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In their highly read First Things essay “Voyages to the End of the World,” Peter Thiel and Sam Wolfe use Francis Bacon’s utopian “New Atlantis” to argue that modern faith in unlimited technological progress has subtly redefined salvation as a human-controlled achievement rather than a divine gift, displacing religious understandings of human destiny with promises of security, abundance, and mastery over nature.

They warn that this Baconian project – disguised in Christian imagery – risks creating a seductive but spiritually impoverished civilization where technological power outpaces moral wisdom, potentially leading to an end-times trajectory of false salvation unless reintegrated into a framework that respects natural and spiritual limits.

Authored by William Brooks via The Epoch Times,

Founded in 1990 by the late Fr. Richard John Neuhaus, First Things magazine strives to promote a well-informed public philosophy in the Christian and Jewish traditions.

Last year, one of the most read essays in First Things was titled: “Voyages to the End of the World” by Peter Thiel and Sam Wolfe. Thiel is a tech entrepreneur, investor, and author. Wolfe is a writer and researcher at Thiel Capital.

These thinkers offer a probing examination of our modern technological ambitions. Using Francis Bacon’s unfinished 17th-century work “New Atlantis” as a point of departure, Thiel and Wolfe suggest that modern faith in scientific progress is corroding the religious understanding of human destiny. They contend that Bacon’s utopian tale about knowledge and prosperity contains a warning about the moral costs of unlimited technological mastery.

Thiel and Wolfe’s central claim is not that science itself is evil or that technological progress must be rejected. Rather, they argue that Bacon’s scientific project—and the modern world that has adopted it—rests on a redefinition of salvation. Whereas Christianity views redemption as a divine process that transcends history, Bacon relocates it firmly within human control. In doing so, modern technological civilization risks mistaking power for wisdom. This could have grave consequences as we enter an epoch defined by unprecedented technological advancement.

At the heart of their essay is a close look at Bacon’s fictional account of the island society of Bensalem. On its surface, Bensalem appears harmonious, pious, and benevolent. Its inhabitants are devout, orderly, and humane; its institutions promise healing, abundance, and stability. Its governing institution, Salomon’s House, is dedicated to the systematic investigation of nature for the “relief of man’s estate.” Bacon presents scientific inquiry as a quasi-religious vocation, cloaked in Christian imagery and moral restraint.

Thiel and Wolfe warn that this superficial harmony conceals a radical transformation of the human relationship to nature, knowledge, and God. They argue that Bacon’s true ambition was not merely to advance science but to replace the classical-Christian understanding of limits with a project of total technological mastery. Knowledge, in Bacon’s vision, is not ordered toward moral formation but toward domination and control. Nature is no longer something to be understood within an inherited moral order; it is something that can be conquered and redesigned.

This shift has profound implications. Bacon’s scientific method implicitly promises what religion once offered: security, healing, abundance, and even a form of immortality. By embedding these promises within a framework that appears Christian, Bacon disguised the degree to which his vision subtly marginalized the hand of God. In New Atlantis, God remains present, but increasingly as a symbolic guarantor of human progress rather than as the ultimate judge of human action.

Thiel and Wolfe interpret this displacement through an eschatological lens. Drawing on biblical imagery, they suggest that Bacon’s utopia resembles the deceptive peace promised in apocalyptic literature—a peace achieved not through repentance or divine reconciliation, but through human ingenuity and centralised power. The danger is not tyranny in its crudest form, but something more seductive: a world so efficient and secure that it no longer recognizes its spiritual impoverishment.

One of the essay’s most troubling conclusions is that modern technological civilization may be better understood as an end-times trajectory rather than a benign accumulation of new tools. Scientific progress does not merely extend human capacities; it reshapes human expectations about the future. When technology promises to eliminate scarcity, suffering, and even death, it inevitably assumes the role once played by theology. In this sense, modernity reconfigures the religious impulse by substituting technique for grace.

