Month: May 2025

12-Year-Old Tennessee Boy Arrested for Instagram Post Says He Was Trying To Warn Students of a School Shooting

After posting a screenshot of two people planning to “shoot up” a Nashville school, a 12-year-old DuPont Tyler Middle School student was arrested and charged with threats of mass violence. Although his charges were later dismissed, school officials opted to expel the boy without properly assessing whether the threat was valid or whether he had authored the messages himself. 

Directly following a school shooting at Antioch High School earlier this year, which resulted in the death of two students and injury to a third, Nashville School District officials were on high alert for other potential threats. The day after the shooting, James, a seventh grade student, was flagged by the FBI for a concerning Instagram post. According to ProPublica, the post depicted a text conversation between two individuals: One said they would “shoot up” a Nashville school if the second would attack another. “Yea,” the second replied, “I got some other people for other schools.” 

When asked about the post, James told school officials he had reposted a screenshot from a Spanish-language news site. He was subsequently arrested and charged with making threats of mass violence. 

Under Tennessee law, when a student is suspected of threatening mass violence, a threat assessment is required “to determine whether the threat of mass violence made by the student was a valid threat.” If the director of schools determines the threat is not valid, the school is not allowed to expel the student.

However, records obtained by ProPublica show that school officials failed to conduct a proper threat assessment and missed crucial steps. Melissa Nelson, a national school safety consultant who trains schools on managing threats, told ProPublica that James’ assessment was “gross mismanagement of a case.” Rather than seek out information to help confirm whether the threat was valid—like notifying and interviewing James’ parents—or pursue options provided by the threat assessment tool to deescalate potential future violence, school officials jumped straight to expulsion after he was arrested. 

“Even if a child is expelled, what I always train is: Out of sight, out of mind doesn’t help,” she said. “Expelling a child doesn’t de-escalate the situation or move them off the pathway of violence. A lot of times, it makes it worse.” 

John Van Dreal, a former school administrator who helped the Nashville School District set up its current threat assessment process, agreed. Choosing to skip directly to expulsion is “actually about the most dangerous thing you can do for the student,” Van Dreal said, “and honestly for the community.”

During an appeal hearing, James maintained that he was not the original author of the texts. When asked if he understood that the screenshot in question appeared to be a conversation he, himself, was having, he replied, “I just wanted to let people know, feel heroic. I didn’t want more people to get hurt.” 

When pressed during that same hearing on why the school chose to expel James without additional investigation, Assistant Principal Angela Post said that it was up to law enforcement, not the school, to investigate the threat. She also admitted that the assessment did not make a determination whether James was the original author of the text, and she couldn’t recall whether school staff investigated the origin of the original threat. By her logic, James’ arrest was evidence enough that the threat was valid, and therefore, expulsion was necessary. 

But since James’ arrest, law enforcement hasn’t treated him like a violent threat. After serving a night in a juvenile detention facility, James agreed to six months of pretrial diversion and court supervision. His supervision was lifted earlier than expected after he completed his pretrial diversion terms, and his case has been dismissed. 

However, following his appeal with the Nashville School District, officials found that the decision to immediately expel James “was not a due process violation.”

The post 12-Year-Old Tennessee Boy Arrested for Instagram Post Says He Was Trying To Warn Students of a School Shooting appeared first on Reason.com.

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Arkansas S. Ct. Vacates Gag Order on Man Accused of Murdering His Teenage Daughter’s Alleged Sex Abuser

From Thursday’s decision in Spencer v. State, written by Justice Courtney Hudson and joined by Justices Rhonda Wood, Shawn Womack, Cody Hiland, and Nicholas Bronni:

On November 27, 2024, Spencer was charged by felony information with second-degree murder … for the shooting death of sixty-seven-year-old Michael Fosler…. The circumstances of the shooting were as follows. In July 2024, Fosler had been charged with numerous sexual offenses against Spencer’s teenage daughter, and he was released on bond. On the night of the shooting, Spencer awoke to his dog barking and realized that his daughter was gone. Spencer found a “hoodie” on a stuffed animal placed in her bed. As a result, he left in his truck to search for her. Spencer located Fosler’s truck—with his daughter inside—and he forced Fosler’s truck off the highway. After an altercation, Spencer called 911 to report that he had shot Fosler. Fosler died at the scene.

On December 4, 2024, the State filed a motion for gag order alleging that Spencer’s arrest had garnered media coverage throughout the state and the nation. Attached to the motion was a press release from Spencer’s attorneys, Erin Cassinelli and Michael Kaiser, criticizing the decision to charge Spencer criminally as “targeting [a] heroic father.” The State also pointed to a television interview in which defense counsel allegedly stated that they felt confident that the community would side with Spencer “because every one of them would have done the same thing for their child or their neighbor’s child or member of their family.” The State argued that a gag order was necessary to preserve the integrity of the jury pool and to ensure the right of a fair trial for both the State and the defendant.

The trial court ordered:

It is the Order of this Court that no party to this action, nor any attorney or agency connected with this case, directly or indirectly, nor any judicial employee or officer of this Court, nor any public official now holding office, including but not limited to law enforcement officials, nor any agent, deputy or employee of any such persons, nor any person subpoenaed to testify at the trial of the case[,] [n]either shall the defendant nor his family shall do any of the following:

  1. [R]elease or authorize the release for public dissemination of any purported extrajudicial statement of the Defendant relating to this case;
  2. Release or authorize the release of any documents or exhibits or any evidence, the admissibility of which may have to be determined by the Court;
  3. Make any statement for public dissemination as to the existence or possible existence of any document, exhibit, or any other evidence;
  4. Express outside of the Court an opinion or make any comment for public dissemination as to the weight, value, or effect of any evidence as tending to establish the guilt or innocence of the Defendant;
  5. Make any statement outside of Court for public dissemination as to the weight, value, or effect of any testimony that has been given;
  6. Issue any statement for public dissemination as to the identity of any prospective witnesses, or their probable testimony or the effect thereof;
  7. Make any out of court statement for public dissemination as to the weight, value, source, or effect of purported evidence alleged to have been accumulated as a result of the investigation of this matter;
  8. Make any statement for public dissemination as to the content, nature, substance, or effect of any testimony which may be given at any proceeding related to this matter with any attorney of record or any agent thereof.

