It was early in the morning on August 25, 2000. As Devin Bennett tells it, he put his 10-week-old son Brandon in a car seat and put the car seat on his bed—and then, as the father dozed in and out of sleep, Brandon fell.

The baby didn’t appear to be hurt in the immediate aftermath of the fall, Bennett says, but hours later he noticed the boy was having trouble breathing. He rushed him to a hospital in Rankin County, Mississippi, where Brandon’s heart stopped beating and he stopped breathing. After being transferred to another hospital, Brandon died.

Two and a half years later, a jury found Bennett guilty of capital murder and felonious child abuse and sentenced him to death. The medical examiners responsible for Brandon’s autopsy—doctors Steven Hayne and Michael West, a pathologist and an odontologist who often worked together—presented evidence that the fatal injuries resulted from a kind of nonaccidental trauma that, at the time, was considered a sound medical diagnosis.

Their autopsy report, written by Hayne, cited “changes consistent with concurrent shaken baby syndrome.”

Hayne and West reached this conclusion because the classic “shaken baby syndrome triad”—bleeding around the brain, bleeding behind the eyes, and brain swelling—were evident in Brandon. At the time, the triad was considered solid evidence of shaken baby syndrome. 

Bennett has been fighting to prove his innocence since 2002. He and I speak frequently and frankly about his case, noting how it hinges on a flawed autopsy and the changing science around shaken baby syndrome. Fighting the state of Mississippi for decades to get an evidentiary hearing has generally left Bennett exhausted and frustrated.

But on June 30, he felt some hope.

The Case of Jimmie Duncan

On June 29, the Louisiana Supreme Court declared an inmate named Jimmie Duncan to be “factually innocent” after he spent 27 years on death row.

Duncan was convicted in 1998 of first-degree capital murder for sexually assaulting and drowning his girlfriend’s 23-month-old toddler, Haley Oliveaux. Today he is free on bail—in part because, according to the Louisiana Supreme Court, “Duncan’s conviction turned substantially on forensic evidence offered by experts whose reliability ‘appears questionable at best.'”

When he read this decision, Devin Bennett took note. Those questionable experts were the same pathologist and odontologist who performed his son’s autopsy: Hayne and West.

In the Duncan decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court cited “serious problems” with Haley’s autopsy. Central to its concern was West’s handling of alleged bite mark evidence on her body.

According to trial documents, West took a dental mold from Duncan and applied it to Haley’s flesh—specifically over areas that he thought might have been bite marks—as part of his standard “comparative technique.” A forensic expert later surmised that the bites West identified were not bites, but maybe bruises. The bite marks that West imprinted on Haley’s body not only destroyed potential DNA evidence but were then identified by prosecutors as Duncan’s actual bite marks.

The Louisiana court wrote that West’s “‘direct comparison technique’ has been seriously questioned,’ and that the [autopsy] video showed him ‘forcibly thrusting’ Duncan’s dental molds into areas of Haley’s face and body ‘in a rather disturbing manner and to a rather disturbing degree.'”

A former head of the American Board of Forensic Odontology, Lowell Levine, testified that what West did was “a fraud, simply put.” Even West himself later said of his own bite mark analysis in another case, “if I was asked to testify in this case again, I would say I don’t believe it’s a system that’s reliable enough to be used in court.”

The takeaway: Whatever passed for acceptable forensic science when Duncan was convicted in 1998 has since been “seriously undermined” by “new, reliable, and noncumulative evidence” that, had it been presented during the original trial, could have resulted in Duncan being found not guilty. Duncan is now out of prison.

As for Haley Oliveaux? Duncan’s attorneys, relying on testimony from Haley’s doctor, now suspect she drowned in a bathtub after suffering a seizure.

The Case of Hayne and West

Hayne and West didn’t just reach questionable conclusions through questionable practices. There was also the matter of their basic competence.

Catherine Legge is a journalist who has researched Hayne and West for years for a documentary on Jimmie Duncan. Hayne and West, she says, worked within a context that “unfortunately allowed them to be shitty at their job.”

Hayne (now dead) and West (retired) used dubious forensic practices in a legal system that permitted and maybe even encouraged it. Their autopsies—as documented in The Cadaver King and the Country Dentist, a 2018 book by Tucker Carrington and former Reason writer Radley Balko—raised suspicions among their peers that they were working in collusion with state prosecutors.

“Hayne and West were seen as tools for giving District Attorneys what they wanted,” says Legge.

In its Duncan decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court wrote that Hayne and West’s forensic work was “below the acceptable standard of care,” “untruthful,” “unreliable,” “sloppy,” and poorly documented. Forensic evidence they have produced in other cases has contributed to 9 convictions (8 in Mississippi) that were later overturned.

