patrick’s Day, have a Guinness or two (or 10).

Before we start, I want to make sure you know about our March Madness bracket groups. Click here for the men’s bracket group, and click here for the women’s one. Alas, there’s no monetary prize for winning this year, but it’ll be fun to see how your bracket compares to Reason staffers (several colleagues who don’t like sports usually join in) and fellow subscribers.

This edition also marks Free Agent‘s first anniversary. No gifts necessary, you can just forward this newsletter to a friend who might enjoy it, or send them straight to our subscription page. It’s been a really fun year—many thanks to all of you for reading and subscribing!

With that, let’s get into the World Baseball Classic, sports betting, legendary sports moments, and, unfortunately, a debate about sexy sports.

Locker Room Links

• Days before March Madness, Alabama’s Aden Holloway is suspended indefinitely after getting arrested for allegedly dealing marijuana.
• After Venezuela reached the World Baseball Classic final, President Donald Trump posted on social media, “STATEHOOD, #51, ANYONE?“
• Washington state is implementing an income tax on millionaires. “It’s gonna sting” in free agency, the Seahawks general manager said. Maybe a flat tax is the way to go?
• Next week NBA owners will vote on exploring expansion—but only in Las Vegas and Seattle.
• How lobbyists for the Portland Trail Blazers pressured politicians into spending $400 million on the team’s city-owned arena.
• Formula 1 canceled two races because of the Middle East war—the races had been planned for Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.
• The White House is posting more bombing videos from the war, now interspersed with footage from Wii Sports.
• J.C. Tretter resigned from the NFL Players Association in shame back in July—now he might get the union’s top job anyway.
• The Reason team was shocked and saddened last week by the death of our longtime colleague Brian Doherty. Brian’s work with Reason spanned four decades, a long and unmatched journalism career: from interviewing Milton Friedman in the ’90s, to chronicling the rise of libertarian Rep. Ron Paul in the 2000s, to countering antigun misinformation in the 2010s, to profiling Elon Musk’s MAGA turn in the 2020s, and many more timeless pieces I don’t have room to list. It’s a terrible loss for Reason, and for everyone who believes in freedom for all.
  

  A farewell to our colleague Brian Doherty, dead at 57 https://t.co/vNY3iVvTqf

  — reason (@reason) March 14, 2026

For Every Sport, a World Cup?

If there’s one thing most people seem to feel strongly about, it’s geography. The place they’re from? It’s better than the place you’re from. That goes whether it’s players from who-knows-where playing on their local professional sports team, or their fellow citizens playing on a team representing their country, or whatever kind of pizza their city is famous for.

Those strong feelings are why every sport would be wise to have a World Cup of some kind.

We’re seeing it now with the World Baseball Classic. The Marlins can’t give enough tickets away to fill their ballpark, but if you just pit the Dominican Republic against Venezuela there with some stakes on the line, you’ll see a $300 get-in price. At some point, MLB started to realize it had a potential hit on its hands—games went from being hidden on MLB Network to shown on FOX, they added more teams and more games, and higher-quality players started opting in, too.

The NHL is ramping up its international involvement, too, with pros finally back in the Olympics and the NHL bringing back the World Cup of Hockey and taking it more seriously. Flag football at the 2028 Olympics has the NFL’s blessing. (The NBA seems to be missing the boat—perhaps because the Basketball World Cup is organized by FIBA and not the league itself, so there’s not much of a direct financial benefit.)

It’s a great way to grow sports internationally. What’s better? Staging a game abroad between two teams that foreigners have little attachment to, or staging a competitive game with a team of players from their country? Foreigners are obviously going to be more interested in following the latter long-term.

Even though these are competitions with a winner and many losers, they generally don’t sow actual hatred between different countries. Maybe you skipped the Canadian maple syrup during the Olympics, but now you wouldn’t think twice about it.

International competition gets players and fans excited—they care about the stakes, unlike in most All-Star Games. They give people something new to watch and care about, and are clearly a great avenue to deepen fandoms. Whatever sport it might be, leaders would be wise to figure out a way to get more of a focus on international team competitions.

Betting With Company Dollars

Lots of talk online last week about The Atlantic‘s new cover story, in which the magazine gave staff writer McKay Coppins $10,000 to gamble on sports during the most recent NFL season. The headline on the cover is “My Year as a Degenerate Gambler,” in case you had any hopes of it being a fair and balanced piece (also, fact check: the NFL season was less than six months long, not a “year”).

Coppins is a strong writer, and I can see why readers were drawn to his personal experience. He starts as a reluctant Mormon, begrudgingly participating in gambling for the sake of good journalism, before the betting devolves into an obsession that’s a strain on his family life.