The order expressly excluded:

  1. Factual statements of the Defendant’s name, age, residence, occupation, or family status;
  2. The circumstances of the arrest, namely the time and place of arrest, the identity of the arresting and investigating officers and agencies, and length of the investigation;
  3. The nature, substance, and text of the charges, including a brief description of the offense(s) charged;
  4. Quotations from, or any reference without comment to, public records of the Court in this case, or to other public records or communications heretofore disseminated to the public;
  5. The scheduling and result of any stage of the judicial proceeding held in open court or in an open public session;
  6. Any request for assistance in obtaining evidence;
  7. Discussion by any witness or prospective witness of any matter in connection with the case with any of the attorneys representing the Defendant or the State.

The Arkansas Supreme Court unanimously vacated the order, reasoning:

Here, the circuit court’s order is extremely broad as to the persons restrained from speaking. It restrains the parties; their attorneys; “any public official now holding office,” along with their staff; witnesses; court staff; and the defendant’s family. The order is also extremely restrictive as to what information is being shielded from public view. It restricts filings and perhaps courtroom proceedings from public view. The order implicates Spencer’s right to a public trial as well as the public’s right to know how its officials are conducting these criminal proceedings. The State points out that Spencer raises arguments regarding the gag order’s application to public officials and to his family, the restriction on public and press access to the court file, and the due-process rights of nonparties as to entry of the order without notice. However, Spencer clearly has standing to bring this petition requesting that this court vacate the gag order in his criminal case, and we will address Spencer’s arguments to the extent necessary to resolve the issues raised in the petition….

Based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s limited precedents in the area, the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded:

In the absence of Supreme Court precedent, the federal circuits and the states have taken different approaches to gag orders. Some courts have adopted the “clear and present danger” or “serious and imminent threat” standard [citing the D.C., 6th, 7th, and 9th Circuits, as well as the Hawaii and Nevada Supreme Courts]. Other courts have adopted the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard [citing the 3d and 5th Circuits]. Still other courts have adopted a “reasonable likelihood” of prejudice standard [citing the 4th and 10th Circuits and the Kentucky Court of Appeals].

When determining which standard to apply, we must initially recognize whose speech is being restricted. We can identify three categories of persons potentially subject to gag orders: (1) attorneys of record; (2) non-attorney trial participants (such as criminal defendants, witnesses, and court staff); and (3) the public at large (i.e., those who are not participating in the trial).3 Because the gag order entered here included members of all three categories, we review each to establish the appropriate standards. {We do not address gag orders on the press in this opinion because the order before us does not impose restrictions on the press, nor does any member of the press challenge it.}

First, we address attorney speech. The Supreme Court has recognized that speech by an attorney is subject to greater regulation than speech by others. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada (1991). The Court recognized that states have historically regulated admission to the bar and exercised authority to discipline attorneys; attorneys have access to non-public information and are viewed as authoritative, both of which pose a greater potential risk to the fairness of a trial; and attorneys are officers of the court. Id. at 1066. For these same reasons, we find it appropriate to allow greater regulation of attorney speech in the context of a criminal trial than would be permissible for the speech of non-attorney trial participants or members of the public. Thus, we hold that attorneys in Arkansas may be restrained from extrajudicial speech that poses a substantial likelihood of material prejudice to an ongoing criminal proceeding. This is consistent with attorneys’ existing obligation under Rule 3.6 of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct regarding trial publicity.

Next, we consider the free-speech rights of non-attorney trial participants. These persons are not subject to the same rules and restrictions as attorneys. But, as participants in the trial, their speech has the potential to have a greater impact than the speech of non-trial participants. See Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966) (“Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function.”) Thus, we conclude that free-speech protections for non-attorney trial participants are greater than those of attorneys of record but less than those of the public at large. Therefore, we hold that the speech of non-attorney trial participants may be restrained only to the extent that it poses a serious and imminent threat of material prejudice to an ongoing criminal proceeding.

Finally, we address prior restraints on the public, whose speech is afforded the most protection in the context of gag orders. Restraining the speech of the public raises obvious issues regarding lack of due process. We cannot fathom why the circuit court believed it could prohibit the speech of “any public official now holding office.” In fact, it is difficult to foresee any circumstance in which a prior restraint on the speech of a member of the public, which would include a public official, could be constitutional.

Having established the legal standards to be applied, we turn to the additional findings a circuit court must make in every case to justify the entry of a gag order restricting the speech of any individual. First, the circuit court must determine whether alternative measures would protect the parties’ right to a fair trial. See Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart (1976). Here, Spencer suggests that extensive voir dire of prospective jurors, using an expanded jury pool, giving cautionary instructions, changing venue, or postponing the trial are alternatives that should be considered before restraining speech, but the circuit court heard no evidence and made no findings in this regard. In addition, the circuit court must find that a gag order would be likely to accomplish the goal of preventing prejudice to the proceedings. Again, there was no such finding in this case. Finally, a gag order must be narrowly tailored to prohibit only what is necessary to protect the integrity of the ongoing judicial proceedings. In other words, the restrictions imposed must not be overly broad. Here, many of the prohibitions on speech listed in the gag order were overly broad. For example, prohibiting the public expression of an opinion as to “the weight, value, or effect of any evidence as tending to establish the guilt or innocence of the [d]efendant” by any public official is clearly overbroad.

In sum, before entering a gag order, a circuit court must specifically find, based on evidence in the record, that (1) the prospectively limited speech would pose a sufficient threat of material prejudice to an ongoing criminal proceeding, depending on whether the limitation applies to attorneys of record, non-attorney trial participants, or members of the public; (2) after consideration of alternative less restrictive measures, none would sufficiently protect the parties’ right to a fair trial; (3) the prohibitions would be likely to prevent material prejudice to the proceedings; and (4) the prohibitions are narrowly tailored to prohibit only what is necessary to prevent material prejudice to the ongoing proceedings.

The court concluded that the gag order was “far too broad and too restrictive of speech protected by the First Amendment,” and was also unconstitutionally vague (e.g., in failing to define “family”). It therefore vacated the order; and though it did “not foreclose the possibility that, after an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court may issue a subsequent gag order narrowly tailored to specific factual findings supported by the record,” it “emphasize[d] that a gag order ‘should be a last resort, not a first impulse.'”