The sheer volume of their work encouraged sloppiness. Hayne worked on contract doing 8–9 autopsies a day, and anywhere from 1,000–1,600 a year. Medical forensic accreditation boards recommend a yearly total of around 250. 

Under Hayne’s contract, counties paid him by the body. Adding up the payments comes to a career total of around $10 million. At its height, his practice was doing 80 percent of Mississippi’s autopsies. His practice was a factory.

Gradually—too slowly—the system took note of his sloppy work. In 2008, Mississippi prevented Hayne from doing autopsies. West was forced to leave the Board of Forensic Odontology in 2006. He often misidentified bite marks and, in one instance, claimed to have linked a suspect’s teeth to a half-eaten sandwich. In another, he mistook crawfish bites on a body as human. 

In The Cadaver King and the Country Dentist, Balko and Carrington write that Hayne and West “dominated the Mississippi death investigation system for twenty years. West testified in dozens of cases, Hayne in thousands.” 

They also quote a former police chief in Mississippi: “There’s no question in my mind that there are innocent people doing time at Parchman Penitentiary due to the testimony of Dr. Hayne. There may even be some on death row.”  

The Case of Devin Bennett

Devin Bennett is on death row at Parchman penitentiary primarily because of Hayne’s testimony. He wants a jury to reconsider Brandon’s autopsy in light of the fuller story we now have on Hayne and West.

In Bennett’s case, several forensic experts have concluded that Hayne and West made critical interpretive errors in Brandon’s autopsy. Most notably, they attributed over a dozen abrasions on Brandon’s body to Devin’s alleged abuse. Yet when Brandon arrived at the first hospital, a nurse found no unusual marks on Brandon’s body and noticed no abnormalities on the head or rest of the body.

Had anyone explored Brandon’s previous medical records (which were at the hospital) or checked with child protective services, they would have learned that Brandon never showed medical evidence of bruising. Bennett and his girlfriend never missed a pediatrician appointment. According to Bennett, the only potentially negative thing they had ever been accused of doing to Brandon was overfeeding him.

Between the initial emergency room visit and Brandon’s transfer to another hospital, Brandon underwent more than one unsuccessful intubation, several resuscitation efforts, and organ harvesting. All cause bruising and abrasions.

Bennett’s attorneys argue that what Hayne presented as evidence of shaken baby syndrome could have been bruising caused by medical professionals trying to save Brandon from the effects of a fall.

At one point at Bennett’s trial, Hayne told the jury that Brandon had “two skull fractures,” one on each side of his skull. The implication was that Bennett had inflicted them. But these fractures are nowhere to be found in Hayne’s autopsy report. The only reference in that report to evidence of a fracture—”bilateral focal fractures”—were later determined by expert medical examiners to be “wormian bones,” which are natural bone chips located in the sutures of the skull.

Hayne “just made shit up,” one of Bennett’s attorneys complained.

The Case of Robert Roberson

What Bennett needs for a new hearing is post-conviction scientific evidence so convincing that it would reasonably lead a jury to this different outcome. On this front, there is good news for Bennett.

In October 2025, the conservative Texas Court of Appeals halted the execution of Robert Roberson. They did so in part on the grounds that the scientific status of “shaken baby syndrome” has changed enough to stay his execution under Texas’ “junk science law.” 

Roberson, who is autistic, was sentenced to death in 2003 for killing his 2-year-old daughter, Nikki Curtis, by shaken baby syndrome. But in the face of weakening evidence of shaken baby syndrome as a valid medical diagnosis, Texas not only halted Roberson’s execution but is moving to provide him an evidentiary hearing.

New research reveals that the so-called triad of shaken baby symptoms—brain bleeding, bleeding behind the eyes, brain swelling—could have resulted from accidents, including birth-related subdural bleeds, adverse reactions to medications, medical preconditions, and, yes, a short fall from a bed.

Reflecting this shift, the American Academy of Pediatrics now officially recommends the term “abusive head trauma” over “shaken baby syndrome.”

If Bennett’s case was heard today, the most convincing explanation for Brandon’s death might be a preexisting condition (a head injury from forceps at birth) combined with a short fall. (For Roberson’s daughter, newer evidence suggests that Nikki died from a combination of pneumonia and a chronic precondition.)

In the wake of the Roberson and Duncan decisions, Bennett is seeking a new hearing for his case. It remains to be seen if Mississippi will give him that chance.

The post Will This Mississippi Man on Death Row Get a Chance To Prove His Innocence? appeared first on Reason.com.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/Fn08EI9
via IFTTT

Call of duties. After most of President Donald Trump’s unilateral tariffs were struck down by the Supreme Court earlier this year, the president reinstated a sweeping global 10 percent tariff under a different—and also questionable—legal authority. But the new legal authority comes with a 150-day clock, meaning the reinstated tariffs would eventually expire. 