The authors argue that this substitution is inherently unstable. Technological power expands far more rapidly than moral wisdom, and the belief that every problem has a technical solution blinds societies to questions of meaning, responsibility, and restraint. The more humanity relies on systems it only partially understands—artificial intelligence, biotechnology, etc.—the more it risks becoming subject to forces it can neither fully control nor morally justify.

A further conclusion concerns the cultural conditions that allow this dynamic to persist. Thiel and Wolfe suggest that widespread biblical and philosophical illiteracy leaves contemporary society unable to recognize the spiritual dimensions of technological ambition. Apocalyptic language, once central to the Western moral imagination, is now dismissed as superstition.

Yet without such language, we lose a critical framework for discerning the difference between genuine progress and false salvation. The result is not rational clarity, but naivete—a readiness to accept sweeping promises of safety and efficiency without asking what is being sacrificed in return.

The relevance of “Voyages to the End of the World” becomes especially clear as we move deeper into the 21st century. Humanity now possesses technologies capable of reshaping life itself, from genetic engineering to autonomous systems that make decisions once reserved for human judgment. Political and economic leaders increasingly speak in utopian terms, promising that innovation will solve social conflict, environmental degradation, and even moral disagreement. These assurances echo Bacon’s vision of a world governed by knowledge rather than virtue, technique rather than tradition.

Thiel and Wolfe suggest we correct our course. They invite readers to reconsider whether the goals of technological civilization are as harmless as they appear. The question is no longer whether we can build more powerful tools, but whether those tools are shaping a conception of life that is ultimately compatible with human well-being.

The authors do not advocate withdrawal from modern life or a rejection of scientific inquiry. Their argument is one of discernment. Technological progress, they assert, must be reintegrated into a moral framework that acknowledges the natural limits of human power. Without such a framework, progress becomes self-justifying, and power becomes an end in itself. We are reminded that the future we build should not be merely technical. It should also be moral, spiritual, and ultimately related to the destiny of human souls.

As the second quarter of the 21st century unfolds, “Voyages to the End of the World” offers a timely caution.

The greatest danger facing technological civilization may not be catastrophe, but success—the achievement of a techno-managed world that no longer knows why or for what it exists.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times or ZeroHedge.

With tensions between Washington and Tehran soaring, the US Air Force has moved to restock its GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bunker-buster bombs, which is the same weapons used in June during Operation Midnight Hammer, when several – some reports say over a dozen – were dropped on three Iranian nuclear facilities.

Along with the ongoing US military build-up in the US Central Command (CENTCOM) region of responsibility, this is another big sign that Trump-ordered military action could be imminent, despite that the Iranians have not attacked the United States or its bases abroad. On that, the below is where things stand in terms of deployments…

After the Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group transits the Atlantic, the U.S. will have 2 aircraft carriers and 15 destroyers (plus a few subs) to work with across combatant commands.

Approx. 33% of the deployed U.S. Navy fleet is represented below, which can carry 600+ TLAMs. pic.twitter.com/1vPf9akqTY

— Ian Ellis (@ianellisjones) February 16, 2026

A partially redacted federal notice posted last week confirms the Air Force awarded Boeing a sole-source contract to replenish the depleted stockpile.

The Air Force stated the move was necessary because “this procurement and sustainment activity is critically needed to replenish the inventory of GBU-57’s, ended during Operation Midnight Hammer (21 June 25).”

The notice further explains the Pentagon bypassed a competitive bidding process because Boeing has “uniquely acquired expertise over a period of 18 years of adapting this specialized weapon to meet evolving mission needs as MOP transitioned from proof-of-concept to Full Operational Capability.” Also, any alternate decision might have resulted in delays.

Boeing is the only manufacturer of the 30,000-pound GBU-57 MOP, the deep-penetration bomb designed to destroy hardened underground targets.

“No delay in award is acceptable for this effort. Delaying this requirement would undermine force readiness and efficient acquisitions for this key weapons program. A delay undermines Combatant Commanders’ capabilities, jeopardizes force readiness and strategic deterrence, hinders nuclear proliferation prevention efforts, and could result in loss of life,” the notice stated.