The court also faulted the trial court for sealing the case:

Here, after the court’s order was entered, the case filings were removed from public view. The inherent authority to seal parts of court files is tempered by the requirements that a request to seal part of a file must be particularized, that there must be some good cause for sealing part of a file, such as a trade secret, and that it should be in effect for only so long as is necessary to protect the specified interest.

Not only are the written records inaccessible to the public, but also, the briefs and statements from counsel at oral argument indicate that the Lonoke County Circuit Court’s courtroom was at least partially closed to the public during Spencer’s arraignment. Although it appears the circuit court intends to close further proceedings to the public, we caution the court from doing so without an evidentiary basis and adherence to the required constitutional analysis set out in Waller v. Georgia (1984)…. “[T]he right to a public trial is one of the most important safeguards in the prosecution of persons accused of crime.”

Justice Rhonda Wood also wrote a separate opinion, arguing that the court should have focused instead on the Arkansas Constitution (but reached the same result under the same test as it adopted with regard to the First Amendment).

Justice Bronni also added, joined by Shawn Womack, Cody Hiland:

Public officials aren’t immune from public criticism—judges and prosecutors included. Because the circuit court’s gag order violates that principle, I join the majority’s opinion granting the writ and vacating that order. But that sweeping order is only one part of a troubling pattern of attempts to shield this case from public view—beginning with a nonpublic arraignment and ending with a handwritten note sealing “[t]he entire case” from public view. We cannot allow that pattern to continue unchecked.

So I’d invoke this court’s superintending authority and reassign this matter to a new circuit court judge. Anything less suggests that what’s happened so far is within the acceptable range of disagreement or administration—and it isn’t.

Begin with the gag order itself. On its face, that order targets a broad swath of people, barring them from “[e]xpress[ing] … an opinion, or mak[ing] any comment” about whether the evidence “tend[s] to establish the guilt or innocence of the Defendant.” Worse, the order itself was sealed, raising serious concerns about selective enforcement. And it doesn’t explain why such an extreme remedy was warranted, instead just declaring it would “help ensure all parties get a fair trial.”

Nor did the circuit court explain why it extended the gag order beyond what even the State thought was appropriate, broadening it to cover the defendant’s family and, even more significantly, sealing “[t]he entire case.” On the contrary, the circuit court entered that order just six minutes after the clerk docketed the defendant’s 19-page opposition to the State’s motion—or barely enough time to make a pot of coffee. That approach cannot be squared with the First Amendment, and it underscores that the gag order wasn’t a last resort but an unconstitutional impulse.

Context suggests why. The same circuit court that issued the gag order here also granted Michael Fosler’s release on bail. It’s that decision—which the defendant’s lawyers called a decision to release “a predator” who “repeatedly violated [the defendant’s] child … on a low bond”—that set off a chain of events that led to the fatal confrontation that’s the subject of this case. And it’s that criticism that the State claimed, and the circuit court effectively concluded, justified gagging the defendant, his lawyers, and others. This sequence raises serious concerns. Indeed, if openness “enhances … the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system,” then secrecy has the opposite effect—it erodes trust.

The effort to shield these proceedings from public view also didn’t begin with the gag order; it started with the circuit court’s decision to arraign the defendant away from public view. And even setting aside the potential constitutional concerns raised by a nonpublic arraignment, that decision highlights the order on review here isn’t an isolated problem. Rather, it suggests a Star Chamber-like atmosphere. We cannot allow that to continue.

Ultimately, judges and prosecutors enjoy “no greater immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions.” Nor should they. “Public vigilance serves us well, for ‘the knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.'” Instead, “justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”

So I join the majority’s decision granting the writ and vacating the gag order, but I would go a step further. The repeated attempts to veil these proceedings in “[s]ecrecy … can only breed ignorance and distrust of the courts and suspicion concerning the competence and impartiality … of the entire criminal justice system.” …

Chief Justice Karen Baker and Justice Barbara Webb didn’t participate. Erin Cassinelli and Michael Kiel Kaiser (Lassiter & Cassinelli) represent Spencer.

The post Arkansas S. Ct. Vacates Gag Order on Man Accused of Murdering His Teenage Daughter's Alleged Sex Abuser appeared first on Reason.com.

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Do Lower Court Judges Time Their Decisions to Take Senior Status (or Retire) Based on Who May Replace Them?

Do lower court judges time their decisions to take senior status or retire, and thus create a vacancy for a President to fill, based upon who they think might replace them? It is an interesting (and timely) question–and one that can be informed by more than anecdote and intuition.

Back in 1995, James F. Spriggs, II and Paul J. Wahlbeck published a paper looking at lower court retirement decisions between 1893 and 1991, “Calling It Quits: Strategic Retirement on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893-1991.” Perhaps unsurprisingly, they found that retirement rates increased significantly among judges appointed by a President of the same party as the current occupant of the White House. Other studies, including “Judges as Party Animals: Retirement Timing by Federal Judges and Party Control of Judicial Appointments” by Ross M. Stolzenberg and James Lindgren have reached similar conclusions.

More recently, John Deschler and Maya Sen looked at whether ideology, distinct from partisan affiliation, influences judges’ decisions to leave active status. Their paper, “The Role of Judge Ideology in Strategic Retirements in U.S. Federal Courts,” published last year, suggests it does. Here’s the abstract:

The widely recognized phenomenon of federal judges retiring strategically has key implications for the composition of the judiciary, particularly given polarization between the two U.S. political parties. Using fine-grained measures of judicial ideology, we examine how ideology shapes such strategic retirements. First, we show that since Reagan’s election, Democratic appointees to lower federal courts have been more likely to retire strategically than Republican ones. Second, we find that more ideologically conservative Republican appointees are more likely to strategically retire than are moderate Republican appointees but only suggestive evidence of a similar pattern among more liberal Democratic appointees. Third, as explanation, we find that moderate Republican appointees appear to “wait out” retiring strategically under more conservative recent presidents, such as Donald Trump, opting instead to retire under Democrats such as Joe Biden. Taken together, our results offer a key insight: ideology, and not just party, can be an important factor in driving strategic retirement.