Today, the 150 days are up. And as of yesterday afternoon at 4 p.m. in Washington, D.C., no one knew precisely what the next tariff regime would look like. 

Well, the new tariff regime has finally been announced, and it looks a lot like the old one. Most of America’s significant trading partners—some 60 economies—will now face a 10 percent tariff. Those without laws intended to prevent forced labor will be hit with a 12.5 percent tariff. 

Ostensibly, according to the administration, the move “encourages stronger labor rights enforcement abroad.” The White House called the new tariffs “the most sweeping international labor rights action the United States has ever taken.” 

But there’s some reason to be skeptical of the stated motivation, given that Trump has long pushed for widespread tariffs under a variety of justifications, not all of which are internally coherent. As visiting Georgetown Law scholar Peter Harrell told The New York Times, Trump’s trading officials are “using this forced labor investigation as a pretext to impose tariffs that Trump wants to impose for his own economic theories and preferences.”

Trump is just doing what he wants to do, and what he wants to do, now and always, is impose tariffs. 

Congress, the opposite of progress. In theory, under the Constitution, only Congress has the power to declare war. In practice, under America’s actual government, that has not always been the case. 

At the beginning of May, Trump notified Congress that the war he’d started with Iran was officially terminated. There was a ceasefire deal in place, with a few formalities left to be worked out. That ceasefire, however, didn’t last. And earlier this month, Trump notified Congress that the United States was once again at war with Iran. Officially speaking, it was a new war, giving the White House another 60 days to act without congressional go-ahead. As Politico reported at the time, the Trump administration framed the supposedly new war as a defensive measure, saying that the president was taking “military action consistent with my responsibility to protect Americans and United States’ interests both at home and abroad.” Meet the new war, same as the old war. 

Congress, of course, could always weigh in and exercise some of its constitutional prerogatives over the executive branch. And yesterday, finally, one chamber did, sort of—in a way that was guaranteed from the start to be meaningless. 

On Thursday, the U.S. House voted in favor of a resolution to stop the war. Four Republicans—Reps. Thomas Massie (R–Ky.), Brian Fitzpatrick (R–Pa.), Tom Barrett (R–Mich.), and Warren Davidson (R–Ohio)—voted with Democrats to put an end to Trump’s unilateral war in the Middle East. But the resolution was a nothingburger from inception. As CNN notes, “even if it passed the Senate, it would not compel the administration to end the war. Concurrent resolutions, which are not presented to the president for signature or veto, lack the force of law.” 

The House was finally taking action—bold, meaningless action. 

Meanwhile, a Senate effort to block the effort failed shortly after yesterday’s House vote. The congressional position on the war amounts to a shruggie emoticon. 

It’s a fitting tribute to the current weakened state of Congress that even when it takes the time to exercise its constitutional prerogatives, it does so in a way that is intentionally guaranteed, from the outset, to be pointless and futile. 

Substandard subpoenas. Speaking of the Constitution, remember the First Amendment? It has a number of elements, including freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and freedom of association. There’s a lot going on. But one of the main things it does is protect the ability to say things, even potentially critical things, about the government, without fear of legal reprisal. This applies to Americans of all sorts, even journalists. One might assume that lawyers for the Justice Department know how these things work. 

So it raised a few eyebrows when the Trump administration subpoenaed New York Times reporters following the publication of articles about Trump’s glitzy new gift airplane from Qatar. The Times reporting suggested that the plane might lack some defense capabilities, like missile defense. Eventually, the White House announced the plane would be pulled from service so it could be “maxxed out.” Meanwhile, the government subpoenaed the Times reporters, attempting to force them to testify in front of a grand jury. 

The Times pushed back in court, and yesterday, after some stern words from a federal judge, Trump’s Justice Department withdrew the subpoenas. 

---

Scenes from Massachusetts: Despite declines in reading, bookstores are making a comeback, including in Boston. 

---

QUICK HITS

• Trump is reportedly “losing patience” with the war in Iran. “A senior administration official said Trump believes that the only thing Iran understands is military force, adding that he was in ‘revenge mode’ against Tehran,” reports The Wall Street Journal. This means that the amped up strikes will most likely continue, even though Trump seems to want out of the war. One way to avoid this sort of conundrum is to just…not start a war in the first place. 
• Sen. Ted Cruz (R–Texas) is reportedly looking at a bill intended to take up catastrophic AI risk. Meanwhile, Anthropic’s chief economist discusses why AI has yet to increase unemployment. 
• Congress is working on another spending bill. It’s already passed the House, which is now pushing the Senate to move quickly on their end. The budget bill would allow an additional $95 billion to be added to the federal budget deficit, and with interest, the figure is more than $100 billion. 