That is one big bomb…

One remaining key detail from the June war which has been shrouded in contradiction and ambiguity is whether the initial bunker busters really obliterated Iran’s nuclear development capability. President Trump certainly claimed this several times soon after the fact, and yet now warns the Iranians against moving forward with their nuclear program.

Authored by Daniel Lacalle,

The latest social financing figures from China show an economy that is increasingly relying on government debt while private demand for credit remains weak. The strength of the Chinese technology sector and its exporting companies gives enough room for leverage. However, behind the weak private sector credit demand lies an evident economic slowdown that the Chinese government acknowledges, challenging consumption patterns, a significant overcapacity problem, and the depth of the housing crisis.

The current economic model, focused on delivering 5% real economic growth, requires larger doses of debt to achieve smaller increments of growth, especially productive sector growth. The government has focused on reducing debt and overcapacity imbalances while reorienting its exports and financial system to lessen dependence on the US dollar; however, the main challenge for the Chinese economy remains boosting consumer demand, despite rate cuts and easing financial conditions.

To understand the intensity of debt of the Chinese model, we must go to the year 2000 and see the acceleration in the flow of debt, not just the current stock. At that time, real GDP growth was around 8–9%, so each percentage point of growth came with roughly 13–16 points of debt‑to‑GDP. Government debt was very low, at around 25% of GDP, and most leverage sat in the state-owned corporate sector with modest household debt. China was able to deliver near‑double‑digit growth with a total non‑financial debt ratio barely above 120% of GDP.

By 2023, non‑financial sector debt had risen to about 285% of GDP, more than doubling its level of 2000. Chinese think‑tanks and official commentators put the “macro leverage ratio” closer to 300% of GDP by 2025, according to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The macro leverage ratio rose by 11.8 percentage points to 302.3 percent in 2025, exceeding the 10.1-point increase reported in 2024.

Over the same period, the trend of real GDP growth has slowed to roughly 4–5%, so each percentage point of growth now requires around 60–75 points of debt‑to‑GDP, more than three times the debt per point of growth required in 2000. Furthermore, it comes mostly from government debt.

In January 2026, aggregate social financing jumped by 7.22 trillion yuan, significantly higher than in the same month of 2025 and above market expectations, consistent with 5% annual GDP growth and a larger composition of the public sector in the mix. Outstanding social financing reached 449.11 trillion yuan at the end of January, rising 8.2% year‑on‑year, while money supply (M2) rose by 9%.​

New yuan bank loans were 4.7 trillion yuan, about 420 billion less than a year earlier and significantly below consensus, showing the weak private‑sector credit demand and the prudent approach of Chinese customers and businesses to debt addition. RMB loans outstanding stood at 276.62 trillion yuan, up only 6.1% year‑on‑year, clearly below the pace of overall financing and money growth.

The driver of credit growth in China is no longer households and private firms but the government and state-owned companies.

The real estate problem has impacted Chinese families in numerous ways. Not only did most of them see the value of their homes decline, but many families invested in the attractive yields of real estate developers’ commercial paper, which led to large losses and even the wipe-out of savings for many. Additionally, despite the excess in supply of houses, prices have not fallen enough to warrant enough appetite for new mortgages, as affordability remains an issue and the traditional prudence of Chinese citizens when it comes to consuming and borrowing adds to the challenge.

Beijing plans to issue 4.4 trillion yuan in local government special‑purpose bonds in 2025, 500 billion more than in 2024, looking to boost government investment and a “proactive fiscal policy,” knowing that raising taxes would be exceedingly negative for growth and consumption.

Local governments are expected to issue more than 10 trillion yuan in bonds in 2025, including refinancing, general bonds, and new special bonds.

The Chinese government knows that it can manage more debt but also sees the weak investment and household spending and acknowledges that large tax increases would be counterproductive.  However, to prevent future debt-driven stagnation, a focus on productivity is necessary.