Setting aside whether Trump should be characterized as more “conservative” than other Republican presidents, and whether the Trump effect found here is properly characterized as a function of “ideology,” the study does seem to find a Trump effect on judges’ decisions to create vacancies.

Why might this matter? One reason it might matter is that judges who are wavering may be more likely to retire if they fell more confident in the sort of nominee who would replace them. At this moment there are 22 circuit court judges who were appointed by Republican Presidents who are eligible for senior status but have not yet announced any intention to step down, as well as 42 district court judges.

This suggests that if the White House wants to maximize the administration’s influence on the judiciary, it should seek to appoint the sort of judges that are likely to instill confidence in judges who are eligible to take senior status, particularly in the beginning. (In other words, it should seek to nominate judges of the caliber that it nominated during the first term.) And if it fails to do so, it may discover that it ends up with fewer vacancies to fill.

Trump’s first judicial appointment of the second term would seem to fit the bill here. The second appellate nomination, Emil Bove, has been more polarizing. So the jury is out on whether Trump’s judicial nominations will, on the margin, encourage more sitting judges to create vacancies for President Trump to fill.

The post Do Lower Court Judges Time Their Decisions to Take Senior Status (or Retire) Based on Who May Replace Them? appeared first on Reason.com.

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Farewell, Fugazy!

Farewell, Fugazy!

Authored by James Howard Kunstler,

“Ah, the delicious smell of peak fear on Sunday/Monday…and max NOISE on X.”

– Raoul Pal

That ruckus you hear in the capital markets is the sickening howl of the Fugazy Economy meeting its extinction. Fugazy means fake, unreal, dishonest, misaligned to what societies need to thrive. Fugazy means mis-using the time-value of things that purport to be wealth to multiply fake wealth in the hands of a few at the expense of the many. The pernicious effects of that system are visible all across the ruined landscape of our country, a nation of broken cities, failed towns, and a demoralized populace.

Mr. Trump apparently aims to convert the expiring Fugazy economy into a production economy — yikes! — based on making things of value, and perhaps more importantly, of people at all social levels having meaningful roles in the making and moving of things. The Trump tariffs are the first big step in a process that is already generating a whole lot of friction, heat, and ferment. The aim of the tariffs is straightforward: the end of a trade regime that punishes and cripples American production.

The response so far is heartening. Many other countries suddenly seek new trade arrangements with the USA, correctly sensing that Mr. Trump means bidness. (This ain’t no Mud Club. . . this ain’t no foolin’ around. . . .) It’s even possible that these readjustments will happen so swiftly that the tariff differentials will be a wash before summer, and everybody will be, at least, on a firm footing, knowing what the clear new rules say. This new disposition of things required forceful incentives to change entrenched, harmful practices.

Another angle on this process is the dynamic known as import-replacement. It means exactly what it sounds like: where you used to get stuff from other lands, you now make it here. It should be obvious that this can’t be accomplished overnight. But the question is: okay, when are you going to start? Part of the answer is: we can’t afford to put it off any longer. There’s an awful lot of stuff, from machine tools to pharmaceuticals to military equipment that we had better start making again — or else slide into collapse, perhaps even slavery to other powers.

That process starts with deploying real capital — as opposed to Fugazy capital — to re-start businesses and industries. That will take money away from hedge funds and other rackets that exist to play games with evermore abstract layers of things that only pretend to represent money. As that occurs, a lot of pretend money will vanish. Don’t be too shocked by this. That’s what happens when a society bends back toward reality: you start sorting out the real money from the fake money. That’s why the price of gold keeps marching up.

I sense that Mr. Trump and his colleagues knew full-well that the tariff play would rattle the markets badly, that these “corrections” are an unavoidable consequence, and are better gotten-over as quickly as possible. What else would you expect in a system that has dedicated itself for decades to mis-pricing the value of just about everything? The snap-back is sure to be harsh.

The psychopathocracy that drives the Global Left lost more traction last week in its quest to keep all of its old rackets running. Their foot-soldiers in the USA have been defunded effectively by Mr. Musk’s DOGE, starting with the immense network of rackets that were run around the USAID program. The Woke NGOs are no more and the fat paychecks are no longer going out to the nose-ring-for-lunch-bunch who came to infest the DC Beltway — and their satellite offices in Democratic Party controlled cities. Hence, the feeble turn-outs in last weekend’s street actions.

The Baby Boomers have gone especially psychotic. That’s why there are so many old folks waving those Soros-made placards in the astroturfed crowds of the “Hands-off” protests. After an eighty-year run of the most mind-blowing comfort and convenience enjoyed by any generation in world history, America’s Boomers stare into the abyss of their fading Fugazy fortunes as their stock portfolios tank. Kind of too bad. Maybe you shouldn’t have gone along for the ride. Maybe you should have cared for your country a bit more.

Here’s your poster-boy for that: the retarded slob rock-and-roller Neil Young, performing in support of the US Intel blob, the Covid-19 vaccine campaign, the degenerate Democratic party, Senator Adam Schiff, and BlackRock. Neil Young’s estimated net worth is about $200-million.

He could lose ninety percent of that and still live a life of luxury. In 2022, he inveighed against Covid vaccine “misinformation” and promoted the shots. Guess, what? You were dead wrong about that, Neil, and now a lot of people are dead and dying because of those vaccines. He has many compadres in showbiz who took the same position against reality.

The time is not far-off when they will be revealed as disgraceful tools — Public vaxx champions such as Stephen Colbert, Jimmy Kimmel, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Oprah Winfrey, Howard Stern, Ryan Reynolds, Lady Gaga. . . the list is long and discouraging. Meanwhile, they’re all out there rallying the Woke troops against the Golden Golem of Greatness as the Left’s leaky lifeboat goes down, gurgle, gurgle. In the process, they’ve destroyed Hollywood, rock and roll, and comedy. The country will recover from that, too. You’ll have plenty of opportunity to laugh at them in the years to come as the obituaries roll in.

Meanwhile, brace and rejoice! Great changes are set in motion. Roll with the turbulence. You’ll come out the other end, stronger, wiser, steadier, perhaps even happier. And, mark ye, the silence emanating from the DOJ and the FBI these budding spring days. 

The New York Times is nervous as all git-out.