• this interview is the skeleton key to his genius, i think, bc nolan’s work is kind of like, what if a filmmaker had just two north stars: jorges luis borges short stories and fast and the furious films https://t.co/iaN02lFcJG

  — Derek Thompson (@DKThomp) July 23, 2026

• Congrats, Xbox owners: There’s a new Halo game, but it’s just the old Halo game, remade. 
• The Marvel Cinematic Universe (MCU) has struggled at the box office recently, and I have a feeling that this year’s big comic book event movie, Avengers: Doomsday, will underperform when it hits theaters in December. But MCU chief Kevin Feige says the studio has movies planned all the way through 2042.  

The post Tariff Man appeared first on Reason.com.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/ZFkatcd
via IFTTT

From Gouldy v. Chiasson, decided Wednesday by the Florida Court of Appeal (Judge Robert Gross, joined by Judges Melanie May and Spencer Levine):

This appeal arises from a frivolous underlying lawsuit Gouldy brought against Chiasson, an attorney, in connection with Chiasson’s actions in representing appellees Amanda Munyan and Michael Peak in a related probate matter involving Gouldy.

We affirm the appeal in all respects and issue a separate order to show cause as to why Gouldy should not be barred from further pro se filings in this court. Gouldy’s excessively long pro se brief contains frivolous arguments, misrepresentations of the record, a phantom case, and fake quotes from actual cases….

This case demonstrates a growing problem in Florida’s appellate courts. The recent change in jurisdiction has given intermediate appellate courts jurisdiction to hear appeals from county court cases. The result has been that the amount of pro se appeals has significantly increased. Initially, the appellate courts were able to expeditiously handle the county court appeals.

Recently, however, it appears that many pro se litigants, in both county and circuit courts, are using artificial intelligence platforms to generate appellate briefs and motions. While the prose in these filings is generally readable, many AI-generated submissions contain phantom authority, misstatements of the record, and fabricated quotations.

Pro se litigants are not governed by the ethical rules with which licensed attorneys must comply. Because a principled appellate court must examine the issues raised by the parties, digging into AI-generated filings consumes valuable time that could be better spent on other cases.

We have observed: “The submission of fictitious or fabricated case law—whether the product of carelessness, misunderstanding, or reliance on generative artificial-intelligence tools—is sanctionable.”

Gouldy’s arguments in this appeal are either unpreserved, inadequately briefed, or wholly meritless. She raised fifteen issues, some with sub-issues.

To the extent any of her issues may contain a shred of arguable merit (e.g., the unpreserved apportionment argument), they are swamped by the sea of frivolous arguments that dominate her initial brief. Her initial brief cites a nonexistent case, misrepresents the record, fabricates multiple quotations from actual legal decisions, and otherwise relies upon cases that do not support the propositions for which they are cited. Gouldy has previously been warned twice against frivolous filings.

In addition to affirming this appeal in its entirety, by a separate order we are issuing an order to show cause as to why Gouldy should not be barred from further pro se filings in this court. See Friend v. Serpa (Fla. App. 2025) (explaining that this court has the authority to sanction a litigant for reliance on “phantom authority” in a brief); Clerk of Ct. & Comptroller for 13th Jud. Cir., Hillsborough Cnty. v. Rangel (Fla. App. 2025) (concluding that sanctions were appropriate where a brief included “multiple misstatements and misquotes” of case law). A brief that blatantly and repeatedly includes fabricated quotations from Florida case law meets the standard of a frivolous or bad faith filing, which authorizes sanctions under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(a).

The post Court Considering Whether Litigant Should Be Barred from Further Self-Represented Filings, Because of Fabricated Citations appeared first on Reason.com.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/bFVM8P5
via IFTTT

From Davis v. Surefire Hospitality Group, LP, decided Wednesday by Judge Marilyn Horan (W.D. Pa.):

Plaintiff has identified herself as Kimberly Davis in all filings in this case, while Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s legal name is Matthew Grinage. As such, Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a). Defendant provides documentation, including her application for employment with Defendant’s restaurant, where she used her legal name, Matthew Grinage. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff has not yet completed a formal legal name change process.

In her brief, Plaintiff argues generic allegations that the use of her legal name causes her “distress, mental anguish, and harm.” Plaintiff argues that, if she does not use her chosen name, she will suffer serious and lasting effects to her mental health.

Rule 10 states that the “title of the complaint must name all parties.” The core intent of Rule 10(a) is to assure public access, transparency, and accountability in judicial proceedings. Following historical practices of publicness, proper access to litigants’ names is important. Rule 10, along with Rule 17, reinforces that court proceedings must remain open and accessible to the public, demands clarity in how parties are identified and ensures the public record accurately reflects the identity of who is before the court and why.

In “exceptional cases,” courts have previously allowed the use of a pseudonym…. [But] the Court finds that Plaintiff has not satisfied the requisite factors to proceed by pseudonym, including use of her chosen, rather than her legal, name, in this case. Disclosure of Plaintiff’s legal name would not cause extraordinary harm or reveal her transgender status in a way that creates genuine danger, because, as demonstrated by Defendant’s brief, Plaintiff has regularly used her legal name, including in her job application for employment with the Defendants.