The official budget sets a deficit of 4% for 2025. However, once all budget items are consolidated, including government funds, special bonds, and off‑budget vehicles, this true fiscal deficit in 2025 is closer to 9%, up from 7.7% in 2024, according to Rhodium Group and JP Morgan. China increasingly relies on hidden or almost fiscal borrowing to support growth.

With outstanding social financing now around 449 trillion yuan and real growth around 4–5%, each incremental point of GDP is increasingly linked with a much larger stock of debt than a decade ago. This rising credit intensity of growth may prevent a significant slowdown but may create a significant fiscal challenge in the future. The Chinese model demands high growth and low taxes; any change to the fiscal system will be negative.

For years, local governments relied on the sale of land for property development to collect tax receipts. Thus, the drag from real estate is evident in the economy and in fiscal sustainability. Real estate development investment fell 13.9% year‑on‑year in the first three quarters of 2025, with residential investment down 12.9%, the steepest drop since 2021, according to official figures. Property investment and sales both posted double‑digit declines in 2024, and forecasters expect real estate investment to fall another 11% and sales to drop 7.5% in 2025, according to Reuters, with further declines in 2026 before stabilizing only in 2027… if it happens as fast as consensus estimates.

The property sector, once a key engine for economic growth and tax receipts, absorbs new credit to stabilize its accounts without boosting growth or creating a multiplier effect.

Additionally, China’s industrial capacity utilization remained at 74.9% at the end of 2025, well below the 78.4% peak reached in 2021. Overcapacity is clear in steel, autos, legacy chips, and parts of sectors like green tech, where expansion has surpassed domestic and external demand. Thus, the purchasing managers’ indices show weak new orders and foreign demand, while bankruptcies and insolvencies have risen, although not to levels that would indicate a financial crisis.​

The Chinese economy needs to reopen, improve investor and legal security and allow the housing slump to materialize fully to see the type of productive economic growth it needs to avoid much larger increases in debt. Otherwise, the risk of stagnation will likely be elevated as population growth stalls, overcapacity remains, and the stock of unsold property becomes a larger liability.  

Moscow just potentially created a big opening for Ukrainian elections to actually happen, with an unexpected overture:

Russia is ready to ensure that there will be no airstrikes on election day in Ukraine if Kiev decides to hold elections, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin said an interview with TASS.

However, the big question remains of if President Zelensky decides to actually proceed with an election. Given that months ago he didn’t even cave to Trump pressuring him to do so, it’s very up in the air whether he wants to actually see this through, or if martial law will continue to be used as an excuse to block a vote.

Russian President Vladimir Putin himself has floated willingness to halt airstrikes deep into Ukraine on election day if elections are held there – but he’s also also recently said that the millions of Ukrainians currently living in Russia should have the right to vote.

These are mostly Russian-speaking Ukrainians who lived in the Donbass – as well as Crimea – before war broke out, or who are still there amid the conflict.

“Of course, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statements remain relevant. But, as I earlier noted, there is no talk yet of the practical organization of voting in Ukraine,” Galuzin said.

“I would like to draw attention to our experience. In March 2024, presidential elections were held in Russia, and polling stations – even taking into account the ongoing military operations -were opened in close proximity to the combat zone. Kiev tried every way possible to disrupt the electoral process in the frontline regions, not shying away from resorting to terrorist means and sabotage. However, it proved unable to achieve its goal,” Galuzin added.

He then emphasized that Russia “will not stoop to Kiev’s practices and will allow the people of Ukraine to fully exercise their constitutionally enshrined electoral rights and independently determine the future development of their country.”

“Of course, if the Kiev regime finally decides to take this democratic step,” the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister added.

Ukraine has said a parliamentary committee is still studying the issue, and that the total safety of all citizens would have to be guaranteed – also by international powers – while the vote proceeds.

Via Middle East Eye

Indonesia is readying 1,000 troops to be deployed in Gaza as early as April as part of the UN-mandated International Stabilization Force, an army spokesperson said on Monday.