 

Tyler Durden
Fri, 05/30/2025 – 16:20

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Nvidia CEO To Sell $800 Million In Stock

Nvidia CEO To Sell $800 Million In Stock

Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang has adopted a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan—disclosed in the chipmaker’s 10-Q filing—to sell up to 6 million shares by year-end. The move comes as Nvidia shares trade near record highs, following a solid first-quarter earnings beat and an upbeat outlook. 

CEO Jensen Huang established his trading plan in March, outlining the sale of up to 6 million shares by December 31, 2025. The same filing also revealed that Director Brooke Seawell intends to sell 1.53 million shares under the trading plan expiring July 31, 2025, while CFO Colette Kress plans to sell 500,000 shares by March 24, 2026.

The trading plan was announced with Nvidia’s stock trading near all-time highs, following a strong Q1 2025 earnings beat and an optimistic outlook. Rule 10b5-1 plans are designed to allow insiders to sell shares on a predetermined schedule, thereby helping to alleviate concerns over trading on material non-public information. 

Bloomberg data shows Huang’s insider activity over the last 5.5 years…

The data also shows that Huang is Nvidia’s fifth-largest shareholder, holding about 3.52% of the company’s outstanding shares—equivalent to around 859.6 million shares as of mid-March.

Nvidia’s solid first-quarter earnings underscore the sustained strength of AI demand, with one U.S. data center financier characterizing the current environment as a “sprint” expected to continue through President Trump’s second term.

Tyler Durden
Fri, 05/30/2025 – 15:25

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Police Arrest Suspects In Murder Of Infowars Journalist

Police Arrest Suspects In Murder Of Infowars Journalist

Authored by Luis Cornelio via HeadlineUSA,

Law enforcement officials have arrested two suspects in connection with the murder of Infowars reporter Jamie White.

The Infowars set. (ThreeSixty Asset Advisors via AP)

The Austin Police Department announced that 17-year-old Rodney Charles Hill, Eloy Adrian Camarillo, and two unidentified 15-year-olds face murder charges after allegedly killing White outside his Austin, Texas, home. Police arrested Camarillo last month.

According to court documents, the suspects were attempting to break into White’s Kia on March 9 when he confronted them and was fatally shot. White was rushed to a nearby hospital but was pronounced dead the following morning.

Detectives said White’s vehicle had a broken window and blood inside, presumably from a cut. Austin police said Kia cars have become frequent targets in Austin due to a flawed security system that makes them easier to steal.

Austin Police Detective Jason Jones said the suspects were tracked through a stolen vehicle they drove to White’s residence. Investigators relied on the car’s data, cellphone signal records and license plate reader scans to locate the suspects, according to KVUE.

“We believe this is a very unfortunate and tragic series of senseless events leading to [White’s death], involving the four individuals who obviously have no value for human life,” Jones said, as quoted by the news outlet.

He added that all individuals believed to be involved are in custody, though the investigation remains ongoing.

White was a rising journalist and well-regarded writer for Infowars. His killing stunned conservative circles, particularly Infowars founder Alex Jones, who shared several social media posts honoring White’s legacy.

“Jamie White, such a good friend of mine,” Jones said in a video, while filming White’s desk. “This makes me sick.”

White had previously celebrated his time with Infowars by posting a photo with Jones in 2023, writing, “Nobody is more committed to defeating the New World Order than him.”

Tyler Durden
Fri, 05/30/2025 – 15:05

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Judge Kim R. Gibson (1948-2025)

Judge Kim R. Gibson (1948-2025)

I had the honor of clerking for Judge Kim R. Gibson in the Western District of Pennsylvania from 2009-2011. This was the most formative experience of my career. In that brief tie, I learned so much about the law, being a lawyer, and life. Judge Gibson passed away today at the age of 77. My co-clerk Adele and I were fortunate enough to visit the Judge a few weeks ago, and it was a moment I will always treasure.

The Western District of Pennsylvania shared this obituary of Judge Gibson, which I am happy to pass on:

Judge Kim Gibson has passed away in Somerset, PA. Kim had turned 77 yesterday.

Kim devoted his entire adult life to serving his country and his neighbors. Born in Trenton, NJ, Kim entered the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1966, graduating with his Bachelor of Science degree in 1970. Upon being commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the United States Army, Kim took one of the hardest paths possible, completing both Airborne and Ranger training before serving as an Armor Officer, on active duty in that assignment until 1975. Kim’s service in the Army on active and Reserve duty extended for 26 years, and he retired as a Colonel in the Judge Advocate General Corps in 1996.

Kim attended the Dickinson School of Law, graduating magna cum laude in 1975, where he served as an editor of the Dickinson Law Review. He was a graduate of the Judge Advocate General School at the University of Virginia, and remained on active duty in the Army JAG Corps until 1978. He was recalled to active duty during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

While Kim was in solo practice in Somerset PA, he served as the Public Defender, as the Solicitor for the Somerset School District, as counsel to the Office of Children and Youth Services and as the Solicitor for Somerset County. In 1997, he was elected by the voters of Somerset County to the Court of Common Pleas, serving in that role until joining the federal bench in September, 2003. While a state court judge, Kim established a Juvenile Drug Court, one of the first in the Commonwealth. Kim came to our Court upon his nomination by President George W. Bush, and served as a District Judge beginning in 2003. He moved to senior status in 2016, but that shift was more theoretical than actual, as he continued to handle a full and active case load until his final illness. While a Judge of our Court, Kim was called upon by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. to serve as a member of the Judicial Conference’s Court Administration and Case Management Committee, the committee that sits at the crossroads of all of the work of the federal courts. Kim was an Adjunct Professor of Law at the Penn State Dickinson School of Law, and a member of its Board of Counselors. As a leader of the bench and Bar, Kim was a valued mentor to many, especially to our own Judges Stephanie Haines and Chris Brown, and to the scores of young people he coached in Little Leagues Baseball.

Kim’s service to the Nation extended even beyond his first career in the Armed Forces and then his second as a practicing lawyer representing the public’s interests, and then his third career on the bench. Kim was called to serve as the co-chair of the Flight 93 Memorial Task Force, a commission established by an Act of Congress, on which he was responsible for leading a diverse group of family members, public officials, community leaders and others in developing and the constructing the Memorial and national park site that commemorate the bravery and patriotism of the passengers and crew of United Flight 93 on September 11, 2001 as they brought down that airliner near Shanksville, PA before its hijackers could reach their intended target in the Nation’s Capital, thereby saving innumerable lives. The Flight 93 Memorial will be yet another perpetual testament to Kim’s life of service to all of the rest of us.