Courts have consistently grounded pseudonym analysis in fears of severe harm. Plaintiff has not pointed to any specific instance within her community, workplace, or the public where use of her legal name has exposed her to danger, harassment, or violence.

The distress, associated with use of a legal name that differs from one’s chosen name, is more properly characterized as embarrassment or discomfort, which the Third Circuit has found to be insufficient to meet the standard. Without particularized allegations, Plaintiff’s request reflects a personal preference, rather than a reasonable fear or severe harm….

[A]s shown by the Defense exhibits, Plaintiff’s legal name has been publicly used many times. Because Plaintiff’s identity has not been confidential in the past, there is no basis to permit her use of her chosen name in the present filings….

While the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s preference to use her chosen name rather than her legal name, such preference does not supersede the interest of the public in knowing the true identity of litigants in cases such as this…. [And] the Plaintiff’s identity, background, and specific circumstances are central to the claims at issue. The public’s interest in knowing the identity of who is making claims is not diminished simply because Plaintiff prefers to use a different name….

Plaintiff’s legal name remains “Matthew Grinage”. It has not been legally changed to “Kimberly Davis.” Pennsylvania law provides a statutory mechanism to obtain a legal name change. Had Plaintiff accessed the appropriate and available legal process to obtain a legal name change, she would be entitled to use that legal name in these proceedings. Such a change, effectuated through court filings and official publications, provides public notice of the legal change of name. However, having not done so, Plaintiff must proceed under her legal name of Matthew Grinage….

Emily E. Mahler and Jennifer Lynn Deflitch (Margolis Edelstein) represent defendant.

The post "Plaintiff Argues That, If She Does Not Use Her Chosen Name, She Will Suffer Serious and Lasting Effects to Her Mental Health" appeared first on Reason.com.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/7DvaMNs
via IFTTT

From yesterday’s Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge Jeff Armistead in Doe v. Portland Ass’n of Teachers, Doe’s allegations:

Doe was born in Israel and takes his Jewish religious faith and ethnic heritage seriously. For Doe, the State of Israel is essential and integral to his devout religious faith. Although Doe immigrated to the United States, he maintains close ties to Israel and his family there. In the 2023-24 school year, Doe worked for PPS [Portland Public Schools] as a high school math teacher.

When he started working for PPS, he chose not to become a dues-paying member of PAT [Portland Association of Teachers], exercising his First Amendment right not to support union political speech and public sector collective bargaining. Nevertheless, because Doe is a PPS teacher, PAT is his exclusive representative by way of Oregon’s Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA) and the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) PAT has with PPS….

Curricula. Doe alleges that PAT collaborates with Oregon Educators for Palestine (OEP) in its publications, including by co-publishing a guide called “Teach Palestine!” The guide references resources for teaching about Palestine, “encourages teachers to use their classroom to teach anti-Isreal views[,] and includes detailed curricula recommendations for pre-K through high school.” Among the recommended resources in the “Teach Palestine!” guide is “Teaching While Muslim,” which includes the statement “75 years ago, a lot of decision makers around the world decided to take away Palestinian land to make a country called Israel. Israel would be a country where rules were mostly fair for Jewish people with White skin” and encouragement to make signs that include the slogan “Free Palestine.”

The “Teach Palestine!” resource guide also includes “Let’s Go to Palestine.” That lesson—directed at elementary school—includes the statement “Palestine is currently under a brutal occupation by Israel. We pray for a truly free Palestine so that the Palestinians can prosper and we can all visit freely.” Also recommended in the guide is “Handala’s Return,” which includes the statement: “A group of bullies called Zionists wanted our land so they stole it by force and hurt many people.” The “Know Your Rights!” guide, also co-published by PAT and OEP, includes references to CBA provisions that protect teachers in teaching what are, according to Doe, anti-Israel views.

Displays. Doe alleges that, with PAT’s encouragement, teachers at Doe’s school wore clothing that included pro-Palestine messages, such as “Free Palestine,” and “From the River to the Sea.” School administration also allowed posting of Palestinian flags, print-out maps of Palestine that eliminate Israel, and other symbols and slogans throughout the school. The displayed flags and other symbols were in common spaces such as hallways, the library, as well as shared classrooms. In Doe’s view, the “placement was intentional so as to appear to be an expression of the community and school rather than any individual.”

Prayer. A teacher “led an on-campus morning meeting that he designated as a ‘prayer circle’ to support Palestine.”