A total of 8,000 Indonesian soldiers will be ready for deployment by June, while the final decision will be made by Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto. “The departure schedule remains entirely subject to the political decisions of the state and applicable international mechanisms,” the spokesman said in a text message to news agency Reuters.

Indonesian Army Chief of Staff Maruli Simanjuntak previously estimated that between 5,000 and 8,000 military personnel could be deployed, with final numbers “still being negotiated”. 

On Saturday, Indonesia’s foreign ministry said that its military’s participation in Gaza as part of the peace plan devised by US President Donald Trump should not be interpreted as a normalization of political relations with Israel. 

“Indonesia consistently rejects all attempts at demographic change or the forced displacement or relocation of the Palestinian people in any form,” the ministry said.

The deployment, which has a non-combatant, humanitarian mandate, could only be carried out with the consent of the Palestinian Authority, the ministry said.

“Indonesian troops will not be involved in combat operations or any action leading to direct confrontation with any armed group,“ the statement said. Indonesian troops would also have no mandate to demilitarize any party, it added.

However the mandate of the stabilization force includes ensuring “the process of demilitarizing the Gaza Strip” and “the permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups”. The resolution authorizes the force to “use all necessary measures to carry out its mandate”.

$5bn to rebuild Gaza 

Indonesia confirmed last week that President Prabowo Subianto will attend the inaugural leaders’ meeting of Trump’s “Board of Peace”, whose members have pledged $5bn toward “rebuilding war-ravaged Gaza”. 

Indonesian foreign ministry said that Prabowo would use the forum on 19 February to advocate for the protection of Palestinians and push for a sustainable peace based on a two-state solution, which envisions the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

Prabowo is also expected to sign a tariff agreement with the United States during the trip, the government said. “We are just preparing ourselves in case an agreement is reached and we have to send peacekeeping forces,” Prabowo told journalists.

The president also said he will seek to negotiate the board’s reported $1bn membership fee. Indonesia’s foreign ministry said that its troops’ participation in Gaza would not be aimed at imposing peace, but would instead focus on humanitarian objectives. 

Indonesia is one of the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping operations globally, with more than 2,700 personnel deployed in missions across Africa and the Middle East.

Indonesia’s largest deployment is with the United Nations Interim Force is in Lebanon. Public support for Palestine is strong in Indonesia, where mass demonstrations have taken place against Israel’s genocide in Gaza. 

On August 3, thousands of Indonesians gathered at Jakarta’s National Monument, waving Palestinian flags and holding placards demanding justice for Gaza.

Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, has consistently called for an end to Israeli genocide in Gaza and has pushed for a two-state solution through international forums. Its government has also provided humanitarian aid, medical support and diplomatic backing for Palestinian institutions.

In November, Indonesia’s defense minister announced that its military had trained 20,000 troops for healthcare and construction efforts in Gaza. Jakarta has also provided humanitarian aid, including the delivery of 10,000 tonnes of rice in August last year, and has launched a long-term cultivation initiative in Sumatra and Kalimantan to support Palestinian food security.

Last summer North Korea began for the first time airing footage which provided public confirmation that it was receiving many of its soldiers home in coffins after they served alongside Russian forces in the context of the Ukraine war.

It’s believed that the some ten to fourteen thousand DPRK troops dispatched to assist Moscow had primarily fought in Russia’s Kursk province, where they helped repel the previous six-month Ukrainian occupation of the southern border oblast (in 2024-2025).

On Monday, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un unveiled that families of soldiers killed in the battle abroad would receive free new housing. He presided over a ribbon-cutting ceremony marking the completion of a new block of apartments for that purpose, state media reported Monday.

“The new street has been built thanks to the ardent desire of our motherland that wishes that… its excellent sons, who defended the most sacred things by sacrificing their most valuable things, will live forever,” Kim said in a speech, as cited by the Korean Central News Agency.

This comes after Kim last week having publicly declared he’s ready to “unconditionally support” all of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s policies and decisions.

“Before their death, the heroic martyrs must have pictured in their mind’s eye their dear families living in the ever-prospering country,” the North Korean leader said.