Each of us will have our own favorite and most cherished memory of Kim. His life and career were marked with service and thoughtfulness, always. His mentorship extended to his dozens of law clerks, almost all having the opportunity to work with Kim for a single year, right from law school, as he felt so strongly about providing those opportunities to as many law students as he could. His courtesy to lawyers and especially litigants and the public set the standard for any judge, and his gentle chuckle and good cheer, coupled with his constant courtesy and consideration for others were his hallmarks. We in the Court, his neighbors in Somerset County, his friends and colleagues across the country, and the public that he served with unwavering dedication, will miss him dearly.

On May 30, 2017, exactly eight years ago today, Judge Gibson held a ceremony when he took senior status. This was a special day for the judge, as many of his former law clerks attended. I recorded his remarks, and took some photos.

 

 

Here is a photo of Judge Gibson from 2011. His daughter Erin painted his portrait, which was displayed at the Somerset County Courthouse.

 

And here is a photo of my co-clerk and I back in February 2010.

 

One of Judge’s favorite parts of the job was presiding over naturalization ceremonies. He always gave every new citizen an American flag. I asked if I could give them Constitutions. As usual, he humored me.

I will always thank Judge Gibson for giving me my introduction to academia. (I wrote about my experience here.) Judge knew I had some interest in teaching. For some time, the Dean of the Penn State Law School had been asking him to teach a class. He never quite got around to it. Early on in the clerkship, he asked me if I was interested in teaching the class with him. I jumped on it. We put together a syllabus for a federal courts class and started in January 2010. Every week, we traveled to State College. I would do my best to teach the theory, Judge Gibson would then explain how things really worked. We had a very good schtick.  Here is one of the videos I uploaded to YouTube back in the day. If you watch, you’ll see it was an early version of the 100 Cases book I published years later with Randy Barnett.

We will miss Judge Gibson dearly.

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Texas Ten Commandments Bill Is the Latest Example of Forcing Religious Texts in Public Schools

Texas has become the latest state to pass a law requiring the Ten Commandments to be displayed in public school classrooms. The bill, which is already being legally challenged and is unlikely to pass constitutional muster, is part of a recent trend of red states attempting to inject religious texts into the classroom.

Senate Bill 10 requires public schools to “display in a conspicuous place in each classroom of the school a durable poster or framed copy of the Ten Commandments.” The poster is required to only contain the text of the Ten Commandments and must be at least 16 inches wide and 20 inches tall. Further, if a school doesn’t have an acceptable poster in each classroom, the bill requires them to accept any privately donated poster. 

The bill was passed by the Texas state House on Saturday and overwhelmingly approved in the state Senate with a 28–3 vote on Wednesday. While S.B. 10 has not yet been enacted, Texas’ Republican Gov. Greg Abbot said in a social media post earlier this month that he would sign the bill if it passed the Legislature.

Similar bills have been recently signed into law in Louisiana and Arkansas. While Louisiana’s Ten Commandments bill tried to avoid legal scrutiny by directing schools to only use private donations, not public funds, Texas’ bill makes no such distinctions. The bill states that a school “may, but is not required to, purchase posters . . . using district funds.” Louisiana’s bill was halted in federal court last November, shedding doubt on the Texas bill’s ability to survive a First Amendment challenge.

The day after the bill was passed, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and several other groups announced that they were suing to stop the bill from becoming law.

“We all have the right to decide what religious beliefs, if any, to hold and practice. Government officials have no business intruding on these deeply personal religious matters,” reads a Thursday statement from the ACLU. “S.B. 10 will subject students to state-sponsored displays of the Ten Commandments for nearly every hour of their public education. It is religiously coercive and interferes with families’ right to direct children’s religious education.”

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DOGE’s Newly Listed ‘Regulatory Savings’ for Businesses Have Nothing to Do With Cutting Federal Spending

This month the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) published new estimates of “savings” from various regulatory changes, which it says total $29.4 billion so far. The New York Times suggests several reasons to question these numbers but overlooks the most fundamental problem: Although deregulation accounts for about 17 percent of the $175 billion in total “estimated savings” that DOGE claims, the numbers in this category generally have nothing to do with federal spending, the project’s ostensible target.

One possible exception: DOGE claims changes to the rules governing health insurance subsidies under the Patient Protection and Affordable Act will save $10 billion, and at least some of that may represent reduced federal spending. But according to an “unnamed senior administration official” quoted by the Times, DOGE’s estimates of the impact from regulatory changes “represent cost savings for regulated parties.”

DOGE plausibly claims deregulation will reduce costs for businesses, and it may also benefit consumers in various ways. But those benefits have no impact on the annual budget deficit or the accumulating national debt. It is therefore illogical to include such “regulatory savings” in a tally that is supposed to show how far DOGE has gone in tackling those problems.

Even if we ignore this conceptual confusion and accept DOGE’s numbers, its progress represents a drop in the bucket of the federal government’s fiscal incontinence, which is mainly due to spending over which DOGE has no control. DOGE’s avowed accomplishments also fall far short of the ambitious goals set by Elon Musk, the billionaire entrepreneur who unofficially ran the initiative until his recent pivot back to his businesses. Musk, who originally thought DOGE could reduce annual federal spending by “at least” $2 trillion, cut that target in half in February. But as recently as late March, he was still confident that DOGE could achieve $1 trillion in annual savings.

On its face, DOGE’s current estimate falls about 83 percent short of that goal. But because that estimate includes multi-year savings, such as projections of the total that would have been spent under canceled grants and contracts, it does not tell us how much DOGE claims to be saving in any given fiscal year.

In April, Musk projected that the savings in FY 2026, when DOGE is scheduled to sunset, would be about $150 billion. But that estimate, which refers to a specific year, should not be confused with DOGE’s periodically updated “estimated savings,” a number that includes spending reductions that span multiple years.