But as someone who’s read every scolding “here’s how this person ruined their life through sports betting” article out there, I was disappointed. Thirteen thousand words and I didn’t see any new arguments I hadn’t heard before, or learned anything new other than “Don’t ask McKay Coppins for betting advice.” (I learned much more from a better and shorter Atlantic piece published over the weekend, “The Cure for Snoring“).

Coppins finishes the season having lost $9,891 of The Atlantic‘s money. While tempted to keep betting, he decides to fill out a self-exclusion form that bans himself from it instead. The takeaway for most readers, it seems, is that the pull of sports betting is too strong for mere mortals to deal with and must be stopped.

My takeaway is different. People should bet for fun. If they’re not having fun, they’re probably trying too hard to get rich quick (or make up for financial losses), which will probably make them poor and unhappy. The law should treat adults as capable of making choices that are best for them, even though a small fraction of the population will cause problems for themselves while everyone else is having fun. While the public narrative seems to think more and more people are getting consumed by sports betting’s temptations, there’s ample evidence that the number of people betting has plateaued.

Thankfully, defenders of betting got good news this week when a new poll found legalized sports betting has more supporters than opponents.

The best rebuttal to the piece, though, is all around you this week: tens of millions of people casually betting with their friends in March Madness bracket pools.

Legends Never Die

Is anything in sports truly legendary anymore?

There’s an interesting case study to be had about nothing in sports feeling legendary anymore. I don’t think it’s a nostalgia thing at all, I think it’s the rise of social media and accessibility so we move on from everything immediately.

— ⁸???????????????????? (@33643pts) March 11, 2026

It’s a sentiment that I sympathize with at times, but I think is totally wrong. When you grow up hearing about legends of the distant past like Babe Ruth and Gordie Howe, it’s easy to miss the fact that you’ve seen the legends of today’s era like LeBron James and Tom Brady. It’s also a weird sentiment to share after the whole country just celebrated a legendary moment thanks to the U.S. men’s hockey team (it was no Miracle on Ice, sure, but it captured the country’s attention for a week).

To be fair, some of this feeling is because of how quickly the news cycle moves. Before the last piece of confetti has been cleaned up, The Athletic and ESPN have “Way-Too-Early” power rankings ready for next season, and a free agency preview to keep your mind thinking forward instead of reveling in the champion’s glory. Yet I’m more likely to click on those early rankings to see how my team stacks up for next year rather than read about the in-depth profile of how some team I don’t care for finally won their title (or worse, did it again).

It’s fine to feel nostalgic about sports (unless you’re a politician thinking about subsidizing a stadium), but don’t let nostalgia cloud your appreciation for the amazing sports moments surrounding you. It’s easier than ever to enjoy all kinds of sports, and sports fans should be incredibly thankful for that.

Sports, Sexy? (Sorry.)

I regret to inform you that this post inspired a vigorous conversation at Reason on which sports are and aren’t sexy, and that I’ve been told this list would make good content.

Skiing is sexy and bowling isn't https://t.co/lCwJcP42kc

— Josh Barro (@jbarro) March 11, 2026

Sexy sports: Skiing, swimming, billiards, tennis, basketball, soccer, curling(?), gymnastics, biathlon (“The guns make it sexy”), field hockey, speed skating, luge (“uncomfortably sexy”)

Not sexy sports: Bowling, hiking, cross country, golf, football, table tennis, wrestling, cricket, competitive weightlifting, chess (unless it’s chess boxing), squash, pickleball (“too many olds”), quidditch (“unsexy to consider it a sport”).

In between: baseball (“only if you’re into dadbods“), equestrian sports (“I don’t want to call a sport with a horse sexy” vs. the outfits), ice hockey (“if you like no teeth“), rugby (“incredible thighs” vs. bleeding ears), water polo, fencing (“inherently sexy, but unsexy uniforms”).

(Sports are not ranked by sexiness, just listed in the same order they came up in our bonkers conversation.)

If you have thoughts on which sports are sexy and which aren’t, I beg you to email me about anything else at freeagent@reason.com.

In all seriousness, to answer the original question of why skiing gets more media coverage than bowling, I suspect it’s because skiing happens in ski-specific resort towns and other centralized areas that have newsworthy stories connected to economics, politics, environmentalism, and travel. Bowling just happens down the street from everybody.

Replay of the Week

You’re going to want to see this one from multiple angles.

WHAT DID WE JUST WITNESS? pic.twitter.com/EKguhwjeFA

— Sportsnet (@Sportsnet) March 13, 2026

That’s all for this week. Don’t forget to join the bracket groups! Click here for the men’s bracket group, and click here for the women’s one. Enjoy watching the real game of the week in an even older bracket competition, Detroit City F.C. against the Michigan Rangers on Tuesday night in soccer’s U.S. Open Cup.

The post Should Every Sport Have Some Kind of World Cup? appeared first on Reason.com.

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