KCNA images also showed Kim touring the new apartments alongside his teenage daughter Ju Ae, believed to be the most likely future successor to Kim.

International reports based on South Korean intelligence estimates say that around 2,000 North Korean soldiers have been killed while fighting alongside Russia so far.

The apartments for families of fallen soldiers is a program clearly intended to create incentives for the military to support Pyongyang’s foreign adventurism on behalf of Moscow, and to deflect potential criticism.

Kim Jong Un opens new Saeppyol Street housing in Pyongyang

Homes built for families of fallen soldiers, KCNA reports

Ceremony marks what he called a ‘heroic era’ pic.twitter.com/kBxdAtm564

— RT (@RT_com) February 16, 2026

Ukraine has bitterly complained about the foreign contingencies helping Russia, and in previously claimed that North Korea could send up to 30,000 – though there’s been little evidence of such a high figure.

Authored by Andrew Korybko,

The cascading consequences of such a blockade, which might not ultimately be imposed due it entailing a high risk of war with Iran, could simultaneously weaken Russia, India, and China.

The Wall Street Journal reported that Trump 2.0 is considering imposing a Venezuelan-like oil blockade against Iran. It hasn’t yet done so due to concerns that Iran might attack the US’ regional military assets and/or seize its Gulf allies’ oil tankers, with either scenario destabilizing the global oil market and spiking the risk of war, so it might never ultimately happen. If the US were to successfully impose such a blockade, however, then it might be able to adroitly divide-and-rule Russia, India, and China (RIC).

“The US Wants To Replicate The Venezuelan Model In Iran” by coercing Iran into subordinating itself and its energy industry to the US. The “Trump Doctrine”, which is shaped by Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby’s “Strategy of Denial”, seeks to deny strategic resources to the US’ rivals. Accordingly, it has an interest in cutting off China’s average import of 1.38 million barrels of Iranian oil per day last year, which could hit its economy hard if they’re not replaced (and that might be difficult).

These exports could then be redirected to India, thus enabling India to more than replace its average import of 1 million barrels per day of Russian oil last month, with the revenue placed in an escrow account per the Venezuelan precedent for release to Iran if it cuts a nuclear and missile deal with the US. Through these means, India could zero out its import of Russian oil while raising the US’ role over its energy security exactly as Trump 2.0 wants, with the end result dealing incredible harm to RIC.

Russia’s budgetary revenue from such sales would be reduced and could only realistically be replaced in part through more sales to China, though that might not be as easy as it sounds. The UK is preparing a campaign to seize Russia’s “shadow fleet” in the English Channel after being emboldened by the US’ seizure of a Russian-flagged oil tanker near its coast. If Russia doesn’t impose unacceptable costs on the UK, and it didn’t impose any on the US for doing this, then its Baltic Sea tankers might never reach China.

Those from the Black Sea might not reach it either if the UK allies with Greece and Cyprus to cut off Russia’s “shadow fleet” from that vector too. Pipeline exports, which have limits to how much they can be scaled, would then be the only means for replacing part of Russia’s lost oil exports to India with China apart from relatively minimal tanker exports from the Far East. The resultant economic pressure on Russia and China might make them susceptible to lopsided deals with the US on Ukraine and trade.

As for India, it already entered into a partially lopsided deal with the US as regards the informal quid pro quo of it agreeing to zero out its import of Russian oil in exchange for their trade deal, and the US’ growing influence over India’s energy security could curtail its hard-earned strategic autonomy. This might then be leveraged for coercing a reduction in India’s purchase of Chinese goods and services so as to place more pressure on the People’s Republic to agree to its own lopsided trade deal with the US.

This worst-case scenario of the US’ dividing-and-ruling RIC can be averted by Iran deterring or breaking a US blockade on its oil in parallel with Russia doing the same with respect to any British one against its “shadow fleet”. These options require immense political will since they entail the potential cost of a hot war breaking out between Great Powers so it’s unclear whether they’ll be implemented, but likewise, so too might the US and UK ultimately back off from their possible blockades for the same reason.