Keeping that distinction in mind, there are reasons to doubt whether even these modest savings will materialize. News organizations have identified many problems in DOGE’s “Wall of Receipts,” which lists canceled or modified contracts, grants, and leases. The errors include contracts that were not actually canceled, contracts that were terminated during the Biden administration, iffy estimates of savings on contracts that had not been awarded yet, contracts that were counted multiple times, conflation of contract caps with actual spending, the inclusion of past spending in estimates of future savings, and overvaluation of contracts and grants.

The Times, which publicized many of those mistakes, sees similar exaggeration in DOGE’s new list of “regulation repeals and modifications.” Reporters Coral Davenport and Stacy Cowley “examined 10 of the largest claims on the leaderboard” and concluded that “several did not show evidence of savings to households.”

Right away we see a problem. DOGE does not claim the “regulatory savings” accrue to “households,” although it does say its total “estimated savings,” which include the “regulatory savings,” amount to $1,086.96 “per taxpayer.” In any case, both ways of framing the numbers overlook the point that DOGE is supposed to be reducing federal spending. Its estimates of “regulatory savings” for businesses are irrelevant in that context.

Instead of delving into that puzzle, Davenport and Cowley question the wisdom of various regulatory changes. They note, for example, that DOGE “claims that the Energy Department’s proposals to reverse 16 efficiency standards on appliances like dishwashers and microwaves will save Americans a combined $4 billion.” Yet according to “government scientists’ own accounting,” they say, “appliance efficiency standards saved the average American household about $576 in 2024 on water and gas bills.”

That is not exactly an apples-to-apples comparison, and it takes for granted the paternalistic premise that consumers are not smart enough to assess their own interests. Left to their own devices, Davenport and Cowley assume, Americans would irrationally discount the long-term savings from reduced utility bills. They might prefer cheaper appliances that save them money up front or dishwashers that use more water per cycle but clean dishes better in less time. In any event, appliance manufacturers are free to tout the cost-cutting advantages of more “efficient” models, which may or may not persuade any particular consumer. As Davenport and Cowley see it, that would give Americans more freedom than the federal government should allow.

What does any of this have to do with the accuracy of DOGE’s numbers? According to “multiple experts in regulatory policy,” Davenport and Cowley say, “many of the numbers DOGE and the Trump administration cite show little to no evidence of the comprehensive cost-benefit analysis” that “has historically undergirded agency regulations,” which considers the impact on “individuals and households” as well as regulated businesses.

Davenport and Cowley see a similar problem with DOGE’s estimate that rescinding the Biden administration’s limits on credit card late fees “will save Americans $9.5 billion.” That can’t be right, they say, because “government analysts” in the prior administration “calculated that the rule would save millions of customers an average of $220 per year,” totaling “about $10 billion annually, mostly in avoided bank penalties.”

By ignoring those savings, Davenport and Cowley think, DOGE is presenting a misleading picture. Yet the estimate that they cite does not take into account the unintended results of capping late fees, which could hurt consumers.

“Individuals considered risky are still able to access credit because of contractual terms like late fees,” Reason Contributing Editor Veronique De Rugy noted in 2023. “Lighten the fees and delayed payments will increase, making lending money riskier for institutions. When that happens, the only tools left to manage risk will be higher interest rates—which means higher costs even for responsible borrowers—or outright denials of low-income credit card applicants.”

Whatever the merits of the policy that the Trump administration reversed, the savings DOGE is claiming based on that change do not imply any reduction in government spending. Nor do the savings it attributes to relaxed appliance efficiency standards, which may increase consumer freedom but have no impact on federal outlays.

“The cost savings from [those] unprecedented deregulatory actions represent projected savings to both consumers and manufacturers based on a variety of factors, including increased choice of lower cost appliances and lower compliance costs,” a Department of Energy spokeswoman told the Times. That is all well and good, but it does not explain why those savings should be counted in any calculation of the Trump administration’s success at curtailing runaway federal borrowing.

Given DOGE’s track record, there is ample reason to be wary of the dollar figures it attaches to particular regulatory changes. To begin with, DOGE does not specify what period of time is covered by each item. Are these total savings or annual savings?

Davenport and Cowley offer more grounds for skepticism. They note, for example, that DOGE says rolling back water efficiency standards for commercial washers “would save Americans $1.9 billion.” That seems implausible, they say, since “the entire market for commercial washers is about $6.5 billion.” They quote Steve Cicala, co-director of the National Bureau of Economic Research’s Project on the Economic Analysis of Regulation, who says “there’s just no way that number makes any sense.”

Susan Dudley, “an expert in regulatory policy at George Washington University” who “served as the senior regulatory official in the George W. Bush administration,” concurs. “I don’t understand how anyone thinking this through could account for that claim of savings,” she told the Times. “This was one of my concerns with DOGE from the beginning. They’re not doing their homework, and they’re not showing their work.”

That take jibes with the impressions of budget experts such as the Manhattan Institute’s Jessica Riedl, the American Enterprise Institute’s Nat Malkus, and the Cato Institute’s Romina Boccia. But in this case, the problem is not just that DOGE’s numbers are unreliable or that its results are unimpressive even when taken at face value. The problem is that DOGE implicitly portrays “regulatory savings” for businesses as a step, however tiny, toward federal fiscal sanity.

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Short Circuit: An inexhaustive weekly compendium of rulings from the federal courts of appeal

Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

Call for papers: Scholars, next year IJ’s Center for Judicial Engagement is going to celebrate and confer upon “The Other Declarations of 1776.” Accordingly, we invite papers on the history, meaning, and impact of state declarations of rights from 1776. It’s going to be a blast. Please send us proposals. Click here for more.

Recently, Prof. Samuel Bray opined that it would be “folly” to incorporate the Seventh Amendment’s civil-jury right against the states—an argument occasioned by IJ’s latest cert petition. As you might expect, we politely disagree. IJ’s own Jared McClain, one of the petition’s authors, has therefore penned a neutron bomb of a response.

Check out the latest episode of Unpublished Opinions, IJ’s roundtable podcast. Wherein Patrick Jaicomo reflects on his recent SCOTUS argument and Anya Bidwell can’t get enough of Fanny Burney.