Organizing and Political Activities. PAT collaborates with OEP in its publications, including by co-publishing the “Know Your Rights!” guide—a document “developed in response to the censorship, discrimination, and harassment” that PPS staff experienced when teaching or supporting pro-Palestine views. PAT’s social media accounts follow OEP, which organizes events and speech activities in support of Palestine and against Israel and which is visible to the public as well as members of PAT. OEP used social media to promote May 15 as “Nakba Day,” for instance. It stated, “This Nakba Day, we call on educators across Oregon to wear your kufiya [sic], pins, and “From the River to the Sea, Palestine Will Be Free” shirt to school or work!” On its own social media channels, PAT announced a “students for peace” walkout on March 15, 2024, with a rally at PAT headquarters that included anti-Israel expression.

Doe also alleges that PAT endorses candidates who are vocally anti-Israel and pro-Palestine, including then-candidates Raschelle Chase-Miller and Jorge Sanchez Bautista, both of whom have used social media to promote anti-Israel messages. On May 28, 2024, PAT held informational sessions for teachers to “[l]earn about your rights to teach and advocate for Palestine within Portland Public Schools” at PAT Hall.

PAT Member Conduct. PAT members and representatives allegedly “took coordinated, politically charged actions” while knowing or disregarding the effect they would have on Doe, including posting on social media that staff should wear pro-Palestinian clothing and should post pro-Palestinian messages through the school. In March 2024, Doe “was physically intimidated by a colleague who physically blocked him from entering the copy room to use the copy machine.” The colleague was “vocal about her anti-Israel views.” Doe also alleges that other PAT members spread rumors about Doe and falsely blamed and accused him of various things….

Doe also takes issue with PPS, alleging that it discriminated against him and violated his First Amendment rights. Against PPS, Doe alleges the following:

• “[t]he school’s policy is that every poster or expressive item displayed in the school’s common areas, such as a hallway, has to receive approval from administration. Thus, any display in these areas was with the explicit or implicit permission of the school administration.”
• “School administration allowed posting of Palestinian flags, print-out maps of Palestine that eliminate Israel, and other symbols and slogans throughout the school.”
• “The displayed flags and other symbols were in common spaces such as hallways, the library, as well as shared classrooms. The placement was intentional so as to appear to be an expression of the community and school rather than any individual staff person.”
• Although Doe brought his concerns to PPS, his school’s administration refused to remove pro-Palestine symbols.
• “When he asked school administrators if he could display a flag of Israel or symbols supporting Israel’s right to exist, school administrators denied Plaintiff’s request telling him that an Israeli flag or related symbols would be too disruptive.”
• “Because it only allowed pro-Palestinian flags, symbols, and messages, the school failed to maintain any kind of viewpoint neutrality on this issue.”

Doe asserts that PPS created a hostile work environment in its religious discrimination, primarily by making Doe’s school “a forum for one-sided, anti-Israel rhetoric.” As a result of that hostile work environment, Doe experienced a “severe recurrence” of his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) which forced him to take a leave of absence and undergo medical treatment during the summer of 2024.

Doe alleges that PPS’s discriminatory conduct continues because it has failed to resolve or respond to his complaints, failed to take measures to curb the hostile work environment, and subjected him to an investigation based on false accusations. Although PPS transferred Doe to another school for the 2024-25 school year, Doe asserts that he continues to face hostility because of PPS’s failure “hold individuals to account,” which means that he cannot attend district-wide events because he might encounter those colleagues there.

Doe also contends that PPS’s discrimination is ongoing because, as a result of PPS’s “refusal to clarify the record,” he continues to be “blamed for incidents that did not occur.” For instance, in May 2025, Doe had to correct one of his new colleagues when they asked him “whether it was true that he was suspended for removing Palestinian flags from all the classrooms.” …

The report recommended rejecting Doe’s claims “that PAT’s exclusive representation violated his First Amendment right to free association by forcing him to associate with expression with which he disagrees, and which betrays his deeply held religious and moral beliefs”:

The collective bargaining system [upheld in Minn. State Bd. for Comm. Colleges v. Knight (1984)] is no different than PECBA in any way that matters to Doe’s constitutional challenges. Doe, who is not a member of PAT and does not have to pay PAT membership dues, has not had his associational rights impaired. And Knight extends, as this court sees it, to First Amendment rights generally. Knight (“The state has in no way restrained appellees’ freedom to speak on any education-related issue or their freedom to associate or not to associate with whom they please, including the exclusive representative. Nor has the state attempted to suppress any ideas.”). That Doe specifically challenges his right to freely exercise his religion is of no moment in this context. Like the freedom to associate and freedom to speak, rights that are unburdened by exclusive representation, so too is Doe’s freedom to practice his religion—PAT’s exclusive representation in no way “forces” Doe to “tacitly approve” PAT’s beliefs.

The report also recommended rejecting Doe’s claim that PPS unconstitutionally discriminated against his viewpoint:

Does allege in Claim 3 that PPS allows expression of pro-Palestine, anti-Israel views but disallowed his request to promote pro-Israel views, and that by doing so (the One View Conduct), PPS applied its rules on speech and expressive activity in a viewpoint-based manner….