  1. Four days after Media Matters published an article reporting that Elon Musk endorsed an antisemitic conspiracy theory while Twitter was placing corporate ads next to pro-Nazi content, the Texas AG launched an investigation into Media Matters for potential deceptive trade practices and issued a sweeping demand requiring the group to produce a slew of records. MM sues in DC, alleging 1A retaliation. AG: You can’t sue me there, or for that, and even if you could, you lose. D.C. Circuit: Not only is the suit proper, but also the PI barring enforcement of document production is completely appropriate.
  2. Does the Controlled Substances Act violate the Commerce Clause as applied to purely intrastate cultivation, manufacture, possession, and distribution of marijuana pursuant to state law? First Circuit: The Supreme Court said “no” back in 2005, and “no” is still the answer. The fact that Congress has since made use of appropriations riders preventing the DOJ from using any funds to prosecute state-legal marijuana doesn’t change the analysis. And the law is fine under the Due Process Clause as well, despite the plaintiffs’ thorough canvassing of marijuana’s historical pedigree.
  3. For thirty years, the town of Nantucket, Mass. has required a rental car to hold one of a limited set of rental-car “medallions”—a practice which has (shockingly) resulted in a small cartel of local businesses (plus one national chain) holding all the medallions themselves. And that, says the First Circuit, is a-okay by us.
  4. Plainclothes Mt. Vernon, N.Y. officers grab sexagenarian pedestrian and, without identifying themselves, cuff him and hustle him into their unmarked car as he yells himself hoarse begging bystanders to call 911. Oops! He’s not their suspect (who’s wanted for misdemeanor groping). Second Circuit (unpublished): These things happen.
  5. Second Circuit: Even though the defendant failed to even respond to the complaint, the district court nonetheless dismissed this case because the alleged copyright infringement was fair use, which was error because this totally isn’t fair use! Concurrence: Guys, don’t freak out, but I think I’ve come up with an easier way to resolve this case.
  6. Plaintiff: New York City cancels tax-refund checks after only six months without notice. Now, I didn’t get one of those checks myself, but I sell things for a living, and so if somebody had been able to cash their refund check after seven months, that unidentified somebody might have bought some things from me. Second Circuit (unpublished): Let us just stop you right there.
  7. Allegation: On overnight flight, Penn State fencing coach gropes female fencing coach (who is unaffiliated with the school). He also repeatedly and unsuccessfully insists that they join the Mile High Club. Later, she is pressured to keep quiet. District court: She’s neither a PSU student nor employee; her Title IX claims are dismissed. Third Circuit: Actually, for some claims she is within Title IX’s “zone of interests.” And some of her state-law claims against the groper are undismissed as well.
  8. Does the First Amendment constrain the ability of government to remove books from public libraries? Fifth Circuit (en banc): Nope. Libraries’ curation decisions are gov’t speech, and not at all akin to the dissent’s over-caffeinated invocations of book burning.
  9. NLRB: So, 10 years ago, we found that this small business violated federal labor law, but then we just kind of . . . forgot about it for a while? Anyway, we just remembered, and so we think it’s time to punish them. Fifth Circuit: Ten years? Ten? Years? Ten years?
  10. Texas passes law to prevent vision plans from promoting vision-service providers they may be affiliated with. A First Amendment violation? Fifth Circuit: Indeed. We generally presume consumers don’t benefit from having information withheld from them.
  11. Allegation: Some Texas state employees sought to destroy pro-life organization that provides reproductive healthcare services across the state. This included feeding lies to the Texas Observer for a “hit piece,” while another encouraged a disgruntled former employee of the organization to swipe confidential documents from the organization’s Dropbox account that she still had access to. Fifth Circuit: The state employee who encouraged the Dropbox access used the disgruntled former employee as a state agent in a way that, if true, super violates the Fourth Amendment and leaves him without qualified immunity. Moreover, his argument that the organization lost its reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the documents by uploading them to Dropbox is bollocks.
  12. Houston motorist flees, crashes his vehicle, and does not follow orders to show his hands. Officers shoot him dead. Officers: And his widow does not have standing to sue us. Fifth Circuit: She most certainly does. But it doesn’t violate the Fourth Amendment to shoot if officers reasonably thought someone might have a gun, even if turns out there wasn’t one.
  13. Another week, another episode of the Seventh Circuit‘s brooking no sloppiness from hapless lawyers.
  14. Federal-jurisdiction mavens may be interested in footnote 6 of this Eighth Circuit opinion, which informs us that the parties have already settled this case but that settlement (for unexplained reasons) “does not render this appeal moot.”
  15. “The central question in this case is whether ‘Eleanor’ is a copyrightable character. Eleanor is a collection of Ford Mustangs featured across four films, most recently in Gone in 60 Seconds (2000).” Ninth Circuit: Sadly for Eleanor, this assortment of sports cars is not really a character. But don’t worry, the court reassures us that the Batmobile is.
  16. In 2008, applicant applies for permission to build a 500-mile transmission line to carry power from a wind farm in New Mexico to market in Arizona and beyond. Ninth Circuit (2025): Which the feds granted without sufficient consideration of whether historic properties are affected. Case undismissed!
  17. Washington State spa, where patrons are sometimes naked, only serves biological women, leading to state investigation after a trans woman with male genitalia is denied service. Ninth Circuit: The investigation didn’t violate various provisions of the First Amendment. Dissent: The state statute doesn’t actually bar the spa’s conduct.
  18. Allegation: Oakland, Calif. police officers engage in an unauthorized high-speed chase without turning on their lights or sirens, without informing dispatch, and with the intent to harm the suspect. The suspect loses control of his car, killing and severely injuring innocent bystanders. Whom police then ignore. Ninth Circuit: No qualified immunity. Dissent: Shocking, deeply disturbing, but QI.
  19. And in en banc news, the D.C. Circuit will not reconsider its decision that Steve Bannon is contemptible (as in subject to sanctions for contempt of Congress—we avoid politics here). Three judges think there are separation of powers problems.

New case: In 1960, in Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court gutted the Fourth Amendment’s oath-or-affirmation requirement, deep-sixing our noble history and tradition of issuing warrants based only on sworn, first-hand accounts from real accusers. Which was bad for all of us in general, and bad in particular for IJ client Michael Mendenhall, whose Denver townhome was searched based on third-hand hearsay from a patently unreliable source. Click here to learn more.

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