“When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says.” In Downs v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit held that materials posted on school bulletin boards constituted government speech because only school employees could access the bulletin boards, the bulletin boards were the property of the school, and the school principal oversaw (and thus implicitly approved) the posted materials. That implicit approval was equivalent to the school itself speaking, and when the school principal removed a competing bulletin board put up by a teacher with opposing views, that “explicit rejection” was equivalent to the school “choosing not to speak.”

Doe alleges that it is PPS’s policy “that every poster or expressive item displayed in the school’s common areas, such as a hallway, has to receive approval from administration” and thus any displays in the school’s common areas required PPS’s “explicit or implicit permission.” Given that Doe alleges that the One View Conduct is approved by PPS, the viewpoint challenged by Doe is attributable to PPS….

The report likewise recommended rejecting Doe’s claim that PPS’s actions unconstitutionally established religion:

[T]he Curricula and Display allegations are not a violation of the Establishment Clause because they can be regarded as geopolitical or political expressions that happen to align or harmonize with religious beliefs. That is, a policy or conduct does not violate the Establishment Clause “merely because it ‘happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.'” … Even for the resource guide “Teaching While Muslim,” which Doe alleges is sectarian, he fails to allege specifically what content in the guide advanced the Muslim faith rather than a political viewpoint that can be shared by Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

As for the Prayer allegation, its critical deficiency is that it fails to satisfy Iqbal pleading standards. The allegation merely states that a “teacher led an on-campus morning meeting that he designated as a ‘prayer-circle’ to support Palestine.” That cursory allegation omits any facts that would allow the court to conclude whether the “meeting” or “prayer-circle” was an instance of the unnamed teacher crossing the line from “protected private expression” to “impermissible government coercion.” Put differently, prayer is not categorically prohibited in schools because the Supreme Court has “long recognized … that secondary school students are mature enough to understand that a school does not endorse, let alone coerce them to participate in, speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.”

The report recommended rejecting Doe’s hostile work environment harassment claim against PPS, partly because of the statute of limitations, but partly for broader reasons:

Doe fails to plausibly allege that PPS’s conduct was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive work environment.” … Although the court does not doubt Doe’s subjective perception that his workplace was hostile and conflicted with his religious beliefs and identity, the occurrences alleged by him do not rise to the baseline of pervasiveness and severity that the Ninth Circuit has set….

First, PPS’s alleged conduct is part of a contentious geopolitical debate in which it is not settled whether the views Doe takes issue with are antisemitic or, rather, protests against the actions of the Israeli government toward Palestinians. To adopt Doe’s argument that the environment at his school was objectively offensive enough to alter his work conditions is to conflate Doe’s subjective belief with the requirement that the work environment was objectively hostile…..

Second, Doe does not allege, or plausibly allege, that the conduct he finds offensive was directed at him. Significant [in past precedents] was that much of the alleged conduct was not directed at the plaintiffs…. Offensive comments purposely directed at an employee are by degrees more severe than comments overheard first-hand or second-hand, or in this case expressions concerning a geopolitical dispute….

And the report recommended rejecting Doe’s discrimination claim against PAT, again largely for statute of limitations reasons, but also because of this:

[Doe] asserts that, in the spring of 2025, PAT publicly endorsed two school board candidates, on social media and through a meet-and-greet, who are “vocally anti-Israel and pro-Palestine.” PAT responds that imposing civil liability for a public endorsement would violate its First Amendment rights. The court agrees. See Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. (9th Cir. 2010) (“Harassment law generally targets conduct, and it sweeps in speech as harassment only when consistent with the First Amendment.”).

The endorsement and social media posts were not directed at Doe, nor does Doe allege that he was required to attend the meet-and-greet. In other words, PAT’s endorsement sought to “disseminate a message to the general public,” rather than “intrude upon the targeted [listener] … in an especially offensive way.” See also Rodriguez (holding that “a college professor’s expression on a matter of public concern, directed to the college community” could not “constitute unlawful harassment” where its “offensive quality was based entirely on [its] meaning, and not on any conduct or implicitly threat of conduct that [it] contained”)…. Doe cannot rely on PAT’s endorsements to allege an ongoing hostile work environment and timely Title VII violation.

I hope to put up a post soon on the Magistrate Judge’s decision to allow Doe to proceed under a pseudonym.

Misha Isaak, Megan S. Bradford, and Dominik K. Mackinnon (Stoel Rives LLP) represent PPS and related defendants. Scott A. Kronland and Matthew J. Murray (Altshuler Berzon LLP) and Karen O’Kasey (Hart Wagner LLP) represent PAT.

The post Jewish Teacher Sued Portland Public Schools + Union for Discrimination Over Colleagues' Anti-Israel Speech appeared first on Reason.com.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/7TW8Pzk
via IFTTT

For those of us who are more interested in policy than politics, it’s frustrating to try a rational discussion about any issue once it’s caught up in a partisan maelstrom. Few matters are more given to hysteria than crime, for the obvious reason that everyone (except criminals) is against it—and politicians are incentivized to use crime-related policy to score political points.

We have to await the passage of time to analyze which anti-crime policies worked, which created unintended consequences, and which made little difference. I’m long past expecting politicians to learn about past policy, but it’s worth trying. So I cheer the Legislative Analyst’s Office, which last month released a report evaluating the results of a brouhaha that most of us have forgotten: prison realignment. The short take: the doomsayers were wrong.

Fifteen years ago, California prisons were filled to 180% of their design capacity—the result of 1990s tough-on-crime initiatives that boosted sentences and created larger populations. A 2009 federal court decision agreed that overcrowding undermined inmates’ right to receive “adequate” healthcare, but the court stayed the full implementation of California’s proposed fixes while the case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.

In May 2011, the high court agreed with the lower court: “[W]ithout a reduction in overcrowding, there will be no efficacious remedy for the unconstitutional care of the sick and mentally ill,” as a 2011 LAO report noted. Democratic Gov. Jerry Brown’s solution was Assembly Bill 109, which “shifted to counties the responsibility for monitoring, tracking and incarcerating lower-level offenders previously bound for state prison,” per the Stanford Criminal Justice Center.

This was a bipartisan problem. Problems arose during the Republican Schwarzenegger administration, but came to a head under Brown. Although the ruling was backed by the court’s liberals, one conservative provided the deciding vote. Regardless of the court’s ideology—and whether it was right in its determination—its decision required California to reduce its prison population. State leaders, regardless of their philosophy, had no choice but to act.

Many anti-realignment arguments centered on the capability of locals to handle the influx of prisoners, which was a legitimate concern. Some progressives were angry that the law mainly moved prisoners around rather than reduced their sentences, which was tone deaf. But Republicans opposed the bill and then started ramping up emotional tactics, arguing that realignment would lead to carnage—even though Brown’s solution upheld sound conservative principles regarding local control.

Shortly after realignment began, Assembly Republicans “began an online video campaign to get Californians outraged over Brown’s prisoner shift program,” reported ABC 7 in Sacramento. The ad featured “scary-looking thugs and ominous music.” Two years later, Republicans pushed to unravel realignment and go on a prison-building spree.

GOP fear-mongering became so obnoxious that two conservative former Assembly members, Pat Nolan (R–Glendale) and Chuck DeVore (R–Irvine), published a 2013 column in the Los Angeles Times complaining that, “Some Republicans…are trying to score short-term political points by employing old scare tactics about the state’s prison ‘realignment’ plan. Realignment gives local jails the responsibility—and funding—to oversee low-level inmates, while violent and career offenders remain the responsibility of costlier state prisons. This is a common-sense division of responsibility.”

Years later, after crime spiked during the pandemic, conservatives were still pointing their fingers at realignment, although they fell silent after crime rates dropped again. So what exactly are the results of this policy—one that seems rather modest in hindsight, but was depicted as a radical gutting of the criminal-justice system at the time? Drum roll, please.

Per the LAO, the effort “contributed to a modest increase in property crime and had no effect on violent crime.” Realignment enabled California to meet its court obligations: “Without it, the state would have had to pay for significantly more prison capacity and/or allow the federal courts to release tens of thousands of people from prison.” Although the reform altered some sentences for lower-level offenders, it could have been worse had courts been granted release power. Meanwhile, “sentences for violent crimes were largely unaffected.”

The law did increase pressure on county jails, but subsequent initiatives “mitigated the population pressures created by realignment.” Realignment also created better fiscal management: “[C]ounties now bear a greater share of the costs of felony sentences. As a result, county decisions about sentencing now incorporate the costs of incarceration for many felony sentences—thereby better aligning counties’ costs with their decision-making authority.”

What about overall crime in California? Rates are 27 percent lower now than they were in 2011, which was not only the beginning of realignment—but the beginning of a series of criminal-justice reforms mostly passed by voter initiative. Did I mention that California has been shuttering prisons rather than embarking on costly prison-building efforts? Too bad we had to wait 15 years to confirm that all the alarmism was political nonsense.

This column was first published in The Orange County Register.

The post California's Prison Reform Experiment Worked. The State's Crime Rate Has Fallen by 27% in 15 Years. appeared first on Reason.com.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/rxFz8J6
via IFTTT

7/24/1997: Justice William Brennan dies.

 

The post Today in Supreme Court History: July 24, 1997 appeared first on Reason.com.

from Latest – Reason.com https://ift.tt/ipB0LCT
via IFTTT